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Abstract 
My dissertation examines Muslim-Christian relations in Palestine during the British 
mandate period, specifically, around the question of what constituted Palestinian- 
Arab identity. More broadly speaking, the dissertation addresses the topic within the 
context of the larger debate concerning the role of material factors (those related to 
specific historical developments and circumstances) versus that of ideological ones. in 
determining national identities. At the beginning of the twentieth, century, two models 
of Arab nationalism were proposed-a more secular one emphasising a shared 
language and culture (and thus, relatively inclusive of non-Muslims) and one wherein 
Arab identity was seen as essentially an extension of the Islamic religious 
community, or umma. While many historians dealing with Arab nationalism have 
tended to focus on the role of language (likewise, the role of Christian Arab 
intellectuals), I would maintain that it is the latter model that proved determinative of 
how most Muslim Arabs came to conceive of their identity as `Arabs. ' Both models 
were essentially intellectual constructs; that the latter prevailed in the end reflects the 
predominance of material factors over ideological ones. Specifically, I consider the 
impact of social, political and economic changes related to the Tanzimat reforms and 
European economic penetration of the nineteenth century; the role of proto-nationalist 
models of communal identification-particularly those related to religion; and finally, 
the role played by political actors seeking to gain or consolidate authority through the 
manipulation of proto-nationalist symbols. 
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Introduction 
"The age of religion is over. Today comes the age of science, of steam and 
electricity. Take away from your eyes the blindfolds, and renounce this 
hatred. Fly to lofty heights that we might follow, and proclaim no religion 
save that of brotherhoodil 
George Suwaya, Christian Arab poet 
"In the face of Zionism, Husseinis might be said to represent Church and 
extreme Arab nationalism, Nashashibis, State and making the best of a bad 
job. "2 
Ronald Storrs, Governor of Jerusalem from 1917 until 1926. 
The aim of the thesis is to examine the relationship between Christian and Muslim Arabs 
in Palestine during the British mandate period. The relationship between the two was a 
complex one, turning largely around the question of what constituted Arab identity, and, 
perhaps more importantly, the relationship between Arab identity and Islam. Was Islam 
simply a part of the Arab legacy, albeit a highly significant one, or was it Islam that 
defined who the Arabs were? Certainly, it is fair to say that it was Islam that had shaped 
Arab high-civilisation. Moreover, the Qur'än, Islam's most sacred text, was written in 
Arabic, the language of the Arabs; it was thus the holy language of sacred writ. 3 Could 
one then speak of an Arab nation apart from Islam? There were those who maintained 
1 Appearing inAl-Karmi!, 5 December 1929. 
2 Ronald Storrs, Orientations, The Definitive Edition (London: Nicholson and Watson, 1943), p. 401. 
3 Sir Steven Runciman, The Historic Role of the Christian Arabs in Palestine, the second Carreras Arab 
Lecture of the University of Essex 26 November 1968, London: Longman for the University of Essex, 
1970, pp. 1-2. 
that the only true Arab was one "whose ancestors came out of Arabia to spread the word 
of Islam. 774 The question that might be asked then is whether such an identity was 
inclusive of Christians. One historian went so far as to suggest that for many, "the term 
`Christian Arab' is an unlawful contradiction. "5 In the aftermath of the First World War, 
in Palestine as in most parts of the Arab world, what exactly was the nature of Arab 
identity was still very much an open question. How this question came to be addressed 
would be of particular significance to Christian-Muslim relations in Palestine, and would 
determine, in no small measure, the extent to which Christians and Muslims were able to 
see themselves as sharing a common national identity. 
Most Christians had a fairly clear idea what they thought the relationship between the 
Arabs and Islam ought to be-the latter, while constituting a significant part of a shared 
culture and history, by no means defined who the Arabs were in any definitive sense. One 
was no less an Arab for being a non-Muslim. More important, however, was how 
Muslims-who made up the vast majority of Arabs in Palestine as elsewhere in the 
Middle East-felt. When considering Palestine during the mandate period, one must take 
into account what were the rather unique circumstances related to the Mandate itself. In 
many respects, nationalist sentiment was shaped first and foremost by a shared opposition 
to Zionism. In connection with this, it is perhaps worthwhile considering a statement 
made by Sir Herbert Samuel, the first High Commissioner of the Palestine Mandate, in 
his annual survey for 1922, when attempting to define the mind-set of the Muslim 
community: 
Three currents of thought combine to create and to maintain [their] 
opposition [to the British occupation]. First, there is the Arab national 
movement, which desires to see the establishment of a great Arab Empire, 
of which Palestine should form a part; a movement which was always 
4 Ibid, p. 1. 
5 Ibid. 
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hostile to Turkish rule, and which welcomed the British as the agents of 
liberation. Second, there is the anti-Zionist movement, which came into 
existence after the occupation, which is inspired by a dread of 
submergence under a flood of Jewish immigration and of political 
subordination, sooner or later, to a Jewish Government. Third, there is the 
Pan-Islamic movement, which commands the support of numbers of 
religious Moslems, which sympathises with Mahommedanism wherever it 
may be found, and feels it be its duty to adopt whatever course in Palestine 
may contribute to the advancement of the common cause, paying only 
secondary attention to the facts of the local situation. These three motives 
intermingle. The minds of some men may be more influenced by one, of 
some by another. The majority of the Moslems of Palestine are probably 
moved, in greater or lesser degree, by all three [emphasis mine]. 6 
Palestinian identity-defined first and foremost through its opposition to Zionism-was, 
for most Muslims, both `Arab' in the more secular nationalistic sense, and Islamic. The 
two, as already stated, were intrinsically linked. The question that interests us here is in 
what manner. Arguably, for most Muslims, the distinction was one of little 
consequence-for all practical purposes, being Arab and being Muslim were one and the 
same thing. For Christians, obviously, the distinction was of huge consequence, and had 
serious implications as far as what their status might be in any future independent 
Palestinian Arab state. As long as the much strived for state remained a political 
hypothetical as opposed to an actual impending reality-that is, as long as there was the 
immediate problem of Zionism to contend with-such differences of perspective might 
be considered as constituting minor details to be ironed out later. Better yet, they might 
be rationalised away altogether. As Khalidi discusses it, underlying the nationalist project 
6 From CO 733/41, the 1922 Palestine Annual Survey, `The Situation in Palestine, ' by Samuel, sent to the 
Duke of Devonshire, 30 December 1922, in the Political Diaries of the Arab World, Palestine and Jordan, 
Volume 1: 1920-1923, ed., Robert L. Jarman (London: Archive Editions Limited, 2001), page 349. 
was an attempt to "elide, ignore, or resolve religious differences, or to bury them in a 
shared vision of an other. "7 This tendency would constitute an underlying tension in 
Muslim-Christian relations in Palestine, a tension often exacerbated both by the fact of 
the Mandate itself-given that Britain was a'Christian' power and the significance of 
Jerusalem to the `Christian' West-as well as local political rivalries. 
It is the latter which constitutes a key focus of the thesis-local politics in Palestine were 
generally defined by the political rivalry between the two main factions for control of the 
leadership of the nationalist movement; the extremists, centred around Hajj Amin al- 
Husayni and often referred to as the Majlisin, and the moderates, centred around Räghib 
al-Nashäshibi and often referred to as the Mu äridin or `Opposition. '8 With regard to the 
former, Hajj Amin, as Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and President of the Supreme Muslim 
Council-religiously derived titles both tended to emphasise the Islamic character of 
Palestine and of its indigenous people. In addition to radicalising the Palestinian 
nationalist movement by appealing to religious sensibilities, it also served to enhance his 
own status, both in Palestine, and regionally, inasmuch as it redefined the Palestinian 
nationalist cause as an Islamic one regional in scope. 9 Through him, the Palestinian cause 
against Zionism was to a large degree defined as a matter of defending Palestine's 
Muslim holy sites, in particular, Jerusalem's Haram al-Shanf. 10 The moderate faction, in 
7 Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, The Construction ofModem National Consciousness (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 50. 
8 The termMajlisin was a reference to Hajj Amin al-Husayni's position as President of the Supreme 
Muslim Council, al-Majlis al-Islamryyah al- Aliyyah. This institution functioned in many respects as Hajj 
Amin's power base. The termMu'äridYn or `Opposition' referred to those who were `opposed' to Hajj 
Arvin al-Husayni, specifically, to what often appeared his absolute control of the Council. 
9 See, for instance, Nels Johnson, Islam and the Politics ofMeaning in Palestinian Nationalism (London, 
Boston and Melbourne: Kegan Paul International, 1982), p. 28. 
10 Literally the noble sanctuary, in the West, most closely associated with the monumental `Dome of the 
Rock. ' 
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addition to being politically more accommodating, both with respect to the British and 
Zionism, tended not to emphasise the Islamic character of Palestine. For one thing, doing 
so would only have served to strengthen the position of Hajj Amin al-Husayni and his 
supporters. It would also have had the effect of undermining popular support for the more 
moderate policies they favoured. Most Christians active in the nationalist movement 
tended to affiliate with the latter. 
The World Islamic Conference, held in Jerusalem in 1931, under the auspices of the 
Supreme Muslim Council, marked something of a turning point in the struggle between 
the two factions. It was through the Conference that Hajj'Amin was able to redefine the 
Palestinian nationalist cause as a pan-Islamic one. Interesting to consider here by way of 
contrast is the Second Arab Orthodox Congress, organised by the Christian Orthodox 
community in Palestine, and held concurrently with the World Islamic Conference. While 
ostensibly concerned with what was an internal church matter-the election of a new 
Patriarch-the Congress touched on the broader question of what constituted Arab 
identity. Specifically, the Congress demanded that the new Patriarch should be Arab 
rather than Greek. More generally, the Orthodox community sought the Arabisation of 
the Orthodox Church in Palestine-hence their self-designation as Arab Orthodox (as 
opposed to Greek Orthodox, as had been the case historically). Orthodox Arabs saw their 
conference and the World Islamic Conference as somehow analogous. Both, though 
focusing on religious issues specific to their respective communities, were representative 
of the larger Palestinian Arab nationalist cause. In truth, however, the two were not 
analogous. Whereas the Arab Orthodox Congress sought to redefine what was essentially 
a religious issue in nationalist terms, the World Islamic Conference did quite the 
reverse-it sought to take an issue arguably specific to Palestine and turn it into a pan- 
Islamic one. 
The first chapter of the thesis starts off by considering changes that took place during the 
late Ottoman period as would impact on Christian-Muslim relations during the British 
mandate period. Particularly relevant in this respect were the Tanzimat reforms, many of 
which dealt directly with the status of non-Muslims in the Empire. Also considered in 
this chapter are the different Christian communities in Palestine-most specifically, the 
Orthodox, Latin Catholic, Greek Catholic and Protestant communities. Of them all, the 
Orthodox community would, over the course of the Mandate, prove to be the most 
committed to the nationalist cause; Latin Catholics, arguably the least. The second 
chapter focuses on Christian involvement in the nationalist, movement. At the beginning 
of the Mandate, cooperation between the two communities was fairly strong, something 
exemplified by the Muslim-Christian Associations (MCAs), which early on were the 
front-line organisations of the nationalist movement. Muslim-Christian relations were 
severely strained with the convening of an international missionary conference in 
Jerusalem in the spring of 1928, the subject of the third chapter. By that time, the 
nationalist movement had begun undergoing a process of radicalisation and Islamisation, 
something immediately apparent with the Wailing Wall riots of August 1929. Hajj Amin 
al-Husayni, the leading figure within the extremist faction of the traditional leadership 
was quick to capitalise on the emotions aroused by the Wailing Wall riots, his efforts 
culminating in the World Islamic Conference of 1931, the subject of the fourth chapter. 
The final chapter focuses on the nationalist movement's radicalisation and Islamisation 
following the World Islamic Conference, and the impact this had on Muslim-Christian 
relations. The emphasis given Islam, particularly during'the Great Revolt, would put a 
great strain on inter-communal relations and would see Christian Arabs almost 
completely marginalized within the nationalist movement. 
Identity and Arab Nationalism 
Historians addressing the manner in which nationalist identities are formulated have 
tended to focus on one or another factor underlying their actual development. Some, such 
as Elie Kedourie, have stressed the role of intellectuals in the formulation of nationalist 
ideology, and have sought to explain nationalism's rise almost solely through a 
consideration of ideological factors. " Thus, Kedourie characterises modem nationalism 
11 Thus, for example, Gellner, who rejects Kedourie's view of nationalism as being `anti-historical, ' 
characterises him as believing that nationalism was an "avoidable aberration, accidentally spawned by 
European thinkers. " Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1983), p. 125. 
6 
as largely a `German intellectual invention, ' the most important contribution perhaps 
being that of Johann Gottfried Herder, who stressed the relationship between language 
and ethnicity. 12 Other historians have tended to stress more material factors, factors 
related either to broader historical developments, for instance, or the behaviour of 
political actors seeking to gain or consolidate power. An example Of the former might be 
Breuilly, who, while not denying the doctrinal dimension of nationalism, sees its rise (in 
Europe at least) as being due to a crisis of the modem bureaucratic state. Thus, while its 
genuineness may indeed derive from the fact that it was an intellectual response, one 
cannot overlook the fact that it addressed a very concrete problem-namely, that of the 
relationship between the state and civil society in the modem period. 13 It was because of 
the need to bridge the widening gulf between the two that intellectuals became 
preoccupied with the question of the nature of society and the relationship between the 
individual and the whole. 14 In a similar manner, Benedict Anderson, in his work, 
Imagined Communities, contends that, in Europe at least, people found it necessary to 
construct `imagined communities' as a response to the crisis of meaning and orientation 
that resulted from the destruction wrought on religious and dynastic authority by the 
Enlightenment and the French Revolution. 15 An example of the latter might be Eric 
12 Specifically, Kedourie focuses on three German philosophers as having provided the ideological 
underpinnings of modem nationalist thought These are Immanuel Kant and his idea of individual self- 
determination; Johann Gottlieb Fichte and his belief that the social whole is more important than the 
individual parts; and Johann Gottfried Herder, who emphasised ethno-linguistic diversity. Elie Kedourie, 
Nationalism, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, Ltd, 1960 [fourth edition]), especially pp. 12-64. 
13 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993 [second 
edition]), p. 69. 
Oliver Zimmer, Nationalism in Europe, 1890-1940 (Studies in European History) (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2003), p. 10, discussing Breuilly. 
is Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
Revised Edition (London: Verso, 1991), p. 7. See also Zimmer, Nationalism in Europe, p. 14. 
7 
Hobsbawm, concerning the role of political actors. Thus, he asserts that nationalism 
functioned as a means of political legitimisation in connection with developments in 
Europe during the latter half of the nineteenth century. 16 A final consideration, which 
might be seen as constituting both an ideological and material factor, concerns the 
relationship between modem national and proto-nationalist identities-the latter referring 
to communal identities pre-dating the modem period, and often expressed in religious 
and ethnic terms. '7 
In emphasising either ideological or material factors on the question of nationalism- 
whether as a general phenomenon or with respect to the formulation of specific national 
identities-it is not necessarily the case that historians wish to absolutely assert the one 
against the other. Nonetheless, such emphases have implications as far as understanding 
why any particular national identity took the shape it did. The thesis addresses the role 
played by factors of the types noted above in the formulation of Arab national identity. 
More to the point, it is argued that one is only able to understand the nature of Arab 
national identity and how it came to be formulated if one properly accounts for material 
factors. These might be categorised as follows-those related to proto-nationalist modes 
of communal identity (particularly as related to Islam); those related to social changes 
that took place during the late nineteenth century in connection with the Tanzimat 
reforms and European economic penetration; and those related to the aforementioned 
rivalry between the Majlisin and Mu äridTn (thus addressing the behaviour of political 
actors). Such material factors determined in large part the way in which Arab national 
16 As put by Hobsbawm, the advent of the state "raised unprecedented problems of how to maintain or even 
establishthe obedience, loyalty, and cooperation of its subjects or members, or its own legitimacy in their 
eyes. " Eric Hobsbawm, "Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914, " The Invention of Tradition, 
eds., Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 265. 
17 Concerning the relationship between the two, see, for instance, Hastings (The Construction of 
Nationhood, 1997), Breuilly (Nationalism and the State, 1993), Hobsbawm (Nations and Nationalism since 
1780) and Smith (The Ethnic Origins of Nations, 1986). 
identity came to be formulated-more specifically, the relationship between Arab 
national identity and Islam, and to what extent Arab identity is inclusive of non-Muslims. 
None of this is to say that more purely ideological factors were irrelevant. Nonetheless, 
the extent to which any intellectual construct of identity matters is, in the end, a measure 
of how closely it corresponds to the experienced reality of a people. Thus, for example, 
Hobsbawm, when considering the relationship between proto-nationalist notions of 
community and modem nationalist ideology, has noted that where a certain degree of 
compatibility exists, "existing symbols and sentiments... could be mobilized behind a 
modem cause or a modem state. "" Considering more directly the Arab case, Suleiman 
characterises nationalist movements as a case of mining the past in order to legitimise 
`modernisation projects. ' In this sense, nationalist movements might be seen as being 
aimed at addressing contemporary issues while maintaining a sense of continuity with the 
past. The success of a nationalist movement would depend on how effective it was at 
"reining in the conflicting forces of modernisation in the community in a manner which 
enable[d] change to take place without appearing to jettison the legitimising element of 
tradition. s19 A nationalist ideology then was more likely to be adopted by a particular 
community if that ideology found a correspondence with its proto-nationalist sense of 
communal identity and with contemporary social, economic and/or political issues. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, there existed two very different intellectual 
conceptions of Arab nationalist identity. For Muslim intellectuals, as discussed briefly 
above, it was still an identity largely subsumed within the more inclusive one of Islam. 
Arab identity was seen largely as an extension of the Islamic community of believers, or 
umma; whereby it was defined on the basis of that people's special role with respect to 
18 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 77. 
19 Yasir Suleiman, The Arabic Language and National Identity, A Study in Ideology (Edinburgh, Edinburgh 
University Press, 2003), p. 40, with reference to Joshua A. Fishman, Language and Nationalism: Two 
Integrative Essays (Rowley, Massachusetts: Newbury House Publishers, 1973), p. 9. 
9 
Islam. This model of Arab nationalism came to constitute the movement known as 
salafiyyah, a `return to the way of the ancestors. '-as a model of national identity, it is 
here referred to as salaft Arabism 20 Christian intellectuals, on the other hand, 
propounded a more secular model of nationalism, one based on a shared language and 
culture, and largely founded on a liberal ideal that defined the relationship between the 
state and the individual as one of `social contract'-certainly it was a model wherein 
religion did not play a determinative role. 21 Initially, neither model enjoyed much popular 
support, as the vast majority of Muslim Arabs still tended to see their primary identity as 
`Muslim. ' Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the former model corresponded more closely 
with the existing mode of identity (that is, religious) and thus would eventually prove 
more effective at acquiring adherents. Conversely, the latter model, based more on 
secular notions of nationalist identity, was unfamiliar to the majority of Muslims. While 
it would find ready adherents among Christian Arabs, many of whom were educated in 
Western missionary schools, it simply did not find a correspondence with the way most 
Muslims at the time identified themselves. 
Historians dealing with the topic of Arab nationalism have often stressed (much as have 
Arab nationalists) the role of the Arabic language in the formulation of Arab national 
identity. Inasmuch as it emphasises language, one might imagine that such an identity 
would be equally inclusive of non-Muslims as of Muslims. Certainly, historical accounts 
of the Arab nationalist movement emphasising the role of ideology (for instance, 
Antonius's The Arab Awakening) would seem to suggest this23; indeed, there are still 
20 Tellingly, it was first thought of as a movement aimed at Islamic reform. 
2'Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the LiberalAge, 1798-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983 (first published in 1962)), pp. 274-279; also Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, p. 50. 
22 George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, the Story of the Arab Nationalist Movement (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1961). 
23 Thus, for Breuilly, the fact that Antonius's account of the early Arab nationalist movement is in many 
respects flawed is largely due to its being (misguidedly) based on an `intellectual interpretation of Arab 
10 
many Middle East historians who maintain the validity of a language-based Arab national 
identity equally inclusive of non-Muslims 
24 Models emphasising the role of language 
with respect to non-European nationalist movements are not exclusive to historians of the 
Middle East; several historians dealing more specifically with nationalism per se have 
asserted that such a model is particularly appropriate when considering non-Western 
national identities . 
25 Kohn, for instance, sees the advent of cultural nationalism as 
something quite natural to non-Western countries given their backward political and 
social development, and colonial and imperial legacies. With respect to the latter, cultural 
nationalism might be seen as constituting a reaction against what are perceived as 
externally generated challenges. ' It is a model of nationalism seen in many respects as 
mirroring the German model, which "substituted for the legal and rational concept of 
`citizenship'... the infinitely vaguer concept of `folk. "'27 As in the German model, the 
emphasis is on language-as Hutchinson puts it when considering the case of Irish 
nationalism, it becomes the means of morally regenerating the historic community. 28 The 
nationalism. ' Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, p. 150; see also William L. Cleveland, "The Arab 
Nationalism of George Antonius Reconsidered, " Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East, eds., 
James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 86. 
24 See, for instance, Suleiman, The Arabic Language, pp. 131-146. Some it seems would still assert a model 
of Arab nationalism entirely based on a shared language and common culture almost entirely exclusive of 
any religious component. See, for instance, Susan Silsby Boyle, Betrayal of Palestine: The Story of George 
Antonius (Oxford: Westview Press, 2001), especially pp. 24-33. 
25 For instance, Gellner, Nations and Nationalism; also Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, A Study of its 
Origins and Background (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944). 
26 Ibid, pp. 329-331. 
27 Ibid. 
28 In his own words, a "drive to recreate the nation which, integrating the traditional and modem on a 
higher level, will again rise to the forepronte of world progress. " John Hutchinson, The Dynamics of 
Cultural Nationalism, The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation State, (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1987), P. 32. 
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main difference in the Arab case, however, is that the language being emphasised is not 
that of the `folk' but of the Qur'än. 
When considering the role of the Arabic language in the formulation of Arab national 
identity, this becomes a crucial factor. One might argue, of course, against over- 
emphasising the link between the Arabic language and Islam. The attachment many 
Arabs feel to the language is by no means limited to its connection to the Qur'än. In 
considering the Arabic language as a defining aspect of a proto-nationalist identity in 
keeping with the model proposed by such figures as Adrian Hastings and Philip S. 
Gorski, 29 one ought not to assume that the Arabs' appreciation of the Arabic language has 
. ever 
been limited to its religious function. Historically, much has been made, for 
instance, of its poetic function as something predating Islam30; of its capacity as a 
language of administration and intellectual pursuits31; likewise, as a source of lexical and 
grammatical influence on other languages (for instance, Turkish). 32 Certainly, Arabs have 
always shown a strong appreciation of the language from a purely linguistic standpoint. 
Nonetheless, it remains difficult to speak of the Arabic language as something apart from 
the Qur'an, and correspondingly, as something apart from Islam. Modem-day nationalists 
concerned with its standardisation, for instance, have generally resisted borrowing from 
the language's many dialects, in large part, in order to ensure that it remain in 
concordance with its Qur'änic form. As noted by Suleiman, "any attempt to replace the 
29 Zimmer, Nationalism in Europe, p. 18. Philip S. Gorski is arguably more relevant in this respect, 
inasmuch as he argues for that pre-modern communal-identities, even where expressed in religious idioms, 
might be understood as constituting early manifestations of nationalism. In ibid. 
30 See, for example, Suleiman, The Arabic Language, p. 35. See also A. A. Duri, The Historical Formation 
of the Arab Nation, A Study in Identity and Consciousness, trans., Lawrence I. Conrad (London: Croom 
Helm, 1987), p. 147. 
31 Suleiman, The Arabic Language, p. 42-49. 
32 Ibid, PP. 74-79. 
12 
standard by the colloquial as a marker of... nationalism [would] inevitably [be] met with 
religious opposition. "33 The question of the role of language in the conception of Arab 
national identity is dealt with more fully in the conclusion. 
For now, even if accepting that a conception of Arab nationalism strongly linking Arab 
identity with Islam should inherently have a greater appeal, there is still the question of 
how the transition was made from a proto-nationalist identity to a nationalist one. Well 
into the twentieth century, the great majority of `Arabs' still saw their identity in largely 
religious terms. This was especially true of Muslim Arabs. That any conception of Arab 
national identity should find adherents would reflect a number of developments. If at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the vast majority of Palestine's Muslim Arabs 
identified themselves on the basis of their faith, it was in a very informal manner. We 
might consider this as constituting a proto-nationalist basis of communal identity. The 
thesis suggests a process whereby, through the formalisation of religious and political 
institutions, in connection with the Tanzimat reforms of the mid- to late-nineteenth 
century, religious identity itself became more formalised, and thus something more easily 
subsumed within a modem nationalist model of identity. 
In the period leading up to the Mandate, being `Muslim' simply meant being part of the 
mainstream of society, and required little consideration of what such an identity actually 
entailed in its particulars. The Tanzimat reforms, coupled with increased European 
economic penetration, saw the development of a much more formalised `Islamic' identity 
than what had existed in the past, one based more on a legalistic understanding of correct 
Islamic religious practice and more closely affiliated with Islamic institutions. Most 
importantly, it provided the basis of a definable shared Islamic identity, significantly, one 
easily exploited by individuals of a certain Islamo-religious qualification, individuals 
who would prove to have a strong appeal among the masses, particularly those less 
educated, as was the case with the great majority of the Arab peasantry throughout the 
33 See, for example, ibid, p. 10. 
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Mandate. Most notable in this respect was the militant leader Sheikh 'Izz al-Din al- 
Qassdm (discussed more fully below). 
Some studies of nationalism address the role played by political figures seeking to 
manipulate proto-nationalist symbols within a new nationalist context in order to further 
their own political ambitions. According to Eric Hobsbawm, nationalism has often served 
as a device for political legitimisation. In Europe, during the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the question of political legitimacy arose, largely due to what was the expansion 
of political participation. The elite found nationalism-invented traditions and the 
historicizing of the present-a useful means of shoring up an endangered power base. It 
became a means of engendering feelings of loyalty and patriotism among the masses 
through the appropriation of public national ceremonies, rituals and symbols. 34 Similarly, 
in the Arab case, we find during the inter-war period a growing political awareness 
among the larger population and an attempt by the traditional elite to legitimise their 
status. During the Mandate, two main factions struggled for control the traditional 
leadership, one of which, it turned out, was better able to manipulate proto-nationalist 
symbols (that is, Islamo-religious symbols). Thus, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, through his 
positions as Grand Mufti and President of the Supreme Muslim Council, proved 
particularly adept at appropriating such symbols for the purpose of strengthening his own 
political position vis-ä-vis his political rivals. This became particularly evident following 
the Wailing Wall disturbances of 1929, at which point Hajj Amin sought to characterise 
the nationalist cause as a pan-Islamic one-that is, as a matter of defending the Muslim 
holy places in Jerusalem. The World Islamic Conference, following shortly thereafter, 
and cosponsored by Hajj Amin, 35 served to greatly enhance his status, both within 
Palestine and regionally. 
34 See, for example, Hobsbawm, "Mass-Producing Traditions, " pp. 268-283. 
35 Together with Shawkat'Ali, the President of the Indian Muslim Khalifat Committee. 
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Gellner refers to these proto-nationalist symbols as cultural `shreds' and `patches' which 
nationalists utilise for their own purposes36 the equivalent of Hobsbawm's `tool-kit' 
from which political actors may draw as required by their situational needs. 37 Suleiman 
criticises Gellner for dwelling too much on the question of such symbols' empirical truth 
or falsity; more important, according to Suleiman, is their efficacy as instruments of 
political mobilization in pursuit of national objectives. 38 More to the point, as Hobsbawm 
puts it, their manipulation should correspond to a "felt... need among particular bodies of 
people. "39 Relevant in this respect is to what extent they correspond to genuine concerns 
of a socio-economic or socio-political nature. Exactly such a concern existed in 
mandatory Palestine-what was perceived to be the under-employment of Muslim youth, 
the expression of which often manifested itself in anti-Christian sentiment, as it was 
generally held that Muslims were being discriminated against in favour of Christians for 
government positions. Missionary activity as conducted by Western Christians was 
another such concern, one that resonated quite strongly with the majority Muslim Arab 
population in Palestine-perceived as an external threat to their way of life, it also served 
to create a link in the minds of many Muslim Arabs between Christians in general and 
their much chafed at colonial status. The convening of an international missionary 
conference in Jerusalem in 1928, not surprisingly, was greatly resented by Palestine's 
Muslims, and while protests were for the most part directed against foreign missionaries 
and the Palestine Government, Christian Arabs as a whole were not spared the resulting 
Muslim indignation-this in spite of the fact that not a single Palestinian Christian Arab 
attended the conference. 
36 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 56. 
37 In Zimmer, Nationalism in Europe, pp. 21-22; see also Hobsbawm, "Mass-Producing Traditions, " 
pp. 268-270. 
38 Suleiman, The Arabic Language, p. 41. 
39 In Zimmer, Nationalism in Europe, pp. 21-22; see also Hobsbawm, "Mass-Producing Traditions, " 
pp. 266-268. 
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Relevant here is the fact that, as discussed by Khalidi and Kayali, salafi Arabism-that 
is, a model of Arab national identity emphasising the link between the Arabs and Islam- 
would, from the beginning, constitute an anti-establishment socio-political movement 
40 
More specifically, it would prove an attractive ideology for Muslims who felt 
disenfranchised, whether by the traditional leadership or by non-Muslims. Those who 
felt 
most hard done-by, both during the Ottoman period and during the Mandate, were newly 
educated Muslims and second-rank notables. The former, members of ä fast-evolving 
professional class had, from the mid-nineteenth century on, found themselves competing 
for newly created jobs and political positions (to a large extent brought about by the 
Tanzimat reforms and increased European economic penetration) both with members of 
the traditional elite (who often tended to monopolise such positions) and with non- 
Muslims, (who, on the basis of their education, were often better qualified). The latter, 
mostly the younger members of elite notable families, likewise often found their way 
blocked by the older and more well-established members of their own families. 
In many respects, not much had changed by the time of the Mandate-newly educated 
Muslims again found their career and political aspirations frustrated, though this time, 
they were competing for positions not only with Christians, but with Jews (that is, 
Zionists). They were equally frustrated regarding nationalist goals. The main culprits here 
were, of course, the Zionists and the British. Christians, however, were implicated to 
some extent as well-many were seen as being all too willing to cooperate with the 
`Christian' mandatory power, a power too often seen (as noted) as favouring Christian 
Arabs when hiring for government positions. As before, the traditional elite was also 
targeted, though now, largely because of their ineffectual leadership of the nationalist 
40 Rashid Khalidi, "Society and Ideology in Late Ottoman Syria: Class, Education, Profession and 
Confession, " Problems of the Modern Middle East in Historical Perspective, Essays in honour ofAlbert 
Hourani, ed., John Spangnolo (Reading: Ithaca Press (for the Middle East Centre, St. Anthony's College, 
Oxford), 1996), pp. 119-131; and Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and 
Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), in particular, 
p. 48. 
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movement. Too often, they seemed willing to compromise nationalist goals when these 
conflicted with their own more narrowly defined interests. 
Historians such as Berlin and Smith have characterised the rise of nationalism in Europe 
as an intellectual reaction against the appropriation of Enlightenment ideals by the 
traditional elite (in this case, kings and princes) for the purpose of maintaining the status 
quo. Spearheading this movement in the European case was a newly educated strata that 
resented the fact that in spite of the lofty sentiments associated with Enlightenment 
thought, they found themselves marginalized politically, socially, and economically. 4' 
Arguably, one finds a parallel in the situation in mandatory Palestine, wherein what was a 
newly developed Muslim educated strata rejected the liberal ideals associated with 
British mandatory rule. Such `liberalism' was seen as upholding the status quo-that is, 
the authority of the traditional notable class. Moreover, it was seen as hypocritical-for 
many Muslims, what seemed clear was that the supposed values they represented related 
to equality and meritocracy really only applied to Christians and Jews (that is, Zionists). 
It is perhaps not surprising then that young Muslims embraced an ideological movement 
that provided a `religious rationalisation' of modem ideas and institutions, one moreover 
wherein Muslim Arabs had a privileged position. 42 In many ways, it might be considered 
as having served a similar function as `Romanticist' nationalism43 in post-Napoleonic 
Europe. Both were, in effect, movements of opposition against the established order and 
the supposed values they represented. 
41 Zimmer, Nationalism in Europe, p. 9. 
42 Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 48. 
43 That is, nationalist movements based on a Romanticist tradition as opposed to the liberal model 
associated with the French Revolution, and concerned more with relationship between the state and the 
individual, and "connected with the concepts of individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism. " Kohn, 
The Idea of Nationalism, p. 330. 
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In comparing salafi Arabism with the European `Romanticist' nationalist movements of 
the preceding century, we might make one crucial distinction-that relating to the role 
often assigned the development of `high culture' by historians of nationalism. In the 
European case, this has usually meant an emphasis on folk culture and vernacular 
languages. As Gellner puts it, nationalism "conquer[ed] in the name of a putative folk 
culture... drawn from the healthy, pristine, vigorous life of the peasant, of the Volk. s44 Of 
course, as Gellner points out, even if defining its objective as being the defence of `folk 
culture, ' its real objective was to forge anew high culture 45 Nonetheless, the notion of 
`folk culture' was instrumental to its formulation. In the Arab nationalist context, the 
emphasis was always on high culture as high culture. 46 This is most evident in the 
emphasis given the standard form of Arabic over its dialectical forms. Significantly, as 
noted above, one of the reasons for this had to do with that language's special 
relationship to the Qur'an. It is perhaps not surprising then that, in the case of mandatory 
Palestine, we find within the nationalist movement during its more radical phase a strong 
element aimed at religious reform. Thus, whereas, European Romanticist nationalists 
tended to uphold folk practices (folklore, popular culture, etc. ) as somehow embodying 
the essence of a `people, ' Arab nationalists, in many cases, sought to eradicate them as 
part of a reformation of religious practice, something often characterised as a necessary 
precondition to the achievement of nationalist goals. In the case of Palestine, such an 
attitude was best exemplified by the aforementioned al-Qassam, an individual who would 
prove to have a strong appeal among the peasantry, particularly during a period when 
they had become increasingly disillusioned with the British. It was no coincidence that 
the majority of the militant leaders during the Great Revolt of 1936-1939 modelled 
44 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 57. With reference to Arab nationalism, see Suleiman, The Arabic 
Language, p. 34. 
45 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, pp. 57-58; also Suleiman, The Arabic Language, p. 34. 
46 The bias towards high culture is reflected, for instance, in the comparatively low status given oral and 
folk literature, and in the "less-than-flattering attitude towards the peasant (Jalläh) in classical and modem 
Arabic literature. " Suleiman, The Arabic Language, p. 35. 
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themselves after al-Qassäm and were known as Qassamites. Such leaders were popular 
among the peasantry largely because of their reputations as pious Muslims. 
One other factor warrants mention here-alongside the formalisation of Islamic religious 
practice, the mandate period saw the semi-proleteriatisation of the peasantry, as 
increasing numbers of landless peasants made their way to the cities and larger towns 
looking for work. It was here, in fact, that many first became affiliated with Islamic 
institutions and came into contact with religious reformers like al-Qassäm. While the 
analogy is an imperfect one, Gellner's argument that European nationalism arose during 
the modem period because industrial societies... need[ed] homogenous, language-based 
high cultures in order to work efficientlyi47 seems relevant here when we consider the 
role played by religious institutions and, more importantly, religious reformers, in 
formalising the Islamic identity of the peasantry. Notably, the reform of Islamic practice 
among the peasantry came at a time when its members were becoming increasingly 
literate and nationalistically aware; for many Muslim peasants, nationalist and religious 
commitment went hand in hand. The development of such a link would form the basis for 
a shared understanding between the peasantry and Muslims of the more educated strata, 
the large majority of whom were nationalistically motivated by salafi Arabism, a model 
which, likewise, linked Arab national identity with Islam. 48 
Which brings us back to the two different models of Arab national identity noted at the 
beginning: the one emphasising a shared language and culture in largely secular terms 
and generally favoured by Christians; the other, defining Arab identity as an extension of 
the Islamic religious community, or umma. Initially, historians tended to over-emphasis 
the influence of the former in shaping the Arab nationalist movement during its formative 
period. In no small part, this reflected the influence of Christian Arabs in shaping 
Western perceptions of the Arab nationalist movement. The most notable manifestation 
47 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 34; also Zimmer, Nationalism in Europe, p. 12. 
48 See, for instance, Yehoshua Porath, The Palestinian Arab NationalMovement: From Riots to Rebellion, 
1929-1939, Volume II (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1977), p. 137. 
19 
of this is George Antonius's book The Arab Awakening, and even today, his work proves 
extremely influential in determining how modem historians view the Arab nationalist 
movement, at least during its early stages. 49 More recently, it has been the tendency of 
historians on the subject, not only to stress the significance of the latter model, but also to 
point out that it is highly questionable that a strong nationalist consciousness existed 
among Arabs at large during the period in question, whether in Palestine, or anywhere 
else in the Arab world. This thesis not only asserts that the latter model prevailed in the 
end, but suggests some reasons as to why, largely through a consideration of more 
material factors against more purely ideological ones as determining the particulars of 
what came to constitute Arab national identity. At the heart of the matter is the fact that 
an Arab nationalism based on salafi Arabism corresponded quite well with the 
experienced realities of Palestine' Muslim majority, whether in terms of socio-economic 
grievances or existing proto-nationalist forms of identity, or in connection with the ability 
of political figures to manipulate relevant symbols for their own purposes. 
The nature of Muslim-Christian relations in Palestine over the course of the Mandate 
very much reflected developments in the formulation of Arab national identity. Early on, 
when Arab national identity was still something of an open book, Christian-Muslim unity 
was quite strong, something evident in the Muslim-Christian Associations that formed the 
bases of the Arab Executive and the various Palestinian Nationalist Congresses. 
Significantly, their strength also reflected the fact that early on, nationalist activity was 
largely confined to the traditional leadership-indeed, the MCAs were made up primarily 
of members of the notable class-and it is questionable whether a sense of common 
cause with respect to the nationalist movement was equally prevalent among the greater 
mass of Palestine's Arabs, whether Muslim or Christian. Arguably, what largely bound 
49 For example, as referenced above, Susan Boyle in her recent biography of Antonius. Boyle, Betrayal of 
Palestine, in particular, pp. 24-33. While most historians today no longer accept Antonius's account of the 
early Arab nationalist movement as entirely accurate, there is still aa tendency to exaggerate the role of 
Christian Arabs, particularly with respect to its intellectual formulation. See, for instance, Breuilly, 
Nationalism and the State, pp. 150-151; also Cleveland, "The Arab Nationalism of George Antonius 
Reconsidered, " p. 86. 
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Muslim and Christian notables, both to the movement and to each other, was not so much 
strong nationalist sentiment, but a sense of shared economic interests. 
Initially, the majority of Arabs in Palestine were content to put their trust in the 
traditional leadership. It was not long, however, before they became disenchanted with 
the traditional leadership's inability to achieve nationalist goals. Continued frustration in 
this respect would see the eventual radicalisation of the nationalist movement. As noted, 
certain elements within the traditional leadership-most notably that represented by Hajj 
Amin al-Husayni -would attempt to harness this sense of frustration to enhance their 
own status at the expense of their political rivals through the manipulation of proto- 
nationalist Islamo-religious symbols. Such manipulations corresponded quite well with a 
growing nationalist consciousness among Palestine's Muslims that emphasised an Arab 
identity tied to Islam. By the time of the Great Revolt, Christians had become almost 
completely marginalized with respect to the nationalist movement. Very few took an 
active part in the Revolt, either among the leadership or the rank-and-file, and Christians 
would find themselves increasingly subjected to harassment and accusations of disloyalty 
with respect to the nationalist cause. 
Christians would try desperately to maintain for themselves a role in the nationalist 
movement: first, by trying to maintain a model of Arab national identity equally inclusive 
of Muslim as non-Muslims; later, by defining Islam as something more cultural than 
religious such that it might be inclusive of Christians. Some Muslim intellectuals, 
particularly in connection with the formulation of a cultural Islamic model, would also 
seek to maintain a place for Christians within a shared identity. The more pressing 
problem of Zionism would to a large extent allow both Muslims and Christians to ignore 
differences regarding perceptions of Arab national identity; likewise concerning what 
kind of state they aspired to and what should be the place of non-Muslims in it. In the end 
though, this was only a temporary expedient; by the end of the Mandate, what had 
become largely evident was that the only Arab whose identity as such went unquestioned 
was a Muslim one. The fact of the matter was that, for many of the reasons noted above, 
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an Arab national identity that emphasised the Arabs' ties with Islam resonated much 
more strongly with the great majority of Palestine's Arabs. 
The primary sources used in this thesis consist, among others, of contemporaneous 
Arabic-language newspapers and periodicals. Many of these were owned by Christians, 
and provide valuable insight concerning Christian reactions to incidents touching on 
Muslim-Christian relations. Those used most extensively were Filastin, published in Jaffa 
by 'Isä al-'Isä, an Arab Orthodox, and al-Karmil, published in Haifa by Najib Nassär, a 
Protestant. While in part their use reflects their relatively easy accessibility, it is also 
indicative of the fact that both were widely read in mandatory Palestine and enjoyed a 
high level of prestige. Material derived from two has been supplemented with material 
culled from several other newspapers as relevant, among these for example, Mir'ät al- 
Sharq, a Christian newspaper based in Jerusalem. Several newspapers might likewise be 
considered as representative of mainstream Muslim views, for instance, al Jämi'ah al- 
Arabiyyah, which additionally functioned as something of a mouthpiece for Hajj Amin 
al-Husayni and the Supreme Muslim Council. 50 In addition to Arabic-language 
publications, the Jewish English language publication, the Palestinian 
Bulletin/Palestinian Post, proved particularly valuable. In addition to providing a non- 
Arab perspective on events, it was also suggestive of where one might find material in the 
Arabic language press, not least in its daily summaries of articles appearing the previous 
day in Arab publications. Non-Palestinian newspapers published abroad, such as the 
London Times and Oriente Moderno, were also used. 
Among non-press sources, British government documents, primarily from the Colonial 
Office and Foreign Office, were used extensively. Particularly valuable were the CID 
(Criminal Investigation Department) reports that provided information concerning 
localised incidents between Muslims and Christians, incidents that at the time often did 
not seem to warrant extensive press coverage. Most of these were ascertained at the 
50 Uri M. Kupferschmidt, The Supreme Muslim Council: Islam under the British Mandate forPalestine 
(Leiden; New York: E. J. Brill, 1987), p. 141. 
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Public Records Office in London, though some came from the Israeli State Archives in 
Jerusalem. Documents from the Zionist Archives, also located in Jerusalem, were also 
used. Other British documents used were the Command Papers dealing with Palestine, 
the various censuses taken, special reports dealing with specific topics-for example, the 
inquiry made into the affairs of the Orthodox Patriarchate in Jerusalem produced by Sir 
Anton Bertram and Harry Charles Luke-and various other materials that might best be 
characterised as miscellaneous. Not all non-press source documents were government 
documents. Quite useful, for instance, were the minutes of the Christian Missionary 
Conference, held in Jerusalem in April of 1928. 
Various memoirs were also examined. These might be divided into three categories- 
those by missionaries; those by British individuals serving in the mandate administration; 
and those by Palestinian Arabs, both Muslim and Christian, reflecting on their 
experiences during the Mandate, generally in connection with the nationalist movement. 
Within this last category, I am inclined to group certain historical accounts written by 
individuals who took part in the related events-though setting out to provide a broader 
account of these events, much of the information provided is anecdotal in nature and 
reflects personal experiences. A good example of this is Matiel Mughannam's The Arab 
Woman and the Palestine Problem. Secondary sources of course proved invaluable, 
though at times, frustrating. Certainly they were useful as far as providing a sense of the 
larger historical backdrop against which the relationship between Muslim and Christian 
Arabs played itself out. At the same time, though vague reference is often made to the 
declining state of affairs between the two communities in relation to broader events, little 
is often provided by way of detail. " In part, it is this tendency that inspired this thesis, 
suggesting as it did an area for research yet to be fully explored. Hopefully this thesis 
has 
gone some way towards remedying this. 
51 The one notable exception in this respect are the works by Daphne Tsimhoni. 
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Chapter I, Ottoman Days 
The Tanzimat 
Any discussion of Muslim-Christian relations in Palestine during the British Mandate 
must find its beginning in the waning days of the Ottoman Empire. Over the course of the 
nineteenth century, the nature of Muslim-Christian relations would undergo substantial 
change in connection with the Ottoman Empire's attempt to modernize along European 
lines. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, authority in the Arab provinces lay 
primarily in the hands of the local (mostly urban) notables. Particularly in Palestine, such 
authority manifested itself in the control they exercised over certain administrative 
functions, the most important of these-for instance, those of gddi and mufti-being of a 
certain religious qualification'; likewise, in the loyalty they commanded from the 
peasantry or certain elements therein, often acquired through patronage (see below). 
Notable authority was usually limited to the urban centres and their respective 
surrounding villages, and often it was the case that there existed in any given centre 
several notable families vying for control-for example, in Jerusalem, the Husayni, 
Khälidi, Alämi, and later, Nashashibi families, and in Nablus, the Tugän and 'Abd al- 
Hädi families. 
'Albert Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables" in Beginnings ofModernization 
in the 
Middle East: The Nineteenth Century, eds., William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (Chicago: 
The 
University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 52-53; also Dick Douwes, The Ottomans in Syria, 
A History of 
Justice and Oppression (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), p. 72. 
2 See, for instance, Moshe Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861, 
The Impact of the 
Tanzimat on Politics and Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), pp. 113-118; also Beshara 
Doumani, 
Rediscovering Palestine: The Merchants and Peasants ofJabal Nablus, 1700-1900 
(Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1995), pp. 34-44. See Butros Abu Manneh, "Jerusalem 
in the Tanzimat Period: The 
New Ottoman Administration and the Notables, " in Die Well des Islams 30 
(1990), pp. 23-35. 
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In keeping with its desire to modemise, the Ottoman centre sought to consolidate its 
control of the Arab provinces, in large part, through a series of reforms known as the 
Tanzimat. 3 More than simply seeking to extend its administrative reach, it hoped to instil 
within its subjects a sense of loyalty to the Empire in nationalistic terms; 
correspondingly, a sense of identity apart from one's religion or place of residency, until 
then the prime markers of who one was. Whereas till then, one identified him or herself 
as the member-of a religious community or as coming from a particular village or a 
region-that is, as a Muslim or Christian, or a Hebronite or Nablusite-one was now to 
think of him or herself as a citizen of the Ottoman Empire. Equally important, all 
Ottoman citizens, regardless of faith, were to be considered equal in all respects. This 
principle was fundamental to the Tanzimat, and was stated in the very first reforming 
edict, the Hatt-i Sharif of Gülhane, promulgated in 183 9.5 
The conception of individuals as citizens of the state was a fairly radical notion. This was 
particularly problematic for Christians for whom the relationship to the broader Ottoman 
society had been determined primarily by the millet6 system, wherein the political 
identity of Christians was defined at the level of the community rather than that of the 
individual. Whatever interaction they had with the Ottoman authorities was as a 
3 In Arabic, tanzimät, meaning `orderings' or `reorderings. ' For an overview of the Tanzimat period, see 
Standford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, Volume II, Reform, Revolution, 
and Republic: The Rise ofModern Turkey, 1808-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, 
pp. 55-171. 
° See Shaw and Shaw, Reform, Revolution, and Republic, pp. 61-69; also Roderic H. Davison, "Turkish 
Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century" in Essays in Turkish History, 
1774-1923, ed., Roderic H. Davison (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1990), p. 65-66. 
5 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983 (first published in 1962)), pp. 45,47; Davison, "Turkish Attitudes, " p. 64. 
6 In Arabic, millah. Under the Ottoman Empire, each non-Muslim religious community was recognised as a 
`nation, ' or millet. 
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community, and was usually mediated through their clerical leaders. The ecclesiastical 
hierarchy responsible for any given millet managed all of its internal affairs-religious 
and educational matters, as well as those related to personal status such as marriage, 
divorce and inheritance. 7 As individuals, and with respect to the larger Muslim- 
dominated Ottoman society, their status was effectively that of second-class citizens. 8 
Christians were not eligible for the highest administrative posts; could not serve in the 
armed forces (on the basis of which, they had to pay an exemption tax); nor provide 
evidence in a Muslim court of law. 9 Disputes with Muslims and crimes against the State 
came under the jurisdiction of the Muslim courts. Among those crimes punishable by 
death were crimes against the State, blasphemy against the Faith, the Prophet and the 
Qur'an, plotting on behalf of an infidel power, the murder of a Muslim man or woman, 
highway robbery against Muslims, the seduction of a Muslim woman, and religious 
proselytising. 1° The second-class status of Christians (and other non-Muslims) found 
expression in other ways. Christians might be debarred from riding horses or wearing 
colourful clothing, have their homes inexplicably invaded by Muslim functionaries 
7 Anthony O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians: Religion, Politics and Society, c. 1800-1948" in Palestinian 
Christians, Religion, Politics and Society in the Holy Land, ed. Anthony O'Mahony (London, Melisende, 
1999), pp. 18-19; Sir Steven Runciman, The Historic Role of the Christian Arabs in Palestine, the Second 
Carreras Arab Lecture of the University of Essex, 26 November 1968, London: Longman for the 
University of Essex, 1970, pp. 7-8. This did not, however, include the collection of taxes. See, for instance, 
Kemal H. Karpat, "Ottoman Views and Policies Towardss the Orthodox Christian Church" in The Greek 
Orthodox Theological Review, The Holy Cross Orthodox Press, Volume 31, Spring-Summer 1986, 
Nos. 1-2, p. 143. 
8 Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence ofArab Nationalism, with a Background Study ofArab-Turkish Relations 
in the Near East (New York: Caravan Books, 1958 [reprinted 1973]), p. 27. 
9 Davison, "Turkish Attitudes, " p. 62. 
10 Runciman, The Historic Role, p. 8. 
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demanding food or lodging, find themselves subjected to levies of money without reason, 
or even be forced off the pavement when their paths crossed with Muslims. " 
With the Tanzimat reforms, Christians suddenly found themselves expected to participate 
as citizens in the administering and governing of the Empire. The Tanzimat would effect 
achange within Christian communities as well. Thus, reforms were initiated that dealt 
directly with their internal administration, the most significant of these being those 
calling for a radical restructuring of their political organisation. Both the Greek Orthodox 
and Armenian Orthodox communities saw the promulgation of new constitutions calling 
for the creation of representative assemblies with lay majorities, which would be 
responsible for matters related to education and the general welfare of the community. 12 
Effectively, the new constitutions sought to promote the interests of the lay communities 
over those of their respective higher clergies. 13 Not surprisingly, the changes embodied in 
the new constitutions were resisted by the clergies, and in the Jerusalem patriarchates of 
both, the reforms related to communal organisation were never carried out. '4 
For Muslims, the impact of the Tanzimat reforms was quite different. While the basis of 
their loyalty to the Empire might have been in a sense redefined, they had always 
constituted the larger body politic. What was new was that they were expected to relate to 
individual Christians (and other non-Muslims) as political and social equals. Many 
"See James Finn, Stirring Times: Or Records from Jerusalem Consular Chronicles of 1853 to 1856, 
Volume I, ed., Elizabeth Anne Finn (London: C. Kegan Paul and Company, 1878), p. 201, referring to the 
journal of the Reverend Fisk, who was in Jerusalem in 1823. 
12 Shaw and Shaw, Reform, Revolution, and Republic, pp. 125-127. Though as it turned out, the Armenian 
one had considerably more teeth. Shaw and Shaw, Reform, Revolution, and Republic, p. 127. 
" O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 20. 
14 lbid, p. 20; also Shaw and Shaw, Reform, Revolution, and Republic, pp. 125-127. 
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Muslims, however, were sceptical regarding Christian loyalty to the Empire. 15 Relatively 
speaking, up through the end of the seventeenth century, the situation of Christians under 
Ottoman authority had been benign. Concomitant with the decline in Ottoman authority 
in Syria and the other outer provinces beginning in the early eighteenth century, however, 
their situation had begun to deteriorate, and Christians increasingly found themselves at 
the mercy of local authority figures no longer accountable to the centre. 16 Added to this 
was growing Muslim agitation over political developments in the Ottoman Empire's 
European territories. When following the Greek uprising of 1821, for example, the Sultan 
issued a decree providing Muslims with arms and confiscating those of Christians, the 
local governor in Palestine tried to extort money from the latter by threatening to arouse 
the former against them. " With the European powers' increasing penetration of the 
region, both economically and politically (see below), indigenous Christian communities 
began to look to them for support-in particular, Uniate Catholics1' (inclusive of 
Maronites) looked to France, and Orthodox Christians to Russia. What was by then a 
fast-growing trade with Europe further strengthened ties between local Christians and 
Europeans, the former often acting as middlemen between European traders and local 
producers. Christians, on the basis of a shared faith and a greater familiarity with 
European languages, tended to be more comfortable associating with Europeans than 
15 Davison, "Turkish Attitudes, " p. 71. 
16 Robert Brenton Betts, Christians in the Arab East -A Political Study (Athens: Lycabettus Press, 1975, 
1978 revised edition), p. 121. 
17 Finn, Stirring Times, pp. 276,304. See also Kirsten Stoffregen Pedersen, The Holy Land Christians, ed., 
Natalie King (Jerusalem: Private Publication, 2003), pp. 65-68. For his part, the Sultan held the Orthodox 
Patriarch in Istanbul personally responsible for the Greek revolt, and had him hanged. Karpat, "Ottoman 
Views, " pp. 149-150. 
"' The Uniate Churches, or Eastern Churches as they are sometimes known, while acknowledging the 
supremacy of the Pope in Rome, have largely preserved their own liturgies and customs. 
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Muslims. 19 Generally, they were also more receptive to Western ideas and values, a 
tendency strengthened by increased interaction. 20 
Christians would also benefit from the Tanzimat reforms, and not only those seeking to 
eradicate religious divisions. Arguably, those dealing strictly with economic and 
administrative issues had an even greater impact, inasmuch as they reshaped the overall 
economic, political, and social environment in a manner favourable to them. 21 More 
specifically, and of particular relevance to our discussion, they helped initiate a process 
that saw a change in the criterion determining elite status. During most of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, a period of Ottoman decline during which the centre was no 
longer able to exert its authority over the outer provinces, the 'ulama22 those who were 
learned in Islamic knowledge and affiliated with Islamic institutions-had become the 
principal administrators of the Empire . 
23 This was no more so than in the Empire's Arab 
territories. Status had come to be determined largely by what one might deem an Islamic 
criterion-whether one held an important position within an Islamic institution, as a gädi 
19 Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 95. 
20 This tendency would carry over to the mandate period. As recollected by a Christian from Lebanon, 
among many Christian Arabs, "European morals, habits, ways of living, dress and general behaviour were 
idealised as belonging to a superior race. " Edward Atiya, An Arab Tells His Story: A Study in Loyalties 
(London: John Murray, 1946), pp. 3-4. 
21 Philip Mattar, The Mufti ofJerusalem, AI-Hajj Amin Al-Husayni and the Palestinian NationalMovement 
(New York: Columbia Press, 1988, revised edition), p_ 4. 
22 Singular, alim-best translated as learned man. 
23 Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume I, Empire of the Gazis: 
The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1208-1808 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 
p. 165 
29 
or a mufti; at the very least, whether or not one enjoyed a reputation as a learned and 
`pious' Muslim 24 
How pious one was often reflected an individual's overall behaviour-whether he was 
just, honest, compassionate, and so forth. Significant with respect to later developments, 
formal practice and formal training would not have constituted the only yardstick, indeed 
probably not even the most important one, by which one's worth as a Muslim was 
measured. This was certainly true of village sheikhs. As noted by Doumani, "[t]heir 
actions... were circumscribed by social and cultural boundaries that defined ideals for 
accepted behaviour, notions of justice, and levels of accountability to the collective 
community. "25 It equally applied to the urban notability, particularly with respect to 
town-village relations. As noted by Divine, "[g]enerosity and cooperation from the 
notability created bonds of loyalty between urban and rural sectors. "2" Both urban and 
rural notables were expected to represent the interests of the larger community when 
dealing with the Ottoman authorities. 27 A fair amount of patronage was often involved as 
well, particularly in connection with the formation of militias. 28 The Tanzimat reforms, in 
tandem with the changes brought about by increased European economic penetration, 
would redefine the criterion determining elite status to one based largely on wealth, 
24 See Hourani, "Ottoman Reform, " p. 49. This was certainly the case in Jerusalem, where authority largely 
constituted what Abu Manneh refers to as "a notability of service and descent" in connection with Islamic 
institutions. Abu Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period, " p. 14. 
25 Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, p. 35. 
26 Donna Robinson Divine, Politics and Society in ottoman Palestine, The Arab Struggle for Survival and 
Power (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), p. 39. 
27 Douwes, The Ottomans in Syria, p. 167. 
28 See, for example, Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, pp. 34-44, concerning Nablus during most of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
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particularly that acquired through commerce. 29 Significantly, this was a criterion 
considerably more accessible to Christians. 
European economic penetration 
In Palestine, European economic penetration began with the coastal areas and was 
initially based on the cultivation of cotton for export. 30 During the same period, these 
areas were also subjected to an influx of European manufactured goods, primarily 
textiles, with which local production found it difficult to compete. 31 While initially the 
interior was able to resist European economic penetration, it was not long before it too 
was drawn into the global economy. 32 The changes initiated by European economic 
penetration had a particularly positive impact on local Christians who, for the reasons 
noted above, were often better able to take advantage of related economic opportunities. 
Added to this, privileges related to the capitulations, until then enjoyed only by 
33 foreigners, were extended to many of the local Christians with whom they did business. 
Inasmuch as this shielded them from Ottoman taxes and the Ottoman courts, it 
29 Gad G. Gilbar, "The Growing Economic Involvement of Palestine with the West, 1865-1914" in 
Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period: Political Social and Economic Transformation, ed., David Kushner 
(Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1986), p 188. 
30 Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, pp. 31,98. 
31 Gad G. Gilbar, "The Growing Economic Involvement, " p. 199; also Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, 
pp. 74,120-121. 
32 See Roger Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914 (London: Methuen, 1981), pp. 88, 
90-91. 
33 See Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 
1908-1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 18; also Daphne Tsimhoni, The British 
Mandate and the Arab Christians in Palestine 1920-1925 (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, SOAS, University of 
London, 1976), pp. 13-14; and Mattar, The Mufti ofJerusalem, p. 4. 
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represented a significant advantage over Muslim merchants. 34 Needless to say, this 
fostered a great deal of resentment among Muslims, many of whom began to suspect 
local Christians of conspiring with their European co-religionists to dominate the 
35 Ottoman Empire, not only economically, but politically as well. 
As it was, the European powers would increasingly evoke their self-ordained role as 
`protectors' of specific Christian communities as a pretext for interfering in the internal 
affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Following sectarian violence in Lebanon in 1860, for 
instance-violence which saw large numbers of Christians (predominantly Maronites) 
killed36-the French landed troops and exerted pressure on the Ottoman Sultan to grant 
the Maronites self-autonomy as a privileged and independent province. 37 Even the actual 
content of the Tanzimat reforms directly resulted, in part, from European pressure having 
been brought to bear on behalf of the Empire's Christian subjects 38 From the perspective 
of Muslims, Christians seemed all too happy to take advantage of what was a growing 
European presence. Certainly Lebanon's Maronites, who now experienced French 
34 Concerning the capitulations, see Davison, "Turkish Attitudes, " p. 72; Shaw, Empire of the Gazis, p. 163; 
Kirsten Stoffregen Pedersen, The Holy Land Christians, p. 54; Sergio I. Minerbi, The Vatican and Zionism, 
Conflict in the Holy Land, 1895-1925 (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 87. 
35 See, for instance, FO 195/194, Rose to Canning, Beirut, 21 March 1842; also Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform, 
pp. 210-211,219. 
36 See, for instance, Betts, Christians in the Arab East, pp. 22-23. 
37 See Shaw and Shaw, Reform, Revolution, and Republic, pp. 142-143; also Arnold J. Toynbee, "The 
Administration of the French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon and of the British Mandate for Palestine" 
in Survey of International Affairs 1925, Volume I, The Islamic World Since the Peace Settlement (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press; London: Humphrey Milford, 1927), p. 154; Derek Hopwood, The Russian 
Presence in Syria and Palestine, 1843-1914, Church and Politics in the Near East (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1969), p. 67-68; and Betts, Christians in the Arab East, p. 23. 
38 See, for instance, Davison, "Turkish Attitudes, " pp. 72,76; also Hourani, "Ottoman Reform, " pp. 65-66; 
and Karpat, "Ottoman Views, " pp. 150-151. 
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protection and the possibility of direct trade links with Europe, had benefited from the 
French intercession there. 9 One might argue that the Maronites constituted a special case 
(see below); at the same time, it is not difficult to see how events in Lebanon might have 
been understood as anticipating possible developments elsewhere. Certainly this was fair 
to say of Palestine, given its special religious significance for Christian Europe and the 
fact that it had a sizeable indigenous Christian population of its own. It is perhaps not 
surprising then that Palestine's Muslims became wary of what they perceived to be a 
growing `special relationship' between foreign and local Christian s40-thus, the 
establishment of European consulates in Jerusalem in the middle of the nineteenth 
century was greatly resented by local Muslims. 41 The visit of a French consul almost a 
hundred and fifty years earlier, in 1701, had produced similar outrage. Then, the local 
notables had responded with a petition stating that, "our city is the focus of attention of 
the infidels" and that "this holy land [could be] occupied as a result of this, as has 
happened repeatedly in earlier times. "42 Arguably, there was some genuine cause for 
concern on the part of Muslims. In 1841, for instance, Christians in Syria circled a 
petition calling on Europe to place Palestine under Christian rule! 43 
39 Suad Joseph, "Muslim-Christian Conflict in Lebanon: A Perspective on the Evolution of Sectarianism" 
in Muslim -Christian Conflicts: Economic, Political, and Social Origins, eds., Suad Joseph and Barbara 
L. K. Pillsbury (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press; Folkestone, England: Dawson, 1978), pp. 68-69. 
40 Divine, Politics and Society, p. 158. 
41 Abu Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period, " pp. 19-21; James Finn, Stirring Times, p. 76. 
42 Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, The Construction ofModern National Consciousness (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 152-153, letter from the Khalidi library collection. 
43 See Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform, p. 218. 
33 
Education 
A number of other factors underlay the advantageous position enjoyed by local Christians 
vis-ä-vis Europeans, not the least being that Christians on average were much better 
educated than their Muslim counterparts. More important was the fact that it was an 
education that emphasised more secularly based subjects. This was a type of education to 
which Christians would have considerably greater access than Muslims well into the 
twentieth century. In this respect, Christians had considerable outside help in the form of 
missionary schools. Latin Catholic missionary activity in the area of education (as well as 
medicine), particularly as represented by the Franciscans, dated back to the Crusades. By 
the end of the seventeenth century, they were already running fourteen schools in 
Palestine. 44 Other Catholic orders, such as the Salesians and Dominicans, established 
schools as well. 45 The opening of Palestine to missionary activity under Ibrähim Pasha 
(see below) proved particularly beneficial to Protestants. Unlike the Latin Catholics, they 
tended to work primarily through missionary societies. In Palestine, the most important of 
these was the British-based Church Missionary Society, which commenced its activities 
there around 1870.46 Together with the Berlin Missionary Association, 47 it would 
establish thirty-one schools in Palestine by the end of the century. 48 Another missionary 
44 Kirsten Stoffregen Pedersen, The Holy Land Christians, p. 83. 
45 A. L. Tibawi, Arab Education in Mandatory Palestine: A Study of Three Decades of British 
Administration (London: Luzac and Company, Ltd., 1956), p. 63; Harry C. Luke and Edward Keith-Roach, 
eds., The Handbook of Palestine and Trans-Jordan, 3rd Edition (London: McMillan and Company, 
Limited, 1934), p. 49. 
46 Matiel E. T. Mogannam, The Arab Woman and the Palestine Problem (London: Herbert Joseph Limited, 
1937), p. 250. See also Derek Hopwood, The Russian Presence, p. 94. 
47 Concerning joint Anglican-Lutheran missionary activity in Palestine, see Daphne Tsimhoni, "The 
Anglican (Evangelical Episcopal) Community in Jerusalem and the West Bank" in Oriente Moderno, 
Nuova Serie, Anno II, Nr. 1-12 (Gennaio-Diciembre 1983), p. 252. 
48 Thid, p. 252. 
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society involved in educational activities was the Friends' Mission of America, which 
maintained two important educational centres in Ramallah, one for boys and one for 
girls. 49 Others were the Jerusalem and East Mission, the Christian and Missionary 
Alliance and the Scots Mission. 5° During the nineteenth century, the Russian Orthodox 
Church was also active in the area of education, particularly as represented by the 
Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, which saw the establishment of over a hundred 
schools in Palestine alone, among them a women's teachers' training college in Beit Jala, 
and a men's seminary in Nazareth. 51 Jerusalem was particularly targeted for missionary 
educational activity, and according to one source, had, by the turn-of-the-century, thirty- 
five Christian missionary schools with over 2,200 students and more than 150 teachers. 52 
The establishment of missionary schools had a secondary effect as well, generating a 
growing demand among Muslims for schools providing a more secularly based 
education. Missionary schools were generally open to non-Christians, but most Muslims 
were disinclined to send their children to them for fear they might convert to 
Christianity. 53 At the same time, the secular education they desired was generally not 
54 available in the traditional madrasa or kuttab. The latter half of the nineteenth century 
49 Mogannam, The Arab Woman, p. 250; A. L. Tibawi, Arab Education, p. 63. 
so Luke and Keith-Roach, eds., The Handbook, p. 254. 
sl Elie Kedourie, "Religion and Politics: The Diaries of Khalil Sakakini, " Middle Eastern Affairs, 1, St. 
Antony's Papers, 4 (1958), p. 84. See also Derek Hopwood, The Russian Presence, pp. 107,112,137-158. 
52 Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, p. 48. 
53 lbid, p. 47. 
54 A kuttab provided a very basic education-reading, writing and the precepts of the Islam-to young 
children roughly between the ages of 5 and 12. The madrasa functioned as a kind of theological school 
with a curriculum based on Arabic and Islamic studies. See A. L. Tibawi, Arab Education, pp. 56-58. See 
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saw an effort on the part of the Ottoman Government to establish secular state schools, 
inclusive of secondary schools. 55 At the start at least, Muslims generally preferred 
whenever possible to send their children to the state schools. S6 Moreover, given that 
Catholic and Protestant missionary activity at that time was directed more at `Eastern' 
Christians, it was not only Muslims, but often Orthodox Christians as well, who found 
the state schools a more appealing alternative. 7 With the advent of state schools, Islamic 
educational institutions were forced to revise their curriculum to include secular subjects 
in order to compete. 58 In addition, a number of private Muslim schools were established 
(though these had a rather limited impact5). 
While the effort never came close to satisfying demand, some of these state schools did 
go on to effectively compete with the missionary ones, 60 and the attempt at modernising 
also Ami Ayalon, Reading Palestine, Printing and Literacy, 1900-1948 (Austin, Texas: University of 
Texas Press, 2004), p. 20. 
ss Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, p. 39. This was done primarily through the Education Law, enacted in 
1869. 
56 Kayah, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 24. Those Muslims that did attend missionary schools tended to come 
from the upper elite. Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, p. 60. 
57 Ibid, p. 47; Davison, "Turkish Attitudes, " p. 74. 
58 Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, p. 39. 
59 By 1914,379 private Muslim schools had been established, with an overall student body of 8,705 (of 
which 131 were girls). The great majority of these however were of the traditional kuttab type, and 
provided little instruction beyond the basic precepts of Islam and fundamental reading, writing and 
arithmetic. A. L. Tibawi, Arab Education, pp. 20,270. A number of private secondary schools were also set 
up towards the end of the Ottoman period. Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, pp. 49,225. 
60 By 1914, in Palestine, the Ottoman Government had established only 95 elementary and three secondary 
public schools with a student body of 8,248,1,480 of which were girls. A. L. Tibawi, Arab Education, 
pp. 20,270. 
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the educational system did have limited success. The number of Muslims able to 
effectively compete for administrative and other positions requiring a secular education 
did increase. 61 Nonetheless, Christian (and Jewish) educational institutions would remain 
widely perceived as providing a superior education to that of the government provided 
state schools and many of the private Muslim ones. Moreover, throughout the Ottoman 
period, the number of state schools would continue to lag far behind demand such that 
educated Christians (together with Jews) continued to far outnumber educated Muslims. 62 
It is worth noting here as well that collectively, these newly educated Muslims would 
come to constitute an important political constituent with respect to later developments. 
As noted above, the Tanzimat reforms, coupled with European economic pentration, had 
seen the creation of numerous new job opportunities for which non-notable Muslims (as 
well as second-rank notable ones) might now compete. 63 A fair number did so 
effectively, and would come to constitute a new element within Arab society-a Muslim 
professional class as it were. At the same time, many would experience frustration as 
growing political and career aspirations remained unmet, either because the relevant 
positions were still being monopolised by the traditional elite or on account of 
competition with Christians (and Jews). Much of this frustration would be equally 
directed against both-that is, the traditional elite as well as Christians (and Jews). 
Correspondingly, many would come to support a more radical brand of Arab nationalism, 
one that emphasised the relationship between the Arabs and Islam-that is, salafi 
Arabism (discussed more fully below) 64 
61 Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 48; also Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, p. 61. 
62 Thus, for instance, well into the twentieth century, many Muslim notables were more inclined to hire 
Christians (and Jews) as secretaries and personal assistants on the basis of their education. Geoffrey 
Furlonge, Palestine Is My Country, The Story ofMusa Alarni (London: John Murray, 1960), p. 28. 
63 Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, p. 61. 
64 Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 48. 
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Muslim-Christian equality 
In 1831, Ibrahim Pasha, the son of the Egyptian Khedive, invaded Syria, inclusive of 
Palestine. Though he would only retain control of the region some nine years, his 
administration oversaw the implementation of numerous political, economic and social 
reforms of a far-reaching nature. 65 With respect to Muslim-Christian relations in 
Palestine, by far the most important reforms were those that encouraged Christians to 
think of themselves as full-fledged citizens of the state rather than members of ghettoised 
communities. 66 Christians were admitted to the advisory councils, 67 and laws setting 
restrictions with respect to dress, person and property were abolished. 68 In some cases, 
Christians were even utilised militarily. Christian soldiers from Lebanon, for instance, 
were used to suppress Druze and Nusayri risings. 69 Equally significant in this respect, the 
Egyptian regime permitted missionary activity to a degree previously unseen. 70 This, 
together with the establishment of consulates, 7' effectively gave Europeans a more or less 
permanent foothold in the region, and during the period of Ibrahim Pasha's rule, the 
65 Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 60; Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, p. 129. 
66 See Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp. 52-53; also Betts, Christians in the Arab East, p. 21. 
67 Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 60. 
68 Runciman, The Historic Role, p. 8. Concerning their abolition, see, for instance, Henry H. Jessup, Fifty- 
Three Years in Syria, Volume I (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 2002 [first published in 1910 by Fleming H. 
Revell Company, New York]), p. 160. 
69 Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 60. 
70 A. L. Tibawi, British Interests in Palestine, 1800-1901, A Study of Religious and Educational Enterprise 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 16; also Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform, p. 17. 
71 See O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 25. 
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number not only of missionaries, but also of traders, travellers and religious pilgrims 
visiting Syria (and Palestine) jumped up dramatically. 72 
The sudden elevation of Christians to a status politically equal with their own caused a 
great deal of resentment among Muslims, and went a long way towards undermining the 
popularity of the new regime. 73 Not surprisingly, after the Egyptians were forced to leave 
and the Ottoman Government had begun to reassert its control of the area, something of a 
backlash ensued. As observed by the American Protestant missionary, Henry H. Jessup, 
"the new liberties granted to the Christian sects, their growth in wealth, the appointment 
of their prominent men to foreign consular offices... all these and other causes had 
kindled [among the Muslims] fires of fanatical hatred. "74 Disturbances in Aleppo in 
1850,75 Mosul in 1854 and in Nablus in 1856,76 in which Christians were especially 
targeted, 77 might be understood in part as an attempt by the 'ulamä to restore their old 
position, particularly in the face of continued reform and a growing European presence. 
The incitement of anti-Christian feeling always proved an effective means of garnering 
popular support . 
78 Even where things did not turn violent, it was not uncommon for 
governors-for example, Najib Pasha in Damascus-to attempt to roll back the reforms 
made under Muhammad `Ali and "re-establish the Islamic faith in all its former glory. , 79 
72 Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 60. 
73 Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform, pp. 17-18; also Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 63. 
74 Jessup, Fijly-Three Years, p. 165. 
75 See Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform, pp. 190-191. 
76 Described more fully below. See also ibid, pp. 226-227. 
77 See, for instance, Ma'oz's discussion concerning the Aleppo riots. Ibid, pp. 190-191. 
78 Hourani, "Ottoman Reform, " p. 68. 
79 See, for instance, FO 78/456, Rose to Palmerston, No. 3, Gazir, 26 July 1841. 
Given the general atmosphere, Christians were loath to take advantage of early attempts 
by the Ottoman authorities to institutionalise Muslim-Christian equality. Thus, even 
though the Ottoman Government almost immediately established administrative councils 
inclusive of Christians, 80 those serving on them rarely exercised their prerogatives when 
it went against the will of the Muslim majority. As put by one observer, it was not 
unusual that they should be `bullied down into consent... at the dictation of the Moslem 
members. "81 
Such resentment was further aggravated by what was a growing missionary presence. 
Under Ibrähim Pasha, Protestant and Catholic missions had been permitted to operate 
mole freely than ever before. "2For the most part, missionary activity was directed at 
`Eastern' Christians, 83 and little attempt was made at proselytising among Muslims. 84 So 
long as missionaries concentrated their efforts on other Christians, Muslims were 
80 Roderic H. Davison, "The Advent of the Principle of Representation in the Government of the Ottoman 
Empire" in Beginnings ofModernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century, eds., William R. Polk 
and Richard L. Chambers (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 98-99. 
81 Finn, Stirring Times, p. 179. See also Finn, Stirring Times, p. 202. Early on, at least, it was not unusual 
that even when having seats allotted them, Christians were not included on the councils. See, for example, 
Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, pp. 49-50. 
82 Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 63. 
83 See, for instance, Jessup, Fifty-Three Years, p. 242,243,244,289; also Finn, Stirring Times, pp. 151- 
153,147,223; and Jessup, Fifty-Three Years, pp. 244,289. 
84 See, for instance, Alex Carmel, "C. F. Spittler and the activities of the Pilgrims Mission in Jerusalem" in 
Ottoman Palestine 1800-1914, Studies in Economic and Social History, ed., Gad G. Gilbar (Leiden: E. J. 
Brill, 1990), p. 264. 
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prepared to tolerate their presence, "' and by the mid-nineteenth century, missionaries 
reported a decrease in Muslim interference in their activities. Even the promulgation of 
the Tanzimat reform known as the Hatt-i Humayün in 1856, allowing for conversion 
from Islam to Christianity, did not create too strong a backlash, though putting the 
principle into practice would prove another matter. "" Local Christians were not 
particularly supportive of Western missionary activity. Nonetheless, many Muslims 
found it hard to disassociate what was a growing European Christian presence (not only 
as represented by missionaries, but by merchants, pilgrims, and consuls as well) from a 
new assertiveness on the part of indigenous Christians. 
When the English Protestant missionary Reverend S. Lyde accidentally killed a Muslim 
in Nablus in the mid-nineteenth century, the Muslim community exacted its revenge 
against local Christian Arabs. 87 Attacks on local Christians were often inspired by the 
perception that a special relationship existed between them and their European 
coreligionists. 88 Hence, the aforementioned French intervention on behalf of the Maronite 
community in Lebanon set off a massacre of Christians in Damascus, which saw roughly 
Though sporadic attempts were occasionally made to limit missionary activity, particularly that of 
Protestants. See, for instance, FO 618/3, Quarterly Report of the British Charge d'Affaires in 
Constantinople, 14 April 1908. 
86 See, for instance, Henry Harris Jessup, Fifty-Three Years, pp. 267-268,291. See also James Finn, 
Stirring Times, pp. 211-212; and Elihu Grant, The People of Palestine, an Enlarged Edition of 'The 
Peasantry of Palestine, Life, Manners and Customs of the Village' (Westport, Connecticut: Hyperion Press 
Inc., 1921, reprinted 1976), p. 125. 
87 John Mills, Three Months 'Residence at Nablus and an Account of the Modern Samaritans (London: 
John Murray, 1864), pp. 101-102; also Mary Eliza Rogers, Domestic Life in Palestine, London, 1862, 
Reprint, London and New York, 1989, pp. 293-295. 
"" As noted by one European visitor to Palestine, Protestants were generally perceived as English, Latins as 
French, and Orthodox as Russian proteges. Ibid, p. 255. 
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10,000 killed. 89 The association between foreign and local Christians where mob violence 
was concerned seemingly worked in both directions. In 1876, for example, following the 
attempt of Greek Orthodox in Saloniki to prevent the conversion of a local Bulgarian girl 
to Islam, the resultant Muslim mob violence was equally directed against the French and 
German consuls, both of whom were killed. 90 Likewise, during the (above-noted) 
massacres of 1860, foreign consulates were among the first houses to be attacked. 91 
A new elite 
After reasserting their authority in the region, the Ottomans continued and even extended 
the reforms initiated by Ibrahim Pasha. These reforms, both political and economic, in 
concert with changes brought about by increased European-related economic activity, 
inevitably saw an undermining of the criterion determining elite status-one in which 
one's position with respect to Islamic institutions, 92 and one's reputation defined largely 
in Islamic terms, played a large role. While wealth had always constituted a factor in 
determining status as well, it was now to play an increasingly dominant role. 93 
s9 See Betts, Christians in the Arab East, pp. 22-23; also Shaw and Shaw, Reform, Revolution, and 
Republic, p. 143; Jessup, Fifiy-Three Years, pp. 157-214; and FO 78/1625, Robson's report, enclosed in a 
letter from Dufferin to Russell, No. 9, Beirut, 23 September 1860. 
90 Davison, "Turkish Attitudes, " p. 74. 
91 FO 78/1625, Robson's report, 23 September 1860. 
92 In addition to muftis and gädis, for instance, were the imams, the leaders of public prayer in the mosque, 
the hatips, who were in charge of public oration, the muezzins, who were in charge of summoning the 
faithful to prayer, and sheikhs, who acted as religious instructors to the general population. See Shaw, 
Empire of the Gazis, p. 138. 
93 See, for instance, Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, pp. 240-241; also Nels Johnson, Islam and the 
Politics ofMeaning in Palestinian Nationalism, London, Boston and Melbourne: Kegan Paul International, 
1982, pp. 14-15. 
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Effectively, these reforms lay the groundwork for what Doumani refers to in his study of 
mid-nineteenth century Nablus as the "politics of `free' trade. "94 While it is true, as 
discussed above, that Muslims lacked many of the advantages enjoyed by Christians vis- 
ä-vis Europeans, those of the till then existing elite, generally referred to as the notable 
class, were nonetheless, on the basis of their positions under the old order, 95 able to avail 
themselves of the new economic opportunities. In large part this reflected such 
opportunities' generally capital intensive nature, such that only established individuals 
and families (that is, those of the notable class) were able to take advantage of them. 
Additionally, most notables had over the course of time, established extensive networks, 
which they were now able to exploit in competing with merchants outside their own 
immediate region . 
96 Finally, as discussed more fully below, this developing new elite was 
able to co-opt newly created political structures. In a word, they were able to adapt, and 
while the basis of their elite status might have changed-likewise their exact place in the 
pecking order-the same notable families could still be found among the upper elite. As 
expressed by Doumani, the old ruling political families were being transformed into rich 
merchants. 7 
Probably the most significant new political structure created in connection with the 
Tanzimat reforms were the advisory councils, introduced in 1840,98 with the objective of 
94 Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, p. 129. 
95 Ibid, pp. 53,55. 
96 See, for instance, Owen, The Middle East, p. 90; also Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, pp. 55,93,118, 
188,213,240; and Gad G. Gilbar, "The Growing Economic Involvement, " pp. 193-198. 
97 See Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, p. 135; also ibid, pp. 51,240; and Butros Abu Manneh, `Aspects 
of Socio-Political Transformation in Palestine in the Tanzimat Period (1841-1876), ' paper presented at the 
conference, The Turks and Palestine: A Thousand Years of Relations, 22-24 June 2004, sponsored by Yad 
Izhak Ben-Zvi and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; and Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 35. 
98 In essence, a carry-over of the majlis al-shüra initiated by Ibrahim Pasha during the time of the Egyptian 
occupation. 
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giving local communities a role in local administration. Redesignated as administrative 
councils, or majälis al-idära99 with the Provincial Regulation of 1858, their main purpose 
was to better enable the Ottoman centre to maintain control of the outer provinces. In 
actual fact, they became a means by which the local elite was able to consolidate its 
authority at the local level. 10° The great majority of those sitting on the councils came 
from the notable families, 101 and while in theory they were supposed to represent the 
interests of the people at large, it quickly became apparent that it was their own interests 
with which they were primarily concemed. 102 Functioning as they did as intermediaries 
between the appointed governors and the local population, it was often only with their 
assistance that other Tanzimat reforms could be implemented. 10' It was thus fairly easy to 
ensure that such reforms were carried out only if and in such a way as would serve their 
own interests. 104 
Prior to the Tanzimat period, villages had been largely self-sufficient and had not 
los depended on the city for their livelihood. Economic integration together with the urban 
99 Singular, majlis al-idära. 
100 Hourani, "Ottoman Reform, " p. 62; also Shaw and Shaw, Reform, Revolution, and Republic, pp. 84-85, 
87; and Mattar, The Mufti ofJerusalem, pp. 2-3. 
'o1 See Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, p. 235. Also Abu Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period, " 
p. 12. 
102 See ibid, pp. 129-130,238-239. 
103 Hourani, "Ottoman Reform, " p. 62; see also Mattar, The Mufti ofJerusalem, p. 4. 
104 See, for instance, Hourani, "Ottoman Reform, " p. 62; also Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, p. 97; 
Shaw and Shaw, Reform, Revolution, and Republic, p. 86; and Yehoshua Porath, The Palestinian Arab 
NationalMovement: The Emergence, 1918-1929, Volume I (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1977), 
pp. 10-11. 
105 Abu Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period, " p. 4. 
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notables' appropriation of the new Ottoman administrative structures, the majälis al- 
i&ira in particular, quickly undermined whatever leverage the peasant class had had till 
then. 106 One's ability to exert influence among the peasantry had in large part depended 
on patronage, as well as the respect one enjoyed as a `good' Muslim-that is, that one 
was essentially honest and just (discussed above); it was now increasingly defined within 
the context of the new administrative structures. Once having appropriated control of 
these structures, the urban notables no longer needed the willing support of the peasantry, 
whether tacit or overt. 107 This tendency was further reinforced by the fact that, as urban 
notables residing in any given urban-centre found a common interest in competing with 
merchants from rival urban-centres (not to mention foreign merchants based in the 
coastal cities), internal rivalries quickly diminished. 108 As the possibility of a violent 
confrontation between rival notable families became less likely, the relative status of 
individual families became less dependent on their ability to employ actual physical 
force. 109 Correspondingly, notables found it less necessary to solicit support among the 
peasantry for the purpose of creating militias, something that had usually involved a 
certain degree of largesse. "o 
106 See, for instance, Mattar, The Mufti ofJerusalem, p. 4. Added to this was the fact that the peasantry was 
becoming increasingly dependent on the notables to act as intermediaries with the government in such 
matters as conscription, new legal codes, and new methods of collecting taxes. lbid, p. 4. See also Johnson, 
Islam and the Politics ofMeaning, p. 15. 
107 C. R. Pennell discusses what was a similar process in Morocco during the early part of the twentieth 
century. See C. R. Pennell, Morocco since 1830, A History (London: Hurst and Company, 1988). See in 
particular pp. 163-164. 
108 Joel S. Migdal, "The Effects of Regime Policies on Social Cohesion and Fragmentation" in Palestinian 
Society and Politics, ed., Joel S. Migdal (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 15. 
109 Divine, Politics and Society, p. 30. 
l1o Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, p. 35; also Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform, pp. 109-115. 
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The Tanzimat reforms (coupled with the effect of increased European economic 
penetration) saw authority increasingly concentrated in the towns. The majälis al-idära in 
particular helped effect a consolidation of notable interests, while simultaneously 
providing an effective mechanism by which urban notables might extend their authority 
over their respective hinterlands in a manner that circumvented the intermediary role of 
the country sheikhs (see below). "' The aforementioned networks established under the 
old order constituted an additional factor in this process. In much the same manner that 
they facilitated the exploitation of the peasantry by urban notables, they provided the 
framework by which the hinterlands were eventually absorbed into the political, 
economic and social nexuses of the urban centres. 112 The corresponding 
commercialisation of agriculture along with the growing pervasiveness of money 
lending' 3-the means by which town merchants were able to gain greater access to 
increasing crop surpluses-served to facilitate the consolidation of their control over the 
surrounding villages. 114 Additionally, through their control of the majälis al-idara, the 
notable class were also able to take advantage of reforms dealing with land-registration in 
order to expand their land holdings! " This also had the effect of depriving the peasantry 
of much of their land usage rights, as many became converted into sharecroppers and 
1" Hourani, "Ottoman Reform, " p. 62; also Abu Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period, " pp. 13,37. 
112 Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, p. 14,53,153,183-184,238-239; also Ted Swedenburg, "The Role 
of the Palestinian Peasantry in the Great Revolt (1936-1939), " in Islam, Politics and SocialMovements, 
eds., E. Burke III and I. Lapidus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 109,182. 
1 13 Gilbar, "The Growing Economic Involvement, " p. 205; and Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian 
Peasantry, " p. 174. See also Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, p. 134-136. 
114 Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, p. 239. 
1 15 A. Granott, The Land System in Palestine, History and Structure (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 
1952), pp. 72-77. 
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hired labourers. 116 Compounding the problem was the fact that too often, peasants were 
unable to pay their taxes. As a result, they were often forced to borrow money, and 
eventually, under the burden of tax and debt, to sell their land to wealthy notables. 
This process saw the diminution of the power of the rural elite, or country sheikhs, 117 
who until then had traditionally exercised a fair amount of authority within their 
respective nahiyas and villages. "8 In some cases, it had been considered that they held 
paramount power in the rural areas. Thus, for instance, in pre-Tanzimat Jerusalem, it was 
considered that the authority of the mütesellim, or governor, was entirely confined to the 
city and that the "country sheikhs were uncontrollable. "' 19 In addition to their role as 
intermediaries between village and town-based in part on their role as tax-collectors- 
the country sheikhs were responsible for maintaining law and order and dispensing 
justice in accordance with traditional law, or `urf120(discussed more fully in the last 
chapter). 121 As noted by one missionary, justice was "almost exclusively administered by 
116 Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry, " p. 173. 
"' The term country sheikh is here inclusive of both nährya sheikhs and village sheikhs. Under the pre- 
Tanzimat Ottoman administration, each sanjak was divided into subdistricts called nähryas. In addition to 
collecting taxes, the nähiya sheikh was responsible for maintaining law and order and dispensing justice 
(discussed further in the final chapter). In each village of the nähiyn, a local deputy or village sheikh, was 
appointed to run local affairs. Abu Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period, " pp. 4-5. 
"S See, for instance, Ermete Pierotti, Customs and Traditions ofPalestine, Illustrating the Manners of the 
Ancient Hebrews, trans., T. G. Bonney (Cambridge: Deighton, Bell and Company, 1864), pp. 201-202. 
119 Abu Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period, " p. 5; also Amy Singer, Palestinian Peasants and 
Ottoman Officials, RuralAdministration around Sixteenth-Century Jerusalem (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), p. 38. 
120 Perhaps best translated in this instance as `customary law. ' 
121 Abu Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period, " pp. 4-5. 
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the village sheikhs. i122 The authority enjoyed by the country sheikhs was sufficiently 
dependent on the support of the peasantry to ensure that they might reasonably keep their 
interests at heart. 123 Additionally, the country sheikhs enjoyed a certain degree of 
leverage vis-ä-vis the urban notables, something reflected in what were generally 
equitable relations between rural peasantry and townsfolk. 124 This was to change in two 
important respects. First, for the reasons noted above, the role of the country sheikh as 
intermediary between town and village was significantly undermined. Second, their 
authority within the villages themselves was directly diluted by the Tanzimat reforms. 
Effectively incorporated into the Ottoman bureaucratic system, the country sheikhs were 
stripped of their judicial powers and converted into appointed mukhtars. 125 As for the 
peasantry, they were left, as Abu Manneh expresses it, "leaderless, " leaving the 
countryside "open to the influence and domination of the city. "126 
In short, a new elite had come into being which, though consisting of many of the same 
notable families as before, was now based on a criterion defined to a much greater degree 
by wealth, particularly that derived of commerce. 127 Many notables were uncomfortable 
with the new basis of their elite status, and still tended to define it primarily in Islamic 
terms-either by holding positions within Islamic institutions or at the very least, 
"2 The Rev. C. T. Wilson, Peasant Life in the Holy Land (London: John Murray, 1906), p. 283. 
123 See, for instance, Douwes, The Ottomans in Syria, pp. 171-172; also Singer, Palestinian Peasants, 
pp. 44-45. 
'24 Thus, for instance, it was commented to the American missionary Elihu Grant at the turn-of-the-century 
by certain Palestinian natives that "half a century or more ago... the fellahin were often in the ascendancy 
and the city people glad to treat with them. " Grant, The People, p. 225. 
ýý Abu Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period, " p. 36; Porath, The Emergence, p. 10. 
17'6 Abu Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period, " p. 37. 
127 See, for instance, Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, p. 205. 
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maintaining reputations as pious Muslims. 128 More than just a question of sensibilities, in 
many respects, it was also imperative to their success as merchants. In the case of the 
former, it was often a means of acquiring waq " property, generally a good source of 
revenue. 130 Additionally, there was still some value in maintaining a certain degree of 
legitimacy among the peasantry, particularly in connection with the aforementioned 
networks. The surest way of doing this was through the cultivation of religious status. 131 
Nevertheless, affiliation with Islamic institutions was less the basis of elite status, and 
more a means of legitimising status after the fact-it provided a veneer of 
respectability. 132 
These developments had a particularly negative impact on the peasantry. It had always 
been the case that notable authority constituted something of a balancing act, between the 
legitimacy conferred by the higher Ottoman authority and that given by those over whom 
authority was exercised. As Hourani puts it, "[i]t is because [the notable] has access to 
authority that he can act as leader, and it is because he has a separate power of his own in 
m Of course, money could facilitate both, whether through exerting influence in obtaining a desirable post, 
marrying into a family of religious scholars, providing charity, or financing an infinite number of 
pilgrimages to Mecca. See ibid, pp. 232,240-241,266. 
129 A waqf (plural, awgäf) is a religious foundation or trust, whereby the related property is designated for a 
specific, usually charitable, function or purpose. For a fuller definition, see J. B. Barron, Mohammedan 
Wakfs in Palestine (Jerusalem: Palestine Government, 1922). 
130 See Gabriel Baer, "The Dismemberment ofAwgäf in Early Nineteenth-Century Jerusalem" in Ottoman 
Palestine 1800-1914, Studies in Economic and Social History, ed., Gad G. Gilbar (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), 
pp. 299-300,306-309,314-316. 
131 As expressed by Swedenburg, "the notables had to `work on' pre-capitalist ideologies of hierarchy, so 
as to reinforce the peasants' attitude of deference... " Ted Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian 
Peasantry, " p. 176. See also Johnson, Islam and the Politics ofMeaning, p. 15. 
132 See, for instance, Abu Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period, " pp. 18-19. 
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society that [the higher] authority needs him and must give him access. "133 What was 
changing was that the balance was shifting in favour of the former. Under the old system, 
the authority of the urban notables and country sheikhs had depended at least in part on 
the support they enjoyed among the peasantry, something in part determined by their 
ability to respond to the latter's needs, as well as to provide patronage. The peasantry had 
at least some leverage. 134 Under the new system, however, the authority enjoyed by the 
urban notables-likewise, that of the country sheikhs (now mukhtars)-was no longer 
dependent on peasant support. Given their control of the new political institutions, the 
notables no longer needed the peasantry to sanction their position. Unable to rely on 
traditional ties of reciprocity, the peasantry was increasingly. forced to resort to more 
formal Islamic institutions, particularly the Islamic courts, not only for the settling of 
internal disputes-previously the prerogative of the country sheikhs (on whom they no 
longer felt able to depend)-but as likely to defend themselves against the less 
scrupulous among the new class of notable merchants. 135 
All of this had a strong effect on how the peasantry came to view the notable class. There 
was a growing sentiment among the peasantry that its exploitative practices constituted 
something decidedly unethical. Worse even was that they seemed willing to exploit their 
control of formal Islamic institutions, particularly the courts, to better serve their own 
commercial interests. For many peasants, such unscrupulous behaviour would have 
seemed something entirely unworthy of Muslim notables. Given their decidedly un- 
Islamic behaviour then, it was not surprising to Muslim peasants that this new `merchant' 
133 Hourani, "Ottoman Reform, " p. 46. See also Divine, Politics and Society, p. 39. 
134 Evidenced, for instance, by the fact that sheikhs were often chosen "by acclamation or by general 
consent. " Grant, The People, p. 150. 
135 See, for example, Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, pp. 169,175. 
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elite should be open to non-Muslims. 136 In principle, one might still have conceived of 
the elite as constituting two different groups-on the one hand, Muslim notables, in 
control of the new political institutions, engaging in money lending practices, and owning 
large tracts of land; on the other, a commercial bourgeoisie, composed chiefly of 
Christians (as well as Europeans and Jews), representative of banking and merchant 
capital, 137 and also owning large tracts of land. Yet the line between the two had become 
blurred, and most peasants had begun to see them as constituting a single interest 
group. 138 As Swedenburg notes, "Muslim notables, allied with Christian merchants, [had 
come to constitute] the dominant sector. "139 Such a perception was hardly without basis. 
Certainly in the area of commerce, it was becoming quite common to find Muslims and 
Christians in partnership. 140 The two groups were interacting on levels other than the 
commercial one moreover. Thus, for instance, Muslim notables were increasingly 
inclined to send their children to Christian or missionary schools. 14' Together, the two 
had come to constitute a new elite-one derived first and foremost of commercial 
success. Significantly, it was this elite which would come to constitute the leadership of 
the Arab nationalist movement in Palestine during the British mandate period. 
1'613y the mid-nineteenth century, Christian merchants were even active in the area of Nablus, an area 
notably famous for its strong Islamic and conservative character, and with a very small Christian 
population. See Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, pp. 57,116. 
137 Hourani, "Ottoman Reform, " p. 68; also Migdal, "The Effects of Regime Policies, " p. 14. 
"See, for instance, Gilbar, "The Growing Economic Involvement, " pp. 188-210. 
139 Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry, " p. 174. 
140 See, for instance, Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, p. 166-168. 
la' Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, p. 60. Concerning the experience of one such Muslim, see Geoffrey 
Furlonge, Palestine Is My Country, pp. 33-34. 
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Ottomanism 
While, for Christians, probably the most important element of the Tanzimat was that 
elevating their status to one of equality with Muslims, l42 it was actually the various 
administrative and educational (not to mention civil and legal) reforms that gave the 
principle of equality practical effect. The majälis al-idära, for example, provided a forum 
within which they might actually exercise their new political status. 143 In reality, much of 
this remained more a matter of theory than fact. Nonetheless, coupled with the new 
commercial opportunities that now presented themselves and the relative advantage 
enjoyed by Christians in pursuing them, it is fair to say that by the end of the nineteenth 
century, the situation of Christians had markedly improved. The purpose of Ottoman 
reform efforts, however, had never been simply to improve the situation of Christians, but 
rather to reinvent the Ottoman Empire as a modem European nation-state. As part of this 
larger programme, an attempt was made to define an Ottoman national identity inclusive 
of all members of the state, regardless of faith. As expressed in the Constitution of 1876, 
all Ottoman subjects were to be considered "Osmanli, whatever religion or creed they 
hold. s144It was an identity to be understood primarily in secular terms, one inclusive of 
the members of the different religious communities. 
Problematic was that, until then, the legitimacy of the Ottoman dynasty, and by 
extension, the Empire, had been largely grounded in the Islamic faith-the right of the 
`House of Osman' to rule was based on its role as leader and protector of the religion of 
Islam. 145 For most Muslims, the prestige of the Empire was linked to Islam, and loyalty to 
'42 Thus, both the Hatt-i Sherif ofGülhane of 1839, and the more extensive Hatt-i Hümayun of 1856, called 
for the equal treatment of all subjects regardless of creed. Davison, "Turkish Attitudes, " pp. 63-64. 
143 See, for instance, Davison, "Turkish Attitudes, " p. 64; see also Daphne Tsimhoni, "The Status of the 
Arab Christians under the British Mandate in Palestine" in Middle Eastern Studies, 20 iv, 1984, p. 182. 
144 Davison, "Turkish Attitudes, " p. 64. 
145 Thid, p. 75. See also Shaw, Empire of the Gazis, pp. 113,164. 
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the one inherently implied loyalty to the other. For Christians of course, the exact 
relationship between Ottoman identity and religious identity was considerably more 
ambiguous. Arguably, the Ottoman authorities were not entirely clear themselves. On the 
one hand, they tried to provide Ottomanism with an Islamic basis in order to assure its 
acceptance by Muslims. " At the same time, they promoted the concepts of political 
representation and popular sovereignty with the objective of binding non-Muslims "by 
common interests to the common fatherland "47 Thus, for example, following a bad 
harvest in Nablus, in the name of Ottomanism, Muslims were asked to help those who 
had suffered on the basis of a shared faith, whereas Christians were encouraged to help 
because "those who are not coreligionists are [still] brothers in the fatherland [ikhwanI 
al-watan]. "las 
For many Muslims, reforms were understood more as being based on a generous 
interpretation of Islam with respect to non-Muslims than on any kind of secular 
principles. Thus, for example, while Christians were able to serve on the majälis al-idära 
established in the Arab provinces, it was generally as representatives of their respective 
communities more in keeping with their millet-status than in proportion to their size. '49 
Certainly they were never allowed to form a majority, even when making up the larger 
part of the respective population. '5° As noted above, at least early on, Christians very 
rarely went against the will of the Muslim majority, even when doing so ran contrary to 
146 Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 23. 
147 Ibid, p. 24. 
1'8 Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, p. 176. 
149 See, for instance, Davison, "The Advent, " p. 104. 
150 See, for instance, Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform, p. 198. 
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their own interests. "' Many were afraid to exercise their new rights, fearful that it would 
eventually result in a backlash against them, 152 a concern that no doubt reflected the 
realisation that most Muslims were having difficulties coming to terms with the idea of 
non-Muslims as political equals. 
To many Muslims, Christians seemed overly quick to take advantage of the opportunities 
afforded them in having been granted political equality, yet unwilling to own up to their 
new responsibilities. Many Christians resisted serving in the army, for example, 
something that till then had not been required of them. 153 This sentiment was further 
exacerbated by the various drives for autonomy or even independence by Christians in 
the Empire's European territories. Following an episode of sectarian violence in Crete, 
for instance, Muslims in Damascus began threatening local Christians, who, according to 
one missionary account, began fleeing "by the hundreds to the mountains and Beirut, 
fearing a repetition of the massacre of 1860 .? 
1154 Many Muslims saw a link between 
Christians having been granted equal political status and their sudden brazenness in 
challenging Ottoman authority. '55 Equally, they saw the newly created constitution-one 
that granted disproportionately high representation to non-Muslims-not as providing a 
means by which Christians, together with Muslims, might fulfil their civic duties to the 
Ottoman state, but rather as a concession to Christians' European backers and Christian 
separatism. '56 Certainly Muslims were loath to accept Christians in positions of authority. 
15' Finn, Stirring Times, pp. 179,202. See also Hourani, "Ottoman Reform, " p. 62. 
152 See, for instance, Finn, Stirring Times, p. 188. 
'53 See, for instance, Davison, "Turkish Attitudes, " pp. 63,67. See also FO 618/3, page 7, General Reports, ' 
Damascus 1912, where it is noted that Christians (as well as Jews) preferred to pay an exemption fee of £30 
rather than serve in the military. 
'54 Jessup, Fifty-Three Years, p. 328. 
155 Shaw and Shaw, Reform, Revolution, and Republic, p. 128. 
156 Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, pp. 30-31; also Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 94. 
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Thus, for example, the British consul, James Finn, noted that it was considered necessary 
that body-guards employed by consulates should be Muslim-these might "safely strike 
or lay hands on an unruly Moslem, or arrest him if a thief, which a Christian could not 
[do] without provoking a riot if not worse. "157 
Arab nationalism 
Ottomanism was not the only supra-communal identity to which Arabs might aspire- 
primary among its competitors were those of pan-Islamism and Arab nationalism, or 
Arabism. Though the former certainly had a powerful appeal, and a powerful effect on 
the manner in which the other two developed, we are here chiefly concerned with the 
latter. Arab nationalism, at least in its secular incarnation, during the latter part of the 
nineteenth century was essentially the province of Christian Arabs, often in connection 
with Protestant missionary educational institutions. 158 As developed by them, Arab 
nationalism was conceived primarily in secular terms, largely around the Arabic 
language, a language shared by both Muslims and Christians, and on the basis of which it 
was believed they might develop a sense of a shared cultural and historical identity. '59 
It should be borne in mind that Christians were in large part motivated by a desire to 
improve their political position16o; obviously, this would hardly constitute a motivating 
factor for Muslims. 161 Given the resistance most Muslims felt at the time towards 
157 Finn, Stirring Times, pp. 94. 
l-"8 See Zeine, The Emergence, pp. 52-53; also Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 245. 
159 Ibid, pp. 276-279. 
160 See Zeine, The Emergence, p. 53. 
16' Ibid, p. 61. 
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recognizing Christians as political equals, Arab nationalism conceived as such initially 
had little appeal among Muslims. 162 More than simply being an idea ahead of its time, it 
was completely at odds with how most Muslim Arabs in the Ottoman Empire conceived 
of their identity. Added to this was the fact that Muslims had less regular contact with 
Europeans and thus were not as familiar with ideas related to European secular 
nationalism. For Christians, it was more than simply a matter of being exposed to these 
ideas in missionary schools. Many were in constant, often daily contact with Europeans, 
and were thus regularly exposed to notions related to secular nationalism163; hence their 
greater receptivity towards them. Moreover, many Christians saw themselves as having a 
special role to play in transmitting these new ideas to their Muslim brethren. They would 
function as a bridge between Europe and the Islamic world, introducing ideas derived of 
modem European thought to their Muslim countrymen in much the same way that, 
centuries earlier, they had transmitted Greek and Roman culture and philosophical 
thought. 164 
All this is not to say that Muslim intellectuals were indifferent to the question of `who 
were the Arabs. ' They tended, however, to define Arab identity within an Islamic 
context. As developed by them, Arab identity, while also influenced by European notions 
of nationalism, took as its point of departure the umma, 165 or Islamic community. The 
political conception of Arab identity as an extension of the Islamic umma arguably had its 
roots in the political discourse of Jamäl al-Din al-Afghäni. 166 Al-Afghäni advocated pan- 
162 Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 38; Zeine, The Emergence, pp. 52-54 
163 See, for instance, Karpat, "Ottoman Views, " pp. 148-149. 
164 Betts, Christians in the Arab East, p. 120. 
165 Perhaps best defined in its religious sense as the community of believers. 
'66 Concerning al-Afghani's background, see Sylvia G. Haim, Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Los 
Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 6-8. 
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Islamism, though in a manner that transformed Islam from a belief-system into a modem 
political force aimed at binding Muslims together into a strong state capable of 
withstanding their enemies (that is, the European colonial powers). 167 Islam then was to 
become a means of producing a state of political solidarity-asabiyyah' -among its 
practitioners. 169 While one ought not to confuse the pan-Islamism advocated by al- 
Afghäni with nationalistic belief, it did foster an activist attitude towards politics, 
arguably an attitude which constituted a necessary pre-condition for the spread of Arab 
nationalist thought. 170 Al-Afghani's concept of asabiyyah was further developed by one 
of his disciples, ' Abdällah al-Nadim, a radical journalist and political agitator, who 
sought to use the concept of asabiyyah, or Muslim solidarity, to rouse the population at 
the time of the 'Urab rebellion. Significantly, he argued that Muslim solidarity should be 
inclusive of Copts (Egyptian Christians) and Jews in a display of national unity. This 
represented a break with an orthodox understanding of the umma, which until than had 
not permitted non-Muslims to be full members of the body politic. That said, Muslims, 
were to remain its dominant element. 171 
More important with respect to the link between Arab national identity and Islam was 
Muhammad Rashid Rida. 12 Together, with his mentor Muhammad 'Abduh, he initiated 
the Islamic reform movement known as salafiyyah-a `return to the way of the 
ancestors. ' Under Rashid Rida, the salafiyyah movement placed emphasis on the Arab 
167 Ibid, pp. 12-14. 
168 Translated variously as nationalism, tribalism, tribal solidarity, and esprit de corps. 
169 Haim, Arab Nationalism, p. 13. 
170 See ibid, p. 15. 
"' Ibid, p. 16. 
172 Concerning Rashid Rida's background, see ibid, pp. 20-21. 
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people as the Muslim community par excellence. They represented the Islam practised by 
Muhammad and his immediate successors through the Abbasid period. This was to be 
distinguished from later Islamic practice, which was understood as having been corrupted 
due to the umma's eventual domination by non-Arab peoples-in particular, the Turks. 173 
The Arab community, or umma, was distinguished as something apart from them. For 
Rashid Rida, the Arab umma did not constitute an end in itself, but rather the means by 
which Islam was to be revitalised. Indeed, Rashid Rida came around to support Arab 
independence only after the Young Turks, following the deposition of the Ottoman 
Sultan ' Abdulhamid II in 1908, began to demonstrate an indifference towards Islam. His 
emphasis always remained on Islam, and his thinking would have a profound effect on 
how Muslim intellectuals came to perceive the nature of Arab identity-that it was to be 
understood first and foremost within an Islamic context. As with Muhammad Rashid 
Rida, many subsequent Muslim intellectuals would prove `more Arab Muslim than 
Muslim Arab. "74 Specifically, salafi Arabism, as it came to be known, would have a 
strong appeal among second-rank notables (the younger members of notable families) as 
well as what was a growing professional class, 175 both of whom, while supporting the 
constitutionalism and greater liberalism represented by the Tanzimat, were opposed to its 
centralising tendencies. 176 
Important with respect to later developments was the fact that salafi Arabism effectively 
constituted an anti-establishment socio-political movement. Both second-rank notables 
"ý See, for instance, Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 36; also Haim, Arab Nationalism, p. 22. 
171 Ibid, p. 24. 
175 Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 48. 
176 See Rashid Khalidi "Society and Ideology in Late Ottoman Syria: Class, Education, Profession and 
Confession" in Probleins of the Modem Middle East in Historical Perspective, Essays in honour of 
Hourani, ed., John Spangnolo, (Reading: Ithaca Press (for the Middle East Centre, St. Anthony's College, 
Oxford), 1996), pp. 119-131. 
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and young professionals often enough found themselves competing for the same 
positions, both, as noted above, because such positions tended to be monopolised by the 
traditional elite, and on account of Christian (and Jewish) competition. Owing to the 
movement's emphasis on reason and progress, and thus the possibility of obtaining 
position and prominence in the Ottoman bureaucracy on the basis of merit, the movement 
had a strong appeal among the younger generation of students attending modem 
Tanzimat schools. At the same time, it was a `religious rationalisation' of modem ideas 
and institutions, one instilled with an ethnic consciousness that gave pride of place to 
Muslim Arabs. "' The practical implication was that, under the system espoused by salaft 
Arabism, the highest levels within the bureaucracy, at least regionally, should fall to 
them-hence also their support for liberalisation and opposition to centralisation. Among 
other things, centralisation served to maintain the status of the traditional elite. 
In any case, with the involvement of Muslim intellectuals in the formulation of Arab 
identity, Christians quickly recognised the need to acknowledge the special place of 
Islam in a shared Arab heritage. 17" Of course, there had never really been any question 
that a connection existed between Arab identity and Islam. At issue was the nature of that 
connection. Christians tended to define Islam more as one aspect, albeit a very significant 
one, of a more broadly defined Arab identity; one essentially secular in character, based 
on a common race and a shared language, and equally encompassing non-Muslims as 
well as Muslims. In keeping with this perspective, Christians now sought to recast 
Islamic history as Arab history. The curriculum of the Madrasa al-Dustüriyya19 school, 
177 Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 48. 
178 Hopwood, The Russian Presence, pp. 175-176; also C. Earnest Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism: 
Essays on the Origins ofArab Nationalism (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1973), pp. 387-388. 
19 For a description of the Madrasa al-Dustüriyya, see Ami Ayalon, Reading Palestine, Printing and 
Literacy, 1900-1948 (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 2004), p. 33. 
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established by the Orthodox Christian intellectual Khalil al-Sakäkini ß° in Jerusalem in 
1909,181 was indicative of just such an approach. 182 In any event, prior to the First World 
War, Arab nationalism as a movement made little impact. "" Certainly it produced 
nothing resembling a broader political programme, and so long as this remained the case, 
differences between Muslim and Christian conceptions of Arab identity remained largely 
abstract. Moreover, its political implications with respect to non-Muslims remained 
something that largely concerned only Christians. Not surprisingly, the great majority 
favoured the idea of a secular state within which religion, while having an honoured 
place, would be divorced from government. '84 
Palestine's Arab Christians 
At the start of the British Mandate, the great majority of Palestine's Christians were Arab 
(that is, `Greek') Orthodox! " The next largest community was the Latin Catholic one. In 
addition, there were sizeable communities of Greek Catholics (also known as Melkites), 
Protestants, Maronites, Armenians (of which most were Orthodox, or Gregorian18) and 
"" An educator by profession, Sakäkini was initially a strong supporter of the CUP (see below). He would 
quickly become disillusioned with them, however, and become involved in Arab nationalist politics. 
'$' Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, p. 45. 
1.. As Khalidi (1998) put it, the school "reimagin[ed] what had heretofore been taught as Islamic history as 
Arab history. " Ibid, p. 50. 
183 See, for instance, Zeine, The Emergence, pp. 60-63. 
184 See, for instance, Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 277; also Hopwood, The Russian Presence, p. 176. 
"" See below. 
For the purposes of this paper, all Armenians, whether Orthodox, Catholic or Protestant, are considered 
as constituting one community. In large part, this reflects the fact that Armenians regardless of church 
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non-Chalcedonian Orthodox (such as the Syrian Orthodox, or Jacobites). At the 
beginning of the Mandate, Christians made up close to 11 percent of the total Arab 
population. 187 Though Christian birth-rates would not keep pace with Muslim ones, as of 
1931, they still constituted a little over 10 percent of the total Arab population. '88 While 
Palestine's Christian population was generally widely dispersed, '89 there were certain 
cities where Christians featured more prominently than others-for instance, Jerusalem, 
Bethlehem, Ramallah and Jaffa, as well as Haifa, Acre, Nazareth, Tiberias and Safad. 190 
Likewise, there were certain areas where Christian villages tended to be concentrated- 
considered themselves as constituting a nation apart from the Arabs. Pedersen, The Holy Land Christians, 
pp. 114-115. 
in Based on the figures given in the 1922 Census-see Table I, p. 5, in Palestine, Reports and General 
Abstracts of the Census of 1922, Taken on the 23'd of October, 1922, compiled by J. B. Barron, 
Superintendent of the Census (London, 1922); also Janet Abu-Lughod, "The Demographic Transformation 
of Palestine, " in The Transformation of Palestine, Essays on the Origin and Development of the Arab- 
Israeli Conflict, ed., Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1971), 
p. 142. 
'8" Based on the figures given in the 1931 census-see Table VII, Part I, pp. 24-25, in Census of Palestine 
1931, Volume II, Part II, Tables, by E. Mills, B. A., O. B. E., Assistant Chief Secretary, Superintendent of 
Census, by Authority, Printed for the Government of Palestine, by Messrs. Whitehead Morris Limited, 
Alexandria, 1933; also Abu-Lughod, "The Demographic Transformation of Palestine, " p. 144. It might be 
noted that the figures given for Christians for both censuses were inclusive of foreigners. By 1931, this 
would account for a sizeable number-based on the statistics for `citizenship, ' 86 per cent of the Christian 
population at that time was indigenous, 2.5 per cent from other Arab countries, and 11.5 per cent from 
Europe or America (though some of the latter were Arab Christian emigrants returning to Palestine or local 
Christians who had obtained foreign protection). The great majority of foreign Christians were Protestant. 
See Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 20. 
189 O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 36; Tsimhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians, " pp. 185-186. 
190 O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 36. 
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for instance, around Acre, Nazareth and Ramlah. 191 Christians tended to be well 
integrated with respect to the larger Muslim population, often living side-by-side with 
them, even in the smaller villages. Certainly this was the case with the Orthodox, many of 
whom lived in remote and rural Muslim areas, and were relatively unexposed to 
Europeans. '92 In some areas, there were hardly any Christians at all. Most notable in this 
respect was `the bloody triangle, ' encompassing Nablus, Jenin and Tulkarm (so named 
because of the blood feuds between the various important families there), which had very 
few Christians. 193 The town of Hebron had no Christians at all (though there was a 
sizeable Jewish community). 194 As of the 1931 census, of the roughly 24 per cent of rural 
Christians living in villages, half lived in villages where they constituted a minority. 195 
Even when living apart, however, there was often little to distinguish an Orthodox 
Christian village from a Muslim one. At the time of the Mandate, one Orthodox Christian 
commented to a visiting Western pilgrim that "[b]etween a Moslem and a Christian 
village, there was no discernible difference"196 For a breakdown of the Christian 
population as of 1922 by town and village, see Table A. l in the Appendix. 
19' Ibid, p. 36. Tsimhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians, " p. 184, footnote 126. It might be noted here 
that Trans-Jordan (modem-day Jordan), which as of the beginning of the Mandate was considered part of 
Palestine, had a sizeable Christian population as well. During the mandate period, they numbered between 
25-30,000. Betts, Christians in the Arab East, p. 67. 
'2 Daphne Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the Palestinian Arab National Movement during the 
Formative Stage, " in The Palestinians and the Middle East Conflict, An International Conference held at 
the Institute ofMiddle Eastern Studies, University of Haifa, April 1976, ed., Gabriel Ben-Dor, (Ramat Gan, 
Israel, Turtledove Publishing, 1978), p. 83. See also O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 34. 
193 See Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, p. 23; also Finn, Stirring Times, p. 238. 
194 See also ibid, p. 253. 
195 O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " pp. 36-37. 
''6 Harry Emerson Fosdick, A Pilgrimage to Palestine (New York: Macmillan, 1927), p. 260. See also 
Grant, The People, pp. 44,221. 
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A high level of integration was also evident in the larger towns, even those containing 
sizeable Christian populations. Jaffa circa 1840 is case in point. An examination of the 
eight main neighbourhoods shows that Christians and Muslims were fairly intermixed- 
with the possible exception of Sheikh Ibrahim, all had sizeable numbers of both. 
Table 1.1. Religious Distribution of Jaffa's Neighbourhoods circa 1840 
Neighbourhood Muslims (%) Christians (%) 
Fallahin 70 30 
Sheikh Ibrahim 91 9 
Marah 72 28 
Naqib 88 12 
Nasara 21 79 
Qal'a 50 50 
Tabiyya 63 37 
Burj 34 66 
Note: The above figures are based on the selling of contracts for homes from the 
period in question. Mahmud Yazbak, `Jaffa: The Formation of the City and Society 
at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century According to Local Sources, ' paper 
presented at the conference, The Turks and Palestine: A Thousand Years of 
Relations, 22-24 June 2004. 
The high level of integration between Muslims and Christians, particularly Orthodox, 
was often evident in their manners and customs. Many local Christians had over time 
come to adopt what were essentially Islamic practices. Thus, one English missionary, 
while visiting Nablus during the mid-nineteenth century, observed local Christians 
applying rules of inheritance based on the shari ä. l97 The Russian Orthodox missionary 
Porfiri Uspenski, while visiting Palestine and Syria in the mid-nineteenth century, noted 
that many Muslim practices such as the veiling of women and their strict segregation in 
harems were adopted by Christians. '98 He further noted that "[t]he Arab Muslims and 
197 Mills, Three Months'Residence, pp. 155-159. 
198 Hopwood, The Russian Presence, p. 30. 
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Christians are exactly the same in Palestine-in language, customs and vices, the worst 
vice being blood revenge. "199 An Arab Christian admitted that "[w]e are very ignorant, 
the only difference between our women and those of the Moslems is that the latter swear 
by the Prophet and ours by the Virgin. "200 Mary Eliza Rogers, the sister of the British 
vice-Consul in Palestine, while travelling through the country during the mid-nineteenth 
century, noted that Christian women in particular were "very much wedded to the ancient 
customs of the country, and... will not abandon them notwithstanding the persevering 
efforts of the priesthood. ? Q01 While the priests did try to discourage practices that were at 
odds with church dogma, often by threatening excommunication, it was noted that "if the 
priests persisted in carrying out their threats.... Their congregations would soon be 
scattered; so they are lenient, and thus Greek and Roman forms of Christianity are 
blended insensibly with [customary] ceremonies and practices. "202 For their part, many 
Muslims considered local Christian churches to be the equivalent of saints' shrines , 
203 
and between Muslims and Christians, there were many common saints, festivals, and 
holy places. 204 
19' Ibid, p. 30. Concerning superstitions shared by both Christians and Muslims, see Wilson, Peasant Life, 
pp. 47-52; also Philip G. Baldensperger, "The Immovable East, " in Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly 
Statement (PEFQS), 1906, p. 100. 
200 Wilson, Peasant Life, p. 55. Concerning similarities in the practice of Muslims and Christians, see also 
Elihu Grant, The People, pp. 93,117. 
201 Rogers, Domestic Life, p. 97. Though she was speaking here specifically about the Greek Catholic 
community, it might equally have applied to the Orthodox one. 
202 Ibid, p. 97. 
203 Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry, " p. 172. 
204 Hopwood, The Russian Presence, p. 30. 
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The high level of Christian integration with respect to the larger Muslim community was 
also evident in the Christian communal law courts, which in many cases, adopted Muslim 
laws, particularly those related to inheritance. 205 Even with respect to marriage, in the 
case of the Orthodox at least, while practice was in principle based on the old Byzantine 
law, the Arab laity and lower clergy often adopted customs derived of the shari'a. 206 This 
came, in fact, to constitute one of the bases for the conflict between them and the Greek 
higher clergy (discussed more fully below). 207 The tendency for adopting Muslim law 
was particularly evident among Orthodox Christians, though also to a lesser extent 
among Greek Catholics, Armenians, and in certain remote districts, Latin Catholics208 
Cases related to intestate succession and the guardianship of minors were generally not 
even dealt with in the respective communal court, but rather were referred to the Islamic 
shari'a courts. 209 Christian religious foundations further served to integrate Christians 
within the larger Muslim community inasmuch as such `wagfs'were permitted only if 
done in accordance with Muslim law and before a shari'a court. As such, all matters 
pertaining to religious properties established for the benefit of Christians came under the 
jurisdiction of the shari'a courts. 210 
205 Tsimhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians, " p. 173. 
206 Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 131. 
207 Tsimhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians, " p. 173. For instance, concerning the performance of 
bigamous marriages by Orthodox priests. Ibid, p. 173, footnote 43. 
208 ISA 2/B, B/20/38, Report by the Haifa and Northern District Commissioner, 2 May 1929. 
209 Tsimhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians, " p. 173. This affinity for Islamic law would carry over 
into the mandate period. See Hopwood, The Russian Presence, p. 203. 
210 Uri M. Kup ferschmidt, The Supreme Muslim Council: Islam under the British Mandate for Palestine 
(Leiden; New York: E. J. Brill, 1987), p. 87. 
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As noted above, Orthodox Arabs by far comprised the largest Christian community in 
Palestine. (For a complete breakdown of Palestine's Christians by church community as 
of 1922, see Tables A. 2 and A. 3 in the Appendix. ) The Patriarchate was (and still is) 
based in Jerusalem. The Orthodox community was the oldest Christian community in 
Palestine, its patriarchate tracing its origins to the sub-apostolic Bishopric of Jerusalem, 
which dated back to the very founding of the faith . 
211 At the beginning of the Mandate, 
Orthodox Arabs numbered roughly 33,400.212 By 1931, their numbers had risen close to 
38,000.213 The community was particularly strong in Jerusalem, where, as of 1931, they 
numbered over 5,500.214 During the Mandate, they made up the majority of the Christian 
population in eight of the eighteen subdistricts, 215 and could be found in large numbers in 
the towns of Bethlehem (particularly in its suburbs of Bayt Jala and Bayt Sahur), 
Ramallah, Nazareth, Jaffa, Ramlah, Lydda and Acre, as well as in a number of Christian 
villages in Judea and Galilee. In towns where Christians outnumbered Muslims, 
Orthodox Arabs often made up the majority of the former-particularly notable in this 
respect were Jerusalem and Ramallah. In Nazareth and Bethlehem, two other cities 
dominated by Christians, the numbers were equally divided between Orthodox and 
Catholics. 216 Arguably then, they held considerable sway within the overall Christian 
community. There was some historical precedence for this-in the mid-fifteenth century, 
211 Pedersen, The Holy Land Christians, pp. 9,20; Fannie Fern Andrews, The Holy Land UnderMandate, 
Volume I (Westport, Connecticut: Hyperion Press, Inc., 1931), p. 153. 
212 From Table XII, p. 43 in Census of 1922. 
213 Table VII, Part III, pp. 29-43 in Census of Palestine 1931, Volume H. If including those claiming 
European origin (mainly Greek and Russian), the number was closer to 40,000. Ibid. 
214 Counting non-Arab Orthodox (again, mostly from Greece and Russia), the number was closer to 6,550. 
Ibid. 
215 O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 38. 
216 See Table XIV, p. 45, and Table XVI, p. 50, both in Census of 1922. 
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the `Greek' Orthodox were the first Christians to be recognised by the Ottoman Sultan as 
constituting a semi-autonomous millet. Additionally, the Patriarchate in Istanbul was 
initially granted authority over all Christians in the Empire, whether Orthodox or not. The 
Armenians would not be granted status as a separate millet until roughly a century later; 
the Catholics, not until the late-eighteenth century- 217 
As the longest standing Christian communities in Palestine, the Orthodox were also the 
most well integrated with respect to the larger Muslim community. This was particularly 
evident in towns where, though having a strong presence, Muslims made up the clear 
majority-for instance, Jaffa, Ramlah, Lydda and Acre. As noted above, Orthodox Arabs 
were more inclined to adopt Muslim practices. Culturally, they often had more in 
common with their Muslim neighbours than other Christian Arabs. Moreover, Orthodox 
had traditionally tended to maintain good relations with the dominant Muslim families. 
This was reinforced by the fact that Orthodox Arabs were more inclined than other 
Christians to send their*children to Ottoman state schools. 218 Finally, historically 
speaking, there had for a long time existed a general feeling of hostility towards Western 
Christendom, one dating back to the schism between the Latin Catholic and Orthodox 
churches of 1054, and later reinforced by the Crusades, during which time Orthodox had 
often faired as poorly if not worse than Muslims. 219 
As well integrated as they were, Orthodox Arabs were not entirely impervious to foreign 
influence, and during the latter part of the nineteenth century, they became the target of 
Russian missionary efforts. In many respects, Russian missionaries operated as agents of 
the Russian Government-through them, Russia hoped to further its own imperial 
217 The Protestant millet, established in 1850, was the last Christian community to be recognised as such by 
the Ottoman authorities. Shaw and Shaw, Reform, Revolution, and Republic, p. 126 
218 Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, p. 123. 
219 See, for instance, Karpat, "Ottoman Views, " p. 136. 
67 
interests in the Ottoman Empire. 22° Thus, Russia quickly involved itself in what till then 
had been a local conflict between the Greek-dominated higher clergy and the Arabic- 
speaking laity. At heart, the conflict revolved around the question of whether the 
Orthodox community was ethnically `Arab' or `Greek' (discussed more fully in the next 
chapter). The laity asserted the former, while the higher clergy maintained the latter. 
Russia sided with the laity in the belief that if the authority of the `Greek' Patriarch were 
undermined, the Orthodox community would transfer its loyalty to the Russian branch of 
the Orthodox faith. This of course would facilitate Russia's ability to further involve 
itself in Ottoman internal affairs. The actual effect of such support, however, was more to 
stir up Arab nationalist passions than to create a correspondence between local Orthodox 
interests and Russian imperial ones 22' 
Though not as large as the Orthodox community, the Catholic community, made up 
primarily of Latin and Greek Catholics, was considerable. A large number of these were 
converts. Over the course of the nineteenth century, roughly a third of the Orthodox 
community converted to Catholicism, tm the great majority as Greek Catholics, 223 or 
Melkites, 224 who, though recognising the authority of the Papacy, maintained their 
Eastern rites. The Greek Catholic community was recognised as a separate millet in 
220 Hopwood, The Russian Presence, p. 212. 
221 Ibid, pp. 165,170. 
2" Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, pp. 14-15. 
223 By the time of the Mandate, roughly a quarter of Orthodox Arabs in Palestine had become Greek 
Catholic. Betts, Christians in the Arab East, p. 66. 
224 The term, meaning `Emperor's men, ' was originally used to designate Greek Orthodox in recognition of 
their fidelity to the Emperor Marcian in connection with the decision taken at the Council of Chalcedon 
against the Monophysite doctrine. "The History of the Melkites, " http: //www. opuslibani. org. lb/egliseeng/ 
003/ hi., toirc. htiul. 4 March 2002. Though later abandoned by the mainstream Orthodox conununity. the 
term was maintained by Greek Catholics. Betts, Christians in the Arab East, p. 45. 
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1848,225 and until now, there has existed a Greek Catholic Patriarch based in Damascus, 
with bishops representing the various communities throughout the Levant. By the time of 
the First World War, the largest Greek Catholic communities were to be found in 
Lebanon, though a fair number could also be found in Palestine. 226 As of the 1922 census, 
Greek Catholics in Palestine numbered close to 11,200, the great majority of them (a little 
over 9,800) residing in the northern part of the country. 227 They were particularly well 
represented in the Galilee region and constituted roughly half the Christian population in 
Haifa, likewise those in the medium-size towns of Shafa Amr (near Haifa) and Mughar 
(near Tiberias). In the Christian villages of Ma'alia, Fassuta, Iqrit, Bassa and `Aylabun 
(all in the Acre sub-district), they made up clear majorities. Additionally, they formed a 
sizeable minority in Nazareth, where they made up roughly 20 percent of the overall 
Christian population. 228 In Jerusalem, their numbers were quite small, and during the 
mandate period, only a little over 200 resided there. 229 
At the time of the 1922 census, Latin Catholics in Palestine numbered over 14,000.730 By 
1931, their numbers would approach 19,000.231 A good number of these, however- 
roughly 2,500-would be non-Arab, coming primarily from Europe. 2 The great 
225 "The History of the Melkites" (website). 
226 O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 36. 
227 From Table XII, p. 43 in Census of 1922. 
228 See Table XVI, p. 50 in ibid. 
229 From Table VII, pp. 29-43 in Census of Palestine 1931, Volume II. 
230 From Table XII, p. 43 in Census of 1922. 
231 See Table VII, Part III, pp. 2943 in Census of Palestine 1931, Volume Ii. 
232 Ibid. 
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majority of Latin Catholics resided in and around Jerusalem and Bethlehem, close to 
10,000 altogether. 233 The northern part of Palestine accounted for most of the rest, the 
greater part residing in Haifa, Acre and Nazareth 234 Smaller concentrations of Latin 
Catholics could also be found in Jaffa, and in such rural communities as `Ain Karim and 
Zababdeh. The Latin Catholic Patriarchate was first established in Jerusalem in 1099, 
with that city's capture by the Crusaders. With their departure at the end of the thirteenth 
century, the Patriarchate ceased to exist. It would not be revived until 1847, largely by the 
efforts of Pope Pius IX, though in the interim, Latin Catholics would maintain a presence 
in Palestine through their various religious orders. 23' The most important of these was the 
Franciscan order, which, through the Latin Order of the Holy Sepulchre, or Custodia 
Terrae Sanctae, was made responsible by the Pope for the holy shrines and the religious 
welfare of Catholic pilgrims. 236 
Regarding the lay community, with the notable exception of the Latin Catholic 
community in Bethlehem, held by some to be a remnant of the original Medieval Latin 
the great majority were made up of community established there by the Crusaders, ' 
converts, many of whom were attracted by the educational opportunities afforded them 
by Catholic missionary schools. 28 Not unrelatedly, many of them tended to be urban, 
233 See Table XII, p. 43 in Census of 1922. 
234 In 1922, this amounted to roughly 4,000 Latin Catholics. See ibid. 
235 Pedersen, The Holy Land Christians, p. 84; also Finn, Stirring Times, p. 44. 
236 See Andrews, The Holy Land, p. 158; and Pedersen, The Holy Land Christians, pp. 51-52. 
237 See, for instance, Philip J. Baldensperger, "Morals of the Fellahin (Answers to Questions), " Palestine 
Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement, 1897, pp. 123-134; Robert Brenton Betts, Christians in the Arab 
East, p. 57; Millicent Fawcett, Easter in Palestine, 1921-1922 (London: T. Fisher Unwin Limited, 1926), 
p. 19. See also Runciman, The Historic Role, p. 12. 
238 See, for instance, Donald Attwater, The Uniate Churches of the East (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 
1961), p. 19. 
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well-educated, and Western-oriented. During the late-Ottoman period, unlike what was 
the case with most of the other Christian communities-including Greek, Syrian and 
Armenian Catholics-the Latin Catholics were not considered as constituting a millet, 
largely because they were not considered an indigenous community. Instead, they were 
represented by a special agent and granted special rights with respect to judicial matters 
and internal administration 239 Their Western orientation remained quite evident during 
the Mandate, something reflected in part by the large non-Arab Latin Catholic 
community residing in Palestine. Though mostly there in connection with the various 
religious orders, 240 they nevertheless tended to be well integrated with the indigenous 
Catholic community. A few other smaller Catholic communities existed in Palestine at 
the time of the Mandate. Most prominent among these were the Armenian Catholics, the 
Syrian Catholics, and the Assyrian Catholics, numbering as of the 1931 census roughly 
330,170, and 100, respectively. Almost all of these resided in Jerusalem and the 
immediate surrounding area.. 24' 
Protestant Arabs, though not constituting a unified community in the same sense as the 
Orthodox and Catholic communities, did share certain features in common. Hence, 
O'Mahony refers to them as having constituted a quasi-millet. 242 They tended to be the 
best educated in the secular sense-correspondingly, they were also the most liberal and 
progressive of all the Christian Arab communities, and thus the most open to European 
notions. 243 At the beginning of the Mandate, Protestants in Palestine numbered less than 
239 O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 21. 
240 Concerning the various orders, see Andrews, The Holy Land, pp. 158-159. See also Luke and Keith- 
Roach, The Handbook, p. 49. 
241 From Table VII, Part III, pp. 29-43 in Census of Palestine 1931, Volume II. 
242 O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " pp. 21,23. 
243 Betts, Christians in the Arab East, p. 58. 
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7,000.244 Mostly they were concentrated in Jerusalem, Ramlah, Nazareth, Lydda and 
Haifa, as well as some of the Arab villages in Judea and the Galilee region. Notable 
among the latter were Bir Zayt, Zababdeh, Rafidiya, and Kafr Yasif. 245 A sizeable 
community existed in Amman in neighbouring Trans-Jordan as well . 
2` 6 Although 
Protestant Arabs tended to associate themselves with the West to a greater degree than 
did other Christians Arabs, they were also among the most ardent of nationalists. 
In large part, their strong commitment to Arab nationalism reflected the fact that, well up 
through the end of the Mandate, the heads of most of the Protestant churches remained 
European, often as not English, Scottish, or German, depending on the church in 
question. 247 Most of the Protestant churches in Palestine had strong connections with 
their respective mother churches in Europe and North America; moreover, large parts of 
their congregations consisted of resident Europeans and North Americans. 248 Both factors 
reflected the relative youth and small size of the respective church communities. 
Nonetheless, it was not long before Protestant Arabs were demanding that positions 
within the church leadership be filled by their own '(see below). Sensitivities over what 
for many seemed a manifestation of European colonialism within their own church 
hierarchies had a similar effect on Protestant Arabs as that engendered among Orthodox 
Arabs by the Orthodox clergy-laity conflict. 
24' Table XII, p. 43 in Census of 1922. 
245 Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, pp. 16-17,29-30; O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 39. 
246 Betts, Christians in the Arab East, p. 67. 
247 Ibid, p. 5 8. 
248 Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 20. 
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As noted, the largest Protestant community in Palestine (as well as in Trans-Jordan) 
during the Mandate was the Anglican one 249 Given the predominance of British 
influence (and British missionaries), this is perhaps not surprising. It was represented not 
only in the Bishopric in Jerusalem, established since 1841, but also by several Anglican- 
based educational institutionsu° (of which many Arabs, Muslims as well as Christians, 
took advantage251). Presbyterian, Lutheran and Templar communities could also be found 
in Palestine. 2 Though not constituting a unified community, ties did exist between the 
various Protestant churches. Often enough these reflected efforts at ecumenicism, though 
sometimes, they reflected broader political considerations and came at the prompting of 
respective `home countries. ' Thus, for example, the aforementioned Anglican Bishopric 
was originally founded as a joint Anglican-German Lutheran enterprise. It was only in 
1881, that the Bishopric became solely Anglican, the resident bishop thereafter bearing 
the title Bishop of the Church of England in Jerusalem. 253 
Two other Christian communities existing in Palestine during the Mandate warrant 
mention here, which, though small, had some bearing on Muslim-Christian relations. 
These were the Armenian and Maronite communities. In many ways, the experience of 
the Armenians paralleled that of the Orthodox Arabs; like them, they had, beginning in 
249 By 1931, it constituted roughly 5.3 per cent of the overall Christian population. O'Mahony, "Palestinian 
Christians, " p. 38. See also Betts, Christians in the Arab East, p. 58. 
250 The most prominent being St. George's Primary and Secondary School in Jerusalem, established in 
1842. Tsimhoni, "The Anglican Community, " p. 253. 
251 Ibid. 
252 As of 1922, of the close to 7,000 Protestants residing in Palestine, roughly 4,500 were Anglican; 
350 Presbyterian and 430 Lutheran. See Table XII, p. 43 in Census of 1922. See also Tsimhoni, The British 
Mandate, p. 30. 
253 Luke and Keith-Roach, The Handbook, pp. 53-54; also Andrews, The Holy Land, pp. 162-163; and 
Tsimhoni, "The Anglican Community, " pp. 251-252. 
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the early nineteenth century, looked to Russia for support in the fulfilment of nationalist 
aspirations. 254 Unlike the case with the former, it had not translated into a sense of shared 
identity with their Muslim neighbours. Though their numbers were fairly large with 
respect to the Ottoman Empire as a whole, in Palestine, they were quite small. Prior to 
1914, the Armenian community in Palestine was largely a monastic one. It was made up 
almost entirely of Armenian Orthodox, or Gregorians, and was mostly concentrated in 
Jerusalem around the Monastery of Saint James. An Armenian patriarch had resided in 
Jerusalem since at least the early fourteenth century, 255 and by the time of the Mandate, 
Armenian patriarchal property had come to occupy so much of the southwest corner of 
the Old City that it had become known as the Armenian Quarter. 256 During the First 
World War, Palestine was flooded with Armenian refugees, such that by the time of the 
1922 Census, they numbered roughly 3,200. uß The great majority of Armenians 
continued to reside in Jerusalem or in the immediate surrounding area (roughly 2,000). 258 
The rest were split fairly evenly between the north and south. Though generally fluent in 
Arabic, they were the least Arabicised of all the Christian communities in Palestine. 59 
The Armenian community remained mostly on the sidelines of the nationalist struggle, 
and while the notion that they constituted a people-apart from the Arabs generally went 
254 See, for instance, Pedersen, The Holy Land Christians, pp. 115-116. 
255 Ibid, pp. 118-124. 
256 Andrews, The Holy Land, pp. 160-161. 
257 Table XII, p. 43 in Census of 1922. They numbered about 3,500 as of the 1931 census. From Table VII, 
Part III, pp. 29-43 in Census of Palestine 1931, Volume II. In both cases, the figure is inclusive of not only 
Gregorian Armenians, but of Catholic (that is, Uniate) and Protestant Armenians as well. 
258 From Table VII, Part III, pp. 29113 in Census of Palestine 1931, Volume H. 
zs9 See, for instance, Betts, Christians in the Arab East, p. 56. 
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unchallenged, it could be argued that they served as a constant reminder for many 
Muslims that Christian loyalty to the movement in general was never entirely secure. 260 
As of the 1922 census, the Maronites in Palestine numbered close to 2,400.261 Almost all 
of them resided in the northern part of the country, primarily in Haifa and certain 
northern border towns, such as Bir'im, which was exclusively Maronite, and Jish, where 
they made up the majority. Small communities of Maronites might also be found in 
Nazareth, Acre, Jaffa, and, of course, Jerusalem 262 Like the Armenians, the Maronites 
tended to assert a nationalist identity apart from the larger Arab one-that is, Lebanese 
identity. 263 Unlike the case with the Armenians, however, it was not an identity 
recognised by most Arabs, whether Muslim or Christian. 264 The Maronites were largely 
260 Thus, for example, Armenians in Syria operated as something of a client cömmunity of the French, who 
enlisted them in suppressing the Syrian revolt of 1925. Philip S. Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate, 
The Politics ofArab Nationalism, 1920-1945 (London: I. B. Tauris and Company, 1982), p. 206. 
261 From Table XII, p. 43 in Census of 1922. By the time of the 1931 census, their numbers had risen by 
roughly a thousand. Table VII, Part III, pp. 29-43 in Census of Palestine 1931, Voktme H. 
262 O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 38. 
263 Ahmad Beydoun characterises the relationship between Lebanese nationalism and Maronite identity as 
something approaching a Christian asabryya. Ahmad Beydoun, "Lebanon's Sects and the Difficult Road to 
a Unifying Identity" The Beirut Review, No. 6, Fall 1993, The Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies, website: 
htt1) by w«. Ict, s-lehnon of r/1, uhihrex\ N ic\N, l, r6ibev J,, unhr6. html. See also Arnold J. Tovnbee. The 
Administration of the French Mandate, " p. 152. 
264 Not all Christians living in Lebanon shared an affinity for Lebanese identity. The next largest Christian 
community in Lebanon, the Orthodox, tended to be pan-Arabist and to oppose separation from Syria. 
Laurel D. Mailloux, "Peasants and Social Protest 1975-1976 Lebanese Civil War" in Muslim-Christian 
Conflicts: Economic, Political, and Social Origins, eds., Suad Joseph and Barbara L. K. Pillsbury (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press; Folkestone, England: Dawson, 1978), pp. 115-116. 
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concentrated in the area around Mount Lebanon, 265 and for the greater part of their 
history, had maintained a strong sense of themselves as constituting a unique religious 
community. Recognising as they did the authority of the Papacy in Rome, they enjoyed 
strong outside support, not only from the Vatican, but from the French (the `protectors' of 
Catholics) as well. 266 Since its designation as a semi-autonomous province in 1860, 
Lebanon had remained somewhat isolated from broader developments in the Ottoman 
Empire, not least those related to Arab nationalism. This sense of constituting a 
community apart from the larger Arab one would become formalised and politicised 
under the French Mandate. 267 
For the most part, this was a sensibility shared by Maronites residing outside of Lebanon, 
including those in mandate Palestine. 268 Many of the latter were, in fact, refugees from 
Lebanon who had fled during the First World War. 269It is not surprising then that they 
felt a strong affiliation with the larger Maronite community in Lebanon. 27° Most 
265 On the eve of the First World War, Christians made up 79 per cent of the population on Mount Lebanon. 
Of these, 84 per cent were Catholics (inclusive of Maronites, Greek Catholics and Latin Catholics). Ahmad 
Beydoun, "Lebanon's Sects. " 
266Toynbee, "The Administration of the French Mandate, " p. 152; Betts, Christians in the Arab East, p. 23. 
267 With the establishment of the French mandate over Syria, Lebanon was almost immediately created a 
separate political entity. See Joseph, "Muslim-Christian Conflict in Lebanon, " pp. 68-73; also Mailloux, 
"Peasants and Social Protest, " pp. 106-107; and Toynbee, "The Administration of the French Mandate, " 
pp. 356-357. 
268 See, for instance, Betts, Christians in the Arab East, p. 47; Suad Joseph, "Muslim-Christian Conflicts: A 
Theoretical Perspective" in Muslim-Christian Conflicts: Economic, Political, and Social Origins, eds., 
Suad Joseph and Barbara L. K. Pillsbury (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press; Folkestone, England: 
Dawson, 1978), p. 10. 
269 Betts, Christians in the Arab East, p. 25. 
270 O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 38. 
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Maronites were not especially sympathetic to the Palestinian nationalist cause; neither to 
the idea of a pan-Arab state. 27' During the latter part of the Mandate, in fact, many 
Zionists came to consider the Maronites their natural allies. 272 From the perspective of 
Muslim-Christian relations, this raised uncomfortable questions concerning the basis of 
Christian loyalty. In the one place where they made up the vast majority and the 
population was relatively homogenous, Christians had all too quickly called for their own 
state. An obvious implication of this was that Christian loyalty was entirely dependent on 
there being a lack of any viable alternative. 
Sultan 'Abdulhamid 
Islam as a defining component of Ottomanism received renewed emphasis with the 
succession of'Abdulhamid 11 as Sultan in 1876.73 With his accession, the period of the 
Tanzimat reforms effectively came to a close. While in many respects as much a 
moderniser as his predecessors, 'Abdulhamid had much stronger autocratic tendencies, 
and quickly moved to stifle any potential opposition. Among other things, this meant 
effectively shutting down the Parliament only one year after its establishment. The 
renewed emphasis given Islam served first and foremost to bolster the legitimacy of 
' Abdulhamid's rule as sultan-caliph. 274 It also served to alleviate what had been a 
backlash among Muslims against the Tanzimat reforms. Many responded favourably to a 
return to Islamic orthodoxy, finding it much easier to support a state based on Islamic 
271 Concerning their resistance to a pan-Arab state, see Toynbee, "The Administration of the French 
Mandate, " pp. 359,360. 
272 See, for instance, David Ben-Gurion, The Peel Report and the Jewish State, Palestine Labour Studies, 
No. 10 (London: Palestine Labour Studies Group, 1938), p. 61. 
273 Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, p. 61. 
274 Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 208. 
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principles than one based on secular ones. 275'Abdulhamid's Islamism neither negated nor 
superseded Ottomanism. Under'Abdulhamid, Ottomanism was, as Kayali puts it, 
"equipped with [an] ideological embellishment deriving from Islam, " wherein the figure 
of the Sultan became its embodiment. 276 While functioning to justify his autocratic rule, 
' Abdulhamid's brand of Ottomanism was also useful in the area of foreign policy; thus, 
he often used the threat of a united Muslim uprising-one hypothetically extending well 
beyond the borders of the Ottoman Empire-to respond to perceived foreign 
aggression. 27 This was a threat taken quite seriously by the European powers, 
particularly Britain and France whose empires included large numbers of Muslim 
subjects. 
This did not mean that under'Abdulhamid, non-Muslims in the Empire suffered 
persecution or were discriminated against in any systematic sense. 27' Many, in fact, held 
important administrative posts in the Empire. Such employment, however, seemed more 
symbolic than anything else, meant to demonstrate that, in spite of his emphasis on Islam, 
' Abdulhamid had not forsaken the Empire's non-Muslim population. 279 For the most part, 
there seems little question that under him, the relative position of Muslims was greatly 
enhanced. Among the Arabs in particular, notables with strong Islamic backgrounds were 
favoured for influential administrative positions, 280 and many rose to high positions 
2'5 This had been particularly evident in the Fertile Crescent area. Porath, The Emergence, pp. 22-23. 
276 Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 31. 
277 Ibid, p. 35. 
278 Witht the notable exception of the Armenian community. It was during Abdelhammid's reign that 
persecution of them first began in earnest. While not necessarily reflective of state policy, other Christian 
communities were also occasionally mistreated, for instance, Syrian Christians in Anatolia, in 1894-96. 
Kirsten Stoffregen Pedersen, The Holy Land Christians, p. 160. 
2'9 Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 44. 
280 lbid, p. 44. See also Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, pp. 61,86; and Porath, The Emergence, p. 23. 
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within the Hamidian bureaucracy. 28' In Palestine, support for'Abdulhamid was strongest 
in Nablus, the country's most homogenously Muslim town. Such support did not go 
unrewarded, and 'Abdulhamid did much to encourage Nablusite industries and granted 
scholarships to members of its leading families for study in Istanbul. 282 For those whose 
economic success was derived from an elite status determined as much by their 
reputations as pious Muslims and their holding of important positions within Islamic 
institutions as by their control of the majnlis al-idära, 283 'Abdulhamid's brand of 
Ottomanism-Islamism struck a nice balance between progressiveness and conservatism. 
It was exactly such a characterisation that defined the traditional notable elite during this 
period. Not surprisingly, under ' Abdulhamid, they proved strong supporters of 
Ottomanism. 284 
At the beginning of' Abdulhamid's reign, there is little evidence of any serious support 
for Arab nationalism among the Arab population at large, or even among the notable 
class. 285 Opposition to the Hamidian regime generally focused on the issue of 
reinstituting the constitution, and cut across ethnic as well as religious lines. 286 Protests 
relating to distinctly `Arab' issues primarily concerned perceived biases in Ottoman 
281 lbid, p. 23; Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, p. 86. 
282 Porath, The Emergence, p. 21. The more conservative element in Jerusalem-for instance, the 
Husaynis-also enjoyed special favour under Abdulhamid. Abu Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat 
Period, " p. 40; also Porath, The Emergence, p. 23. 
As discussed more fully above. 
284 C. Ernest Dawn, "The Rise of Arabism in Syria" inMiddle East Journal, vol. 16 (1962), pp. 148-49; also 
Furlonge, Palestine IsMy Country, pp. 30-3,47; and Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 35. 
Zffi Ibid, pp. 12-13; Zeine, The Emergence, pp. 14-15,33. 
2 Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, pp. 42-43,208. 
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institutions in favour of Turks. 287 What little support there was for Arab nationalism was 
to be found primarily among Christian Arabs, and even there, largely only among those 
living abroad, either in Europe or in Egypt 288 Moreover, while it is true that Christian 
intellectuals in the Empire were disproportionately represented in organisations 
emphasising Arab identity and culture, this did not inherently mean that they were 
opposed to Ottomanism289 
The Committee of Union and Progress 
In 1908, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), a secret society aimed at restoring 
the parliament and constitution of 1876, came to power., 9° Almost immediately, it 
embarked on an ambitious programme of reform. The reaction of Arabs to the CUP's 
programme was decidedly mixed. The more conservative-among them, many of the 
notable class-generally responded negatively. °' More reform-minded Muslims, by 
contrast, tended to support the CUP, and initially at least, relations between Arab 
reformists and the CUP were amiable. Among such supporters, a fair number were the 
aforementioned. second-rank notables-the junior members of notable families or `almost 
haves' who under the old system had been effectively blocked by their elder kinsmen 
from achieving positions of prominence . 
292 As with the Tanzimat, many hoped that the 
287 See, for instance, ibid, p. 34. 
2238 Many of whom had, in fact, been exiled for nationalist agitation in the press. Ibid, pp. 39,208. 
289 See, for instance, Abu Manneh, concerning Butrus Bustäni, one of the Christian leaders of the Syrian 
Scientific Society. Butrus Abu Manneh, "The Christians Between Ottomanism and Syrian Nationalism: 
The Ideas of Butrus al-Bustani" in IJMESII (1980), pp. 293-97. 
290 Some might say, stumbled into power. Shaw and Shaw, Reform, Revolution, and Republic, pp. 266-267. 
291 See, for instance, FO 61813, Report on the State of Affairs in Damascus sent to Lowther, dispatches to 
Constantinople, 4 September 1908. 
292 Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 49; also Rashid Khalidi "Society and Ideology, " pp. 123,129. 
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CUP's programme of reform would create opportunities for advancement that 
circumvented the traditional hierarchal structure. The CUP's programme of reform was 
equally supported by the growing professional class, many of which also saw in it new 
possibilities for social and economic advancement. Both groups would be 
disappointed. ' 
Underlying much of the support enjoyed by the CUP, was its professed constitutionalism. 
This was particularly relevant to merchants and professionals, many of whom were 
Christian 
. 
294 Thus, for instance, the prominent Christian intellectual, Khalil al-Sakäkini 
was a strong supporter of the coup and the CUP's programme of constitutional reform. 295 
Support for reform during this period would form a basis for a certain level of 
cooperation between Christian and Muslim merchant elite. This was evident, for instance, 
in the formation of the Beirut Reform Committee in 1913, in effect, to act as mediating 
body between that city's merchant community and the Ottoman government around the 
question of reform. Significantly, it was a self-appointed committee and was composed of 
an equal number of Muslims and Christians. That the basis of this cooperation was shared 
economic interests went without question. 
Arab support for the CUP would eventually erode, largely because of its tendency 
towards centralisation. This was particularly the case with the aforementioned members 
293 See Ibid; also Muhammad Y. Muslih, The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism, The Institute for 
Palestine Studies Series (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 157; and Kayali, Arabs and 
Young Turks, p. 119. 
'94 FO 618/3, Report on the State of Affairs in Damascus sent to Lowther, file no. 39, dispatches to 
Constantinople, 4 September 1908. 
295 Elie Kedourie, "Religion and Politics" in The Chatham House Version and Other Middle-Eastern 
Studies, New Edition (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1984), p. 332,339. 
Z96 Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 128. 
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of the professional class and second-rank notables, many of whom were becoming 
increasingly attracted to salafi Arabism. 297 Christian reaction was decidedly mixed. 
Those living in areas where they constituted relatively homogenous populations298 (and 
in some cases already enjoyed a fair degree of autonomy, such as in Lebanon) tended to 
favour decentralisation. 299 On the other hand, those Christians living in areas where they 
constituted a minority tended to oppose decentralisation, mostly for fear of what might 
happen if there was no longer a strong Ottoman presence-often this had acted as a check 
against religiously fuelled persecution 300 
The 
constitutional reforms proposed by the 
CUP were problematic for Christians in another sense, as they threatened to abolish 
proportional representation on the basis of religion. In mixed communities where they 
made up a minority, the danger was that they might end up having no representation at all 
on governing bodies. 301 
Arab support for the CUP was also eroded by what was a growing association between 
centralisation and a perceived policy of `Turkification, ' mostly as evidenced in the 
imposition of the Turkish language in administrative and educational institutions. 302 
Reformist and conservative Arabs alike were soon calling for the reinstitution of the 
Arabic language in regional government schools, in the courts, and in the local 
29 Ibid, p. 119. 
298 lbid, pp. 119,208. 
299 Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 119. 
300 See, for instance, Finn, Stirring Titnes, p. 58; see also FO 618/3, Report on the State of Affairs in 
Damascus sent to Lowther, dispatches to Constantinople, 12 August 1908. 
301 See, for instance, ibid, 8 September 1908. Also Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 82. 
302 Susan Silsby Boyle, Betrayal of Palestine: The Story of George Antonius (Oxford: Westview Press, 
2001), pp. 32-38. Whether this was indeed the case has been challenged by a number of scholars. See, for 
instance, Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 14; also Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, p. 157. 
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administration. This did not necessarily reflect a desire to break away from the Empire. 
Expressions of Arab dissatisfaction with the CUP's policies were largely limited to calls 
for greater Arab autonomy, and most of the political organisations that sprang up around 
this time advocated exactly that. For the most part, their memberships were 
overwhelmingly Muslim, though there were some Christians among them 303 There was 
also some organisational activity aimed at achieving Arab independence, but nothing 
even remotely representative of majority opinion, whether Christian or Muslim. It was 
not even regionally based, in fact, but rather had its centre in Paris, in connection with 
Muslim and Christian Arabs studying there. Though Christians featured quite 
prominently in the movement, it was a purely Muslim organisation, al-Fatät, which most 
strongly represented it. 304 Al-Fatät, or the `Young Arab Society, '305 was founded in 1911, 
and though initially only seeking `administrative' autonomy, 306 it was not too long before 
it began calling for complete independence. 07 The level of cooperation between Muslims 
and Christians in the movement was high, something perhaps best evidenced in the Arab 
Congress, convened in Paris (at the initiation of al-Fatät) in June 1913. Of the roughly 
twenty-five delegates attending, almost half were Christian . 
308 At the same time, many 
Muslim Arab nationalists were sceptical of Christian intentions. Thus, one of the 
delegates contended that the Christians delegates were lacking in a proper commitment to 
303 For example, the Christian, Iskandar `Amun of Lebanon, was among the founders of the 
Decentralisation Party, or al-Lamarkaziyya (literally meaning de-centralisation). 
304 Zeine, The Emergence, p. 83. 
305 In Arabic, al-Jam'iyyah al- Arabiyyah al-Fatat. 
306 Zeine, The Emergence, p. 83. 
307 Hourani, Arabic Thought, p. 284. 
30$ Hopwood, The Russian Presence, p. 176. 
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the Arab cause. As he expressed it, "not once [had they] sipped from the fountain of Arab 
Unity. "309 
While the more reform-minded may have felt increasingly alienated by the CUP, most 
Muslim Arabs had not yet arrived at the point of actively opposing them. In part, this 
reflected the CUP's growing tendency, in a manner not unlike what had been the case 
under 'Abdulhamid, of trying to legitimise its rule on the basis of Islam. Particularly 
given that by now most of the Empire's European territories had been lost and what 
remained was predominantly Muslim, this made some sense 310 For Christian Arabs-and 
not just the more intellectually minded-this represented a disturbing trend that only 
served to further alienate them from the CUP. This is not to say that at this point, 
Christians were of one mind with respect to the CUP or even that most were opposed to 
them; for many, it was still a question of whether or not they supported 
decentralisation. 311 Nevertheless, the fact that the CUP-an organisation which had 
defined itself in largely secular terms and its programme almost entirely around 
constitutional and administrative issues-should fall back so quickly on Islam as a 
political expedient was worrying 312 
Zionism 
A factor unique to Palestine and its political development during this period was Zionism, 
a Jewish nationalist movement, which in its more extreme form, aimed at the creation in 
Palestine of a Jewish state on the basis of that people's ancient religious and historical 
309 Haim, Arab Nationalism, p. 33, quoting from a letter written to Rashid Rida from one of the 
participants. 
310 Shaw and Shaw, Reform, Revolution, and Republic, p. 304. 
311 See, for instance, O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 46. 
312 Kedourie, "Religion and Politics, " p. 92. 
84 
connections. In practical terms, this meant the immigration of European Jews to Palestine 
and the acquisition of land through purchase. While at first, many Palestinian Arabs were 
not overly alarmed about the long-term political implications of early Zionist activity, the 
acquisition of large tracts of land for agricultural use soon brought the Jewish settlers into 
conflict with Arab peasants. 313 As the number of dispossessed Arab peasants increased, 
the urban notables began to take greater notice of the Zionist threat, even if till then, it 
had not directly impacted on their own economic situation 314 Initially, Palestine's Arabs 
looked to the Ottoman Government to combat Zionism, though in this, they were 
disappointed-both ' Abdulhamid and the CUP did little to prevent land sales. 315 
Consequently, an association developed in Palestine between anti-Zionism and anti- 
Ottomanism, particularly with respect to the CUP. 16 Zionism came to be perceived as a 
specifically `Arab' problem, and as such, helped to foster a sense of Arab identity. 317 
Almost from the start, Christians played a prominent role in combating Zionism, first and 
foremost through the Arab press 318 This was particularly evident in the Palestinian press; 
the vast majority of newspapers in Palestine were owned and run by Christians, and 
almost all were stridently anti-Zionist. Typical was the position adopted by the 
newspaper Filastin, founded in Jaffa in 1911 by the brothers Isä and Yüsuf al-' Isä, both 
Orthodox Christian and strongly anti-Zionist. Filastin was one of the most widely read 
313 Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, pp. 99-100. 
3141bid, pp. 94,110 
315 Ibid, pp. 103-104,111. 
316 Something particularly evident in the Palestinian press. See Khalidi, "The Role of the Press in the Early 
Arab Reaction to Zionism" in PeuplesMediterraneens, no. 20 (July-September 1982). 
317 Likewise, Zionism as a specifically `Palestinian' problem fostered a sense of a purely Palestinian 
identity. See Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, p. 111. 
318 See, for instance, ibid, p. 110. 
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newspapers during this period, and one of the few to survive the First World War intact. 
Another important Christian-run paper was al Dustür, founded by the aforementioned 
Khalil al-Sakäkini, also Orthodox, in Jerusalem in 1910. As with the ' Isä brothers, 
Sakäkini was strongly anti-Zionist and a staunch Arab nationalist. During this period, 
Christians were, in many respects, more vehement than Muslims in their opposition to 
Zionism; early on in fact, many Zionists were convinced that opposition to Zionism was 
limited almost entirely to Christian Arabs. 319 One of the earliest organised efforts against 
Zionism was initiated by Christians in 1891-an official protest against Jewish 
immigration directed at the Ottoman Government. 20 Christians would remain at the 
forefront in the struggle against Zionism well into the twentieth century. Thus, it was the 
Protestant Christian editor of the newspaper al-Karmil, 32' Najib Nassär, who in 1910 
organised the first association aimed at persuading the Government to prohibit the sale of 
land to Jews. 322 He also was the first Arab to publish a book on Zionism 323 
Another factor underlying Christian opposition to Zionism was the perception that Jewish 
immigration threatened their economic interests-specifically, there was a concern 
among urban-based Christians (76 per cent of all Christians324) that an increased Jewish 
319 Yaacov Ro'i, "The Zionist Attitude to the Arabs" in Middle Eastern Studies, Volume IV, No. 3 
(London, 1968), pp. 198,206,212-213. 
320 O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 45. 
321 Founded in Haifa by Najib Nassar, an Orthodox from Lebanon who later converted to Protestantism, al- 
Kannil was first published in December 1908. It took a strongly hostile position to Zionism from the start, 
and was probably the leading publication in the campaign against Zionism through 1914. Khalidi, 
Palestinian Identity, p. 125. 
322 O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 46; also Porath, The Emergence, pp. 28-29. 
3 Entitled a1-Sahyüniyya: Tarikhuha, Gharaduha, Ahammiyyatuha (Zionism: Its History, Aims and 
Importance), published in 1911. O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 46. 
324 Based on the 1931 Census. lbid, p. 36. 
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presence would lead to unwanted economic competition. 325 There was some basis for 
this. Most Jews immigrating to Palestine preferred to settle in urban centres such as 
Jerusalem, Safed, or the new Jewish city of Tel Aviv (located next to Jaffa) rather than in 
agricultural settlements. Added to this was the fact that most of Palestine's rural Christian 
population was based in the Galilee, 326 an area targeted early on for Jewish agricultural 
settlement. 327 Feelings against Zionism were further fuelled by anti-Semitism, something 
that, initially at least, was considerably more evident among Christians-particularly 
Latin Catholics-than Muslims. 328 Primarily, it was a theologically-based anti- 
Semitism, 329 one which in many respects reflected the closer relations Christians had with 
Europeans. This was particularly evident with the blood libel, most likely imported from 
Europe, and mostly unknown in the Ottoman Empire before the nineteenth century. 
Certainly it was little known among Muslims before then 330 At the same time, Jews had 
325 See, for instance, ISA, AE, 1026, `Report on the Situation in Palestine, ' submitted to Churchill, 
29 March 1921; also O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 45; Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the 
National Movement, " p. 79; and David Gilmour, Dispossessed: the Ordeal of the Palestinians, 1917-1980 
(London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1980), p. 51. Such concerns existed among the Muslim bourgeoisie as 
well. Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry, " p. 178; 
326 See, for instance, Table XI, pp. 36-37, and Table XI, p. 39, both in Census of 1922. 
327 Gilmour, Dispossessed, p. 51. 
32" See, for instance, David K. Shipler, Arab and Jew, Wounded Spirits in a Promised Land (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1986), p. 165. Concerning Christian Arab anti-Semitism, see also Rogers, Domestic Life, 
p. 359. 
329 Something still evident today. See Shipler, Arab and Jew, p. 161. 
33° See, for instance, ibid, pp. 317-318. Concerning the incident in Damascus, see Finn, Stirring Times, 
pp. 106-111. 
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never enjoyed a particularly positive image in the Muslim world, 331 and many passages in 
the Qur'an cast the Jews in a negative light, significantly, some in a manner that found 
concurrence with Christian -inspired anti-Semitism, such as the allegation that the Jews 
had attempted to crucify Jesus. As the nationalist struggle evolved, Muslims would stress 
the Jews' rejection of Jesus and supposed culpability in his crucifixion. 332 Given the 
centrality of Zionism with respect to the nationalist movement, it is perhaps not 
surprising that anti-Semitic notions so quickly came to constitute a point around which 
both Muslim and Christian Arabs could readily find agreement. 333 As one prominent 
Muslim nationalist put it during the early part of the Mandate when addressing the 
problem of Zionism, "the Muslims and Christians know the Jews well from the verses of 
the Koran and the stories of the hadith which tell of their deceit, cunning, selfishness and 
corruption. "334 
331 Thus, it was not uncommon during the Mandate to see at Arab demonstrations such mottos as `Palestine 
is our land and the Jews are our dogs. " See, for instance, CO 733/44 `Report of the Political Situation in 
Palestine and Trans-Jordan for the Month of March 1923, ' p. 3. Also Porath, The Emergence, p. 62. 
332 See, for instance, Shipler, Arab and Jew, pp. 172-173. 
333 Arguably, Muslims and Christians had a shared aversion towards Jews from an early point. Thus, for 
instance, Mary Eliza Rogers, the aforementioned sister of the British vice-Consul, during her stay in 
Palestine in the mid- nineteenth century, noted that Muslim and Christian children rarely played with one 
another, and would "only unite to persecute the poor little Jews. " Rogers, Domestic Life in Palestine, 
p. 189. See also Porath, The Emergence, p. 59. 
334 ISA, AE, 1072, `Izzat Darwaza to the Arab Executive, 3 August 1922. 
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Chapter II, National Unity 
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire 
The period immediately prior to the First World War saw a worsening of the situation of 
Christians in the Ottoman Empire. In many respects, this reflected what was an 
intensification of Islamic sentiment, much of it in reaction to the loss of the greater part 
of the Empire's European (that is, Christian) territories. More specifically, many Muslims 
were sceptical regarding where the loyalty of the Empire's Christians truly lay. This was 
not without some basis. During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, for instance, most 
Orthodox Arabs sided strongly with the Empire's long time enemy, Russia. As noted in a 
British report from 1904, "the Christians with very few exceptions [were] fervently 
praying for the success of Russia. " The same report noted that "[b]y contrast, the 
sympathies of most Muslims, inclusive of Arabs, were with Japan. i1 Tensions between 
Muslims and Christians became particularly acute during the Balkan Wars and the war 
against Italy. Both were represented as a religious war of Muslims against Christians, and 
many Muslims identified local Christians With the Empire's enemies. 2 In part, this 
reflected the tendency of Christians to avoid military service, something greatly resented 
by most Muslims. 3 
During this period, the situation of Christians declined from the standpoint of political 
representation as well. In 1913, the Ottoman Government amended the Vilayet Law; 
'F0618/3, Damascus, 1904, Quarterly Reports, draft letter to O'Conor, 9 July 1904, pp. 11-12. See also 
Edward Atiya, An Arab Tells His Story: A Study in Loyalties (London: John Murray, 1946, p. 3; and Derek 
Flopwood, The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine, 1843-1914, Church and Politics in the Near East 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), pp. 125-127. 
2 Yehoshua Porath, The Palestinian Arab NationalMovement: The Emergence, 1918-1929, Volume I 
(London: Frank Cass and Company), 1977, p. 294. 
3 See, for instance, FO 618/3, Damascus 1912, General Report for the vilayet of Syria, 1 July 1912. 
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whereas half of the seats of the provincial councils had until then been reserved for non- 
Muslims, all were now to be freely contested. The result was that in many towns, 
Christians were under-represented. This was a particularly acute problem in Palestine, 
where many Christians lived in mixed communities. In the elections held in Jaffa that 
year, not a single Christian was elected. Isä al- Isä, the editor ofFilastin, criticised the 
change as discriminatory, 4 and was hardly appeased when the mayor and mufti in Gaza 
responded by ordering the secondary electors there-all of whom were Muslim-to elect 
one (pre-selected) Christian. It was a move Filastin found patronising at best. ' Another 
article appearing in Filastrn accused Muslims of religious fanaticism and of behaving in a 
hostile manner towards non-Muslims, an attitude stemming in large part apparently from 
a belief that Christians were not loyal Ottoman citizens. Overall, relations between the 
two communities in Palestine were tense, something evident even among the children. 
Thus, it was commented by one visiting European that in mixed towns Muslim and 
Christian children rarely befriended each other, and it was not uncommon to hear Muslim 
children singing disparagingly of the Christian faith. 7 
On 29 October 1914, the Ottoman Empire entered the First World War on the side of 
Germany; the European powers, anticipating the Empire's break-up, began making plans 
for its division between them. Most notable in this respect was the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement, which divided the Empire's Arab provinces between Britain and France, the 
"Filastin, 28 May 1913. 
S lbid, 29 May 1913. 
6 Ibid, 15 May 1913. 
7 Philip J. Baldensperger, The Immovable East. - Studies of the People and Customs of Palestine (London: 
Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons, Limited, 1913), pp. 256-257. 
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greater part of Iraq being allotted to Britain, and Syria, inclusive of Lebanon, to France. ' 
Whether Palestine was to be included as part of Syria would prove the subject of much 
contention following the war. 9 In any case, the Agreement arguably marked the 
beginning of a process that would eventually see Palestine created a separate political 
entity. At the same time, Britain sought to promote an Arab nationalist uprising under 
Sher f Husayn Ibn 'Ali of Mecca. 10 Following lengthy negotiations, the Shenf agreed on 
the condition that Britain recognise Arab independence within certain designated 
territories. Which territories were to be included would likewise prove a point of 
contention, particularly with respect to Palestine. " What came to be known as the Arab 
Revolt was finally launched on 5 June 1916. 
How deeply rooted Arab nationalist sentiment was at the time of the Revolt is open to 
question. Beyond a small intellectual elite (made up of notables and a growing 
professional class), the greater part of the Arab population was till then uneducated and 
lacked any real political consciousness. It is difficult then to speak of Arab nationalism as 
something enjoying strong support at the grass-roots level. 12 According to Porath, the 
8 Though more as spheres of influence than outright colonies. See the `Sykes-Picot Agreement' in The 
Israel-Arab Reader, A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict, eds., Walter Laqueur and Barry 
Rubin (New York: Penguin Books, 1984 [revised and updated edition]), pp. 12-15. 
9 Susan Silsby Boyle, Betrayal of Palestine: The Story of GeorgeAntonius (Oxford: Westview Press, 
2001), pp. 7-10; also, for instance, CO 733/8, draft reply from Deedes to Churchill, 22 December 1921. 
lo At the onset of the First World War, Sher if Husayn was `ruler' of the Holy Cities as an autonomous 
vassal of the Ottoman Sultan. 
11 Certainly the area around Jerusalem, in recognition of that city's broader religious significance, was 
never intended as part of `French' Syria, and in fact, was designated an international zone. `Sykes-Picot 
Agreement' in The Israel-Arab Reader, pp. 12-15. 
12 Concerning different views on this question, see Porath, The Emergence, p. 63, and Rashid Khalidi, 
Palestinian Identity, The Construction ofModern National Consciousness (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1997), pp. 57,110. On the question of the level of popular support for Arab nationalism 
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combined membership of all existing Arab nationalist societies on the eve of the First 
World War numbered no more than 126, with only an additional 30 joining over the 
course of the war. 13 The prevailing attitude among the vast majority of Arabs at the start 
of the war was one of religious conservatism and loyalty to the Ottoman state. Arguably, 
this would change as the war progressed, in part due to Jamäl Pasha's'4 repressive 
policies while military governor of Syria, 15 and many Arabs in Syria and Palestine-most 
significantly, those of the notable class-would become increasingly ambivalent in their 
commitment to the Ottoman Empire and its social, political and economic structures. 16 
The First World War was a particularly difficult time for Christians. In a manner 
reminiscent of' Abdulhamid, the Young Turks had, in the period leading up to the war, 
begun to encourage feelings of loyalty towards the Ottoman Empire among its Muslim 
subjects by appealing to religious sentiment. Thus for example, the Islamic significance 
of the Hijaz railway-only recently constructed, and linking the Empire with Mecca and 
Medina-was greatly stressed. This was something strongly resisted by Christian 
deputies in the Parliament. As noted by two of them, the railway was a vital economic 
early on, see also Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the 
Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 8; and Boyle, Betrayal of 
Palestine, p. 37. 
13 Porath, The Emergence, p. 20. According to Dawn, 22 of the first category and 10 of the second were 
Palestinian. C. Ernest Dawn, "The Rise of Arabism in Syria" in Middle East Journal, vol. 16 (1962), 
pp. 148-49. 
"Concerning Jamal Pasha, see Standford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 
Volume II, Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise ofModern Turkey, 1808-19 75 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. 319-324. 
's Concerning the impact he had in generating support for Arab nationalism, see Khalidi, Palestinian 
Identity, p. 160. 
16 See, for example, Porath, The Emergence, p. 24; also Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, p. 161. 
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institution and should belong to all Ottomans. '? During the same period, the Young Turks 
sought to discredit reformists by characterizing them as agents of Christian powers. Thus, 
for example, it was reported in 1913 in an Egyptian paper that an Arabic-language 
pamphlet entitled `al-Haqq yä alte' ('Truth [God] Will Triumph') was being circulated in 
Syria with the aim "to stir up Moslem fanaticism by stigmatising all the Christians of 
Turkey as secret agents of Europe and the betrayers of the Moslem fatherland. "18 There 
was some truth to this-a number of Christian reformists did in fact have separatist aims 
as well as secret links with European countries, France in particular. Thus, for instance, 
Christians from Beirut attending the Arab Congress in Paris in 1913 held prior meetings 
with French officials, something that sat uneasily with Beirut's Muslim attendees, and led 
them to decide to settle the question of reform with the Ottoman goveinment. 19 In the 
end, the CUP was largely able to discredit the reform movement by depicting it as a 
Christian conspiracy. 20 
The advent of the First World War, one in which all the belligerents were Christian 
powers, saw this tendency even further accentuated, and the Ottoman government 
quickly characterising the war as one of Islamic jihad. To many Christians, it appeared as 
if the Young Turks were seeking to resurrect the Empire's original raison d'etre as the 
defender of Islam. Christians in the Empire found themselves increasingly subjected to 
harassment and even violence. Armenians were especially targeted, but not only them. 
Syrian Orthodox in Anatolia, for instance, were also heavily persecuted. 21 Lebanon was 
17 Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 157. 
'$ Ibid, p. 156, appearing in the Egyptian Gazette, 25 April 1913. 
19lbid, p. 138. 
20 Ibid, p. 156. 
21 Kirsten Stoffregen Pedersen, The Holy Land Christians, ed., Natalie King (Jerusalem: Private 
Publication, 2003), p. 160. Other Christian groups targeted were the Jacobites, Chaldaeans and Nestorians. 
93 
particularly hard hit-its semi-autonomous status was abolished shortly after the outbreak 
of hostilities, and replaced by a repressive wartime government. During the next three 
years, roughly 100,000'Lebanese, the great majority of whom were Christian (almost 
25 percent of the total population) died of disease, starvation and execution. 22 In some 
parts of the Empire, there is evidence that Christian children were subjected to forced 
conversion. 2' Within the Arab provinces, the cumulative effect of these developments 
was to drive Christians further into the nationalist camp. 24 Typical in this respect was 
Khalil al-Sakäkini, who when approached by a delegation of Orthodox clergy and laity 
arriving from Jaffa in March 1914, with the purpose of forming a political party that 
would look after Christian interests, responded that, 
[i]f your aim is political, then I do not approve it, because I am an Arab 
first of all, and I think it preferable that we should form a national party to 
unite all the sons of the Arab Nation, regardless of religion and sects, to 
awaken national feelings and become imbued with a new spirit. 25 
Most Muslim Arabs still saw their identity primarily in religious terms, and were not so 
inclined to support Arab nationalism. At the same time, many were quite sceptical 
Robert Brenton Betts, Christians in theArab East-A Political Study (Athens: Lycabettus Press, 1975,1978 
revised edition), p. 29. 
n Ibid, pp. 29-30. 
23 As asserted, for instance, by the Chaldean Patriarch in Iraq. See FO 371/5191, `Losses suffered by 
Chaldean community, ' signed by Young, 24 February 1920. 
24 Betts, Christians in the Arab East, p. 164. 
25 Elie Kedourie's "Religion and Politics: The Diaries of Khalil Sakakini, " Middle Eastern Affairs, 1, St. 
Antony's Papers, 4 (1958), p. 92. See also Daphne Tsimhoni, The British Mandate and the Arab Christians 
in Palestine 1920-1925 (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, SOAS, University of London, 1976), p. 293. 
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regarding what seemed the CUP's cynical exploitation of Islam so late in the game 26 For 
too many years, their reform efforts had worked to undermine religion as a governing 
principle; as such, they had lost a great deal of credibility among Muslims. 27 All of this 
did not necessarily translate into support for Arab nationalism. Nonetheless, it could be 
argued that, as a result, many Muslims were more susceptible to the idea, and indeed, 
from about 1908, there exists evidence of increased Muslim involvement in the 
nationalist movement at the organisational level. 28 Correspondingly, the Arab nationalist 
movement began to take on an increasingly Islamic character along the salaft lines 
advocated by such individuals as Rashid Rida. This was particularly evident in the 
emphasis given the idea of resurrecting an Arab caliphate. Arguably, for many Muslims, 
it was a frustration with the Young Turk's secularising tendencies that had led them to 
become Arab nationalists. 29 
The Arab army, under the leadership of Husayn's son Faysal (and with strong British 
support), entered Damascus in early October 1918. Almost immediately, an `Arab' 
administration was established with Faysal at its head. Though in fact subordinate to the 
Supreme Commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, General Edmund Allenby, 
many Arabs saw this as the laying of the foundation of a future independent Arab state, 
and flocked to Damascus. A fair number of these were what might be termed second-rank 
notables, what Muslih refers to as `Younger Politicians'-the younger members of elite 
26 Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, pp. 95-96. 
2' Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, p. 157. 
28 Muhammad Y. Muslih, The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism, The Institute for Palestine Studies Series 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 157, p. 210. 
29 See, for instance, Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983 (first published in 1962)),, p. 297; also Sylvia G. Haim, Arab Nationalism: An 
Anthology (Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1962), p. 34. 
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notable families who under the till then existing order had found little possibility of 
advancement. 30 The Arab nationalist movement presented an opportunity for them to 
circumvent the traditional hierarchy, and many quickly attached themselves to the 
nationalist cause. Among them were a large number of Palestinians, many of whom soon 
saw in Arab unity the best possible defence against Zionism. Against these were the older 
notables-what Muslih refers to as the `Older Politicians'-the great majority of whom 
were not enthused with the nationalist cause, nor with the idea of being under the 
authority of Faysal's administration in Damascus as part of a united Arab state. These 
had earlier been the strongest supporters of Ottomanism, 31 and now hoped to preserve 
their positions of influence by keeping Palestine autonomous. 32 The establishment of a 
separate Palestinian government, even if ultimately under European rule, would see them 
occupying the highest levels of administration. 33 Significantly, this division would lay the 
foundation for the political rivalry that would come to dominate the nationalist movement 
in Palestine throughout the mandate period-that between the Mu'äridin and the 
Majlisin, centred around Räghib al-Nashäshibi and Hajj Amin al-Husayni respectively. 34 
30 Muslih, The Origins, p. 157; also Rashid Khalidi "Society and Ideology in Late Ottoman Syria: Class, 
Education, Profession and Confession" in Problems of the Modern Middle East in Historical Perspective, 
Essays in honour ofAlbert Hourani, ed., John Spangnolo, (Reading: Ithaca Press (for the Middle East 
Centre, St. Anthony's College, Oxford), 1996), pp. 123,129. 
31 Ibid, p. 123; also Muslih, The Origins, pp. 158,159. 
32 Ibid, pp. 160,162. 
33 Ibid, p. 160. See also Porath, The Emergence, p. 84. 
34 Nassär Iddin al-Nashäshibi, in his biography of his uncle Räghib al-Nashäsh i, perhaps summed it up 
best. He characterised al-Husayni's leadership as "pan-Arabist in nature [and] Ragheb's leadership [as] 
genuinely Palestinian in character and orientation... It is in this crucial sense that Ragheb's party was the 
only party of the Palestinian nation. " Nasser Eddin Nashashibi, Jerusalem 's Other Voice: Ragheb 
Nashashibi and Moderation in Palestinian Politics, 1920-1948 (Exeter: Ithaca Press, 1990), p. 61. 
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By December 1917, the greater part of Palestine had been `liberated' from the Turks. 
Almost immediately, a British military regime was set up by General Allenby for its 
administration. In keeping with the Hague Convention of 1908, which called for the 
upholding of the existing status quo, the Turkish administrative system was maintained, 
and clerical and manual employees were recruited locally. Most of these were Christian 
Arabs. 35 Almost simultaneous with Britain's occupation of Palestine was the 
proclamation on 2 November 1917 of the Balfour Declaration, which called for "the 
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. " Support for 
Zionism was no doubt motivated in part by a desire to provide a pretext for maintaining a 
British presence in Palestine. 36 Arguably, however, it also reflected what was a sincere 
belief that the Jews had a special claim there. 37 On 30 October 1918, the campaign in the 
Middle East officially came to an end. The till then existing political and social 
framework, Ottomanism, had collapsed, 38and the one many supposed would supersede it, 
Arab nationalism, had yet to be fully formulated. Until then, Arab nationalism had 
existed, as it were, largely only on paper. It was now to form the basis of a new 
impending political reality, the blueprint for an Arab state. The details had yet to be 
worked out, however, and Christians might yet see for themselves a role in determining 
the actual character of such a state. To use Haddad's terminology when considering the 
role of Christians in shaping Syrian society at the turn of the century, the situation was 
one of `formation' and `radical modification, ' and it was under just such circumstances 
3s Ylana Miller, Government and Society in Rural Palestine, 1920-1948 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1985), p. 37. 
36 Boyle, Betrayal of Palestine, pp. 8-9. 
37 See, for instance, David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1939), vol. II, p. 720. 
38 Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, p. 86. 
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that "a marginal community's power to influence and shape the dominant community 
[was] greatest. "39 
Added to this was the fact that Palestine's Muslims and Christians had first to contend 
with the more immediate threat of Zionism. It quickly became apparent that the British 
were serious about supporting Zionism, and it was not long before opposition to Zionism 
came to constitute a defining feature of the nationalist cause. In the meantime, at the 
Peace Conference in Versailles, it was determined that the former Ottoman Arab 
provinces would be placed under the supervision of one or another of the Western powers 
as `mandates' until such time it was deemed they were ready to become fully sovereign 
nations. France was to be given Syria (inclusive of Lebanon); Britain, Iraq and Palestine. 
Most Arabs, Muslims in particular, were extremely dissatisfied with this arrangement, 
and called for a pan-Arab state inclusive of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. The American 
President Woodrow Wilson advocated the creation of an inter-allied commission to 
ascertain the wishes of the peoples of Syria-Lebanon-Palestine in connection with the 
proposed mandates. This was the impetus behind the formation of what came to be 
known as the King-Crane Commission. 40 
The Commission arrived in Jaffa on 10 June 1919. Over the next several weeks, it 
travelled throughout Syria and Palestine in order to ascertain the feelings of the native 
inhabitants. In Palestine, the one point on which all could agree was their opposition to 
Zionism 41 On union with Syria, both Muslims and Latin Catholics tended to come out in 
39 Robert Haddad, Syrian Christians in Muslim Society, An Interpretation (Princeton, New Jersey: 
University Press, 1970), p. 3. O'Mahony takes this as a model for understanding the role of Christian Arabs 
in the nationalist movement in Palestine at the beginning of the Mandate. Anthony O'Mahony, Christians, 
Religion, Politics and Society in the Holy Land, ed. Anthony O'Mahony (London, Melisende, 1999), p. 41. 
40 Concerning the history and activities of the King-Crane Commission, see Harry N. Howard, An 
American Inquiry in the Middle East, The King-Crane Commission (Beirut: Khayats, 1963). 
41 Ibid, p. 93. 
98 
favour, though for different reasons. Latin Catholics favoured union with Syria in 
connection with the latter being awarded as a mandate to France; Muslims more on the 
basis of pan-Arabism, and with the hope of achieving complete independence. 
Interestingly, it was commented by one British officer that support for complete 
independence was strongest among "extreme and more fanatical Moslems. "42 Of those 
Muslims in Palestine willing to accept mandatory control, most preferred an American 
mandate, or at the very least, a British one. In any case, they were adamantly opposed to 
a French one. 43 Orthodox representatives, while generally opposed to a French mandate, 
were split over the question of union, and quite a few came out in favour of Palestinian 
autonomy under a British mandate. 44 Many of these were members of the merchant elite. 
Some of the Muslim heads of the Muslim-Christian Associations (concerning the MCAs, 
see below)-in most cases, also members of the merchant elite-came out in favour of 
Palestinian autonomy as well. What was a convergence of interests was particularly 
evident in the Jaffa Muslim-Christian Association, where both Muslims and Christians 
(Protestants45 as well as Orthodox) specifically requested British protection. ' As put by 
one British official, a "strong combination of Christian and enlightened Moslems [called] 
for local autonomy under the guidance of one of the great Powers with a view to future 
independence as soon as the country [was] able to stand alone. "47 This was perhaps not 
42 FO 371/4179, telegram from Clayton to the Foreign Office, 28 February 1919. 
n Ibid. Also Muslih, The Origins, p. 181. 
44 Porath, The Emergence, p. 296. 
45 Howard, An American Inquiry, p. 91. 
46 Ibid, p. 92. Concerning the general attitude of the merchants in Jaffa towards Arab nationalism, see 
FO 371/3389, `Report on the Political Situation, ' Ormsby-Gore, 27 August 1918. 
47 FO 371/4179, telegram from Clayton to Foreign Office, 28 February 1919. See also Ted Swedenburg, 
"The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry in the Great Revolt (1936-1939), " in Islam, Politics and Social 
Movements, eds., E. Burke III and I. Lapidus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 179. 
Concerning the general attitude of the merchant class in Jaffa, see FO 371/3389, `Report on the Political 
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surprising. The MCA in Jaffa was made up largely of merchants, many of them 
Christians, and would over the course of the Mandate tend to give considerable weight to 
strictly economic considerations. 8 Overall, Christians were more inclined than Muslims 
to support the idea of some form of mandatory control over complete independence. 49 
Christians and the nationalist movement 
At this point, it is worth considering more closely the positions adopted by the different 
Christian communities in Palestine with respect to union with Syria and Arab 
independence. Christian Arabs were confronted with a range of possible outcomes-on 
the one extreme, the possibility of living in an independent Arab state where Muslims 
made up the clear majority; on the other, of living under a colonial regime that was 
nominally `Christian. ' With respect to the latter, there was also the question of which 
country would be the mandatory power, Britain or France. A general perception existed 
among Christian Arabs that the British were pro-Muslim, 50 and the French, pro- 
Christian. 51 Correspondingly, the decision taken at the San Remo Conference in April 
1920 to grant France the mandate for Syria (inclusive of Lebanon) was supported by a 
large number of Arab Christians living in Syria and Lebanon. This was particularly true 
of Catholics, 52 most of whom were also opposed to Lebanese union with Syria. Orthodox 
Situation, ' Ormsby-Gore, 27 August 1918. Thus, it was stated that the "educated `Levantine' population' of 
Jaffa, much like those in Alexandria and Cairo, were considered as "evinc[ing] a feeling somewhat akin to 
hostility towards the Arab movement. " 
48 Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 210. 
49 ISA 7/124, Money, to the Chief Political Officer in Cairo, 28 May 1919. 
50 Betts, Christians in the Arab East, pp. 27,34. 
s' Ibid, p. 27. 
52 Ibid, p. 22. 
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Arabs in Syria and Lebanon were, for their part, split between their antipathy towards 
living in a French -cöntrolled state where Catholics would enjoy a privileged position, 
53 
and their fear of living in a independent Arab state dominated by Muslims. 54 As reported 
by the King-Crane Commission, in spite of the nationalist language employed by Faysal 
and his followers, 55 his political base was largely Islamic-religious. 56 Many did favour a 
pan-Arab state, but with either a British or American mandate. 57 
In Palestine, Christian Arabs often found themselves united with Muslims regarding . 
union with Syria, 58 but at odds regarding the acceptance of mandate-status. Catholics, 
whether Latin or Uniate, generally favoured union, though largely in the expectation that 
Syria should become a French mandate. 59 Thus, at the All-Palestine Congress (held in 
53 See, for instance, FO 371/4178, interview with Count de Zogheb, the Foreign Office, 4 January 1919. 
"See, for instance, Zeine N. Zeine, The Struggle for Arab Independence, Western Diplomacy and the Rise 
and Fall of Faisal's Kingdom in Syria (Beirut: Khayat's, 1960), p. 35. 
ss In an attempt to win Christian confidence, Faysal promised to put "religious separation out of sight. " 
Howard, An American Inquiry, pp. 181. He also promised to maintain Lebanon's pre-war semi-autonomous 
status. Zeine, The Struggle for Arab Independence, p. 138. See also Betts, Christians in the Arab East, 
p. 30. 
56 Howard, An American Inquiry, pp. 127; also Ahmad Beydoun, "Lebanon's Sects and the Difficult Road 
to a Unifying Identity" in The Beirut Review, No. 6, Fall 1993, The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, 
t\-ebsite: httn i. "ýý ýý ýi. lcý (ci, {inun ot.. /put, l, reý, l. \ L, ii, iheýdount I4 ütmi. See also Betts. Cin"istituns in the 
Arab East, p. 164. 
57 FO 371/4178, telegram from Wingate to the Foreign Office, 13 January 1919. See also Beydoun, 
"Lebanon's Sects. " 
513 See, for instance, CO 733/1, `Report on the Political Situation for the Month of February 1921. ' 
S9 Howard, An American Inquiry, pp. 93,98-100; also Betts, Christians in the Arab East, p. 31. The one 
exception to this seemed to be the Latin Catholics in Tiberias and Haifa, who expressed a preference for 
union with an independent Syria. Howard, An American Inquiry, p. 102. Tsimhoni attributes this to the fact 
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February 1919), the Latin Catholic Shukri al-Kärmi, attending as a representative of the 
Jerusalem MCA, was willing to sign a resolution in favour of union with Syria, but not 
one opposing a French mandate. 60 That Palestine's Latin Catholics looked favourably 
upon a French mandate was motivated by a number of factors, not the least being that 
under such a mandate, they might anticipate a privileged status, not only vis-ä-vis 
Muslims, but with respect to other Christians as well. There were also those who had 
reservations about living in an independent Arab state dominated by Muslims 61 Most 
Muslims, certain elements among the notable class excepted, also favoured union with 
Syria. Thus, around the question of union, Latin Catholics found themselves in alliance 
with the great majority of Muslims. The latter, however, were strongly opposed to a 
French mandate or, for that matter, to a mandate of any kind. 62 Nonetheless, Latin 
Catholics and Muslims were able to overlook differences with respect to long-term 
objectives and focus on the task at hand-namely, the achievement of Syrian-Palestinian 
union. Thus, for instance, the strongly nationalist al-Muntadä al-Adabi initially had close 
63 ties with the indigenous Association of Catholic Youth 
Many in the Orthodox community favoured union and complete independence; a sizeable 
number however called for an autonomous Palestine under a British mandate. To some 
extent, this reflected the fact that, as a community, the Orthodox Arabs tended to be 
that many of these were rural Christians and therefore were more socially assimilated with the larger 
Muslim community. Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 227. 
60 ISA 7/12-1], Camp's report, 15 February 1919, and Storrs' report, 25 February 1919, with attached letter 
from al-Karmi and Yusuf Farwaji; also Porath, The Emergence, p. 83. 
61 See, for example, FO 800/221, Secret Political Report No. 17, Albina to Sykes, 10 October 1918; also 
Howard, An American Inquiry, p. 116. 
62 Betts, Christians in the Arab East, p. 32. 
63 See, for example, ZA, L/4,276lib, concerning ties between al-Muntada al-Adabi and the Catholic 
Association; also Porath, The Emergence, pp. 75,295. 
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politically moderate. It also reflected the fact that, as with Latin Catholics, many had 
reservations about living in an independent `Arab' state dominated by Muslims. This 
became immediately evident during a special meeting of the Jerusalem MCA, convened 
in early 1919, for the purpose of putting together a delegation to represent them at the 
First Syrian Congress. The Orthodox representatives were initially so opposed to an 
independent Arab government that they refused to send any delegates at all, and only 
agreed in the end in order to avoid friction between the two communities. 64 Even among 
those who professed support for an independent pan-Arab state, one has the impression 
that this was more out of a consideration that such an outcome might come to pass 
whether they wanted it or not. Thus, one Syrian Christian indicated that, while preferring 
a French presence in Syria, he had come to the conclusion that Faysal would 
succeed in the general lines of his policy and establish a great Arab state 
[and that under] these circumstances... the [Syrian Christians] would be 
ill-advised to put themselves in opposition to [him] and... would do better 
to work with him, and so secure a position which would enable them to 
65 defend their essential interests. 
64 ISA 5016/24-n, Popham to OETA Headquarters, 21 June 1919. Such concerns would remain evident 
over the course of the Mandate. See, for instance, ISA 2/128/129, District Governor of Samaria to the 
Assistant Chief Secretary, 19 May 1923. 
65 FO 371/4178, interview with Count de Zogheb, the Foreign Office, 4 January 1919. See also FO 
371/4178, telegram from Wingate to the Foreign Office, 13 January 1919, where it was noted that many 
Syrian Christians living in Egypt were anxious that their `aloofness' regarding French actions in Syria 
"should not be interpreted as favourable to French aims. " This outlook would shape Christian attitudes the 
duration of the Mandate. See, for instance, CO 733/38, file 48206, confidential letter from Deedes to 
Shuckburgh, 15 September 1922; and CO 733/38, file, 51486, letter from Deedes to District Governors, 6 
October 1923, based on talks with Christian leaders. 
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In Palestine, Christians and Muslims could agree on at least one thing-they were all 
equally opposed to Zionism and saw it as an immediate threat. In connection with this, 
the nationalist movement was characterised right from the start by a strong sense of unity 
between Muslims and Christians. 66 This was most pronounced in the formation of the 
Muslim-Christian Associations (MCAs), the first of which was established in Jaffa in 
March 1918.67 A few months later, what would become the largest and best-organised 
MCA was established in Jerusalem. 68 Though not, in principle, political organizations, 69 
they did articulate the political demands of the Palestinian Arabs-their opposition to the 
Jewish `National Home' and Jewish immigration, and the principle of Palestinian 
independence, at least with respect to internal affairs. Branches were quickly established 
throughout the country, the one in Jerusalem eventually becoming something of a 
headquarters. 70 The MCAs would form the organisational basis of the various national 
congresses and their resultant executive committees, the permanent body of which came 
to be known as the Arab Executive (see below). This body would take on something of a 
leadership role with respect to the nationalist movement. 
The MCAs' top leadership was drawn primarily from the older generation of urban 
notables, individuals who viewed themselves as the natural leaders of the community 
and, moreover, wished to maintain their traditional role from Ottoman times-that is, as 
intermediaries vis-ä-vis the higher authorities. As such, they tended to shy away from 
open confrontation with the British, as this would have undermined the basis of their own 
66 See FO 800/221, Political Report No. 15, Albina to Sykes, 15 June 1918. 
67 O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 47. 
68 Concerning the organisation of the Jerusalem MCA, which was largely along sectarian lines, see ibid, 
p. 48. 
69 Porath, The Emergence, p. 93. 
70 O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 47. 
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authority. From the British point-of-view, the MCAs served a useful function, acting as 
bridge between them and the larger population. Additionally, they were fairly moderate, 
confining as they did their political activities to petitions and relatively peaceful 
demonstrations. In theory, they were organisations with which the British could work. 7' 
For the most part then, while in many respects genuinely representative of broader 
sentiment in their articulation of nationalist demands and their opposition to Zionism, 
their legitimacy and support was at the end of the day based primarily on the social status 
of their leaders, together with the tacit support they received from British officials. 
Christian Arabs were well represented within the MCAs, and it was even suggested in 
some quarters that it was they who had prompted their establishment. 72 For the majority 
of Palestine's Arabs, this was the first experience of political collaboration between 
Christians and Muslims. 73 Overall, Christian representation exceeded their proportional 
numbers in Palestine. According to Muslih, one reason for this over-representation was 
the fact that commerce and education, and hence politics, attracted a disproportionate 
number of the relatively more urbanized and educated Arab Christian community. 74 
Certainly, it is fair to say that the majority of those politically active at the beginning of 
the Mandate came from the educated strata, where, again, Christians were 
disproportionately represented. 75 That Christians were so active among the leadership 
71 See, for instance, ISA 3939/64, Watson's report, 26 September 1919. See also Muslih, The Origin, 
pp. 161-162, concerning assertions that the British supported the MCAs because of anti-Jewish feelings. 
72 Porath, The Emergence, p. 32. 
73 Daphne Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the Palestinian Arab National Movement during the 
Formative Stage, " in The Palestinians and the Middle East Conflict, An International Conference held at 
the Institute ofMiddle Eastern Studies, University of Haifa, April 1976, ed., Gabriel Ben-Dor, (Ramat Gan, 
Israel, Turtledove Publishing, 1978), p. 74; O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 47. 
74 Muhammad Y. Muslih, The Origins, p. 158. 
's See, for instance, Millicent Fawcett, Easier in Palestine, 1921-1922 (London: T. Fisher Unwin Limited, 
1926), p. 59. 
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early on reflected other factors as well. At the beginning of the Mandate at least, 
Christians arguably felt more strongly than Muslims about Zionism (see above). 76 
Christians were particularly active on the economic front, in part because it was in the 
economic sphere that they felt most threatened by Jews (see above). There was arguably 
some basis for this perception, and not just among moderately successful merchants and 
small shop owners. Thus, for instance, an Arab Christian from Bethlehem, Sulaymän 
Rabbub, was denied by the Administration the concession to the rights to utilise the 
Jordan and Yarmuk rivers for generating electricity in favour of a Jew, Pinhas Rutenberg, 
in spite of having good financial backing and having applied first. " Christians played a 
prominent role in the campaign against the sale of land to Jews, especially in the north, 
where they made up many of the landowners, contractors and agents, and thus were 
directly affected by Jewish land purchases. 78 A notable example of this centred round 
contested lands in the area of Beisan. On the basis of their supposed status under the 
Ottomans as state lands, they were targeted early on for Jewish settlement. 79 Questionable 
was whether under the Ottomans they had in fact been state lands, something Beisan's 
Arab tenants challenged . 
80 Christians figured prominently among their supporters. Jubrän 
76 See O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 46; also Sir Steven Runciman, The Historic Role of the 
Christian Arabs in Palestine, the Second Carreras Arab Lecture of the University of Essex, 26 November 
1968, London: Longman for the University of Essex, 1970, p. 16. 
77 Mrs. Steuart Erskine, Palestine of the Arabs (London: George G. Harrap and Company, Ltd., 1935), 
pp. 106-107. Whether the decision to refuse Rabbub the concession constituted a case of discrimination 
against non-Jews is, however, debatable. See, J. M. N. Jeffries, Palestine: The Reality (London: Longmans, 
Green and Company, 1939), pp. 431-438. 
78 Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 80. 
79 David Ben-Gurion, The Peel Report and the Jewish State, Palestine Labour Studies, No. 10 (London: 
Palestine Labour Studies Group, 1938), pp. 53-54. 
80 See, for instance, CO 733/4, dispatch from Samuel to Churchill, 23 July 1921. 
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Iskandar Kazmä, an agronomist who owned a farm in the Jordan valley, championed 
their cause during the High Commissioner's visit to Beisan in April 1921.81 Shortly 
thereafter, George Farazliyah, who during the Ottoman period had leased a tract of land 
in Beisan for cotton cultivation, brought the case before the Arab Executive 82 (concerning 
the AE, see below). Finally, there was Wadi' al-Bästani, a Maronite from Haifa, who 
represented (successfully) Beisan's Arab tenants in court. 83 Another figure active in 
fighting against land sales to Jews was al-Karmil's proprietor, Najib Nassär. In 1922, he 
established the Arab Economic Development Association, an organisation that sought to 
improve the lot of Arab peasants through the formation of cooperative companies and the 
84 establishment of a national bank, the majority of whose members were Christian. 85 
Christians served a particularly valuable function in representing the movement abroad, 
specifically in Europe and America. Even during periods of tension between Muslims 
and Christians, it was often considered imperative by both that they present a united front 
before the international community. This was particularly evident in delegations sent 
abroad, which generally had a disproportionate number of Christians. Specifically, their 86 
81C073313, `Report on the Political Situation for the Month of April, 1921, ' attached to dispatch from 
Deedes to Churchill, 9 May 1921. 
82 Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 80. 
83 ISA 4/2-ii Cox's reports to the Chief Secretary, 30 January 1923,6 February 1923. See also CO 733/54, 
correspondence from Samuel to Ormsby-Gore, 19 July 1923; and CO 733/62, draft report on the situation 
in Palestine by Weizmann, attached to a letter from Weizmann to Schuckburgh, 15 February 1925. 
84 ISA 3939/64, Saig to the CID's central office, 10 August 1921 concerning its registration; ISA 4/4-1], 
Symes to the Civil Secretary, 25 January 1922, concerning its programme. 
85 Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 81. 
86 For example, three of the eight member delegation sent to London in June 1921 were Christian. 
CO 733/4, `Notes on the Moslem-Christian delegation who are proceeding to England, attached to dispatch 
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purpose was to make the case for Arab nationalism in terms amenable to the `West. ' This 
is perhaps best typified by the Orthodox George Antonius, who, in his extremely popular 
book The Arab Awakening, described the Arab Revolt in overtly secular nationalistic 
terms. 87 Antonius was a native of Lebanon who later came to serve in the British 
administration in Palestine. An ardent Arab nationalist, Antonius would become active in 
representing the cause of Palestine's Arabs before British audiences, again in what were 
largely secular nationalist terms. 88 Similar in this sense was the Christian Arab Amin 
Rihäni, also of Lebanese origin, who, like Antonius, promoted Arab nationalism among 
Westerners as something largely secular. 89 Whether such a representation, either of the 
Arab cause or the Palestinian one, was accurate is certainly debatable90-arguably 
though, this was how Westerners sympathetic to the Arabs liked to see it, and in this 
respect, Christians filled an important niche. 9' 
sent from Samuel to Churchill, 2 July 1921; also CO 733/4, Report on the Political Situation in Palestine 
for the Month of June 1921. 
"'George Antonius's The Arab Awakening, the Story of the Arab Nationalist Movement, was published in 
1938, close to the end of his life. Concerning Antonius, see Boyle, Betrayal of Palestine. 
See, for instance, Albert Hourani, "The Arab Awakening: Forty Years After, " in The Emergence of the 
Modern Middle East (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981). 
"9 Esco Foundation for Palestine, Palestine, A Study of Jewish, Arab, and British Policies, Volume I (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), p. 552; also Livia Rokach, The Catholic Church and the Question of 
Palestine (London: Saqii Books, 1987), p. 30. 
90 Certainly there have been many who have questioned the accuracy of his depiction, particularly its 
secular character, among them Zeine (The Emergence ofArab Nationalism, 1958), Hourani ("The Arab 
Awakening: Forty Years After" in The Emergence of the Modem Middle East, 1981), and Tibawi (A 
Modern History ofSyria, 1969). Boyle, Betrayal of Palestine, pp. 27-33. 
91 Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 77. 
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Individuals such as Antonius and al-Sakäkini were most likely sincere in depicting the 
Arab and Palestinian causes in such terms; certainly this reflected how they wanted to see 
it. 92 This does not mean, however, that they were unaware of the language often 
employed by Muslim leaders who, when appealing to fellow Muslims, tended to 
characterise the cause of Palestine as something akin to an Islamic holy war. 93 This could 
be easily rationalised, however, as simply a matter of expediency-of consciously 
expressing the cause in terms most likely to generate sympathy from Muslim audiences, 
just as they sought to do with respect to Western Christian ones. It was no accident, for 
example, that the first Palestinian Arab delegation to London, when issuing a pamphlet 
designed to present their case to the British public at large, entitled it `The Holy Land. '94 
In a similar vein, Najib Nassär, in a series of articles appearing in al Kannil in November 
1924, and addressed to the Pope, sought to draw the attention of `Christian Europe' to the 
danger of Jewish immigration and the extensive land purchase that had led to an increase 
in the level of Christian emigration from Palestine. He ended his letter by calling on 
Western Christendom to come to the rescue of Eastern Christendom, to save the Christian 
character of Palestine. 95 
It was one thing, however, to be addressing Europe and quite another to be addressing 
fellow Arabs. One might ask why it should be necessary to use religious terminology at 
all in order to motivate the latter on behalf of a `nationalist' cause. Moreover, even when 
appealing to the religious sensibilities of `Christian Europe, ' great care was taken to 
92 Esco Foundation, Palestine, A Study, p. 552. 
93 Nels Johnson, Islam and the Politics ofMeaning in Palestinian Nationalism (London: Kegan Paul 
International, 1982), pp. 26-29, original example, al Ahram, 4 July 1922. 
94 See CO 733/8, draft reply from Deedes to Churchill, 22 December 1921. See also Tsimhoni, The British 
Mandate, pp. 238-239. 
95A1-Karmil, 12,15,19 November 1924. Concerning the emphasis given Palestine's Christian significance 
in order to garner Western support for the nationalist movement, see also Porath, The Emergence, p. 42. 
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acknowledge the overall `Muslim' character of Palestine. In the aforementioned series of 
articles, for example, Najib Nassär emphasised Palestine's importance to Muslims and 
the need to safeguard their interests. It was rare that Muslims took equal pains when 
discussing Palestine's Islamic significance to make note of its importance to Christians. 97 
This was not something lost on Christian Arabs, and there were many who were sceptical 
regarding Muslim-Christian unity, and who felt that Christian interests would best be 
safeguarded if they represented themselves politically as an independent community. 98 
During the early part of the Mandate, however, these represented a minority, and the 
prevailing sentiment, at least among the leadership, was one of national unity. The 
prevailing mood was perhaps best expressed in an article appearing in Süriya al- 
Janübiyya-a Muslim-owned and edited newspaper-concerning the Muslim-Christian 
Association in Gaza, only then recently established. The article hailed the new 
Association as indicative of the strong solidarity that existed between Muslims and 
Christians. Furthermore, it was described as being aimed at creating a united front against 
Zionism, as well as against attempts by the British and the Zionists to divide the Arabs 
along religious lines. The article went on to state that "old sensitivities and frictions [had] 
been removed from [Christian and Muslim] spirits and hearts. "99 
That Muslim and Christian notables were strongly united was certainly evident. As 
members of a recently evolved merchant class with shared interests, however, this was 
96 A1-Karmil, 12,15,19 November 1924. 
97 One might, for instance, contrast attitudes evidenced at the Fourth National Congress concerning 
delegations intended for the Hijaz and for the Vatican. Not only was the former considerably larger, it was 
determined that related expenses should be paid, at least in part, by the MCAs. By contrast, expenses for 
the latter were to be covered entirely by the delegates themselves. Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 232- 
233; see also Porath, The Emergence, p. 42. 
98 See, for instance, Al-Karmil, 9 February 1924; also Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 293. 
99 Sürrya al-Jantibiyya, 26 March 1920. 
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perhaps not altogether surprising. Questionable is just how representative the traditional 
elite was of the rest of Palestine's Arabs. Important when examining this question is a 
consideration of the relationship between the traditional leadership and the broader 
society at the time. The great majority of Palestine's Arabs had not yet developed a 
strong political consciousness, and were inclined to follow the lead taken by the 
traditional leadership. For the most part, they still trusted the notable class to represent 
their interests at the national level. '00 The MCAs were the embodiment of this notable 
class, and in this respect, might be considered as representative of the broader society. 
This would change, however, as Palestine's Arabs became increasingly politicised. The 
MCAs constituted little more than a loose alliance of notables, 10' and thus had no 
political structures by which they might penetrate society and incorporate members of the 
lower strata. Additionally, as the Mandate wore on, too often the traditional leadership 
would show itself willing to compromise nationalist goals whenever they conflicted with 
their own more narrowly defined interests. Over time, this would serve to undermine 
their position with the great majority of Palestine's Arabs. 
Such tendencies were evident early on-for instance, when many among the notable 
class came out against union with Syria. 102 As part of a united Syria, they would be 
subordinate to the notables in Damascus, both politically and economically, and it was 
with an eye towards keeping Palestine separate from Syria that many notables came out 
in favour of a British mandate, even if it meant accepting the terms of the Balfour 
Declaration 
. 
113 Thus for instance, even when the All-Palestine Congress, convened in late 
January 1919 by the various MCAs in response to the Paris Peace Conference, declared 
10° As evidenced by the fact that the MCAs, and not the more radical groups such as al Nadi al-' Arabi, 
controlled the first All-Palestine Congress. Porath, The Emergence, pp. 79-80. 
101 Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry, " p. 180. 
102 Muslih, The Origin, p. 178. 
103 Porath, The Emergence, p. 93. 
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in favour of union with Syria, the representatives of the Jerusalem MCA remained 
opposed, and it was only after its leadership role became threatened that the Jerusalem 
delegates reversed their position. It was not by chance that Nablus was proposed as an 
alternative venue for the next Congress. '°4 The incident marked what would come to be a 
strong rivalry between Jerusalem and Nablus, one that in many ways reflected the 
relationship between the traditional leadership and those elements within the larger Arab 
community that would come to challenge it. In many respects, Jerusalem was 
representative of the traditional leadership-since the nineteenth century, the city and its 
notable families had enjoyed a special status within the traditional framework of 
leadership. '°5 Nablus, by contrast, would come to represent those dissatisfied with the 
traditional leadership and the moderate politics it favoured-those more inclined towards 
radicalism. Notably, it would be a radicalism with a strong Islamic colour. 
Catholics and Syrian unity 
Generally speaking, Palestine's indigenous Latin Catholics did support Arab nationalism, 
though their level of commitment always had a certain ambiguity to it. It was not a 
question of whether their commitment was genuine; rather it was a problem of being 
pulled in opposite directions by two very different communal affiliations-on the one 
hand, they were part of the `Arab' community, on the other, the Roman Catholic one. 
Support for a French mandate might be understood as an attempt to reconcile what were 
too often two incompatible affiliations. Arguably, Zionism served a similar function. 
Thus, it was not always clear whether Latin Catholic support for Arab nationalism was 
motivated by anti-Zionism or the other way around; Catholic protestations often came 
across more as an extension of the Vatican's anti-Zionist position than as something 
1041bid, pp. 83-84. 
105 See, for instance, Butros Abu Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period: The New Ottoman 
Administration and the Notables, " in Die Well des Islams 30 (1990), pp. 8,15. 
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derived of strong nationalistic sentiment. 106 (For most Muslim Arabs, by contrast, 
opposition to Zionism was motivated first and foremost by the fact that it was what was 
preventing them from realising nationalist aspirations. ) When the local Latin Catholic 
community, for example, adopted a policy of non-cooperation with respect to 
government educational schemes-on the grounds that they were pro-Zionist-it was 
largely at the instigation of the Latin Patriarch Barlassina. 107 While somewhat inclined to 
participate in nationalist activities, Latin Catholics were poorly represented in nationalist 
organisations; indeed, their participation in the latter was generally discouraged by the 
Latin Patriarch. 108 Certainly it was rare that Latin Catholics took part in more violent 
demonstrations. The one notable exception was their involvement in the Jerusalem riots 
of 2 November 1921, the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, though this seemed 
largely only because of that date's coincidence with the Catholic celebration of All Souls' 
Day. 109 Once relations between Britain and the Vatican improved, Latin Catholic 
involvement in the nationalist movement diminished even further. "° 
Much of this reflected the strong relationship Latin Catholics had with their coreligionists 
worldwide. 111 Among Orthodox Arabs, for example, there was nothing equivalent to a 
106 Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 84; also O'Mahony, "Palestinian 
Christians, " p. 48. 
107 CO 733/5, `Report on the Political Situation for the Month of July 1921'; also Tsimhoni, "The Arab 
Christians and the National Movement, " p. 85. 
108 Ibid, p. 86. 
109 ISA 4/3-7), report from the Director of Public Security to Deedes, [no date]. 
do Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 84; also Tsimhoni, The British 
Mandate, p. 334. 
111 Something often experienced quite directly given the large number of foreign Latin Catholics residing in 
Palestine during the Mandate. Ibid, p. 334. 
113 
`Vatican' that might tie them more closely with the wider Orthodox community. '12 
Correspondingly, Latin Catholics were much more comfortable with the idea of living 
under European, particularly French, rule. Almost immediately after the war, the French 
had, in fact, laid claim to Palestine as part of the Syrian mandate. Among other things, 
they demanded recognition of their traditional rights to the liturgical honours in the Holy 
Places, ' 13 and insisted that they still should enjoy their rights as `protectors' of the Latin 
Catholic community there. "4 The French did all they could to encourage those in 
Palestine desiring union with Syria, "5 and in this respect, Latin Catholic Arabs proved all 
too willing agents. Thus, for instance, the dragomans of both the French and Italian 
consulates in Jerusalem arrived at the All-Palestine Congress with pre-drafted resolutions 
accentuating the connection between Palestine and Syria. 116 For the most part, the French 
did not engage directly in Palestinian politics, but rather worked through French agents, 
local Arab Catholics, French religious orders and pro-French newspapers. 117 The French 
were particularly active in connection with the Jerusalem Catholic Society, three of 
112 Though prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, the Russian Tsar had come close to filling this role. 
Hopwood, The Russian Presence, p. 126. 
113 See, for instance, James Finn, Stirring Times: Or Records from Jerusalem Consular Chronicles of 1853 
to 1856, The Emergence, ed., Elizabeth Anne Finn (London: C. Kegan Paul and Company, 1878), pp. 57- 
58; also, FO 371/3391, General Report from Clayton, 28 March 1918. 
114 Sergio I. Minerbi, The Vatican and Zionism, Conflict in the Holy Land, 1895-1925 (New York, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 25,31. The French were eventually forced to relent on both counts. FO 
371/5244, minutes to discussion `Honours Accorded to French Consul by Catholic Church in Jerusalem, ' 3 
July 1920; and FO 371/5181, letter from Grahame to Curzon, 16 June 1920; and British Secretary's Notes 
of a Meeting of the Supreme Council, 24 April 1920 in Documents on British Foreign Policy, 19191-1939, 
Volume VIII, ed., Rohan Butler and J. P. T. Bury (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1958), p. 170. 
"s Porath, The Emergence, pp. 73-74. 
116 ISA 7/12-7i, Clayton's report, 25 February 1919. 
117 Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 83. 
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whose members were also in the Jerusalem branch of the Muslim-Christian 
Association. 118 It was not Christian support that the French sought in the end, however, 
but that of the Muslim majority; this they hoped to gain by appealing to the Muslim 
desire for a pan-Arab state. '19 Catholics were to provide the means by which Muslims 
might be incited to rise up against the British. 12" Likewise, the French emphasised their 
opposition to the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. 
121 French 
propaganda would eventually cease with the ratification of the British mandate over 
Palestine by the League of Nations in July 1922.122 
Like most Arabs in Palestine, Latin Catholics were vehemently opposed to Zionism. As 
noted above, however, in this, they seemed to take their cue largely from the Vatican. 
From the day of its announcement, the Vatican had adopted a strong position against the 
Balfour Declaration, on the basis of which, it expressed grave concerns about Britain 
receiving the mandate. 123 The Vatican would continue to express an anti-British and anti- 
Zionist attitude over the course of the Mandate, both directly as well as through the 
activities of Jerusalem's Latin Patriarch, Monsignor Louis Barlassina. The Vatican 
expressed a number of concerns with respect to Zionism, not the least being that the 
Christian presence in Palestine would suffer as a result of increased Jewish immigration 
1 18 ISA 7/12-1b, Camp's report, 15 February 1919. 
119 Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " pp. 82-84. 
120 See, for instance, FO 371/5200, letter from Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 2 March 1920; also Tsimhoni, 
"The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " footnote 64. 
121 See for instance, ibid; FO 371/3391, General Report from Clayton, 9 March 1918; and ISA 418-n, ICID 
report, 21 October 1920. 
t' Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 84. 
123 Minerbi, The Vatican and Zionism, p. 21. 
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due to economic competition. 124 Such views were often expressed in the world-Catholic 
press. Thus, for example, the New York-based Catholic journal, The Tablet, ran a report 
under the heading "Christians are Menaced by Jews, " which cited emigration statistics 
proving that Christians were leaving Palestine because they were "tired of Jewish 
interference 
. 
"125The Vatican's official position with respect to Zionism became clear 
with the Papal allocution of 14 June 1921, in which the Pope declared the Vatican's 
opposition to Zionism and claimed that "the new civil arrangements [in Palestine] 
aim[ed]... at ousting Christianity from its previous position to put the Jews in its 
place. "126 The Latin Patriarch Barlassina, appointed on 8 March 1920, was equally 
zealous in his attacks on Zionism and the British, both within and outside of Palestine, 127 
though he would become considerably more reticent once relations between Britain and 
the Vatican improved. 128 
At its core, the Vatican's position on Zionism was very much shaped by what might be 
termed a theologically-based anti-Semitism-the Jews had been dispersed as punishment 
for their having rejected the Messiah, and bore collective responsibility for His 
crucifixion. That they might become reconstituted as a nation without having accepted 
Jesus as the Messiah was considered theologically untenable. 129 Indicative of the attitude 
124 Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 85. 
"s Esther Yolles Feldblum, The American Catholic Press and the Jewish State, 1917-1959 (New York: 
Ktav Publishing I-louse, Inc., 1977), pp. 26-27, original The Tablet, 16 July 1921. See also Rokach, The 
Catholic Church, p. 15. 
126Feldblum, The American Catholic Press, p. 26, original in CatholicMind, 19 August 1921. 
127 See, for instance, CO 733/30, letter from de Salis, to Curzon, 21 May 1922. 
128 CO 733/72, `Secret Political Resume for Jerusalem-Jaffa District for Period ended July 3 1'`, 1924, ' 
4 August 1924. 
129 See, for instance, FO 371/4179, minutes to discussion headed `Vatican's attitude that Christians may 
receive treatment less favourable than that meted out to Zionists, ' 15 March 1919; and Bourne to the Prime 
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of the Catholic Church was an article appearing in the Catholic newspaper, Civilitä 
Cattolica, in 1887, the same year as the first Zionist Congress: 
As for a rebuilt Jerusalem, which might become the centre of a 
reconstituted state of Israel, we must add that this is contrary to the 
predictions of Christ himself who foretold that `Jerusalem shall be trodden 
down of the Gentiles, until the time of the Gentiles be fulfilled' (Luke 
21: 24), that is... until the end of the world. 130 
Apart from business contacts, Latin Catholic Arabs generally had little to do with 
Muslims, 131 and collectively, seemed most concerned with their status as a separate 
community. This was particularly evident in the activities of the Latin Patriarch 
Barlassina, who often petitioned the Government concerning the status of his community 
as a religious body; likewise, concerning their rights in local affairs. 132 A memorandum 
presented by Barlassina to the Foreign Office in May 1920, for instance, was concerned 
not only with issues directly related to the Patriarchate, for which he claimed tax 
exemption, but also those pertaining to the community as a whole-namely, that Latin 
Catholics be granted adequate representation in the municipalities and full autonomy with 
respect to religious law courts and education. 133 The Palestine Government, sensitive to 
Minister and Balfour, 25 January 1919; also Rokach, The Catholic Church, p. 11; and Minerbi, The Vatican 
and Zionism, pp. 10,22,96,101,123,158,160-161,169. 
130 Feldblum, The American Catholic Press, p. 15, original appearing in Civilitä Cattolica, 1 May 1897. 
13' Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 334. 
132 Minerbi, The Vatican and Zionism, p. 174; also Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National 
Movement, " pp. 86,174-175. 
133 FO 371/5191, Memorandum of the Patriarch under the file `Rights of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, ' 27 
May 1920. 
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Catholic criticism outside of Palestine, generally made a strong effort to accommodate 
Latin Catholics. 134 
A question one might ask is whether the Latin Catholic Arab community saw Barlassina 
as representative of them. Certainly Barlassina saw himself in this light. When speaking 
before the community on the question of Catholic representation in the municipalities, for 
instance, he asked that whatever the outcome, they should refrain from violence, as "our 
action ought not to be aggressive but limited to defending our rights alone... [No one 
should] act on his own initiative or listen to the suggestions of inconsiderate persons; you 
have a pastor, draw close to him. i135 The pastor in question, of course, was Barlassina. 
To some extent, he presented himself as representative of the Arabs as a whole, in 
connection with which, he often found it necessary to be more extreme than the most 
`fanatical local Muslim. ' 136 As commented by the German ambassador at the Holy See, 
Barlassina did "not miss any opportunity to speak out against the Jewish settlements and 
openly support the Arabs. s437 There would seem to be some evidence that local Latin 
Catholics accepted his lead. Thus, an Italian diplomat in Damascus reported that, while 
Catholics were involved to some extent in nationalist and anti-Zionist activities, "unlike 
the Arabs [emphasis mine] they could not always rely on the willingness of local 
governments to assist them [and thus] their hopes were pinned primarily on the Holy 
See. s138 In the above-mentioned memorandum presented to the Foreign Office, when 
134 Daphne Tsimhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians under the British Mandate in Palestine" in Middle 
Eastern Studies, 20 iv, 1984, p. 176; also Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 141. 
135 FO 406/44, `Extracts from Pastoral Letter of the Latin Patriarch, " in correspondence from Samuel to 
Curzon, 13 September 1920. 
136 Sergio I. Minerbi, The Vatican and Zionism, p. 142; also Rokach, The Catholic Church, p. 29. 
137 Letter from Von Bergen (Rome) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Berlin), 2 July 1922, in P. E. Lapide, 
The Last Three Popes and the Jews (London, 1967), p. 262. 
138 Minerbi, The Vatican and Zionism, p. 141; see also al-Karmil, 26 October 1929. 
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pressing his case, Barlassina strongly suggested that it was largely due to the 
Patriarchate's efforts that Latin Catholic Arabs had refrained from taking part in. political 
activities. 139 
Well until the end of the Mandate, Latin Catholic Arabs would have a reputation of being 
overly dependent on their ecclesiastical body, and of lacking a sufficiently strong 
commitment to the nationalist cause. This was particularly irksome to those in the 
community who were more nationalistic. Interesting in this respect is an article entitled 
`When You Respect Yourself, People Will Respect You, ' appearing in Filastin in 
November 1936. In it, the author, a Latin Catholic, bemoaned the fact that the Latin 
community was "still depending on their Patriarch while we see that all the other Arab 
communities depend on themselves and want to get free from every kind of foreign 
influence. s140 A second article written in response, also by a Latin Catholic, accused the 
Latin Catholic community of behaving as "slaves under the hands of foreigners. " The 
author was particularly incensed by the Arab priests, who he likened to "machines in the 
hands of foreigners . ', 
141 There were occasional half-hearted attempts at taking an 
independent line. Thus, for instance, following a dispute over the excavation of a 
graveyard, several Arab members of the Franciscan monastery in Nazareth sought to 
break away and found an independent order where, among other things, prayers would be 
done in Arabic. 142 Whether this particular incident reflected on Barlassina's position with 
respect to the Latin Catholic community is questionable given that relations between the 
19 F0 371/5191, Memorandum of the Patriarch of Jerusalem (handwritten), under the file `Rights of the 
Patriarchate 
of Jerusalem, 27 May 1920. 
140 Filastrn, 12 November 1936. 
141 F`la trn, 13 November 1936. 
142 Fi1a311n, 24 April 1928. See also al-Kannil, 13 February 1928. 
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Franciscans and Barlassina were often tense. 143 On the other hand, there is evidence that 
by 1923, there were in some corners demands for an Arab Patriarch. '44 
Barlassina and the larger Latin Catholic community certainly shared one thing in 
common-for both, opposition to Zionism was founded in large part on strong feelings of 
anti-SemitiSM. 145 More than most other Arabs, Latin Catholics showed strong anti- 
Semitic tendencies, and their opposition to Zionism often seemed more due to their 
disdain for Jews than the fact that it posed an obstacle to achieving nationalist aims. It 
was arguably through Latin Catholics that anti-Semitism entered the Arab world, 146 
though certainly it did not take long for it to spread among other Christians, and later 
among Muslims. In 1921, for example, the Orthodox-run newspaper FilastTn published in 
translated form the infamous anti-Semitic tract, The Protocols of the Elders ofZion. 147 
Negative attitudes towards Jews were soon evident among Muslims as well. In 1922, for 
instance, when addressing the Arab Executive, Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza noted that it 
was forbidden to believe the Jews since "they are scoundrels and the Qur'dn itself is full 
of stories of the Jews' fraudulent acts . 
ý9148 Often, Muslims sought to promote anti-Sernific 
attitudes among Christians, in particular, foreign ones. While visiting Palestine, one 
Englishwoman reported being told by a 'highly-placed Muslim' that, "if we were good 
143 See Minerbi, The Vatican and Zionism, p. 35. 
144 See, for instance, CO 733/56, letter from Dormer to Curzon, 17 August 1923. 
145 Minerbi, The Vatican and Zionism, p. 125. 
146 Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 79. 
147 Ibid, p. 79, and footnote 27. Concerning Filastin and its anti-Semitic tendencies, see also F. H. Kisch, 
Palestine Diary (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1938), p. 390. 
148 In Porath, The Emergence, p. 60. 
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Christians we should wish to kill all the Jews in order to avenge the death of our 
Saviour. "149 
Most of Palestine's other Christians did not affiliate so strongly with their respective 
worldwide communities, and tended to accentuate their Arab identity over their religious 
one. 150 This was certainly true of most Greek Catholics, not surprisingly perhaps, given 
that, though recognising Papal authority, they still retained their Eastern rites and 
traditions. Indeed, most Greek Catholics were converts from Orthodoxy, and arguably, 
many of them had accepted Catholicism more as a protest against the abuses of the 
'Greek' Orthodox clergy than because of any strong theological commitment; certainly 
they had not done so out of a desire to become more strongly affiliated with the 
'West. '151 To the extent that it was a reaction against the 'Greek' Orthodox clergy, their 
'Catholicism' was already an assertion of their Arab identity. 152 The Greek Catholics 
claimed to be the only wholly Arab Christian community in Palestine, one whose entire 
hierarchy and lay community was and had always been ethnically and linguistically 
Arab-"' At the same time, it was the ongoing conflict between the Orthodox clergy and 
laity that underlay the latter's commitment to the nationalist cause. This was an element 
that was decidedly missing from the Greek Catholic community. 
149 Fawcett, Easter, p. 65. See also Porath, The Emergence, p. 42. 
15° Something true of Palestine's Protestant Arabs as well, despite the fact that, much as with Latin 
Catholics, they had strong relations with their respective mother-churches in Europe and in America. 
151 See, for instance, Hopwood, The Russian Presence, p. 69. 
152 See ibid, p. 69. 
'53 Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 84; also Tsimhoni, The British 
Mandate, p. 319. 
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Relative to the Latin community, Greek Catholics were fairly active in the nationalist 
movement. Their leading figure in the nationalist movement was the Archbishop Yfisuf 
Gregorius Hdjjar, the highest-ranking Greek Catholic clerical figure in Palestine. ' 54 
Notably, he was the only prelate of any faith to take an active part in the nationalist 
movement right from the start. 155 From the beginning, Hdjjar was strongly pro-French. 
Thus, for instance, during the King-Crane Commission's visit to Palestine, he exhorted 
the lay community to demonstrate strong support for a French mandate. 156 Hdjjar tried to 
influence the Orthodox community as well. 157 Most notable in this respect was his 
incitement of the Orthodox community in Acre against the Greek higher clergy, which 
was pro-British, in the hopes of weakening the latter's influence. 158 Similarly, he tried to 
influence Muslims to demand French protection through the formation of ajoint Muslim- 
Greek Catholic committee. 159 
Though Greek Catholic support for the nationalist cause was determined in large part by 
a genuine sense of being 'Arab, ' as with Lafin Catholics, it was also shaped by an 
antipathy towards Zionism. "O In this, their strong ties with the Vatican were evident. 
Likewise, as with their Latin co-religionists, Greek Catholics were open to being utilised 
by the French for the spreading of pro-French propaganda and the incitement of anti- 
154 The Greek Catholic Patriarch was based in Damascus. 
iss Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 84; also O'Mahony, "Palestinian 
Christians, " p. 48. 
Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 320. 
157 Ibid; also Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 84. 
'58 Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 320. 
159 Ibid; also Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 84. 
'60 O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 48. 
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British agitation. On the basis of their relations with the Vatican, the clergy enjoyed semi- 
diplomatic status and thus had free access to their churches in Syria and Lebanon, 
something that facilitated the maintenance of contacts between the French based in Syria 
and pro-French circles in Palestine. 161 Their strong ties with the Vatican also gave the 
Greek Catholic clergy a certain amount of leverage vis-a-vis the British administration. 
162 
Thus, for example, when Hajj ar alleged that the governor of Haifa was anti-Catholic, his 
claims were given wide circulation by the intemational Catholic press, forcing the British 
to invite the British cardinal Bourne to visit Palestine and observe that such claims were 
without base. 163 Other important Greek Catholic nationalists included Fu'dd Sa' d, who 
represented Haifa at the Fourth Palestinian National Congress and was part of the 
delegation sent to London in 1921 to represent the Arab cause there; and Alfred Rok, a 
. 
lawyer from Jerusalem of mixed Arab and European ancestry, who was a strong 
supporter of Hajj Am7in al-HusaynT, and would during the latter part of the Mandate 
become Vice-President of his Palestine Arab Party. 
The `Arab' Orthodox 
Generally speaking, Orthodox Arabs were the most fervent of Palestine's Christians in 
supporting the nationalist cause. 164 Among the leading figures of the nationalist 
movement were a fair number of Orthodox Arabs, the four most prominent arguably 
being George Antonius, Khalil al-SakWinT, Ya'qilb Faffdj and Isd al-'Isd . The most 
well-known in the West, on account of his book about the Arab Revolt, The Arab 
161 ISA 3/6-n, Waggett to OETA Headquarters, 30 April 1919; and ISA 4/8-n, CID report to the Civil 
Secretary, 21 October 1920. 
162 ISA 3/6-i], Waggett to OETA Headquarters, 30 April 1919. 
163 Tsimhoni, The Brifish Mandate, p. 3 20. 
164 See, for instance, CO 733/139/1, Report of the Commission on the Controversies in the Orthodox 
Patriarchate, 26 June 1925, Bertram and Young, pp. 89-90. 
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. 4wakening, was George Antonius. As Assistant Director of Education for the Palestine 
Government, Antonius: sought to use his position to promote the nationalist cause. 165 He 
later took part in the 1939 Round-Table Conference in London, serving as secretary of 
the Palestinian Arab delegation, as well as that of the united delegation of the six Arab 
countries attending. Khalil al-Sakak-inT, a highly respected individual, was a particularly 
outspoken critic of Britain's pro-Zionist policies. In addition to being affiliated with 
166 
numerous nationalist bodies, he was strongly active in the area of education . Ya q5b 
Farraj, a cousin of al-SakWini's and later a Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, was one of the 
founding members of the Jerusalem Muslim-Christian Association. Following the 
Seventh Palestinian Arab Congress in 1928, he was also one of the two vice-Presidents 
on the Arab Executive (concerning the AE, see below). 167 'Isd al-'Tsd, through his 
newspaper Filasan, was a particularly vocal opponent of Zionism and a strong supporter 
of Arab nationalism. During the latter part of the 1920s, he would become more directly 
involved in politics through his affiliation with the Liberal Party. 168 Other prominent 
Orthodox figures in the nationalist movement included Isd al-Bandak, the editor of the 
Bethlehem-based newspaper, Sawt al-Shab, Sulaym5h Nasif, a prominent landowner 
from Haifa who served on the provisionary advisory council established by the High 
Commissioner in October 1920, and Khalil Baydas, a teacher of Arabic at the School of 
St. George, Others included Ibrahim Shaminds, Hyas Mashabbik, Anthony al-Ghuff, and 
yfjSUf QUrt. 169 
165 See Boyle, Betrayal of Palestine. 
166 See, for instance, Kedourie, "Religion and Politics. " 
16ý Porath, The Emergence, pp. 62,165. 
' Ibid, p. 42. 
169 All founding members of the Jerusalem Muslim-Christian Association. 
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The majority of Christians attending the All-Palestine Congress were Orthodox, 170 and 
while their position regarding union with Syria was mixed (see above), almost all were 
opposed if it meant coming under a French mandate. As discussed briefly in the previous 
chapter, Orthodox commitment to the nationalist cause stemmed largely from their own 
internal conflict, between the higher clergy and laity. While the dispute was ostensibly 
about issues related to local communal representation and the financial control of church 
properties, it also touched on the much larger question of who Orthodox Arabs were. 
Were they essentially Greeks who, following the Arab Conquest of the Levant, had been 
Arabicised, or Arabs who had been Hellenised? Certainly Greek was the language of the 
higher clergy, more specifically, the monastic order, the Brotherhood of the Holy 
Sepulchre, from which not only the Jerusalem Patriarch, but also the metropolitans, 
bishops and archimandrites were recruited. '7' The Patriarch was, in fact, ex-officio 
President of the Brotherhood, 172 and only 'Greeks' were admitted to the Brotherhood. 173 
Arguably, well into the nineteenth century, before it came to have any nationalistic 
connotations, 'Greekness' or Hellenism had a similar relationship with Orthodoxy as 
Arabic with Islam. 174 Yet the everyday language of the laity and village priests was 
Arabic, and this had certainly been the case since at least the Medieval period. The higher 
170 ISA 7/12-b, report by Camp, 15 February 1919, and report by Waters Taylor, 3 February 1919, both to 
OETA Headquarters. 
171 The Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulchre was the chief body of the Patriarchate. While its official task 
was to look after the Holy Sites, it also administered the Patriarchate, as well as the Holy Synod. By the 
time of the Mandate, the clergy as well as the Brotherhood were entirely Greek. Runciman, The Historic 
Role, p. 13. 
172 Elie Kedourie, "Religion and Politics, " p. 81. 
173 Finn, Stirring Times, p. 30. 
174 Kemal H. Karpat, "Ottoman Views and Policies Towards the Orthodox Christian Church" in The Greek 
Orthodox TheologicalReview, The Holy Cross Orthodox Press, Volume 3 1, Spring-Summer 1986, Nos. I- 
2, p. 13 8. 
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clergy nonetheless maintained that, whatever language the laity spoke now, they had 
originally spoken Greek. 175 Likewise, they maintained that the laity was ethnically Greek; 
it was simply that they had forgotten who they were! 176 
The laity, by contrast, maintained that they were ethnically and culturally 'Arab. ' They 
argued that Palestine had never really been Hellenised; that even before the Arab 
Conquest, it had had a large Arabic element, and that it was not until the sixteenth 
century that Greeks had become predominant in the Patriarchate. 177 With the rise of 
Greek nationalism in the eighteenth century, Greek control of the Jerusalem Patriarchate 
became even stronger, likewise the emphasis given its Greek character. 178 Beginning in 
the nineteenth century, the Arabic-speaking laity increasingly began to think of itself as 
'Arab. ' A major factor in this was what was a growing Russian missionary presence in 
Palestine. This began in 1843, with the arrival of the Archimandrite Porfiri Uspenski of 
the Russian Orthodox Church in Jerusalem, 179 and would continue to grow over the 
course of the century. Russian influence was felt materially, particularly in the area of 
education, as more than a hundred schools were built. Such efforts were greatly 
facilitated by the establishment in May 1882 of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine 
175 Hopwood, The Russian Presence, p. 196. 
176 CO 733/139/1, Report of the Commissoin on the Orthodox Patriarchate, 26 June 1925, Bertram and 
Young, pp. 31-32. 
177 See Runciman, The Historic Role, p. 14; also Hopwood, The Russian Presence, pp. 194-195; CO 
733/139/1, Report of the Commissoin on the Orthodox Patriarchate, 26 June 1925, Bertram and Young, pp. 
32-50; and Kedourie, "Religion and Politics, " p. 82. 
178 Runciman, The Historic Role, pp. 14-15. 
179 Hopwood, The Russian Presence, p. 37. 
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Society. 18° Whatever political interests they may have represented, almost all of the 
Russian missionaries took a sincere interest in the welfare of the Arabic-speaking 
community, and many Orthodox Arabs soon came to see Russia as their protector, not so 
much against Ottoman authority, but against the Greek-dominated higher clergy. 
181 
In large part it was because of Russian influence that the Arabic-speaking laity became 
conscious of itself as a discrete community, one distinct from the higher clergy, which it 
saw increasingly as alien. The laity soon began calling for recognition of the 'Arab' 
character of the Patriarchate, for the institution of the Arabic language, the right of Arab 
monks to enter the Brotherhood, and so forth. The matter came to a head in 1872, when 
the Jerusalem Patriarch, Cyril, refused to sign a protocol declaring Bulgaria schismatic on 
account of its having rejected Constantinople's authority. His peers immediately called 
for his removal, something many in the laity saw as an attempt by the Greek element to 
undermine the independence of the Jerusalem Patriarchate. The reaction of the Orthodox 
laity was strong; many refused to attend services in Greek, and some even occupied 
monasteries. 182 They petitioned the Ottoman Govemment, 183 which, though initially 
resisting their demands, finally relented under Russian pressure-thus, a new constitution 
was fashioned in 1875, granting the local community more authority in matters related to 
the Patriarchate. '84 
180 See Kedourie, "Religion and Politics, " p. 83; also Pedersen, The Holy Land Christians, pp. 90-91. For 
an overview of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society and its activities, see Derek Hopwood, The Russian 
Presence, , pp. 96-158. 
"" Kedourie, "Religion and Politicsl" p. 83. See also Hopwood, The Russian Presence. 
'82 Sir Anton Bertram and Harry Charles Luke, Report of the Commission Appointed by the Government of 
Palestine to Inquire into the Affairs of the Orthodox Patriarchate in Jerusalem (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1926), pp. 26-27. 
183 Kedourie, "Religion and Politics, " pp. 83-84; see also Hopwood, The Russian Presence, pp. 192-187. 
184 Ibid, pp. 190-191. 
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Little really changed in fact, much to the distress of the Arab laity. In 1908, in connection 
with the new Ottoman constitution, a delegation of priests and laymen demanded the 
formation of a communal council consisting of both laymen and clergy, which, among 
other things, would be responsible for administering the rather considerable properties of 
the Patriarchate. "s When the Patriarch at the time, Damianos, was dismissed by the 
Synod for actually considering their demands, the reaction in Palestine was so violent that 
the Ottoman Government, again under pressure from Russia, had him forcibly 
reconfirmed. 186 Additionally, the Patriarchate was forced to make a number of 
concessions, among them the formation of a mixed council consisting of six lay members 
(together with six members of the clergy), and the opening up of the Brotherhood of the 
Holy Sepulchre to 'Arab' Orthodox monks. 187 
Damianos turned out to be as much a Hellenist as anyone else in the Synod, 188 and by the 
time of the First World War, little had happened as far as implementing the called for 
reforms. 189 During the First World War, the Synod attempted to carry out its earlier 
decision to dismiss him, largely on the argument that he had mismanaged the 
Patriarchate's revenues, and in a move indicative of the extent to which the Greek 
hierarchy of the Jerusalem Patriarchate had become Hellenised, the Synod turned to the 
195 Bertram and Luke, Report of the Commission, Appendix C; also CO 733/139/1, Report of the 
Commissoin on the Orthodox Patriarchate, 26 June 1925, Bertram and Young, p. 27; and Kedourie, 
"Religion and Politics, " p. 85. 
186 Hopwood, The Russian Presence, p. 197-199. 
"" Bertram and Luke, Report of the Commission, Appendix C. See also CO 733/139/1, Report of the 
Commissoin on the Orthodox Patriarchate, 26 June 1925, Bertram and Young, p. 27. 
'ý'3 Ibid, p. 26; also Hopwood, The Russian Presence, p. 203. 
189 Kedourie, "Religion and Politics, " p. 86, footnote 22; also Pedersen, The Holy Land Christians, p. 94.. 
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Greek Government for support. " The lay community, for its part, turned to the British 
authorities, only then newly established in Palestine. They responded by forming a 
commission-the Bertram-Luke Commission. '9' On the basis of their recommendations, 
Patriarch Darnianos was reaffirmed as Patriarch, 192 and a financial commission was set- 
up for the purpose of examining and controlling the finances of the Patriarchate. 193 
Damianos would retain his position until his death in 193 1. 
The conflict between lay community and clergy would outlast the Mandate, and indeed, 
has not found a satisfactory resolution to this day. '9' Arguably, the end of Russian 
influence following the Bolshevik Revolution saw the removal of what for many 
Orthodox Arabs was the last barrier to achieving full Arab nationalist consciousness. Till 
then, there had still been many Orthodox Arabs who, while increasingly aware of 
themselves as being 'Arab' in the sense of not being 'Greek, ' still looked upon Russia as 
their protector. Such ties accentuated the feeling of being part of a distinctly Orthodox 
community apart from the larger Muslim 'Arab' one. Many early Orthodox nationalists 
had till then recognised the need to redefine their sense of community; likewise, that too 
close an association with a European power would make it difficult for Muslims to accept 
them as equals. 195 In any event, the loss of Russian support would strengthen the reliance 
190 Ibid, p. 97; also Hopwood, The Russian Presence, pp. 185,202,261. 
191 Concerning the Commission's formation, see CO 733/139/1, Report of the Commissoin on the Orthodox 
Patriarchate, 26 June 1925, Bertram and Young, p. 6. 
192 Pedersen, The Holy Land Christians, pp. 97-98. 
193 [bid, p. 97. 
194 Concerning the situation until now, see ibid, pp. 99-103 
195 Hopwood, The Russian Presence, p. 176. 
129 
of the Orthodox Arab community on Arab national institutions, particularly in light of 
their ongoing internal struggle. '9' 
The emphasis given language and culture helped to foster a sense of Arab identity, one, 
moreover, that had strong nationalist overtones. As such, it helped generate a sense of 
shared identity with Palestine's Muslims. Added to this was the fact that, as discussed in 
the preceding chapter, the Orthodox Arabs tended to be well integrated with the larger 
Muslim community. During the mandate period, they formed the largest group of 
Christians attending government schools as opposed to Christian ones. Orthodox students 
thus often sat side-by-side with Muslim students. Significantly, the government schools 
were famous for inculcating within their pupi Is strong nationalist feelings (as discussed in 
the next chapter). 197 Orthodox Arabs regarded themselves as the Christian community 
closest to the Muslims, and in -many respects, this perception was reciprocated. 
198 Thus, 
for instance, when the aforementioned Damianos was disposed, Palestine's Muslims 
came out strongly in support of the Orthodox community. '99 
For many Orthodox Arabs, the 'Arab Orthodox' cause, the nationalist cause, and the fight 
against Zionism were all part of the same struggle. 200 Many Orthodox Arabs saw their 
struggle for the Arabisation of the Patriarchate as only one part of the larger struggle for 
Arab independence, and believed that in fulfilling Arab nationalist aspirations, they 
196 Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 82. 
197 A. L. Tibawi, Arab Education in Mandatory Palestine: A Study of Three Decades ofBritish 
Administration (London: Luzac and Company, Ltd., 1956), p. 65. See also Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians 
and the National Movementl" p. 93. 
"" Many Orthodox, for instance, saw their community as being descended from the Arab Christian tribe of 
Ghasan. lbid, p. 83, footnote 57. 
199 Hopwood, The Russian Presence, p. 198. 
2001bid, pp. 200-201. 
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would realise their own communal goalS. 201 It was not accidental that the Orthodox Arab 
struggle was designated by its leaders al-nahdah a1-ur1hi7dhuksiyyah-tlie 'Orthodox 
Awakening. ' 202 Such a designation was indicative of the national character of the 
struggle. 203 Correspondingly, relations between the Palestinian nationalist and Arab 
Orthodox congresses tended to be quite close, with each expressing strong support for the 
other-the former by verbally backing the Orthodox Arabs in their struggle to overthrow 
the Greek upper hierarchy; the latter by adopting nationalist goals as part of their 
, 
resolutions . 
204 "Isd al-'Isd, speaking many years later at the Arab Orthodox Club in 
Jerusalem noted that, while at the outset, his main objective had been to defend the 
Orthodox cause, he had soon found himself in the midst of a national conflict on two 
fronts, the one Arab-Turkish and the other Arab-Jewish. He joined both without ever 
abandoning the Orthodox cause. 205 Indeed, for him, the latter two were simply extensions 
of the first. As Khalidi notes, "for an individual such as 'Isd al-Is d, all of these loyalties 
were fully compatible %rith one another. ý, 206 
The Protestants 
Generally speaking, Protestant Arabs associated with Europeans a good deal more than 
other Arabs. Most of their respective lay communities were quite mixed in fact, 
201 Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 82. 
202 Among its leaders were Khal-il al-Sakaldni, * Tsq al-'Tsa and Y(isuf al-'Isii (Isd al-'Isd brother and 
cofounder of the newspaper Filasan). 
203 See ibid, p. 82. 
204 ISA 4/16-n, report from Storrs on a meeting with Shammas, 23 September 1922. 
20' Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, pp. 156-157. 
206 Ibid, pp. 156-157. 
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containing both Arabs and Europeans. 207 They thus tended to be the most Westernised. 208 
At the same time, as a community, they often adopted positions quite at odds with their 
'mother churches. '2'9 This was nowhere more evident than with respect to Zionism, the 
aims with which many Protestants worldwide were sympathetiC, 210 and which Protestant 
Arabs adamantly opposed. Though their communities were in many respects dominated 
by Westerners, unlike the case with Latin Catholics, there was no central governing body 
analogous to the Vatican. Individual churches were fairly independent, both with respect 
to hierarchy and in how they practised and interpreted the tenets of their faith. Protestant 
lay members, moreover, often had considerably more influence in their churches than 
Catholic lay members did in theirs. That said, the vast majority of church officials and 
congregations were European and American. 211 Moreover, though not strictly hierarchal, 
local Protestant churches tended to have strong relationships with their corresponding 
'mother churches' in Europe and America. One might have anticipated, therefore, that 
Protestant Arabs would be more amenable towards Zionism in keeping with the pro- 
Zionist tendencies of their broader Protestant communities. 212 Quite the opposite was in 
fact the case. 
'07 As of the 1931 census, only 38 percent of Anglicans residing in Palestine were actually Arab. This 
might be compared with 83 per cent for Latin Catholics, and 95 per cent for Orthodox and Uniate 
Christians. Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 20. 
208 Ibid, p. 328. 
209 See Daphne Tsimhoni, "The Anglican (Evangelical Episcopal) Community in Jerusalem and the West 
Bank" in OrienteModemo, Nuova Serie, Anno II, Nr. 1-12 (Gennaio-Dicicmbre 1983), p. 252. 
210 On the basis of Protestant tenets concerning the fulfilment of Biblical prophecy. See, for instance, 
Scgcv, One Palestine, pp. 3 6-37. 
21 1 Thus, as the 1931 Census, out of a total of 4,799 Anglicans residing in Palestine, only 1,8 10 could claim 
Palestinian citizenship. Table VII, Part III, pages 29-43, in Census ofPalestine 1931, Vokime II, Part II, 
Tables, by E. Mills, B. A., ORE., Assistant Chief Secretary, Superintendent of Census, by Authority, 
Printed for the Government of Palestine, by Messrs. Whitehead Morris Limited, Alexandria, 1933. 
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Being the most Westernised, Protestant Arabs tended to be the most exposed to Western 
ideas related to secular nationalism. In this respect, the presence of foreign clergies in 
their churches probably did more to foster national consciousness than diminish it. 213 
Much like the caseArith Orthodox Arabs, their understanding of the nationalist movement 
was shaped in large part by their situation vis-d-vis their own church hierarchies, 
hierarchies that, as noted, tended to be dominated by foreigners. Their heads were 
generally either European or American, something most Protestant Arabs greatly desired 
to see changed. 214 LikeWlse, just as they hoped to see the top positions in their respective 
church hierarchies eventually filled by members of their own communities, they aspired 
as a people to achieve an independent secular state. Few were prepared to sacrifice their 
nationalist aspirations in order that Biblical prophecies concerning the 'homecoming' of 
the Jews might be fulfilled (see below). 
The nationalist tendencies of Protestant Arabs were particularly evident within the 
Anglican community, which even went so far as to reject the designation 'Anglican' in 
favour of the title 'Evangelical Episcopal Arab Community. ' 215 Much of its early efforts 
as a community were concentrated. on building its own communal organisation, one that 
would be fully autonomous and would recognise the authority of the bishop in spiritual 
matters only. This, in fact, caused a fair amount of friction with the Anglican Bishop and, 
212 Many European (and to some extent, American) Protestants in Palestine, including certain British 
personnel, had been motivated in part to come there by their support of Zionism. A good example of this 
was Sir Wyndham Deedes, the High Commissioner's principal advisor on administrative matters. Tom 
Segev, One Palestine, pp. 89-90. 
213 Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 86; also Tsimhoni, The British 
Mandate, p. 327. 
214 See, for instance, al-Kamil, 21 September 1929; FilastTn, 25 July, 18 November 1936. 
215 Tsimhoni, "The Anglican Community, " p. 252. 
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according to Tsimhoni, may have been the main reason why the Anglican Church was 
not recognised by the mandate government as officially constituting a religious 
community. 216 A concern for communal organisation was evident among Protestants as a 
whole. During the Mandate, they were the only Christian community to fully put into 
practice the terms of the Religious Communities Ordinance of 1926 calling for the 
creation of religious and cultural councils as the basis of communal organ isation-this 
through the Protestant Palestine Church Council (actually established in 1905), which 
acted as an organising and directing body inclusive of Arab clergy and lay members from 
the various Protestant congregations. 217 
Quite a few Protestant Arabs were to be found among the leadership of the nationalist 
movement, among them the advocate Mughannarn. Eyas Mughannam from Ramallah 
who was strongly affiliated with Raghib al-Nashashlibi, his wife Matiel, who was a key 
figure with respect to women's political efforts, Najib Nassar, the editor of the Haifa- 
based newspaper, al-Karmil, BuMis Shahdda, the editor of the Jerusalem-based newspaper 
Mir'& al-Sharq, Dr. HabYb SalTm, a prominent physician from Nablus who served on the 
Arab Executive, and Shibl! al-Jamal, a teacher from the St. George School who 
accompanied the Arab delegation sent to London in 1921, and during the 1930s, served 
as a secretary in the Kh5lidi-founded Reform Party. Protestant Arabs tended to be highly 
fluent in English and well acquainted with sections of the British public, on account of 
which, they were often strongly represented in delegations sent to London for the purpose 
of representing the Arab cause before the British public and government. 218 
On the question of union with Syria, two tendencies existed within the Protestant 
community. On the one hand, they often inclined towards a pan-Arabist position along 
216 Ibid, p. 252. 
21' Tsimhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians, " p. 172. 
21sTsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " pp 86-87. 
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strongly secular lines. On the other, given that almost all the events portrayed in the 
Gospels took place within mandate-Palestine's borders, many Protestant Arabs were 
quite able to conceive of their nationalist identity in regional terms, and thus were 
comfortable with the idea of Palestine constituting a distinct geographical entity. 2'9 With 
respect to anti-Semitism, Protestant Arabs tended to go against the grain of their Western 
counterparts. The latter tended to support Zionism in connection with Biblical prophecies 
concerning the eventual 'homecoming' of the Jews to Palestine, and their acceptance of 
Jesus Christ as the long-awaited Messiah as a necessary precondition to his return. In 
large part, this had been the impetus behind one of the more prominent Protestant 
missionary organisations operating in Palestine, the London Mission Society, 220 which 
specifically targeted Jews for conversion. At least initially, the same held true of the 
Anglican Church, which following its establishment in Palestine, had concentrated its 
evangelical efforts on Jews. 22' Though by the time of the Mandate this would change 
somewhat'222 it Was unusual to hear strong expressions of anti-Semitism among Western 
Protestants. The same did not hold true for Protestant Arabs. During a nationalist 
gathering in Nazareth held in March 1920, for example, the resident Anglican priest, 
As'ad Mansu-r, gave a speech in which he explained that the Jews had no right to 
Palestine as it had been taken from them on account of their having rejected the 
Messiah. 223 
219 Porath, The Emergence, p. 7. 
2'0 It's fully name was the London Mission Society for Propagating Christianity among the Jews. Pedersen, 
The Ho ly Land Chrisfians, p. 78. 
221 Finn, Stirring Times, pp. 138-139; also Tsimhoni, "The Anglican Community, " p. 25 1. 
222 See, for instance, Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " pp. 87-88. 
"3 Porath, The Emergence, p. 62. A few years later, the Evangelical Youth Club in Haifa would invite a 
Muslim speaker to deliver a talk along the same lines. At-Kannil, 25 September 1927. 
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The other Christian communities 
For reasons already discussed above, Armenians were less inclined to support the 
nationalist cause. They saw themselves as part of the larger Armenian nation and were 
generally more concerned with the Armenian nationalist movement centred round their 
historic homeland in the Caucasus region. 224 An additional factor was that Armenians, 
much like Latin Catholics and Protestant Arabs, tended to affiliate more strongly with the 
WeSt. 225 They did at times make common cause with the larger Christian community in 
their opposition to Zionism, which they saw as a threat to more narrowly defined 
interests 
. 
226 Arguably, it was a concern about Zionism that prevented Palestine's 
227 Armenians from cooperating more effectively with the British authorities. Much of the 
above applied equally to Palestine's Maronites, the main difference being that the 
question of whether or not they constituted a people apart from the Arabs was still subject 
to debate. Their tendency to dissociate from the larger Arab community arguably 
reflected a great deal more on the larger Christian community and its overall commitment 
to the nationalist cause. There were exceptions of course. The Christian Maronite lawyer 
Wad7t' al-Bastaff, from Haifa, for example, was fairly active in the nationalist 
movement, 228 though this seemed motivated primarily by what were strong anti-Jewish 
224 Concerning the attitudes of diaspora Armenians in the Arab countries, see Hrair Dekmejian, "The Armenian 
Diaspora, " TheArmenian People, From Ancient to Modern Times, Volume II, ed., Richard G. I-lovannisian 
(Houndmills, Hampshire & London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1997), pp. 413 443. 
125 See, for instance, Pedersen, The Holy Land Christians, p. 128. 
226 That is, the safeguarding of church properties or their own econornic situation. lbid, p. 128. 
'27 Unlike, for instance, what was the case in Syria with respect to the French. See Juk-ka Nevakavi, Britain, 
i 
France and theArab Middle East, 1914-1920, Historical Studies, University of London, No. 23 (London: 
Athlone, 1969), p. 113, 
128 Wadr al-135stan! was a member of the Arab Executive, of the delegation sent to London following the 
Sixth Palestinian National Congress, and of the Arab Economic Development Society, formed in 1922, to 
promote the educational and health needs of Palestinian Arab villagers. 
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feelings 
. 
229 As far as the remaining Christian communities were concemed-most of 
which were quite small and monastic in character-their position with respect to the 
nationalist movement and the cause of 'Arab' Palestine was determined largely by two 
factors: a concern about Zionism-specifically, whether Zionists had designs on church- 
owned properties and what impact the implementation of a Jewish state might have on 
Christian rights in the Holy Land in general; and external events related to the larger 
communities with which they were affiliated. 230 
Moderation versus extremism 
The first few months of 1920 saw a surge in militant activity. in April 1920, during the 
Nabi Miisd celebrations in Jerusalem, riots broke out following inflammatory speeches by 
Jerusalem's mayor, MGsd Kdzim. al-Husayny. 231 and members of the strongly Islamic 
nationalist group, a]-Nddli al-'ArabY (see below). For many Muslims, nationalist sentiment 
often found its strongest expression during Islamic religious festivals. The April riots 
were largely a Muslim affair, 232 though there were some Christians involved. (Among the 
casualties were three wounded Christian Arabs . 
)233 Particularly during the early part of 
the Mandate, when Muslim-Christian solidarity was still strong, Christians were inclined 
to participate in the Nabi Miisd celebration. Though ostensibly a religious festival, it 
229 CO 733/62, draft report on situation in Palestine, by Weizmann, 15 February 1923. 
2'0 Thus, for instance, the attitude of the Nestorians or Assyrians towards the national movement in 
Palestine in many ways reflected the situation of Nestorians and Assyrians in Iraq. 
231 Something which saw his replacement as mayor by the more moderate R5ghib al-NashZish-ibi. 
232 Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 254, original in the DailyMirror, 9 April 1920. 
233 lbid, p. 254; also Johnson, Islam and the Politics ofMeaning, p. 21. 
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quickly came to serve as a symbol of Muslim-Christian solidarity. 234 In part, this 
reflected the fact that it took place at roughly the same time as the Christian Easter 
celebrations235 and the Jewish Passover; also the fact that the festival's importance was 
largely confined to Palestine. It thus had about it the air of a national holiday, and this is 
in fact how many Christians saw it. 236 Christian Arabs generally came out to watch the 
festival's conclusion in Jerusalem. In her memoirs, Hald al-Sakdkini, Khalil al-SakWini's 
daughter, recalled with great fondness sitting by St. Stephen's Gate to welcome the 
procession. She characterised the event largely in nationalistic terms: 
Everywhere you could see the Arab flag with its green, red, white and 
black colours: fluttering high above the heads. The scene filled us with 
enthusiasm and national pride. Every now and then strong young men 
would link their arms together and, forming circles, would start dancing 
the dabkeh and singing. It was thrilling to watch and wonderful for the 
spirit. Although the Nabi Musa feast was supposed to be a religious 
occasion, it was in fact a national day in which all the Arabs of Palestine, 
237 Christians and Muslims alike, shared . 
234 Fannie Fern Andrews, The HolyLand UnderMandate, Volume I (Westport, Connecticut: Hyperion 
Press, hic., 1931), pp. 196-197. 
The Nabi Musa festival lasted seven days, and roughly corresponded to the Orthodox Holy Week. 
236 See, for instance, CO 733/44 'Report of the Political Situation in Palestine and Trans-Jordan for the 
Month of March 1923, 'pp. 6-7-, and CO 733/93, Secret Political Resume for the Jerusalem-Jaffa District, 
for the Period by Ronald Storr, 16 May 1923. Also Daphne Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the 
National Movement, " p. 74. 
237 Hala Sakakini, Jerusalem and], A Personal Record (Jordan: The Econornic Press Co., 1987 (1990)), 
p. 49. 
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Over the course of the Mandate, Christian involvement in more radical activities would 
prove limited. 3' During the early going, however, the nationalist movement was, as a 
whole, politically moderate . 
239 Arab efforts at achieving nationalist objectives during this 
period were largely led by the MCAs, which mostly organised demonstrations and 
congresses, submitted appeals and petitions, and sent delegations to plead the Arab case 
before the League of Nations and European governments. Following the establishment of 
civil administration in the summer of 1920, the various MCAs began making 
preparations for the Third Palestinian Arab Congress. 240 It eventually convened in 
December of that year in Haifa, and concluded with the election of a permanent executive 
committee. This body, which came to be known as the Arab Executive, would come to 
dominate the nationalist movement for the rest of the decade. M(Isd Kazim al-HusaynT, 
who presided over the Congress, was made its president. Of its nine initial members, two 
were Christians-lbr5hTm Shammas and Dr. Ya'qfa-b Burtqush. 
Though the nationalist movement would maintain a moderate temperament throughout 
most of the 1920s, this by no means meant that Palestine's Arabs had acquiesced to 
Zionism. This was certainly apparent in early May 1921, when riots broke out in Jaffa, 
only half a year after the Third Palestinian National Congress. What would distinguish 
this early episode of violence from the anti-Jewish violence of the latter part of the 
mandate period-beginning with the Wailing Wall disturbances of 1929-was its 
relatively secular character. Later violence would often have an obvious quality of 
religious fanaticism about it, a development that in many respects corresponded to what 
would be a growing tendency to redefine the nationalist cause in religious terms (as 
discussed ftirther below). The riots, incited by a Jewish May Day Demonstration in 
M Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement: 'p. 78. 
239 See, for instance, Ann Mosely Lesch, "The Palestine Arab Nationalist Movement Under the Mandate, " 
The Politics ofPalestinian Nationalism, eds., William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber, and Ann Mosely Lesch 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 19-20. 
240 Porath, The Emergence, p. 108. 
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Tel Aviv, carried on for almost a week, not only in Jaffa, but in other parts of the country 
as well. The final tally was 47 Jews and 48 Arabs dead, 146 Jews and 75 Arabs 
wounded. 241 
In spite of the fact of Jaffa having a substantial Christian community'242 hardly any 
Christians were involved directly in the rioting, something perhaps best evidenced by the 
relatively small number of Christian casualties-compared to II Muslims killed and 
41 wounded, Christian casualties amounted to 2 dead and 2 wounded. 243 Christian 
involvement in the incident in fact seemed mostly limited to the refusal of Christian Arab 
police officers to assert their authority in order to prevent bloodshed . 
244 The three main 
incidents of Arab attacks on Jews in Palestine aside from the disturbances in Jaffa-those 
against the Jewish settlements in Khedera, Petach Tikvah and Rehoboth-again seemed 
largely Muslim affairS245; that in Rehoboth, interestingly enough, coincided with a 
festival honouring a local Muslim saint, and arguably, the festival constituted a factor in 
inciting the attack . 
246 Though not actively involved, Christians generally condoned the 
241 Abdul Wahhab . Kayyali, Palestine, A Modem History (London: Third World Centre for Research and 
Publishing, 1978). See also Command Paper Number 1499, An Interim Report on the Civil Administration 
of Palestine, during the period I't July, 1920-30t" June, 1921, Presented to Parliament by Command of His 
Majesty, August, 192 1, p. 9. A full account of the 'May 1921 Disturbances' can be found in Command 
Paper Number 1540, Palestine, Disturbances in May, 1921, Reports ofthe Commission ofInquiry with 
Correspondence Relating Thereto, Presented to Parliament by Command -of His Majesty, October, 192 1. 
242 Roughly a quarter of the overall population of 45,000 were Christian, mostly Orthodox, though with a 
fair number of Catholics. lbid, p. 18. 
243 CO 733/3, despatch from Samuel to Churchill, 15 May 1921. 
244 DaplmeTsinihoni, The British Mandate, p. 255, original in Hayeraft's report, pp. 22,45. 
245 Command Paper Number 1540, pp. 5-16,38-41. 
246 Ibid, pp. 41-43; see also Daphne Tsirnhoni, The British Mandate, p. 256. 
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riotS, 247 something perhaps not surprising given that feelings of unity between Muslims 
and Christians were at this time still strong. 248 
While the riots were not motivated by religious sentimentper ýe, such sentiment was not 
entirely absent. There was a strong perception that a link existed between Zionism and 
Bolshevism-a movement that was decidedly anti-religioUS249-and indeed, it was the 
presence of an overtly Bolshevik group in the May Day Demonstration that had set off 
the riots . 
2" Both Muslims and Christians were equally opposed to Bolshevism, and, 
particularly during the early days of the Mandate, made much of Zionism's supposed 
Bolshevik tendencies. Thus, for instance, in an editorial, al-Karmil argued that 
"Bolshevism and Zionism are the same even if they look different. , 251 This tendency 
would never fully disappear during the Mandate; during the Islamic Conference of 193 1, 
for example, one participant argued that the Jews were responsible for the Bolshevik 
revolution in Russia, and that "if the Zionists conquered al-Aqsd mosque, they [would] 
hang in it pictures of Trotsky and of the Russian ambassador in Ankara! 7,252 Such 
emphasis was partly strategic. At the time, the British were greatly concerned with what 
they perceived to be Soviet-inspired threats to their interests in the region, 253 and hence it 
247 Command Paper Number 1540, pp. 35,59. See also CO 733/4, correspondence from Shuckburgh to the 
Duke of Sutherland, 12 July 1921. 
248 See Command Paper Number 1540, p. 18. 
249 See also ibid, p. 12. 
250 Thus it was noted by the Commission investigating the riots that, if it had not been for this group's 
presence, the demonstration would most likely have passed largely unnoticed. lbid, pp. 22-23. 
251 Al-Karmil, 21 September 1929. See also see also ibid, 26 October 1929,1 March 1930, and 9 May 193 1; 
also FO 800/22 1, Secret Political Report No. 15, Albina to Sykes, 15 June 1918. 
252 Oriente Aloderno, January 1932, p. 34, from Filasrin, 6-18 December 193 1. 
253 Minerbi, The Vatican and Zionism, p. 147. 
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was felt that such arguments might resonate more strongly with them. At the same time, 
such sentiments reflected genuine concerns. The overall 'progressive' attitude and 
correspondingly 'immodest' behaviour of the early Zionists was offensive to local 
sensibilities, Christians and Muslims alike. While the great majority of Zionists were not 
Bolshevik in the strictest sense of the term, for many Arabs, 'Bolshevism' had a fairly 
broad meaning encompassing all behaviour perceived as irreligious and disrespectful of 
traditional and conservative values. Such sentiments were particularly strong among 
Christians, particularly those that had strong affiliations with their respective worldwide 
communities. This was nowhere more evident than with Latin Catholics, the attitude of 
whom in many ways reflected that of the Vatican. 254 
A legislative council 
In June 1922, Winston Churchill, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, published a 
statement of British policy, what came to be known as the Palestine White Paper or 
'Churchill White Paper. ' Among other things, it called for "the establishment of a 
Legislative Council containing a larg e proportion of members elected on a wide 
franchise. , 215 Since October 1920, an advisory council had been in place; its non-official 
members, however, had been nominated by the Commissioner. 256 In the new body, the 
non-official members were to be elected. Moreover, whereas previously there had been 
an equal number of official and non-official members (ten of each), the non-official 
254 fbid, p. 122; also Rok-ach, The Catholic Church, pp. 13-14,18,22,29-30. 
255 See 'The Churchill White Paper' in The Israel-Arab Reader, pp. 45-50. 
256 Of the ten unofficial members, four were Muslim, three Christian, and three Jews. Command Paper 
Number 14 99, An In terim Report on the Civil Admin istration ofPalestine, du ring the period I" Ju ly, 
1920-30'h June, 1921, p. 10. Conceming its Christian representatives, see Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, 
p. 144. 
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members would now outnumber the official members twelve to ten. 257 As was the case 
with the Advisory Council, the non-official component was to break down along 
religious lines-of the non-official members, eight would be Muslim, two Jewish, and 
two Christian. 258 
The Arabs rejected the proposed legislative council, as it was considered that its 
acceptance would constitute a tacit acceptance of Zionism. The Palestine Government 
opted to go forward with the elections anyway, to which the Arabs responded with a 
boycott. 259 Overall, the boycott proved quite effective, and was marked by a high degree 
of Muslim-Christian solidarity. Only 18 per cent of qualified Muslims voted, and 5.5 per 
cent of qualified Christians (contrasted with a roughly 50 per cent turnout among Jewish 
voters). 260 Following the election, six of the Arabs who were elected were compelled to 
withdraw, 261 and in the end, the plan for implementing a legislative council was 
abandoned . 
262 In its place, an advisory council was established, the nominated unofficial 
element of which corresponded to that of the proposed elective element in the Legislative 
... Concerning the various schemes proposed and the basis for the final decision, see Tsimhoni, The British 
Mandate, pp. 146-15 1. 
258 Colonial No. 15, Palestine, Report of the High Commissioner on the Administration ofPalesfine, 1920- 
1925, London, HMSO, 1925, pp. 44-45. Additionally, the country was to be divided into 436 voting area 
with the number of secondary electors fixed at 670 Muslims, 59 Christians, 79 Jews and 15 Druzes, 
according to the proportional strength of each community. CO 733/43, telegram from Samuel to the 
Colonial Secretary, 17 March 1923. 
259 See ibid, Appendix D, "Political Report for the Month of February 1923, " 9 March 1923. 
260 Command Paper Number 1889, Palestine: Papers Relating to the Electionsfor the Palestine Legislative 
Council 1923, Presented by command of His Majesty, London, FIN4SO, 1923, p. 9. 
261 Tsimhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians, " p. 180. 
262 CO 733/43, correspondence from the Duke of Devonshire to Samuel, 29 March 1923. 
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Council-eight Muslims, two Jews, and two Christians. Both Muslims and Christians 
refused to comply even with this, and in the end, the advisory council consisted of only 
official members. 263 
In many respects, the solidarity evident in the Arab response to the elections marked the 
high watermark of Muslim-Christian unity. Though Christian participation in terms of the 
actual number of secondary electors nominated was greater than that of Muslims- 
Christians filled 19 of 59 potential spots, about one-third of the total number, against 107 
of 670 potential spots for Muslims, less than one-sixth the total number-it was actually 
less at the PollS. 264 In Haifa and Jaffa, two cities with substantial Christian populations, 
their attitude towards the elections was more extreme than that of Muslims; there, no 
I Christian secondary electors were nominated at all. 265 Christians were also fairly active in 
campaigning for the boycott, particularly as evidenced by the newspapers FilastTn pd al- 
Karmil 
. 
266 Government policy in the immediate aftermath of the boycott reflected the 
high degree of solidarity that had been displayed by Muslims and Christians, and future 
Proposals for representative bodies would call for a division of the population into Arabs 
and Jews, as opposed to Muslims, Christians and Jews. 267 Thus, for instance, Arab 
263 C0733/45, telegram from Samuel to the Duke of Devonshire, 13 June 1923; and C0733/5 I, telegram 
from Samuel to the Duke of Devonshire, 19 November 1923; also Fawcett, Easter in Palestine, p. 179. 
Concerning the resignation of the Christian nominations, see CO 733/48, Clayton to the Colonial 
Secretary, I August 1923. 
264 COMI'land Paper Number 1889, p. 8. 
265 Tsinihoni, The British Mandate, p. 283. Interestingly, Tsimhoni suggests that this might have reflected 
the fact that both cities had substantial Jewish communities, and that local Christians there were reacting 
primarily to Jewish economic competition. Ibid, p. 283. 
266 For '3cample, inAl-Kannil, 9 December 1922,10,28 February, 3,7 March, 7 April 1923. See also 
Tsinihoni, The British Mandate, p. 279 
267 Tsirnhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians, " pp. 180-185. 
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notables invited to participate in a proposed Arab AgenCY268_four of whom were 
Christian 269-were designated only by their political position and place of residency, with 
no reference being made to their religious affiliation. "' 
Muslim-Christian unity 
Over the next few years, things would remain relatively calm. There was a strike, held in 
March 1925, on the occasion of Lord Balfour's visit to Jerusalem for the opening of the 
Hebrew University; also an incident that same year at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem, 
when Muslims took issue with what they considered to be innovations in Jewish worship 
there . 
271 Finally, the following spring saw a demonstration of solidarity with the Arabs in 
Syria in the form of a general strike, called on the occasion of the French High 
Commissioner, M. de Jouvenel's visit to Jerusalem. All of these took place peacefully 
enough, and moreover, saw equal involvement by Muslims and Christians. Arab activism 
was particularly evident during this period in the economic sphere, in connection with 
what was a fast-growing Arab proletariat. With the beginnings of industrialisation and the 
continued expropriation of Arab lands, many Arab peasants began moving to the larger 
towns and cities in search'Of employment opportunities. During this period, Arab women 
also became increasingly active in the nationalist movement. As discussed more fully in 
26' To act as a counter-balance to the Jewisb Agency. In the end, it too was rejected. Command Paper 
Number 1989, Palestine, Proposed Formation ofan Arab Agency. Correspondence with the High 
Commissionerfor Palestine, Presented by command of His Majesty, London, HMSO, 1923. 
1 
2"9 Tsimhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians, " p. 181. 
270 CO 733/50, 'List of Arab Notables Present at the Meeting, ' attached to dispatch from the Samuel to the 
Duke of Devonshire, 12 October 1923. See also Command Paper Number 1989, p. 8. 
271 More specifically, they had brought chairs and benches to the Wall on the Jewish Day of Atonement, 
something many Mushms saw as going against the status quo and therefore as posing a threat to their 
control of the adjoining Hararn al-Shaffif. Command Paper Number 3530, Commission on the Palestine 
Disturbances ofAugust, 1929, p. 34. 
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the final chapter, Christian women would play a disproportionately large role in the 
various women's organisations that began forming around this time. For the most part, 
Muslim-Chfistian solidarity remained relatively strong during this period. 
Muslim-Chrisfian unity manifested itself not only in the newspapers, but also in practice. 
During the early part of the Mandate, Christians were more apt to participate in 
nationalist demonstrations than would later be the case; Christian participation was, in 
fact, actively promoted through the MCAs. 272 Other displays of solidarity were more 
spontaneous in nature. Following the deaths of a Muslim and Christian during 
disturbances in 1921, for instance, it was agreed between the two communities that "they 
should have ajoint funeral, [whereby] the Mufti [would go] into the Greek Church and 
,, 273 the Greek priest ... 
into the mosque. Likewise, with the death of a Christian boy and 
Muslim boy in Haifa that same year-there, "the parents of the Christian boy who was 
killed received 20 pounds from the Moslem community and those of the Moslem who 
died of his wounds received a similar sum from the Christian community. " The official 
reporting this event went on to note that while "[o]pinions differ as to whether these 
events have decreased or increased unity between Christians and Moslems ... on the 
whole, evidence seems to poMt to firmer union. ', 274 Likewise, during the aforementioned 
visit of the High Commissioner to Beisan, a large crowd gathered carrying black banners 
with, among other slogans, one. proclaiming that 'Moslems and Christians are 
brothers. '27' 
272 See, for example, Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 248. 
273 CO 733/4, correspondence from Shuckburgh to the Duke of Sutherland, 12 July 192 1. 
274 CO 733/3, Report on the Political Situation in Palestine and Transjordania for the Month of April, 1921, 
attached to dispatch from Deedes to Churchill, 9 May 192 1. 
275 Ibid. 
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A significant factor underlying Muslim-Christian unity was Zionism, which, in creating a 
common cause, helped bridge differences between the two communities; for some 
observers, the mere fact of Muslim-Christian unity was a measure ofjust how serious a 
danger both considered Zionism. As one visiting European commented, "[t]he fact that 
Moslems and Christians were working together for a common cause was a sign that the 
nation was roused by what was felt to be a common danger, and that there were men 
ready to sink, all differences of outlook in the effort to , Arin through. qi276 In similar fashion, 
Lord Sydenharn of the House of Lords characterised the above-mentioned joint funeral as 
something "absolutely unique in a country which saw the CrusadeS. ', 277 As noted above, 
early on at least, Christians were much more vigorous in their opposition to Zionism than 
Muslims. One commentator at the time went so far as to say that Christians were "even 
)9278 prepared to slaughter the Jews . 
Given the extent to which the nationalist cause defined itself as a movement of opposition 
to Zionism, it is not surprising that Christians were so active on its behalf. Many 
Christian Arabs were, of course, also opposed to Zionism for nationalistic reasons. Thus, 
for example, al-Sakdki-n! remarked that he "hated Zionism because it tried to build itself 
on the ruins of others; in conquering Palestine, [he] felt as if Zionism were trampling the 
heart of the Arab nation .,, 
279 Nonetheless, there is some evidence to suggest that for most 
Christians, the main impetus underlying their involvement in the nationalist movement 
was their opposition to Zionism. Thus, for instance, it was remarked in a speech made by 
the aforementioned As'ad MansUr in 1920, that the reason why Nazareth's Christians had 
not been active in the nationalist movement till then was that there were no Jews living 
276Erskine, Palestine, p. 80. See also Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 206. 
277 CO 733/4, correspondence from Shuckburgh to the Duke of Sutherland, 12 July 192 1. 
278 Minerbi, The Vatican and Zionism, p. 137, original from a report by an Italian minister, 20 December 
1919. 
279 In Segev, One Palestine, p. 29. 
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among them. 280 If some Christians were fearful of living in a 'Muslim' state, they 
certainly had no desire to live in a Jewish one. 
In any case, as long as there was the obstacle of Zionism to overcome, there was little 
point in dwelling at length on what an independent Arab state might look like; likewise, 
what might be the place of non-Muslims in it. This is not to say that Christian support for 
the nationalist cause was predicated on a belief that an independent Arab Palestine would 
never actually materialise. There was a strong belief during the early part of the Mandate 
that it was something achievable-that it was mostly a matter of convincing the. British of 
the j ustice of th ei r cause . 
281 Added to that, the actual number of Jews that had immigrated 
to Palestine by that point was fairly small. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that, so long as an 
independent Arab Palestine remained something strictly hypothetical, Christians did not 
have to worry about what might be their own position in it. In addition, given their 
prominent role early on in the nationalist movement, Christians were, at least initially, 
optimistic that they would have a considerable say in determining the nature of any future 
Arab state. Most Christians in Palestine did indeed favour an independent Arab 
Palestine-their only concern was that it should be a state largely based on the Europ ean 
secular model, and thus one within which Christians would be politically equal to 
Muslims. 
At the same time, many Christians were anxious concerning what a filture independent 
Palestine might actually look like, something perhaps most evident in the fact that when 
Palestine first came under British authority and Britain's long-term intentions were not 
yet entirely clear, many indicated a preference for indefinite British rule rather than 
2130 ISA 2/30-n, address made by As'ad Mansur, 20 March 1920, attached to report by the Military 
Govemor of Galflee, 24 March 1920. 
28' See, for instance, CO 733/48, letter from the Acting High Commissioner to the Colonial Secretary, 
24 August 1923. 
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independence. 282 Once it became clear that British rule also entailed Zionism, Christian 
support for an independent Palestine became much less ambiguous. Much of their 
concern stemmed from the fact that, among rank-and-file Muslims, support for the 
triationalist' cause was o- ften expressed in Islamic terms, particularly in connection with 
the Haram. al-SharTf, or 'Dome of the Rock. ' Initially, in the spirit of unity, Palestine's 
religious significance was defined more broadly to encompass its religious significance to 
both Muslims and Christians. Over time, however, the focus shifted to Islam alone, in 
part, due to a growing conception of the nationalist struggle among Muslims as a case of 
'defending Islam against the West. ' Some emphasis was still placed on its Christian 
significance, though increasingly, this seemed more a tactical consideration, inasmuch as 
it was perceived as useful as far as generating sympathy for the nationalist cause among 
EuropeanS. 283 
A certain Islamic leaning on the part of Muslims involved in the nationalist movement 
was evident from the start. 284 One of the earliest Arab nationalist organisations in 
Palestine, the HusaynT-dominated al-Nad-i al-'ArabT, 285 for example, strongly emphasised 
the ties between the Arabs and Islam, and often sought to draw a link between Arab 
nationalism and Muslim festivals and holidays. 2"6 One of its earliest resolutions was that 
the Sherlif of Mecca should be proclaimed caliph, this in spite of its Christian members 
having expressed their disapproval of giving the nationalist movement an Islamic 
emphaSiS. 287 Though open to non-Muslims, al-Nddl al-'Arab! in fact had very few 
2132 Porath, The Emergence, p. 296. 
283 Ibid, pp. 42,296. 
284 See Johnson, Islam and the Politics ofMeaning, pp. 18-2 1. 
285 Literally translated as 'Arab Club. ' 
286 Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 215. 
2"7 FO 371/3386, report by Storrs, 21 November 1918. 
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Christian members, and with the exception of Khalil al-Sak5kTnVs tenure as Secretary 
from 1922 till 1924, no Christian ever served on its Executive Committee. 288 Even in the 
more politically moderate MCAs-initially at least, representative of the nationalist 
movement's mainstream-Muslims as well as Christians were required to take an oath on 
the Qur'5n in addition to the one made on the national covenant. 289 
It is perhaps not surprising then that cracks did occasionally appear with respect to 
Muslim-Christian unity, even early on. Thus, for example, between late 1919 and early 
1920, nationalist activity within the MCAs was temporarily stifled because of dissension 
between Muslims and Christians, to the extent that Yaqiib FaiTdj felt compelled to 
resign . 
290 Anti-Christian sentiment was also evident when the early nationalist 
organisation, al-Muntadd al-AdabT-noted both for its moderate political attitude and for 
its relatively large Christian component-went into decline in 1920. Jam-il al-Husayni 
suggested that its branches be incorporated into distinctly Muslim organisations, and that 
"all [its] Christian members... be expelled 11291 By the time of the Fifth Palestinian 
National Congress, held in 1922, things had gotten bad enough that it was considered 
necessary to pass a resolution empowering the Executive Committee to form temporary 
arbitration committees for settling disputes between the Muslim and Christian 
communities. 292 Not surprisingly perhaps, tensions between the two communities were 
more evident in the villages, particularly where Christians constituted minorities, than in 
the larger towns; from 1922 onwards, complaints of harassment from Christians in the 
288 ISA 4/18-n, CID report, 8 September 1922. 
289 ISA 3939/64, CID report, 30 August 1922. 
290 Ibid, letter from the Military Govemor to OETA Headquarters, 30 June 1920. 
291 ISA 2/157, Lingley's report, 15 February 1921. 
292 ISA 4/16-n, report on the proceedings of the Fifth National Congress, 29 August 1922. 
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countryside became more frequent. 29' The overriding concern of Christians was that 
Muslims might develop too strong a sense of religious solidarity, and this was in fact one 
of the reasons cited by Shammds in expressing a willingness to cooperate with the 
294 Government with respect to the aforementioned proposed Legislative Council . 
Tensions were also often evident in connection with external events. One such event was 
the unexpected resistance put up by the Turks under Mustafa Kemal against the European 
powers. On 10 August 1920, the Ottoman Empire was compelled to sign the Treaty of 
S6vres, stipulating among other things that it renounce all sovereignty over Palestine and 
the other Arab territories. It also called for a much truncated Ottoman state, bereft even of 
parts of Anatolia, in particular, the area around Izmir, which immediately after the war 
had been occupied by Greek troops. Mustafa Kemal had been able to rally the Turks, and 
eventually the Greeks as well as other foreign troops were forced to leave Turkey. More 
importantly, he was able to force the European powers to renegotiate the final settlement 
295 in what came to be known as the Treaty of Lausanne. As a result, Mustafa Kemal came 
to be seen by Mush ms throughout the Arab territories as a hero for having effectively 
resisted the European 'Christian' powers. 
Significantly, Muslim support for Mustafa Kemal was expressed largely in religious 
terms. He was perceived as a warrior on behalf of Islam (against the Christian West), not 
on behalf of Turkish nationalism. 296 Thus, an article appearing in the newspaper Lisan al- 
293 Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 269. 
294 ISA 4/16-? 3, Storrs' report to the Assistant Chief Secretary on a conversation with Shammas, 
23 September 1922. 
295 Shaw and Shaw, Reform, Revolution, andRepublic, pp. 365-369. 
296 See, for example, CO 733/26, 'Report on the Political Situation in Palestine during the Month of 
September 1922'; and CO 733/27, 'Report on the Political Situation in Palestine and Trans-Jordania during 
the Month of October, 1922. ' 
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Arab noted that when Muslims were asked why they supported Mustafa Kemal and the 
Turks, " they shout[ed] at the top of their voices 'they are the defenders of Islam. `297 
Likewise, it was noted by one British official that "[n]ews of the [Lausanne] treaty was 
received with the utmost pleasure by MosleMS.,, 298 The decision of the Arab Executive to 
send a delegation to Turkey in the hopes of persuading the Turks to press the European 
powers for a revision of those articles in the Treaty of S6vres dealing specifically with 
Palestine (that is, the tenns of the Balfour Declaration) was the source of some concern 
for Christians. 299 Many were uncomfortable with the idea of appealing to a power that 
had ill-treated Christians in Anatolia; likewise there was concern that events in Turkey 
might incite Muslim violence against Christians in Palestine, as apparently had been the 
case in Syria. 300 Correspondingly, those Christians selected for the delegation managed, 
in the end, to excuse themselves from taking part, one of them on the pretext of having 
more pressing engagements elsewhere. 301 
In many respects, Muslim scepticism regarding Christian loyalty was always lurking just 
beneath the surface. Thus, for instance, 'Arif al-'Arif, a prominent Muslim nationalist, 
when recalling the early days of the movement many years later, indicated that, in his 
view, the so-called unity with Christians had had no practical foundation; moreover, that 
the Christians had preferred to cooperate with the British, who were Christian like 
297 CO 733/43, translation of article appearing in Lisan al-Arab, 27 February 1923, in Political Report for 
the Month of February 1923. 
298 CO 733/48, Report on the Political Situation in Palestine for the Month of July 1923. 
299 ISA 4/16-n, CID reporý 7 November 1922. 
300 CO 733/38, confidential letter from Deedes to Shuckburgh, 15 September 1922; also Tsimhoni, The 
British Mandate, p. 267. 
301 lbid, Op. 241-242. 
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them. 302 In another instance, during a 'Muslims only' meeting of the Jaffa MCA, 
suspicions were voiced that several of its Christian members were being employed as 
government agentS. 303 Even when affirming Muslim-Christian unity, Muslims often 
called on Christians to uphold the nationalist cause in a manner that suggested that such 
support could not be taken for granted. One might very easily construe as such the 
Muslim nationalist 'Abd al-Qadir al-Wizaffar's appeal to Christians to boycott the 1923 
elections for the proposed legislative council- "I believe in the religion of Christ, I respect 
it and I hope for the help of the Christians who are of our race, speak the same language, 
follow the same CUStOMS. 7,304 
Developments in Turkey were also suggestive of what Christian Arab reaction might be 
if Arab independence were ever actually achieved. In this respect, one might consider the 
Franco-Turkish Pact of 1921, whereby France turned over Alexandretta (until then under 
French control on the basis of the 1920 armistice) to Turkey. As it turned out, the 
Christians living there were strongly opposed to thiS. 305 While this might to some degree 
have reflected nationalist sentiment-a desire to remain in an 'Arab' state as opposed to a 
'Turkish' one-more likely it was out of a concern about living under some form of 
'Muslim' government. 306 By contrast, Muslims living there "welcome[d] this further re- 
encroachment of Moslem rule into Syria and [were] hoping for the day when the whole 
302 ZA, S/25,3405, M. Kapeliuk, 'Days with 'Arif al-'Arif, ' 30 April 1941. 
303 ISA 2/157, Jaffa Govemor's report, attached to CID report, 19 July 192 1. 
'04 In Hopwood, The Russian Presence, p. 201, original in Oriente Moderno, ii, p. 677. 
305 FO 618/3, correspondence from Morgan to the Foreign Secretary, 24 November 192 1; lbid, 
correspondence from the British Liaison Officer to the General Staff Intelligence in Cairo, 18 November 
1921. 
306 See ibid, correspondence from Morgan to Foreign Secretary, 24 November 192 1; ibid, correspondence 
from the British Liaison Officer to the General Staff Intelligence in Cairo, 9 November 192 1; also ibid, 
18 November 192 1. 
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of Syria [would] be given back to Turkey. , 107 One might question whether, were it not 
for the common threat of Zionism, Muslims and Christians in Palestine would be united 
at all. Sir Mark Syke's Arab Latin Catholic advisor, Yiisuf Alb-ina (himself a resident of 
Jerusalem), described the situation in Palestine at the beginning of the British military 
administration as "a pot-pourri of sects and heterogeneous elements bearing an innate 
hatred against each other and in perpetual conflict against themselves. " Commenting 
further, he noted "[t]he evil influence and under-handed intrigues of some heads of 
communities who ... foster dissension 
between the communities and ... widen the breach 
already existing instead of conciliating the spirits and preaching union and 
forbearance. , 308 Specifically, Christians were (and would remain) concerned that the 
nationalist movement should take on too strong a religious character. Thus, for example, 
many opposed the establishment of a distinctly 'Muslim' university in Jerusalern. 309 
Moderates versus extremists 
From the beginning of the Mandate, the traditional leadership was divided into two 
factions, the one more moderate and the other tending towards extremism. The first- 
often referred to as the 'Opposition, ' orMu'dridl-n, for reasons already noted in the 
introduction and discussed more fully below-was represented most strongly by the 
Nashdshib! family, first and foremost its head, Raghib al-NashashTib-1, the mayor of 
Jerusalem from 1921 . 
310 Rdghib al. -Nash5shlib! was often described as being 'European- 
minded'; both his first and second wives were non-Muslims, the first being French and 
307 lbid, 9 November 192 1. 
308 See also FO 800/22 1, Secret Political Report No. 15, Albina to Sykes, 15 June 1918. 
309 ISA 4/16-n, Storrs' report to the Assistant Chief Secretary on a conversation with Sharnmas, 
23 September 1922. 
310 Initially by appointment, following the removal of Miisd Kdzim al-Husayff for his supposed role in the 
Nab! Masa riots. 
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the latter Turkish Catholic. In general, he was quite comfortable associating with 
Christian S31 '-one of his closest associates was Wqdb Farrdj, one of the leading figures 
in Jerusalem's Orthodox community-and he did not hesitate to have his sons educated 
in Christian schools, as noted by his nephew Nassar Iddlin in his biography of his 
uncle. 312 The NashashibT family as a whole were strongly associated with the commercial 
interests of the merchant elite 313 in connection with which they tended to favour political 
moderation. In part, this also reflected the fact that the base of their support came from 
the towns where, among other things, a large number of Christians were based. 314 Though 
in principle demanding complete independence for Palestine's Arabs and an end to 
Zionism, the moderate camp showed a greater willingness to compromise, both with the 
British and with the Jews. More than simply constituting an aversion towards doing 
anything that might adversely impact on their commercial interests, this also reflected a 
more pragmatic approach witli respect to nationalist aiMS. 31' Nevertheless, what would be 
a growing perception among the rank-and-file as the nationalist movement progressed- 
that the moderates were willing to compromise nationalist objectives in order to 
safeguard their own interests-had some basis in fact. 
Leading the faction tending towards extremism was the Husayn-i family-more 
specifically, Hajj Am7in al-Husayni. As noted in the introduction, this faction was often 
3 11 Nashashibi, in fact, was one of the few Muslim leaders to associate with Christians socially and notjust 
in political organisations. Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 289. 
312 Nassdr Idd-m himself attended the St. George's School and the Bishop Gobat School, and noted in both 
cases that a good proportion of the student body was in fact Muslim. Nashashibi, Jerusalem 's Other Voice, 
p. 4. 
313 Abu Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period, " p. 23. 
3" A]-Nashdsh-ibi, in fact, was one of the few Muslim leaders to associate with Christians socially and not 
just in political organisations. Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 289. 
315 Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry, " p. 182. 
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referred to as the Majlisin in connection with Hajj AmTn al-Husayni's position as . 
President of the Supreme Muslim Council. Hajj Arffn al-HusaynT was one of the more 
pivotal Arab figures in Palestine during the mandate period. Having studied the shan-'a 
extensively, first in Jerusalem and then later in Cairo, Hajj AmTn was first and foremost, a 
man of religion. 316 From an early point, however, he had become politically active on 
behalf of the nationalist cause. Following the NAT Miisd riots of 1920, he was forced to 
flee into exile after being sentenced to ten years for his supposed role in inciting the 
crowd. He was later pardoned from this sentence, largely in connection with his 
appointment by the British as Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. 317 In this capacity, as well as 
that of President of the Supreme Muslim Council (see below), he would go on to exert a 
great deal of political influence, particularly around issues of a more definably religious 
nature. Following the demise of the Arab Executive during the early-I 930s, he would 
become the pre-eminent political figure among Palestine's Arabs. 
In addition to tending towards radicalism, the Husayn! faction also tended to emphasise 
the Islamic character of Palestine and the nationalist movement. The concurrence of 
radicalism and Islarnisation was hardly coincidental, as is discussed more fully below. 
For now, it is sufficient to note that one factor underlying this tendency was the internal 
struggle for control of the traditional leadership between the two factions. Given Hajj 
Am-in al-Husayff's positions as Grand Mufti and President of the Supreme Muslim 
Council, it generally served his own political ambitions to appeal to Islamic sentiment; 
such sentiment still had a strong appeal, particularly among the largely Muslim peasantry, 
the great majority of whom, at the beginning of the Mandate at least, were relatively 
uneducated and were unfamiliar with notions related to secular nationalism. While such 
emphasis was not entirely insincere-since at least the mid-nineteenth century, the 
Husayffs had tended to see themselves as guardians of traditional socio-political 
316 Philip Mattar, The Mufli ofJerusalem, A I-Hay Amin Al-Husayni and the Palestinian lVational 
Movement, revised edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 3. 
317 Concerning his appointment as Grand Muffi, see Uri M. Kupferschmidt, The Supreme Muslim Council. - 
Islam under the British Mandatefor Palestine (Leiden; New York: E. J. Brill, 1987), p. 20. 
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valUeSM-it was also something tactical .3 
'9 Thus, it should not be understood as 
necessarily reflecting a broader agenda, for example, the establishment of some kind of 
ideologically defined 'Islamic' state. Most of the leadership of the extremist faction, Hajj 
AmTh a]-Husayn! included, were part of the same merchant class as those notables 
constituting the moderate faction, and were equally concerned with safeguarding their 
320 interests 
. 
Such tactics, generally in response to the circumstances of the moment, were 
often aimed at gaining some immediate advantage over their political rivals . 
321 It was a 
dangerous game to play however-as the Mandate progressed and nationalist aspirations 
remained unfulfilled, the incitement of religious sentiment would often see the rank-and- 
file turn against the traditional leadership as a whole, Hajj Amin included. 
The Supreme Muslim Council (SMC), established in December 192 1, would prove a 
particularly effective power-base for Hajj Am-in al-Husayn! and his supporters, often 
functioning as a rival to the Arab Executive after it came to be dominated by the 
moderate faction. The term 'Opposition' referred specifically to the latter's opposition to 
Hajj AmTh's domination of the SMC. The term MajUsTh, of course, referred to 'those 
sitting on the Council, ' and indeed, many of his supporters were on its board or held 
important positions in the various Islamic institutions, both waqfs and Islamic courts, 
over which the Council held sway. The Supreme Muslim Council was, in fact, a British 
creation, 322 brought about as part of an effort to establish an Arab body representative of 
3"' Abu Marmeh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period, " p. 40. 
319 See, for instance, Porath, Riots to Rehellion, p. 118. 
320 See, for instance, Kupferschmidt, The SupremeMuslim Council, p. 65. 
321 Thus, for instance, he was quick to disown any appeal to religious sentiment that was seen as threatening 
his own status. See, for instance, FO 371/16926, Periodical Appreciation Summary, 28 February 1933. 
322 See J. B. Barron, Mohammedan Wakfs in Palestine (Jerusalem: Palestine Government, 1922), pp. 49-5 1. 
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the Muslim population in a manner analogous to the Jewish Agency with respect to 
Palestine's Jewish population. This body was to be responsible for administering the 
awqdf, or Muslim religious endowments, and the Islamic sharta courts. 323 In response to 
criticism from various Muslim religious figures during its creation, 324 the Council was 
granted almost unlimited autonomy in the execution of its duties-for all practical 
purposes, the Government had no voice whatsoever with respect to the Council's 
administration of awqCtf and its appointment of qczdTs and waqfofficials. 325 Connected 
with this, supervision of the Islamic shari-a courts was removed from the jurisdiction of 
the Legal Department. Of no small significance was the fact that HqJj Armn's position as 
President of the Council was for life. 326 
Control of the Supreme Muslim Council would prove invaluable to Haii Am-in al- 
Husayff, not least in connection with the revenues it afforded him. The assets of the 
Supreme Muslim Council were considerable '327 as was 
its budget-during the 1920s, 
annual revenues, mostly derived from the tithes related to waqfproperfies, averaged 
IP 60,000.328 Moreover, the Supreme Muslim Council had almost complete jurisdiction 
323 Johnson, Islam and the Politics ofMeaning, pp. 17-18. 
324 Barron, Mohammedan Wakfs, p. 50. 
'25 Colonial No. 17, Appendix to the Report byHisBritannicMajesty's Government on the Administration 
UnderMandate ofPalestine and Transjon-lanfor the Year 1924, London, HA4SO, 1925, p. 26. See also 
Barron, Mohammedan Wakfs, p. 5 1. 
326 See lbid, p. 66; also Kupferschmidt, The Supreme Muslim Council, p. 32. Concerning the circumstances 
surrounding Hajj Amin's election to the Presidency, see ibid, p. 32. 
327 See Colonial No. 17, Appendix to the Report on the Administration UnderMandate, p. 26, for a list of 
institutions affiliated with the Supreme Muslim Council. See also Erskine, Palestine, p. 165. 
"8 Kupfersclunidt, The Supreme Muslim Council, p. 118,172,174-176. Concerning the waqf properties 
under the control of the SMC, see lbid, pp. 110-113 
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with regard to the appointment of qJdTs and mufils, as well as directors of waqfs and 
329 
other related positions; equally to dismiss waqf and sharTa officials. Particularly with 
respect to waqf functionaries, episodes of favouritism and nepotism, likewise the creation 
of sinecures, were not uncommon. 330 The Council also had complete power over all * 
mosque personnel in the country. 331 Thus, Hajj AmTn was able to exert influence through 
his ability to appoint individuals to (or dismiss them from) waqf administrative positions, 
to positions in the mosques, and to the courts. 332 Most importantly, in combination with 
his position- as Grand Mufti, he was ideally situated to influence Muslims through an 
appeal to religious sensibilities whenever it seemed opportunistic to do SO. 333 More 
importantly perhaps, he was also able to characterise attacks against him and his control 
of the Supreme Muslim Council as constituting a betrayal of the nationalist cause, given 
that the Supreme Muslim Council was the only 'Arab national institution' in Palestine. 334 
Through the end of 1925, Hajj AmTh and the faction he represented held the upper hand, 
albeit only slightly, against the moderate faction represented by Rdghib al-Nashash-ibi. 
Beginning in 1926, however, this began to change. Elections that year saw half the seats 
of the Council's board 335 - till then dominated by Haj Am-in-go to the Opposition. The 
Opposition also proved successful in the municipal elections of 1927-the first held 
under British rule. The final blow to Hajj Amin's faction would come with the 
329 lbid, pp. 149-15 3; also Barron, Mohammedan Wakfs, p. 67. 
"0 Kupferschmidt, The SupremeMuslim Council, pp. 60,69-69,83.90. 
331 Johnson, Islam and the Politics ofMeaning, p. 18. 
332 Kupferschmidt, The Supreme Muslim Council, pp. 81,73,149-153. 
333 Ibid, pp. 76-77. 
334 Tsimhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians, " p. 169. 
335 Not counting that of the presidency, occupied by Haj Anini. 
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convocation of the Seventh Palestinian National Congress in Jerusalem in June 1928, as 
discussed in the next chapter. 
So where did Christians fall with respect to the division between moderates and 
extremists? One is tempted to say that the great majority favoured moderation and leave 
it at that, but this would be too simplistic an answer. In the first place, the division 
between the two camps was not as drastic as it would later become. For one thing, the 
population as a whole had not yet despaired of the possibility of persuading Britain to 
change its policy through peaceful means. Secondly, since 1925, for reasons discussed at 
greater length in the next chapter, Jewish immigration to Palestine had actually begun to 
slow down-Zionism no longer seemed the threat it once had. The need for radical action 
did not seem so obvious. Finally, Hajj Am7in al-HusaynT's position as Grand Muffi and 
President of the Supreme Muslim Council was a double-edged sword. While he enjoyed a 
certain prestige on the basis of these positions, they were in fact government positions- 
336 
as such, they made him somewhat dependent on British support. There were some 
Christians who fell in with Hajj AmTn's camp, among them, oddly enough, a number of 
Catholics. Most notable in this respect was Alfred Rok, a Greek Catholic lawyer from 
Jerusalem of mixed Arab and European ancestry, who would remain a strong supporter of 
Haii Am-in al-Husayn! throughout the mandate period. 337 To some extent, this reflected 
historical precedence, whereby Catholics traditionally came under the protective custody 
of the Husayn! family. 338 
336 See Palestine, Civil Service List, 1932 (Revised to the I" ofApril, 1932), Alexandria: Whitehead Morris 
Limited, 1932, p. 52; also CO 733 /287/2, 'Letters' page from extract of The Palestine Post, 19 June 1936; 
CO 733/31012, telegram from High Commissioner to the Colonial Secretary, dated 26 May 1936. 
3" He would later serve as vice-President of Hajj ArnIm's Palestine Arab Party (Hizb A I-Arabi), and 
represent the Christian community on the Husaym-dominated Arab Higher Committee formed at the 
beginning of the national strike in April 1936 (see below). 
338 Historically, the more important families of Jerusalem had tended to develop connections with one or 
another of the Christian communities in Palestine, such that the latter would be considered as coming under 
their protection, Geoffrey Furlonge, Palestine Is My Country, The Story ofMusa Ala7n i, (London: John 
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That said, the greater number of Christians tended to affiliate with the moderate faction. 
Many of these have already been menfioned-'Isd al-'Isd, Ya'qub Farr5j, Mughannam 
Ilyas Mughannam, Shibl! al-Jamal-and there is little reason to believe they were not 
characteristic of the broader Christian sentiment they claimed to represent. In part, the 
Christian tendency towards moderation also reflected certain realities related to Hqjj 
Armn's positions as Grand Mufti and President of the Supreme Muslim Council. 
However inclusive he might claim to be, there was no escaping the fact that his political 
authority was rooted in what were Islamic institutions. As such, it was almost impossible 
that Christians might in connection with him define for themselves a meaningful role 
with respect to the nationalist movement. 339Even to the extent that Hajj Am-in al-Husayni 
and his followers did not actively promote the idea of an Arab identity rooted in Islam, 
given the basis of HqJj AmTh's political authority, such a relationship was inevitably 
implied. As it was, they very often did promote just such a relationship. Thus, for 
example, Hqjj Armn often sought to characterise the Supreme Muslim Council as a 
nationalist body representative of the Palestinian Arabs as a whole. 340 
By contrast, the moderate faction was considerably more secular, and hence, more 
inclusive. This was evident from the start of the Mandate. One might, for instance, 
compare what were probably two of the more important nationalist organisations early 
on-al-Muntadd al-Adab! and al-Nad7i al-'Arabi. The latter, as discussed above, tended to 
emphasise Islarn as the basis of Arab nationalism. The former, dominated by the 
Naslidshlibli faction, emphasised the Arabic language as its foundation. Among its 
Murray, 1969), pp. 9 -10; also Philip J. Baldensperger, "The Immovable East, " in Palestine Exploration 
Fund Quarterly Statement (PEFQS), 1906, p. 15. 
339 See Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 74. 
340 Tsimhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians, " p. 169; see also Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, 
pp. 265-266. 
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activities, it sought to establish free libraries, schools and Arabic theatre. 341 Unlike what 
was the case in al-Nddl al-'Arab-i (and, ironically, the MCAs), its members were not 
required to take an oath on the Qur'dn . 
342 Its secular character was even explicitly noted 
in its preliminary regulations-that "al-Muntadd al-Adab! [was] Arabic in principle and 
foundation and [was] not tinged with a religious colour but work[ed] for the benefit of the 
Arabic nation . 
77343 Christian involvement in al-Muntadd al-Adab-i was certainly stronger 
than in al-Nad-i a]-'Arab-i. One of its four founders was Christian (Kustand! al-Khiiff); 
likewise, the initiator of one of its branches (yjjSUfal_, 1Sd). 344 In early 1919, one of its 
twelve-member Executive Committee and six of its 55 overall members were 
Christian 
. 
345 Organisations like al-Muntadd al-Adab! left open the question as to the exact 
nature of the relationship between Arab identity and Islam. As such, they were more 
inclusive of non-Muslims. Unfortunately for Christians, such organisations would over 
time prove of limited appeal to the vast majority of Palestine's Muslims. 
341 ISA 3939/98, regulations attached to letter sent to the military governor of Jerusalem, 13 February 1919. 
342 Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 218. 
343 ISA 3939/98, extracts submitted to the military govemor of Jerusalem, [no date]. 
344 ISA 7/12-n, Isa's letter to the District Officer of Jaffa, 26 May 1919, and his response, 31 May 1919. 
345 ISA 3939/98, lists submitted to the governor of Jerusalem, [no date]. 
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Chapter 111, The Christian Missionary Conference 
Christian versus Muslim Employment 
Though the moderates had proven successful in the recent municipal elections, the year 
1928 saw a cooling of relations between Christians and Muslims. In part, this reflected 
the fact that by then Zionism appeared to be in full retreat. Since 1925, Jewish 
immigration to Palestine had been in a state of decline. In 1927, the number of Jews 
leaving Palestine had actually surpassed the number of those coming in; ' 
correspondingly, Zionism no longer seemed the threat it once had. Prior to that, the level 
of Jewish immigration had only gone up. 2 Correspondingly, the struggle against Zionism 
had had about it an air of urgency, and thus had acted as a catalyst in bringing Muslims 
and Christians together. Suddenly, the 'struggle' no longer seemed so imperative, and 
Muslim attention quickly turned to other concerns. 
Topping the list was a generally held belief that Christians were faring much better than 
Muslims under the Mandate. This feeling was especially acute with respect to jobs, 
3 
particularly those related to government administration. Right from the start, Christians 
had, in this respect, been a privileged group. They had, for instance, filled a 
I Based on the administrative report for the League of Nations for 1928, Jewish immigration for 1927 stood 
at 2,728, compared with emigration, which stood at 5,07 1. Report by His Majesty's Government to the 
Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan for the year 1928, 
issued by the Colonial Office, in Palestine and Transjorclan Administration Reports 1918-1948, Volume 2: 
1925-1928, researched and collated by Robert L. Jarman (London: Archive Editions, 1995), p. 174. 
Peaking finally in 1925 at 33,801. Ibid. 
3 Ylana Miller, Government and Society in Rural Palestine, 1920-1948 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1985), p. 50; also Yehoshua Porath, The Palestinian Arab NationalMovement., From Riots to Rebellion, 
1929-1939, Volume II (London: Frank Cass and Company), 1977, p. 109. Table A. 5 in the Appendix 
shows a breakdown by religion of the various government departments for 1920-192 1. 
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disproportionate number of posts under the military administration. 4 With the switch to 
civil administration, the High Commissioner Sir Herbert Samuel had begun substituting 
local for British personnel; Christians continued to be disproportionately represented, this 
in spite of Samuel's stated intention of trying to incorporate larger numbers of Muslims 
into the administration. 5 Muslims immediately took issue with this-thus in 1923, 
Samuel noted that he was "continually receiving representations on the question of the 
small number of Muslims employed in positions of responsibility. "6 Such representations 
would only increase in number and take on a stronger tone as the Mandate wore on. 7 
An interesting observation of the situation at the time is that of Ben-Zvi, who argued that 
through their positions in the administration, Christians were effectively ruling over 
Muslims. " Though a decidedly Zionist perspective, and thus not a disinterested one, it is 
worth bearing in mind that Ben-Zvi was an ethnographer of some repute and did have a 
genuine scholarly interest in the various communities of Palestine. 9 Arguably then, his 
observation reflected at least a partial truth as far as Muslim-Christian relations were 
concerned. He contended that there was little real basis for Christian-Muslim unity, 
hfiller, Govemment and Society, p. 37. 
5 See, for example, CO 733/50, minutes under heading 'Appointment of Arab Sub-District Governors, ' 
4 October 1923; CO 733/86, letter from Samuel to Shuckburgh, II April 1924; CO 733/24, file 4073 1, 
despatch from Samuel to Churchill, 6 August 1922; and CO 733/44, file 23077, letter from Samuel to the 
Secretary of State, 27 April 1923; also Miller, Government mid Society, p. 50. 
6 CO 733/44, file 23077, letter from Samuel to the Secretary of State, 27 April 1923. 
7 See, for example, CO 733/86, letter from Samuel to Shuckburgh, II April 1924. 
" ISA, 1904/33, essay by Ben-Zvi entitled 'Christians and Muslims in the Land of Israel' [no date]. 
9 On the basis of which, he would later found the Institute for the Study of Oriental Jewish Communities 
(since renamed the Ben-Zvi Institute), which was devoted, among other things, to the study of the various 
communities and sects of Ismel/Palestine. 
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something he saw as existing only in a superficial manner-what he referred to as a 'thin 
dusty layer'-noting that they lived communally segregated from one another. More 
importantly, he noted that they had opposing economic interests, those of the Christians 
being more related to trade and urban-based activities. He maintained, that Christ ians, 
particularly as represented by the Christian-run press, only played at solidarity with 
Muslims in order to divert attention away from the fact that it was they who were ruling 
the country! 'O A similar argument was put forward by Gad Frumkin, a formerjudge. 
Given that they "were the most highly educated Arabs, " he argued, Christians had been 
confident that within a Muslim-Christian alliance, "they would have the upper hand. " 
Related to this, he added, they had taken on the role of "spokesman for the Arabs of 
Palestine to the British authorities, with whom they shared the kinship of Christianity. "" 
Indeed, Zvi argued, Christians preferred Christian government, even if it should be 
British. 12 
At the core of Ben Zvi and Frumkin's arguments was the idea that Christians were not 
really Arab, a view shared, in fact, by many outsiders. For example, in the 'Interim 
Report on the Civil Administration for 1920-1921, ' the High Commissioner Herbert 
Samuel, when discussing the character of the indigenous population, noted that the non- 
Muslim population, "though speak[ing] Arabic and ... termed Arabs, [were] largely of 
mixed race. 1,13 Another British official expressed the same sentiment somewhat more 
crudely perhaps when he characterised an Arab acquaintance of his as "Christian and 
10 ISA, 1904/3 3, essay by B en-Zvi. 
"In Sergio 1. Minerbi, The Vatican and Zionism, Conflict in the Holy Land, 1895-1925 (New York, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 126. 
12 ISA, 1904/33, essay by Ben-Zvi. 
13 Command Paper Number 1499, An Interim Report on the Civil Administration ofPatestine, during the 
period ]"Jutv, 1920-30'hJune, 1921, Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, August 1921, 
p. 4. See also Daphne Tsimhoni, The BritishMandale and theArab Christians in fialestine 1920-1925 
(unpublished Ph. D. thesis, SOAS, University of London, 1976), p. 335. 
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therefore a white man. 144 Even Muslim leaders often spoke of Christians as constituting a 
community apart from Arabs. Thus, for example, during an interview between the 
visiting Colonial Secretary and the muffis of Jerusalem and Haifa in 1925, it was noted by 
the latter, in connections with their demands for independence, that there should be a 
representative council inclusive of "Arabs, Christians and original Jews. "15 
There was some validity to the perception that the two constituted distinct communities. 
Certainly during Ottoman times, even when living in mixed communities and though 
usually having cordial relations, Muslims and Christians had led more or less separate 
existences. The nationalist movement, and particularly the threat of Zionism, had done 
much to overcome this feeling of separateness. Nonetheless, as Tibawi put it, "memories 
of the distant and recent past came not infrequently to the surface on provocative or 
,, 16 jocular occasions. Under the Mandate, the Christian communities continued to live a 
somewhat separate communal existence, and for the most part were allowed to govern 
17 
their internal affairs independently according to their own regulations. This was most 
evident with respect to the Christian law courts, which were allotted exclusive 
jurisdiction in matters of personal status-for instance, marriage, divorce, alimony and 
WiIIS18 -as well as over religious waqfs. 19 Unlike the sharTa courts, they did not come 
14 lbid, p. 169. 
15 CO 733/102, interview between the Secretary of State and the Muftis of Jerusalem and Haifa, Jerusalem, 
21 April 1925. 
16 A. L. Tibawi, Arab Education inivIandatory Palestine: A Study of Three Decades of British 
Administration (London: Luzac and Company, Ltd., 1956), p. 247. 
17 See Daphne Tsimhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians under the British Mandate in Palestine" in 
Middle Eastem Studies, 20 iv, 1984, pp. 168,171-172. 
"' lbid, pp. 173-174. 
19 lbid, p. 174; also J. B. Barron, Mohammedan Wakfs in Palestine (Jerusalem: Palestine Government 
1922), pp. 72-73. 
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under the jurisdiction of the mandatory administration. Likewise, Arab Christians were 
generally guaranteed separate representation in the various schemes for representative 
and consultative bodies proposed by the mandatory government. 20 
When considering government policy, another factor was arguably at work as well-that 
is, it reflected a conscious attempt to divide Christians and Muslims so as to avoid their 
drawing closer together politically. 21 By allocating Christians separate representation, the 
Palestine Government represented the population as being divided into separate religious 
communities rather than two national groups. 22 On the other hand, there is evidence to 
suggest that from 1923 onward (as discussed above), the Palestine Government had 
begun to pursue a policy aimed at representing Christians and Muslims as constituting 
one community. Thus, for instance, when commenting on the proposal that municipal 
elections should involve separate registers for Muslims, Christians and Jews-such that 
each should elect representatives up to a fixed number-the fEgh Commissioner 
expressed reservations that 
[t]his would have the effect of perpetuating existing divisions by 
preventing a movement, such as is already beginning, towards cooperation 
between groups of the different communities, and which it is most 
desirable to promote. 2' 
20 Tsimhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians, " p. 177. 
21 See, for instance, CO 733/6, 'Observations of the High Commissioner on the Draft Constitution of 
Palestine, ' Articles 3,4 and 5,5 October 192 1. 
2.2 Tsimhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians, " pp. 177-178. 
23 CO 733/1, dispatch from Keith-Roach to Curzon, 14 February 1921. 
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The Municipal Franchise Ordinance of 1926, which determined the manner in which the 
above-referred elections of 1927 took place, represented a compromise in the end. 
Separate electoral registers were prepared for each religious community, and municipal 
seats were divided in proportion to the number of voters on their registers. At the same 
time, voters were not restricted from voting for members of other communities, but 
instead could vote for any individual standing for election. 24 
Whatever other considerations informing British policy in this respect, it is fair to say that 
there did exist a genuine belief that, at least as far as their interests were concerned, 
Christians constituted a community apart from the larger Muslim one; likewise a concern 
that in the event that they were grouped together with Muslims, they might not attain any 
share in political authority. Herbert Samuel, the first High Commissioner expressed it as 
such: 
[I]t would be an error politically to force those two sections, which have 
not in the past been accustomed to combine, into a permanent union... 
The effect could only be that the Christians, in order to obtain any share of 
authority at all, would become more pro-Moslem, or at least anti-Jewish 
than the Moslems themselves... If, at any future time these two sections 
were to cease to be politically allied, no Christians at all might be elected 
to the Council, on the account of the overwhelming Moslem vote in every 
district. 25 
Coming back to the issue of employment, there were, of course, some more practical ' 
considerations underlying the fact that a disproportionate number of Christians were 
Tsimhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians, " p. 193. 
25 CO 733/6, Observations of the High Commissioner, 5 October 1921. 
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represented in the administration (as well as in other areas26). At least during the early 
days of the Mandate; this was in large part justified by the fact that Christians on average 
had a substantially higher level of education than Muslims, and were thus better 
27 
qualified . Both quantitatively and qualitatively, the education 
Christians received was, 
on average, more suited to administrative-type positions. 28 A Christian education tended 
to be more secular-oriented and to emphasis foreign languages more. Related to the latter 
was the fact that, when hiring, the British gave precedence to those Arabs who spoke 
English. 29The educational disparity between Muslims and Christians was most clearly 
pronounced in their respective literacy rates. On average, during the Mandate period, the 
male literacy rate for Christians was about three times that for Muslims. " Likewise, the 
disparity was great with respect to school attendance according to official figures for 
1923, of those children age five through fourteen, only seventeen percent of Muslims 
versus eighty-one percent of Christians were in school. More important when considering 
employment prospects perhaps are the figures for those between the ages of fifteen and 
26 The 1931 Census shows that Christians were disproportionately represented in industry and commerce as 
well as the practised professions. Anthony O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians: Religion, Politics and 
Society, c. 1800-1948" in Palestinian Christians, Religion, Politics andSociely in the Holy Land, ed. 
Anthony O'Mahony (London, Melisende, 1999), p. 40; see also Kenneth W. Stein, The Land Question in 
Palestine, 1917-1939 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), p. 6. 
"A fact generally attributed to the large number of Christian schools conducted by missionary bodies. 
Colonial No. 15, Palestine, Report ofthe High Commissioner on the Administration ofPalestine, 1920- 
1925, London, HMSO, 1925, p. 13. Very few Christians actually attended government schools. O'Mahony, 
"Palestinian Christians, " p. 40. 
28 Tsiinhoni, The British Mandate, thesis, p. 168; also Robert Brenton Betts, Christians in the Arab East: A 
PoliticalStudy (Athens: Lycabettus Press), 1975 (revised, 1978), p. 35. 
29 NfiHer, Government and Society, p. 50. 
30 The disparity was even greater for women. For an overall discussion on the subject, see Rashid Khalidi, 
Palestinian Identity, the Construction ofModern National Consciousness, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1997. 
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eighteen-here, only three per cent of Muslims were in school against thirty-seven per 
31 
cent of Christians . 
By the time of the 1931 Census, the first year for which literacy figures are available, 32 
we find that a large disparity still existed between Christians and Muslims (see Table 
3.1). Nonetheless, the situation had improved, and by the end of the Mandate, nearly half 
of the Arab school-age population would be enrolled in schools, roughly a third of them 
in government schoolS. 33 This would mark a tremendous improvement over what had 
been the situation at the beginning of the Mandate. As of the 1922 census, just a little 
over 20 per cent of Arab school-aged children were in schools. More striking perhaps 
would be the change with respect to the countryside. By the end of the Mandate, nearly 
65 per cent of boys in the countryside were in school (though only 10 per cent of girl S). 34 
Much of this would be achieved through the efforts of the British in the form of 
government- provided schoolS. 35 As of 1928, however, a good deal remained to be done. 
The Palestine Government scheme for providing schools-whereby villages and towns 
provided buildings, and the government, teacherS3'-had actually been suspended in 
31 Harry Emerson Fosdick, A Pilgrimage to Palestine (New York: Macmillan, 1927), p. 2889. 
"AmiAyalon, Reading Palestine, Printing andLiteracy, 1900-1948 (Austin, Texas: University of Texas 
Press, 2004), p. 16. 
33 By 1947, approximately 147,000 of an estimated Arab school-age population of 300,000 were in school. 
The figures for enrolment in government schools are taken for 1947-48-, those for private schools for 
1945-46. See Appendix C in Tibawi, Arab Education, pp. 270-27 1. 
34 Though how much the British should be credited for the spread of education in rural areas has been the 
subject of some debate. See, for instance, Miller, Government and Society, pp. 90-118. 
35 Of the 147,000 Arabs enrolled in school for the school year 194748, roughly 103,000 were in 
government schools. The rest were in private schools. See Appendix C in Tibawi, Arab Education, 
pp. 270 -27 1. 
36 See, for instance, ibid, pp. 24-25. 
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Table 3.1. All Palestine: education by religion and age for males' 
Religion and age Total 
Male population 
Literate Percent 
Muslims 352,172 66,711 19% 
7-14 57,770 18,110 31% 
14-21 39,791 11,594 29% 
21- 164,003 35,906 22% 
Chrisfians 45,896 26,848 58% 
7-14 6,794 4,506 66%, 
14-21 5,853 4,763 81% 
21- 24,123 17,030 70% 
Notes: I Taken from the Census ofPalesline (London: HMSO, 1932), 2: 110, Table IX (B), 
Part I, Summary. Percentages are rounded off to the nearest whole number. 
1923 due to a lack of funds. At that point, only 314 government schools had been 
established. Many of the early government schools, moreover, were converted kultabs, a 
kind of religious primary school, a fact of no small consequence with respect to later 
developments (see below) . 
37 Added to that was the fact that the Government only 
targeted villages with populations of 600 or more; thus, many of the smaller villages- 
311 
arguably half of the entire rural community-did not receive state schools . In addition 
to the lack of schools, many of the teachers were inadequately trained, particularly in the 
. 
39 
secondary schools, where the majority only had elementary qualifications 
37 lbid, p. 57; see also Ami Ayalon, Reading Palestine, Printing and Literacy, 1900-1948 (Austin, Texas: 
University of Texas Press, 2004), p. 26. 
38 Ibid, p. 25. 
39 Colonial No. 12, Report byHisBritannicMajesly'sGovemment on the Administration UnderMandate 
ofPalesline and Transjordanfor the Year 1924, London, HMSO, 1925, pp. 27-28; also Tibawi, Arab 
Education, p. 55. See Table A. 6 in the Appendix concerning the establishment of government schools by 
the Civil Administration through 1925. 
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Some efforts were made by Muslims to improve their own situation with respect to 
education. Shortly after its creation, for example, the Supreme Muslim Council 
established its own education department, through which it absorbed many of the private 
Muslim schools, or kultabs. 40 Additionally, it opened several elementary-secondary 
schools, though these generally had a strong religious character. A number of voluntary 
organisations-for example, the Haifa Muslim Association and the Jaffa Local 
Committee-were also established for the purpose of maintaining schools of an 
elementary standard. 41 Several organisations funded students to study abroad, for 
instance, the Society for the Promotion of Higher Studies among Muslims, founded in 
1925. Conducted entirely by and for Palestine's Muslims, the Society managed to fund, 
wholly or in part, several students to attend the university in Beirut. 42 In like manner, the 
Supreme Muslim Council funded several students to attend al-Azhar and other 
institutions in Cairo. 43 Generally speaking though, it could be said that Muslim efforts 
fell short. 44 As of 1933, the number of specifically Muslim schools was quite small, 
particularly secondary schools, of which there were only two-the Rawdat al-Ma'drif in 
Jerusalem and the Najdh School in Nablus, both partially funded by the Supreme Muslim 
Council. 45 
40 lbid, pp. 57,183. 
41 Ibid, p. 59. 
42 Colonial No. 15, p. 3 1; also T&wi, Arab Education, p. 60. 
43 lbid, pp. 59-60. 
44 One might compare the amount of grants-in-aid monies allocated non-government Muslim schools 
against that allocated Christian ones; in 1924, for instance, LE 1,485 was allocated Christians against only 
LE 4 10 for Muslims. Colonial No. 12, Report on the Administration UnderMandale, p. 30. 
45 Counting orphanages (which generally provided training in at least trades and handicrafts), the Supreme 
Muslim Council controlled seven schools altogether. Harry C. Luke and E. Keith-Roach, eds., The 
Handbook ofPalestine and Trans-Jordan, 3rd Edition (London: McMillan and Company, Limited, 1934), 
p. 253. See also Tibawi, Arab Education, p. 59. 
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Even if proportionally lagging behind Christians with respect to education, it should be 
46 bome in mind that Muslims accounted for roughly 89 percent of the Arab population. 
Thus, whereas Christian predominance with respect to administrative positions might 
seem entirely justified when going by the percentages (Table 3.2), a different story 
emerges if we look at the actual numbers (Table 3.3). Looking at the raw numbers for 
literacy, for instance, Muslims would actually seem to have an edge over Christians. 
Table 3.2. All Palestine: literate Muslim males versus 
literate Christian males by percentages I 
Literate Literate 
Age Muslims Christians 
Total 19% 58% 
Ages 7-14 31% 66% 
Ages 14-21 29% 81% 
Ages 21- 22% 70% 
Notes: I Based on the Census ofPalestine (London: 
HMSO, 1932), 2: 110, Table IX (B), Part 1, Summary. 
Table 3.3. All Palestine: literate Muslim males 
versus literate Christian males by numbers 1 
Literate Literate 
Age Muslims Christians 
Total 66,711 26,848 
Ages 7-14 18,110 4,506 
Ages 14-21 11,594 4,763 
Ages 21- 35,906 17,030 
Notes: I Derived from the Census ofPalestine (London: 
HMSO, 1932), 2: 110, Table IX (B), Part I, Summary. 
46 Based on the 1931 census, Census ofPalestine 1931 (London: IIMSO, 1932), 2: 110. 
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Of course, being literate was not in itself sufficient to qualify for an administrative 
position. 47 More relevant in this respect would be the actual level of education achieved. 
Comparing Muslims with Christians on the basis of years of education gives us the 
figures in Table 3.4. Once again, we find a disparity between Christians and Muslims. 
Still, it is not as big as we might have anticipated, and once more, a consideration of the 
raw numbers would seem warranted (Table 3.5). Looking at the actual numbers- 
particularly those for the 21+ category with 15+ years of schooling, probably the more 
Table 3.4. For All Palestine: number of years at an educational institution by age' 
Male population 
14-21 years of age 21 years + of age 
Religion and % of overall % of % of overall % of 
years at school Population population literate Population population literate 
Muslims 
Total population 76,291 335,130 
Literate 11,594 15% 35,906 11% 
10 years 295 0.3% 2.5% 1,714 0.5% 4.8% 
11 years 57 0.1% 0.5% 114 0.0% 0.3% 
12 years 64 0.1% 0.6% 525 0.2% 1.5% 
13 years 14 0.0% 0.1% 132 0.0% 0.4% 
14 years 10 0.0% 0.1% 132 0.0% 0.4% 
15 years + 8 0.0% 0.1% 535 0.2% 1.5% 
Christians 
Total population 11,737 49,204 
Literate 4,763 40% 17,030 35% 
10 years 318 2.7% 6.7% 1,845 3.7% 10.8% 
11 years 68 0.6% 1.4% 404 0.8% 2.4% 
12 years 61 0.5% 1.3% 700 1.4% 4.1% 
13 years 29 0.2% 0.6% 192 0.4% 1.1% 
14 years 15 0.1% 0.3% 204 0.4% 1.2% 
15 years + 14 0.1% 0.3% 728 1.5% 4.3% 
Notes: I Based on the Census ofPalestine (London: HMSO, 1932), 2: 124-125, Table IX (B), Part 1, Summary 
47 Particularly given the fact that 'state of literacy' as indicated in the 193 1 Census was essentiafly self- 
assessed-individuals were simply asked whether in fact they were able to read and write. A brief 
reading/writing test for ascertaining the findings, a procedure sometimes used in such surveys, was not 
applied. Ami Ayalon, Reading Palesfine, p. 17. 
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Table 3.5. All Palestine: Muslim males versus Christian males with respect 
to number of years at an educational institution by age' 
Male population 
14-21 years of age 21 + years of age 
Years at school Muslims Christians Muslims Christians 
Literate 11,594 4,763 35,906 17,030 
10 years 295 318 1,714 1,845 
11 years 57 68 114 404 
12 years 64 61 525 700 
13 years 14 29 132 192 
14 years 10 15 132 204 
15 years + 8 14 ý35 728 
Notes: I Derived from the Census ofPalestine (London: HMSO, 1932), 2: 124-125, Table IX (B), 
Part I, Summary. 
crucial with respect to government employment-one would expect a ratio of roughly 
3: 2-that is, three Christians hired for every two Muslims. 
What was the actual case then? According to the High Commissioner's 'Interim Report 
on the Civil Administration of Palestine' for 1920-1921, as of 1921, the Palestine 
Government employed 1,633 Arabs, 1,049 of which were Christian (see Table 3.6 
belo W). 48 If we discount those employed by the Legal Department (corresponding to the 
heading 'Law and Justice')-given that many of these worked in the sharta courts4ý-- 
48 Command Paper Number 1499, An Interim Report on the Civil Administration ofPalestine, p. 25. 
Interestingly enough, in a telegram to the Colonial Secretary dated 29 June 192 1, the High Commissioner 
indicated a breakdown of 1,338 Christians versus 719 Muslims. CO 733/4, telegram from Samuel to the 
Colonial Secretary, 29 June 192 1. Table A. 5 in the Appendix provides a complete breakdown of 
government administrative positions by religion as found in Command Paper Number 1499. 
49 See Palestine, Civil Service List, 1932 (Revised to the I' ofApri4 1932) (Alexandria: Whitehead Morris 
Limited, 1932), pp. 53-55. These numbers include individuals affiliated with the civil courts as well, 
inclusive of judges. See ibid, pp. 35-5 1. In a predominantly Muslim country, it was almost inconceivable 
that the majority of non-British judges should be anything but Muslim. The department might thus be 
considered as constituting an exception with respect to overall government hiring practices-hence, my 
decision to discount it. See Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, pp. 184-187,193-194. 
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Table 3.6. Arabs employed by the Palestine Government 
by religion for the period 1920-19211 
Governate or Department Senior Staff 
Chr. Mus. 
Junior Staff 
- Chr. Mus. 
Beersheba Governate -- 3 2 
Galilee Governate 3 15 1 
Gaza Governate 2 -- 4 3 
Jaffa Governate 2 1 12 2 
Jerusalem Governate 3 2 21 -- 
Phoenicia Governate 2 2 13 -- 
Samaria Governate 1 1 8 4 
Central Administration -- -- -- I 
Secretariat -- 10 4 
Financial Secretary I -- 3 -- 
Law and Justice 5 39 20 119 
Agriculture and Fisheries -- 5 17 9 
Antiquities -- I -- -- 
Commerce and Industry -- -- 4 1 
Customs 7 -- 58 22 
Education 3 1 6 8 
Immigration and Travel -- -- 10 3 
Land Commission -- -- 2 3 
Land Registries 2 -- 10 31 
Ports and Lights -- -- 4 1 
Posts and Telegraphs -- 156 56 
Public Custodian -- -- -- -- 
Public Health 37 6 115 37 
Public Security 5 2 31 7 
Public Works -- 1 12 1 
Revenue 7 2 58 97 
Palestine Railway 2 -- 331 104 
Stores -- 6 5 
Surveys I -- 
Treasury 37 
Total 82 63 967 521 
Notes: I Derived from the table in Appendix 11 of Command Paper Number 1499, An 
Interim Report on the Civil Adm inistration ofPalestine, during the period T" Ju ly, 1920- 
30'4 June, 1921, presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, August 1921, p. 25. 
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the numbers become 1,450 and 891 respectively; that is, of the 1,450 Arabs employed by 
the Government, 891 of them were Christian. 50 This does, in fact, give us a ratio of 
roughly 3 Christians for every 2 Muslims, and this at an early point in the Mandate, when 
one might have expected hiring practices to be hugely disproportionate in favour of 
Christians. With respect to certain categories however, it is difficult to say'lArith any 
certainty what was the actual nature of the positions involved. For instance, the great 
majority of those under the headings 'Post and Telegraph' and 'Palestine Railway' were 
very likely low-level ones. 51 If we consider only those categories most likely 
representative of high-level positions, we get a different picture. Thus, for instance, if we 
consider only those positions related to the governates, the numbers become 89 and 
18 respectively-that is, 89 Christians versus 18 Muslims. This gives us a ratio of five 
Christians for every one Muslim. A similar picture emerges if we consider only Senior 
Staff (again, not counting the Legal Department), which gives us 77 Christians versus 
24 Muslims-a ratio of three Christians for every one Muslim. 
The disparity between Muslims and Christians was perhaps even more evident in, the 
Public Works Department-of the 17 non-Jewish Palestinians employed there in 192 1, 
15 were Christian-and the High Commissioner was quick to note in an official 
correspondence that though many Muslims had "the necessary technical qualifications 
and personal character, [very few were] qualified as engineers. 102 The High 
'0 Christians under this heading are also discounted for the sake of fairness. 
51 Hence the large number of positions qualified as 'Junior Staff. ' Interestingly enough, in an attempt to 
refute charges that the Government was discriminating against Muslims, the High Commissioner Herbert 
Samuel specifically drew attention to the large numbers of Muslim railway employees. CO 733179, Middle 
East Department memorandum, C. P. 121 (24), February 1924. 
52 Correspondence to the Colonial Secretary, 25 August 192 1, in Command Paper Number 1540, Palestine, 
Disturbances in May, 1921, Reports of the Commission ofInquiry with Correspondence Relating Therelo, 
Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, October, 1921, p. 63. 
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Commissioner ran into a similar problem when he attempted to get a Muslim appointed 
to the position of Assistant Director to the Department of Education; the problem was 
that there was none qualified for the position, " something even Muslims were willing to 
concede. 54 Efforts at promoting Muslim employment in the district administrations- 
where qualification requirements were less stringent-proved only partially successful, 
and a disparity remained there as well. " Attempts by the Government to employ Muslims 
at the higher levels of government administration bore some fruit. The number of 
Muslims employed at the senior level in the Department of Education and in the Police 
and Prison Department steadily rose over the course of the Mandate. 56 The problem, 
however, was still one of Muslims begin under-quali fled. 57 Thus, for instance, the 
number of Muslims employed in the Health Department continued to remain low 
throughout the Mandate as there were few Muslims qualified as doctors. 5' 
We might now consider the situation in 1929. The breakdown by religion with respect to 
administrative positions, set against that for 1921, is given in Table 3.7. Among the 
Senior Staff, of the 165 Palestinian Arabs employed, 78 were Christian and 87 Muslim; 
of the 2,120 Palestinian Arabs employed as Junior Staff members, 1,098 were Christian 
53 CO 733t24, file 4073 1, despatch from Samuel to Churchill, 6 August 1922. 
54 Ibid. 
55 See, for example, CO 733/50, minutes under heading 'Appointment of Arab Sub-District Governors, ' 
4 October 1923; CO 733/86, letter from Samuel to Shuckburgh, II April 1924; and CO 733/44, file 23077, 
letter from Samuel to the Secretary of State, 27 April 1923.; also Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, 
pp. 178-184. 
56 Ibid, p. 194. 
" See, for example, CO 733/44, file 23077, letter from Samuel to the Secretary of State, 27 April 1923; 
also Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, pp. 198-199. 
5ý'Ibid, p. 194. 
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Table 3.7. Christian versus Muslim employment in 
the Palestine Administration, 1929 versus 19211 
Staff level British Christians Muslims Total ArabS2 
The Government of Palestine 1921 
Senior Staff 179 82 63 145 
Junior Staff 89 967 521 1,488 
Total 268 1,049 584 1,633 
Percentage Senior Staff 57% 43% 
Percentage Junior Staff 65% 35% 
The Government of Palestine 1929 
Senior Staff 239 78 87 165 
Junior Staff 158 1,098 1,024 2,122 
Total 397 1,176 1,111 2,287 
Percentage Senior Staff 
Percentage Junior Staff 
47.3% 52.7% 
51.7% 48.3% 
Notes: I Figures for 1921, taken ftom table in Appendix II of Command Paper Number 1499, 
An Interim Report on the CivilAdministration ofPalesfine, p. 25; those for 1929, from Bernard 
Wasserstein, The British in Palestine: TheMandatory Govemment and the Arab-Jewish 
Conj7ict, 1917-1929 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1978), Appendix 2, p. 246, original in 
Palestine Commission on the Disturbances ofAugust 1929, Minutes ofEvidence, Vol. 11, p. 
1063. / The numbers for 'Arabs' is inclusive of non-Arab, non-Brifish individuals (for example, 
Druses, Circassians) which unfortunately, are not categorised separately in the original table. 
and 1,024 Muslims. While Christians were still being represented in numbers 
disproportionate to their percentage of the overall Arab population, it would seem the 
situation of Muslims had improved. We might again consider the numbers sans the Legal 
Department as above. Unfortunately, the figures for 1929 concerning the breakdown of 
administrative 'staff are not as detailed as those for 1920-21. However, if we assume that 
the number of those employed in the Legal Department had not changed59 (thus setting it 
59 In actual fact, between 1921 and 1926, the number of the shad'a courts expanded (see below), in which 
case, we might anticipate that the final ratio (that is, sans the Legal Department) should actually be slightly 
higher in favour of Christians. lbid, p. 193. 
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Table 3.8. Christian versus Muslim employment in the Palestine 
Administration as of 1929 sans the Legal Department' 
Muslim versus 
Christian Employment 
Senior Staff 
Christians Muslims 
Junior Staff 
Christians Muslims 
Official figures' 78 87 1,098 
- 
1,024 
By percent 57% 43% 65% 35% 
Sans Legal Department 2 73 48 1,078 905 
By percent 60% 40% 54% 46% 
Christians Muslims 
Combined staffs sans 
Legal Department2 1,151 953 
By percent 55% 45% 
Notes: I Figures for 1929, from Bernard Wasserstein, The British in Palestine, p. 246, 
original in Palestine Commission on the Disturbances ofAugust 1929, Minutes of 
Evidence, vol. 11, p. 1063. 
at 39 Senior Staff and 119 Junior Staff for Muslims and 5 Senior Staff and 20 Junior Staff 
for Christians) we get the figures in Table 3.8. This gives us 73 Christians versus 
48 Muslims for Senior Staff, and 1,078 Christians versus 953 Muslims for Junior Staff, or 
roughly three Christians for every two Muslim at the senior staff level, and one Christian 
for every Muslim at the junior staff level. Though Christians still outnumbered Muslims, 
at least with respect to senior staff positions, the ratio of 3: 2 approximates the one 
anticipated based on the number of years of education for Muslims versus Christians (see 
Table 3.5). 
Before moving on, it is interesting to consider a similar analysis done by Tsimhoni 
comparing Christian and Muslim employment in government administrative positions. 
According to his calculations, the percentage of Muslims in junior level positions did 
increase between 1922 and 1924, something he attributes largely to an expansion of the 
government's bureaucracy. After that it pretty much stabilised, however, and Christians 
continued to be disproportionately represented. Tsimhoni notes a similar phenomenon for, 
senior level positions, though here, he attributes the initial growth of Muslim-filled 
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Table 3.9. Christian versus Muslim employment by percentage (from Tsimhoni)l 
Junior Staff 1922 1924 1929 
Muslims 30% 40% 37% 
Christians 47% 38% 39% 
Jews 23% 22% 24% 
Senior Staff 1921 1926 1930 
Muslims 40% 40% 37% 
Christians 40% 34% 34% 
Jews 20% 26% 29% 
Notes: I The above figures are based on caleulations made by Daphne Tsimhoni. See Tsimhoni, The 
British Mandate, pp. 190 -193. 
positions to an enlargement of the sharid courts, between 1921 and 1926. The number of 
sharT'a courts was later reduced in 1930. (See Table 3.9. ) In both cases, he attributes the 
fact that Christians remained disproportionately represented in government 
administration to the simple fact that they remained better qualified. 60 
Whatever the actual case, a perception certainly existed amongst Muslims that the 
disparity between them and Christians in the area of government employment was 
unjustified. Many felt that advances made in education had not translated into a 
corresponding rise, in employment opportunitieS. 61 In any event, if Muslims were 
under-educated, it was the Government that was held responsible; many felt quite 
strongly that the Government had not done everything possible to remedy the 
60 lbid, pp. 190-193. 
6'AI-Jdmi'ahaI-Arabiyyah, 16 August 1928; also al-Ittihadal-: 4rabT, 27 June 1925; and al-Karmil, 
17 June 1936. 
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situation. 62 As early as 1921, the problem of education was already seen by Muslims 
as one pertaining specifically to them. As expressed by the High Commissioner, Sir 
Herbert Samuel, "[t]he matter is continually referred to as a grievance by the Moslem 
leaders, who point out that in a country, where their people contribute the greater part 
of the taxation, their sons should have adequate opportunities of continuing their 
education beyond the primary stage. "63 
Added to this was the fact that the holding of such positions might easily be construed as 
constituting a preparation for the eventual running of an independent Palestinian state. 
The question of who was actually 'running the country' was a particularly sensitive one 
given the fact that, with the coming of the Mandate, the Muslim community had 
effectively been turned into a millet. 64 In large part, this had reflected a practical 
necessity, and from an early point, the millet system was consciously adopted as a model 
for dealing with what Sir Herbert Samuel considered to be the communal national issue 
in Palestine 
. 
6' During the Ottoman period, Muslims had made up the ruling class and thus 
had had no communal organisation of their own inasmuch as their religious courts and 
waqfs had formed a part of the general administration. The reality of British 
administration had necessitated their being reconstituted on a communal basis; otherwise, 
62A1-Jdmi'aha1-'Arabiyyah, 24 September 1929,14 August 1930; Filasrin, 24 April 1929. Though it is 
interesting to note that on occasion, the opposite was argued by Muslims when tying to convince co- 
religionists not to send their children to missionary'schools. AI-Jdmi'ý7h al- Arabiyyah, 16 February 1928. 
63 CO 733/8, correspondence from Sir Herbert Samuel, the High Commissioner, to W. Churchill, the 
Secretary of State, 15 December 192 1. This is a theme that would be taken up in earnest at the time of the 
International Missionary Conference. See for example, FilastTn, 24 April 1928; al-Jdmiah al-ArabiYYah, 
16 August 1928. 
64 See Tsimhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians, " pp. 171,173; also O'Mahony, "Palestinian 
Christians, " p. 3 3. 
65 Elie Kedourie, "Sir Herbert Samuel and the Government of Palestine" in The Chathmn House Version 
and OtherMiddle-Eastern Studies, Alew Edition (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1984), p. 69. 
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unlike the Christians and Jews, they would have been left without proper representation. 66 
For many Muslims, their 'mill etisation' constituted a humiliation. 67 Correspondingly, the 
fact that a disproportionate number of administrative posts were held by Christians was 
of no small consequence. A strong Christian Arab presence was evident, moreover, not 
only in the administration, but in the police and gendarmerie as well. Christians were 
actually quite prominent within the officer ranks of the former, and while their numbers 
in the latter more or less corresponded to their proportion of the overall Arab population, 
the simple fact of Christians serving in such a force in significant numbers was in and of 
68 itself something quite novel . 
Muslim efforts at drawing attention to their grievances concerning education and 
employment were most pronounced in the Young Men's Muslim Associations 
(YMMAs). 69The YMMAs; were ostensibly formed as religious, social and cultural 
organisations for youth beginning in 1927.70 While in principle restricted from engaging 
in politics, they would become increasingly active on the issue of Muslim non- 
employment in the Govemment. Particularly during the 1930s, they would campaign 
vigorously for an increase in the proportion of Muslims working in the Government. 71 
Attempts at highlighting these grievances were also evident in the press. Typical in this 
66 See Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 118; also O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 33. 
67 See, for instance, CO 733/69, secret 'Political Report' from Symes to the Chief Secretary, 29 May 1924, 
68 Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, pp. 194-195. 
69 In Arabic, alVain'iyyat ash-Shubdn al-Arab. 
70 Kamel Mahmoud Khleh, Filastin, Wal-Intid6b al-BrWnf, 1922-1939 [Palestine and the British 
Mandate, 1922-1939], 2 nd edition (Beruit: AI-Mansha al-A'ma, 1982), p. 438; al! -MawsiVa al-Filasrlniýya 
(Palestinian Encyclopedia), Part 11, 'Special Studies' (Beirut, 1990), p. - 553-554; and Porath, The 
Emergence, pp. 301-30. 
71 Concerning the resolutions taken at its Fourth Congress, see al-Jbmi'ah al- Arabiyyah, 12 July 1932. 
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respect was an article appearing in al-Jamiah al-Arabiyyah, which noted that of the 
12 Muslims who graduated in 1927, only three had found ajob in Palestine. The article 
made clear, moreover, that, while the favouritism earlier shown Christians might have 
been justified, this was no longer the case. Towards the end of the article, the writer asks 
rather sarcastically if the "Government was still denying that Muslim youth have earned 
degreesT' While the article refers to teaching posts as well, it is with respect to 
government positions that one detects a hint of resentment towards Christian Arabs. 
Thus, it was noted that appropriate government positions did exist-the problem was that 
they were already filled, and not by Muslims. 72 As the Mandate progressed, the 
resentment directed at Christians would become more overt. By the mid-I 930s, it was not 
uncommon to hear statements to the effect that "the Christians [were] robbing the 
Muslims of their rights to [Government] offices. "73 
In connection with such grievances, many Muslims would, by the end of the decade, 
begin tending towards political radicalism-a radicalism, moreover, with a distinctly 
Islamic character. 7' Quite a few of these were exactly those newly educated Muslim 
youth being so 'wrongfully' deprived of meaningful employment. Others were peasants 
recently migrated to the cities and larger towns, where they had come seeking 
employment. Both types of individuals were becoming increasingly affiliated with 
Islamic institutions, notjust the mosques, but also social organisations such as the 
YMMAs. Significantly, affiliated with both the mosques and the YMMAs were religious 
reformers preaching Islamic orthodoxy; individuals who sought to cleanse the Islamic 
faith of superstition and folk practices. As discussed more fully in the fifth chapter, such 
reformers also tended to be ardent nationalists. Indeed, many would become militantly 
active, and would seek to instil within their followers a discipline vis-a-vis the nationalist 
72 Ibid, 16 August 1928. See also Miratal-Sharq, 14 June 1924,10 October l925; aI-IItihCzdaI-ArabT, 27 
June 1925; and Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 274. 
71 Porath, The EMergence, p. 30 1. 
74 Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 109. 
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movement founded on right religious practice and religious piety (see below). As more 
and more Muslims became disenchanted with the traditional leadership, such figures 
would have an increasing appeal. Growing radicalism among Muslims reflected another 
factor as well-namely, their educational experience within government provided 
schools. Such schools had a low degree of government supervision. 75 For the most part, 
the Government's only role with respect to government schools was to provide teachers' 
salaries along with some basic training. Beyond that, there was little oversight, and in 
many respects, they came to act as incubators for nationalist thought, something perhaps 
most evident in the degree to which pupils observed both general and partial nationalist 
strikes. 76 
Significantly, these schools were predominantly Muslim. Very few Christians attended 
government schools-in 1925, they numbered only 2,285, approximately 12 per cent of 
the total number of Arabs attending at the time. 77Those few that did were mostly based 
in the larger towns and cities, where they formed sizeable communities. This 
preponderance of Muslims within the government schools had a determinative effect as 
far as the kind of nationalism propagated in them. True, in the larger towns and cities, 
where government schools were often enough attended by both Muslims and ChristianS, 711 
nationalism tended to take on a more secular character, one that expressed itself primarily 
in a concern that Arabic history and geography be given a proper emphasis. 79 The 
situation was quite different, however, in the smaller towns and villages. There, many of 
75 See, for instance, Tibawi, Arab Education, pp. 196-197. 
76 bid, pp. 196-200. 
77 O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 40. Not surprisingly, the great majority came from the Orthodox 
community. Ibid. 
7" Tibawi, Arab Education, pp. 71-73. 
79 Ibid, pp. 88,90. 
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the government schools were little, more than converted kullabs, and continued to 
maintain a more or less religious curriculum centred largely round the Qur'dn. 80 Many of 
the teachers-only recently returned from the cities and larger towns where they had 
completed their training-were soon inculcating within their students ideas about Arab 
nationalism. 81 Significantly, it was an Arab nationalism that emphasised the relationship 
between Islam and Arab identity. 82 The influence of such teachers often extended beyond 
their students to the village community as a whole, inclusive even of those who were 
illiterate. 8' 
In Muslim private schools, the emphasis given the relationship between Islam and Arab 
nationalism was even more overt. Nationalism was, in many cases, portrayed as simply 
one aspect of religion. 84 As Tibawi puts it, 
Texts from the Quran or Hadith of the Prophet were expounded in such a 
way that the outcome might as well be presumed to come from a political 
treatise. Conversely, political events and current affairs were so subtly 
represented in a religious garb with an irresistible appeal to the minds of 
I the young, that gave the impression that the outcome was in accord with 
the wishes of the early caliphs or indeed of Muhammad himself. " 
80 lbid, pp. 74,78. 
81 Ted Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry in the Great Revolt (1936-1939), " in Islam, 
Politics andSocialMovements, eds., E. Burke III and 1. Lapidus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988), pp. 196-187. 
132 Tibawi, Arab Education, p. 183. 
s3 See Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry, " p. 187; also Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, 
p. 143. 
84 Tibawi, Arab Education, p. 183. 
lbid, pp. 183-184. 
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When considering the provision of an Islamic-nationalist education, one must also take 
into account the Young Men's Muslim Associations (with which, until it became 
prohibited, many government teachers were affiliated), as well as the various Muslim 
youth clubs and scouts. Added to this were the efforts of the Supreme Muslim Council in 
the area of adult education. 86 Seen collectively, these various developments lay the 
groundwork for an Islamic-religious militancy. All that was needed was an issue that 
might sufficiently galvanise Muslim opinion. 
The Christian Missionary Conference 
At the end of March 1928, an international conference of Protestant missionaries 
convened in Jerusalem. " A specially enlarged 'meeting' 88 of the Intemational Missionary 
Council, the conference stood in session for two weeks. The Conference was highly 
visible almost from the start as the delegates gathered the second day in the open-air on 
the Mount of Olives to hear an address by Dr. Rennie MacInnes, the Anglican Bishop of 
Jerusalern. 89 About a week later, on Palm Sunday, the participants in the conference made 
a devotional pilgrimage along the route travelled by Jesus from Bethany to Jerusalem, 
86 lbid, p. 184. 
87 Most of the factual information provided here on the Christian Missionary Conference is derived from 
the actual minutes of the conference-Minutes of the InternationalMissionary Council and of the 
Committee of the Council, (EnlargedMeeting) Jerusalem, March 24-April 8,1928, (London and New 
York: International Missionary Council, 1928)-as well as articles covering the event appearing in the 
Palestine Bulletin between 21 March and 12 April 1928. , 
"' Concerning its being designated a 'meeting' as opposed to a conference, see William Paton, "Jerusalem 
1928" (New York, London: International Missionary Council, 1928), p. 6. 
89 Palestine Bulletin, 26 March 1928. 
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stopping four times along the way to conduct religious services. 90 A few days later, on 
the Eve of Good Friday, most of the delegates could be found in the Kedron Valley, 
either attending a service conducted by Dr. MacInnes, or meditating in the Garden of 
Gethsemane. 91 Altogether, roughly 240 delegates attended, many of them non-European. 
The Conference tended to focus on social issues (inclusive of education); also the 
relationship between what were termed the 'older' and 'younger' churches-the 'mother- 
churches' based in Europe and North America, and the churches that had taken root in 
Asia and Africa due to Protestant missionary efforts. 92 
Muslim agitation began even before the Conference had started. Typical was an article 
appearing in al-Jamiah al-'Arabiyyah on 5 March, deriding the Government's decision 
to allow the conference to go through, and calling on Palestine's Muslims to "stand up 
like one man who is dedicated to his religion, [and not let] the missionaries achieve [their 
aiml. "93 Growing Muslim sentiment against the conference was of great concern to those 
organising it. Shortly before the conference began, a statement was issued by the 
Anglican Bishop in the Arabic newspaper Sawl AI-Shab. In addition to emphasizing the 
benefits gained by Palestine's Arabs as a result of missionary efforts, he noted that 
Jerusalem had been chosen as "it was gradually becoming a universal geographical 
centre, and [was] the cradle of Christianity. " Arguably, this was not the best argument to 
make if the objective was to alleviate Muslim concerns that 'Christian' Europe had 
designs on the Holy Land. MacInnes' further comment, that "the Caliphate conferences at 
Mecca and Cairo were met with respect by other [read Christian] people, "94 probably 
90 lbid, 3 Apfil 1928. 
9'Ibid, 8 April 1928. 
92 Concerning the topics discussed at the conference, see Minutes, especially pp. 27-36,44,54-55,58-59. 
93 al-Jdmi'ý7h al- Arabiyyah, 5 March 1928,4 May, 3 September 1930 
94 Palestine Bulletin, 21 March 1929. 
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only aggravated the situation given the implied analogy between Mecca and Islam on the 
one hand, and Jerusalem and Christianity on the other. 
In any case, Muslim misgivings remained undiminished, and demonstrations took place 
95 
throughout Palestine for the duration of the Conference. Various letters of protest were 
sent to the Supreme Muslim Council, which itself issued a formal protest to the Palestine 
Government. The Young Men's Muslim Associations in most of the major towns in 
Palestine (as well as Transjordan) cabled protests to the High Commissioner. 96 Shortly 
after the Conference, they convened their first meeting in which they roundly condemned 
both the Conference and missionary activity in general. 97 At the Nabi Musa pilgrimage, 
which took place almost concurrently with the Conference, thousands of Muslims 
chanted 'down with the Missionary Conference. '98 The Mufti in Haifa expressed concern 
about the Conference, noting that "the present work of missionaries in our country and 
their open slandering of Islam and the Prophet have caused great irritation amongst the 
Moslems. " He went on to describe the Palestine Government as one "which tries in the 
worst manner to abolish our religion and traditions, a thing which no Moslem can 
forbear. "99 This conference, now the second of its kind, seemed evidence to many 
Muslims of what was a more aggressive evangelising than had been the case at the 
9' Concerning the various protests, see KWch, Filastin, p. 437. 
96 Palestine Bulletin, 10 April 1928. 
97 See resolutions in al-Karmil, 28 April 1928; also KhIeh, FilastTin, pp. 437-438. 
9" See William Ernest Hooking, The Spirit of World Politics, With Special Studies ofthe Near East (New 
York: The MacMillan Company, 1932), pages 349-350; also Helen Bentwich's account in Norman and 
Helen Bentwich, Mandate Memories 1918-1948 (London: The Hogarth Press, 1965), p. 116, though she 
gives the cry as 'down with the missionaries! ' 
99 CO 733/155/15, telegram from the Mufti to the British Govemment, sent through Plumer, 4 April 1928. 
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beginning of the Mandate as one Muslim described it, an evangelism "of extremely 
antagonistic spirit. "'00 
On 13 April, shortly after the Conference's conclusion, a gathering at the Mosque in 
Gaza, in which numerous speakers delivered addresses against Christian missionary 
activity in Palestine, quickly degenerated into a riot following rumours: that a delegation 
sent to the District Administration Office had been arrested. Police officers were 
assaulted, and several Arabs wounded, and it was only after reinforcement troops were 
called in from Jaffa that order was restored. 101 For the most part, the agitation was 
confined to Gaza, though protests of one form or another continued for some time 
afterwards. A week after the conference had concluded, Muslims in Jerusalem were 
called upon to close their shops in protest against the Conference and missionary activity 
in general . 
102 Protests were cabled not only to the High Commissioner, but also to King 
George, the Colonial Office, the Governments of France and Italy, and several Muslim 
rulers. The Young Men's Muslim Associations cabled the Government a protest against 
the use of force by the police in the incident in Gaza. 103 They also passed a resolution 
calling for the dismissal of the Administrative Officer in Gaza. 104 In Nablus and Hebron, 
demonstrations took place involving teachers and students against the Conference and 
100 CO 73 3/15 5115, telegram from Abdulhadi and Khalili, on behalf of 'certain advocates, ' to the Colonial 
Secretary, 11 April 1928. 
101 lbid, dispatch from Plumer, to the Colonial Secretary, 26 April 1928. See also Palestine Bulletin, 15 
April 1922; and Khleh, Filastin, p. 437. 
" Palestine Bulletin, 19,20,22 April 1922. 
103 Khleh, FilaslTn, p. 437. 
104 Palestine Bulletin, 23 April 1922. 
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what had transpired in Gaza. 105 Particularly targeted were missionary schools, and 
numerous articles soon began to appear calling on Muslims to stop sending their children 
to these schools. 106 Indeed, this particular issue became something of a cause celebre 
among Muslims. Thus, for instance, it was probably the single most important topic 
covered at the Congress of the Young Men's Muslim Associations convened later that 
month. 107 As one British official in Palestine noted in reflecting on the agitation caused 
by the International Missionary Conference, "there is much explosive material in 
,, 108 Palestine, and... the Jewish problem is not our only difficulty here. 
While the Missionary Conference did not overtly state as one of its goals the evangelising 
of Muslims, it certainly considered that modemisation in the East should be rooted in the 
Christian faith. 109 Further, it was clear that it saw a role for Eastern Christians in this 
respect. An important goal of the Conference, noted by Dr. Mott at the opening meeting, 
was the promotion of greater cooperation between the churches of the East and West, 110 
so that the "missionary enthusiasm which characterized the churches of early Christianity 
[might be] set free. ""' In many ways, by its very make-up, the Conference seemed to 
speak of the West's desire to Christianise the East; of the roughly 240 delegates that were 
10' Ibid, 22 April 1922; and "Report by His Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nation 
on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan for the Year 1928, " issued by the Colonial Office, 
page 44, appearing in Palestine and Transjordan Administration Reports 1918-1948, Volume 2, p. 536. 
106 See, for instance, al-Idmiah al-Arabiyyah, 16 February 1928. 
'0' See, for instance, Filast7n, 24 April 1928; al-Karmil, 29 April 1928; also Khleh, FilasfTn, p. 437. 
1 08 CO 733/155/15. unidentifiable memorandum (back of second page), dated 9 May 1928. 
109 Palestine Bulletin, 26,30 March 1928 and I April 1928. See also Minutes, pp. 29,34,36,56. 
110 Palestine Bulletin, 26 March 1928. See also Minutes, p. 49. 
111 From a statement adopted by the Council. See ibid. 
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present, almost half were represented by recently established churches in India, China, 
Japan, Africa and the Philippines. 112 A common theme evident at the Conference, though 
not explicitly with reference to Palestine or the other Arab countries, was the special role 
of indigenous churches in promoting Christianity in their home-countries. "' 
Most Christian Arabs in Palestine disparaged the idea that they should act as the 
handmaiden of Western missionaries, and indeed several articles appeared in Christian- 
run newspapers equating missionary activity with colonialism. An article appearing in al- 
Karmil, for instance, argued that even "the good missionaries open the way for 
colonisation and serve its interests, " this because "in the heart of every missionary was a 
love of his country and govemment. "114 In many cases, Christian opposition to 
missionary activity reflected the resentment felt towards evangelical activity directed at 
them. In this respect, Latin Catholics were targeted as much as Protestants, though more 
often in connection with Catholic educational institutions. Typical in this respect was a 
letter written to the Chief Secretary in Jerusalem by Marie Vitalis, an Orthodox Arab, 
protesting what she claimed to be the forced conversion of her daughter by the sisters of 
the Seours Franciscaines de Marie, the school she was attending. In it, she noted rather 
emphatically that "[mlany mothers like me have suffered from these sisters that put 
intrigues between the daughter and her mother to serve their propaganda. " She ended by 
expressing her "hope that the Government [would] put an end to these religious questions 
that serve nothing but to make suffer the mothers. "' 15 
On the face of it at least, many Muslim Arabs were also dismissive of the idea that 
Christians might support missionary activity. Even al-Almiah al-'Arabiyyah, the 
112 Palestine Bulletin, 26 March 1928. 
113 [bid, 29 March 1928. 
"'Al-Karmil, II July 1931; also al-Amiah al-Arab"ah, 16 February 1928. 
115 ISA 13/12, Change of Religion, 1928, letter from Marie Vitalis to the Chief Secretary, 3 August 1928. 
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mouthpiece of Haj AmTn and a newspaper often given to criticising Christians for not 
being sufficiently committed to the cause, ' 16 was quick to note that not a single Christian 
from Palestine had attended the Missionary Conference. ' 17 At the same time, it was 
certainly not the case that no Arab Christians (that is, from Arab countries other than 
Palestine) had attended; neither that all Arab Christians were unsympathetic with 
Western missionary objectives! 18 Even in Palestine, when criticising missionary activity, 
Christian Arabs often qualified their criticism by noting that many missionaries "had a 
good heart and a good will [and] were worthy of respect"' 19; equally that they were 
supportive of them as individuals and counted many of them among their friends. '20 They 
were also quick to point out that the Conference had been unfairly portrayed by most 
Muslims. In this vein, the Orthodox Youth Club in Jaffa issued a statement that, while 
sympathetic to Muslim sensibilities, repudiated the accusation that the Conference had 
been critical of Islam or had expressed a desire to convert Muslims to Christianity, and 
called on the Government "to put an end to this kind of propaganda in the future. "121 
In actual fact, the Conference rarely focused in any overt sense on the subject of 
evangelism, 122 particularly with respect to the Middle East. 123 More discussion was given 
116 See, for example, al-Jdmiah al- Arabýyah, 24 April, 3 June 1928. 
"' lbid, 24 May 1928. 
118 Palestine Bulletin, 29 March 1928. 
119 Al-Karmil, II July 193 1. 
120 ibid. 
121 Faasan, 14 April 1928. 
122 SeeMinutes, pp. 30,32. 
123 See Palestine Bulletin, 28 March, 1928. 
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to the necessity of resolving differences between the various sects and denominations of 
Christianity. 124 Nonetheless, the overriding concern in the end was that such divisions 
created an obstacle to spreading the word-that it "obscure[d] Him in the minds of a 
perplexed mankind. "125 While an effort was made to demonstrate some degree of 
sensitivity with respect to non-Christian faiths--often, it would seem, by employing 
int entionally ambiguous language regarding any evangelical intentions, 26-the fact of the 
matter is that proselytising was what missionaries did. An article appearing towards the 
end of the Conference in the journal Near East and India perhaps summed up the link 
best when it characterised the Conference as a case of "Protestant Christendom 
[assembling] in the Holy City for the purpose of so sharpening Protestant missionary 
effort that the whole impact of the West upon the East, whether in the professional 
cultural, industrial, or social sphere, should have a Christian character. " 127 One might 
characterise it as evangelism by the back-door, '28whatever the case, the desired outcome 
was the same. Hence, the same article went on to note that, for many, the ultimate 
purpose of the Conference (as with evangelism in general) was, in fact, the "actual 
C 
conversion' of Muslims, Hindus and others. 
1,129 
17A Ibid, 27 Nbroh, 4 April 1928. 
'25 fbid, 27 March 1928. 
'26 See, for instance, ibid, 8 April 1928. 
'27 Excerpt reprinted in ibid, 9 April 1928. 
'28 See, for instance, Roland Allan, "Jerusalem: A Critical Review of 'The World Mission of Christianity"' 
(London: World Dominion Press, 1928), pp. 15,2 0. 
129 Excerpt of article reprinted in Palestine Bulletin, 9 April 1928. 
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While there is no record that the Conference ever directly attacked Islam, it was 
commonly believed by Palestine's Muslims that this had been its main purpose. "O in 
particular, it was held that the Conference had sought to denigrate the good name of the 
Prophet. 131 That missionaries commonly did so was a widely held truism among 
Muslims. Thus, for instance, in a letter appearing in al-JCImiah al-'Arahiyyah, it was 
noted that at a missionary conference held two years prior, those participating "had not 
left any word from the 'cursing' dictionary in criticising Muhammad, the son of 
'Abdallah. "132 Muslims were primarily concerned with Christian evangelism. 133 
Evangelism of course was not something new, and had been practiced before the 
Mandate. Then, however, it had been directed primarily at Jews and Eastern Christians. 
Under British rule, however, the conditions on the ground had changed sufficiently so as 
to greatly facilitate Christian evangelism, and missionaries now began to target Muslims. 
Apostasy by Muslims, which under Islamic law had been punishable by death during the 
Ottoman period, 134 was now openly permitted. 135 
'30 Relatedly, it was considered that the resolutions that were published by the International Missionary 
Council were not the real ones, and were only for show. Al-AmPah al-'Arabtýyah, 24 May 1928. 
131 lbid, 4 May, 5 June 1928. 
132 Referenced in al-Karmil, 5 March 1928. See also alJimiah al-'Arabý, yah, 4,21 May 1929; and 
FilastTn, 24 April 1928. 
'33 See, for example, at-Karmil, 8 July 193 1. 
134 As noted in the first chapter, since 1856, apostasy by Muslims had, in theory at least, been permissible. 
Nonetheless, it was something that continued to be strongly discouraged. See, for instance, Henry Harris 
Jessup, Fifty-Three Years in Syria, Volume I (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 2002 [first published in 1910 by 
Fleming H. Revell Company, New York]), pp. 267-268,29 1. 
135 Livia Rokach, The Catholic Church and the Question ofPalestine (London: Saqi Books, 1987), p. 35. 
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Seen against this background, it is perhaps not surprising that Christian Arabs were 
affected by the backlash caused by the Missionary Conference, even given the fact that 
they had not really participated. The Arab countries as a whole were represented by only 
n me delegates, many of them not even Arab, and none of them Palestinian. 136 Several 
local ecclesiastical dignitaries were entertained at a reception given by the Missionary 
Council at Government House, amongst them the Greek Orthodox Patriarch Damianos, 137 
though arguably, such attendance constituted little more than a courtesy gesture, not 
much different than that extended by the Grand Mufti, when he invited the participants of 
the Conference to visit the Haram al-Shafff. 138 Nonetheless, a few weeks after the 
Conference, al-Jamiah al-Arabiyyah encouraged Muslims to boycott a benefit party at 
the St. George's School, an institution equally affiliated with Palestine's indigenous 
Protestant community as with the British. Ironically, as an ecumenical gesture, the School 
had, in connection with the event, requested a musical band from the Islamic orphanage 
run by the Supreme Muslim Council. 139 During the same period, a political demonstration 
in Nablus directed against the missionary conference had seen accusations of complicity 
levelled against Palestine's indigenous Christian community. FilastTn tried to minimise 
the incident by noting that that they were a "small bad group [that] did not represent the 
whole nation. "" Nonetheless, it was also noted, with some regret, that those responsible 
had succeeded to some degree in their "intentions... to cause a misunderstanding between 
Muslims and Christians. 1440 
136 Conceming those attending from the Arab countries, see Minutes, pp. 6-23. 
137 See Palestine Bulletin, 4 April 1928. See also Minutes, pp. 52,57. 
138 Palestine Bulletin, 4 April 1928. See also Hocking, The Spirit of World Politics, p. 350. 
139AI-J, Imi'dh al-'Arabýyah, 26 April 1928; Palestine Bulletin, 10 May 1928. 
140 FilastTn, 24 April 1928. 
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To many of Palestine's Christian Arabs, it seemed that Muslim resentment of Christian 
missionary activity was beginning to spill over onto them. 141 Such concerns were evident 
in an article appearing in a local Christian paper indicating that during the rioting in Gaza 
on 13 April, several missionaries had been murdered. The report in the end proved 
false-no missionaries had been murdered in Gaza. Nevertheless, it had seemed quite 
plausible to a fair number of Christians. 142 'Ibis was not altogether something new- 
anger over Christian missionaries had from an early point seen an association between 
missionary educational activities and Christian Arab teachers in government schools. 
Thus, it was not uncommon that calls were made for their replacements. Typical in this 
respect was the demand in Jenin, in 192 1, that the Christian schoolmaster be replaced by 
a Muslim, the former being accused of stirring up trouble between Muslims and 
Christians. 143 A similar problem developed two years later in a girls' school in Nablus, 
which, though predominantly Muslim, had a substantial number of Christian teachers. 144 
Of course, there was one way that Christian Arabs might completely dissociate 
themselves from foreign missionaries. Thus, the Muslim newspaper Sawl al-Haqq 
suggested that Arab Christians might best respond to Christian missionary activity by 
following the example of a recent Christian Arab convert to Islam . 
145 Needless to say, 
this was not the solution most Christian Arabs wanted to hear. Christians who showed 
any empathy with missionaries, even if only to suggest they were well meaning if 
141 See, for instance, al-Karmil, I April 1928; also al-Jami dh al-Arabýyah, 3 May, 9 August 1928. 
142 Palestine Bulletin, 15 April 1928. 
143 ISA 2/157, letter from Richmond to the Sub-Govemor, 2 September 192 1, regarding an interview with 
Muslim notables. 
144 CO 73 3/47, 'Political Report for June 1923. ' See also al-jamiah al- Arablýyah, 15 November 1928, 
concerning a similar. incident in Hebron. 
145 Referenced in Palestine Bulletin, 19 April 1928. Though ironically, it was a call that would soon be 
taken up by some of the Christian-run newspapers as well (see below). 
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misguided, found themselves subjected to closer scrutiny. AI-Jamiah al-'Arabiyyah, 
even while acknowledging that most Christian Arabs were loyal to the nationalist cause, 
accused 'Isd al -'Isd, the editor of FilastTn (and certainly an individual with a positive 
track-record as a nationalist'46), of being sympathetic towards the Missionary Conference 
and of supporting the French in Syria against Synan nationalists. 147 Several weeks later, a 
proposal was put forward within Muslim circles calling for an all-Palestine Muslim 
conference, as a way of responding to the Missionary Conference. Christian Arabs were 
intentionally excluded, and several responded by proposing an all-Palestine Christian 
conference. 148 
The Missionary Conference accentuated what for many Muslims was a core aspect of the 
nationalist movement-namely that, at heart, it was a struggle between the Muslim East 
and Christian Europe. Underlying the attitude of many Muslims towards the British 
Mandate was an inability to reconcile themselves to Christian domination. 149 At the same 
time, with the possible exception of Orthodox Arabs, Christian commitment to the 
nationalist cause had cooled somewhat since the early part of the Mandate. 150 Christian 
commitment till that point had, to a large extent, reflected the immediacy of the Zionist 
146 See Yehoshua Porath, The Emergence, p. 296; also Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 254, footnote 6. 
'Isd al-'Tsd had even joined an extremist association (al-Fida'iýyah) at one point Sir Anton Bertram and 
Harry Charles Luke, Report ofthe Commission Appointed by the Government ofPatestine to Inquire into 
the Affairs ofthe Orthodox Patriarchate in Jerusalem (London: Oxford University Press, 1926), pp. 37-39. 
1"A I-J5m iah al-A rab iýyah, 8,24 May 1928. 
1 48 Palestine Bulletin, 8 May 1928. 
149 Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the Palestinian Arab National Movement dunng the Formative 
Stage, " in The Palestinians and theMiddle East Conflict, An International Conference held at the Institute 
ofMiddle Eastern Studies, University ofHaila, April 1976, ed., Gabriel Ben-Dor, (Ramat Gan, Israel, 
Turtledove Publishing, 1978), p. 74. 
1-50 Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 298. 
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threat. 151 Helpful also was the fact that during the early years of the Mandate, an 
independent Palestinian Arab state had remained more or less a hypothetical. Questions 
concerning its exact nature and the place of non-Muslims in it were issues that could be 
ignored in the light of more pressing concerns. By 1928, however, the situation had 
changed. Jewish immigration had tailed off considerably, enough to put the Zionist 
enterprise in jeopardy, though not enough to ensure its failure. The achievement of 
nationalist goals, while by no means assured, suddenly seemed plausible, and suddenly 
Christian concerns about what an actual Arab state might entail with respect to the 
situation of non-Muslims took on greater urgency. 152 As Hourani expresses it, Christians 
could never "be certain that Arab nationalism would not turn out to be a new form of 
Islamic self-assertion. " 153 
The British presence had acted as a kind of insurance with respect to Christian political 
rights. Thus, for instance, inasmuch as municipalities were appointed by the Palestine 
Government, Christian representation proportional to their actual numbers was generally 
ensured, even if it meant in some cases that Muslims constituted a minority on 
representative bodies. This might be contrasted with their situation during the Ottoman 
period. Even following the Tanzimat reforms, it had never been permitted that Christian 
representatives should outnumber Muslim ones, even in towns where they made up the 
largest single community. 154 Contradictions between what were two very different 
conceptions of Arab nationalist identity-the one based on a secular model, the other on 
As discussed above, Christian involvement in the nationalist movement was motivated in large part by 
strong anti-Zionist feelings. 
152 See, for instance, CO 733n3, secret dispatch from the High Commissioner to the Colonial Secretary, 
II September 1924; also Mir'fit al-Sharq, 8 December 1923. 
153 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the LiberalAge, 1798-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983 (first published in 1962)), p. 277. 
154 Tsimhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians, " p. 182. 
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the Islamic unima-were no longer easily ignored. At the same time, Christians had not 
yet become as marginalized as they would later become, and might still hope to have 
some input in shaping what should be the nature of a future Arab state. 
Most Muslims were certainly sincere in their commitment to an Arab state inclusive of 
Christians. More at issue was what should be their place in such a state, and it often 
seemed that the vast majority of Muslims had not really thought the question through 
beyond what were often vague assurances that the situation of Christians (as with other 
'People of the Book') had always been secure under Islam. 155 This was not necessarily 
the answer Christians were looking for. However positive may have been their situation 
historically (and indeed, this is debatable), it had, in the end, been dependent on the 
goodwill of the larger Muslim population. Christians did not want to be in any future 
state by sufferance, but by right, and as political and social equals. This is not to say that 
Muslims consciously envisioned the future status of Christians as second-class citizens. 
Rather it was that they tended to ignore inconsistencies between a national community 
founded on secular liberal values and one founded on Islam. When confronted with the 
question of what would be the status of non-Muslims in an Arab state founded on Islamic 
principles, most proponents simply responded by noting that in the past, Christians as 
well as other non-Muslims had been treated fairly and had generally gotten along well 
enough under Islamic rule. 156 The fact that in the past they had largely been excluded 
from participating in the political rule of the country was studiously avoided. 
Many Muslims asserted that Islamic values and secular liberal values were entirely 
compatible"7--thus, it was not a matter of not wanting to make compromises with 
'55 See, for instance, al-Karmil, 25 September 1927. 
156 Thus, for instance, Rashid Rlda had actually insisted that the situation of Christians and Jews would be 
better in an Islamic state than in a secular one. Hourani, Arahic Thought, p. 244. 
157 See, for example, aWamila al- Arabiyya, 9 August 1928; also Sylvia G. Haim, "Islam and the Theory 
of Arab Nationalism, " in Die Welt des Islams, vol. 4,1955, p. 136. 
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respect to Islam; rather it was a case of not recognising that such compromises might be 
necessary. More to the point, such contradictions simply did not touch Muslims to the 
same extent that they did non-Muslims. Muslims never had to confront the question of 
whether they were somehow less 'Arab' on account of their faith. As a result, they tended 
to minimize such contradictions and their implications. Worse, they tended to dismiss 
Christian concerns along these lines as either being somehow exaggerated or prompted 
by outsiders. 158 Thus, an article appearing in al-Jamiah al-'Arabiyyah claimed that the 
"division [between Muslims and Christians] was brought through Europe's having 
entered SoCiety.,, 159 Christians who complained too much in this respect were also 
accused of intentionally fostering divisions between Muslims and Christians. Such 
individuals were usually contrasted with the 'good' Christians who knew better then to 
"try and accuse [Muslims] of behaving with extremism and hatred towards Christians. " 
Tacit in such contrasts often seemed a warning against making such complaints. 160 
During the early part of the Mandate, Muslim nationalist leaders had tended to avoid 
defining Arab nationalism in Islamic terms. 161 By the mid-1920s, however, it had become 
increasingly commonplace, particularly when dealing with the peasantry, to appeal to 
15" A tendency that has continued more or less till the present. Thus, for example, a survey recently taken of 
Muslim and Christian students at Bethlehem University purporting to demonstrate that the relationship 
between the two communities is trouble-free, is described as "explod[ing] several myths, propagated by 
some Western propagandists, concerning the relations between Muslims and Christians. " Michael Prior and 
William Taylor, "Introduction" in Christians in the Holy Land, eds., Michael Prior and William Taylor 
(London: The World of Islam Festival Trust, 1995), p. 5. Concerning the actual study, see Jeanne Kattan, 
"A Study of Muslim and Christian Students' Attitudes Towards Each Other at Bethlehem University" in 
Christians in the Holy Land, pp. 89-97. 
'59 A I-Am iah al-'A rab 4yah, 8 May 192 8. 
16'Ibid, 8,24 May 1928; al-Karmil, 10 June 1928. 
161 See D. R. Irvine, "Islamic Culture and Political Practice in British Mandated Palestine 1919-1949 ý" 
Review ofPolitics, vol. 45 (1983), pp. 71-93. 
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religious sentiment. 162 Related to this, Christians increasingly found it necessary to 
accommodate the growing association between Arab nationalist identity and Islarn. 163 
Thus, for instance, the Protestant editor of al-Karmil, NqJIb Nassdr, in a 1923 editorial, 
divided the Arab nation into two groups-those who had responded to the Prophet's call 
to join the new faith (farTq al-ijaba), and those who, though not converting, had 
cc accepted his gospel and biddings in everyday life, good manners and national 
commands (farFq al-da ýva). " The two were thus "brethren in language, race and 
habits. "164 The Prophet was thus to be understood as the founder of Arab history, the one 
to whom the Arabs owed their common fate, heritage and culture, and around whose 
greatness the Arab national emergence had taken place. Oddly enough, in noting that 
Christian Arabs also celebrated the Prophet's birthday, Nassar felt compelled to stress 
their sincerity in doing so, as apparently there had been claims to the contrary. 165 
The Seventh Palestinian Arab Congress 
That a rift was developing between Muslims and Christians became evident with the 
approach of the Seventh Palestinian National Congress, scheduled for June that year. The 
purpose of the Congress was to elect a new Arab Executive, one many hoped would unite 
the Nashashibi and Husayn! factions"'; the schism growing between the two had become 
a source of great concern to many Arabs. Needless to say, both factions hoped that the 
new Congress would see their respective position strengthened. The Opposition was 
particularly hopeful in this respect. With the waning of Zionism as an immediate threat, 
162 Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 74. 
163 See for instance, O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 4 1. 
164AI-Karmil, 21 October 1923. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Betts, Christians in the Arab East, p. 211. 
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moderation had become more acceptable as the basis of political action, something 
evidenced in the growing willingness of many Palestinian Arabs to reconsider the earlier 
proposed legislative council. The Opposition hoped that the new Arab Executive would 
not be dominated by Hajj AmYn al-HusaynT and his supporters, and even threatened to 
boycott the Congress when it appeared the latter might effectively block such an 
outcome. 167 
At issue was who would actually attend the Congress-that is, how was representation to 
be determined. Concerns were expressed at three different levels. The Nash4shlib! faction 
and other Jerusalem-based elite were concerned that the MajlisTn would, because of their 
dominant position in the current Arab Executive as well as the Supreme Muslim Council, 
be disproportionately represented. 168 Non-elite Arabs were concerned that Jerusalem, 
regardless of whether represented by the Husayn-i or Nashashlibi, should not dominate the 
Congress. Such concerns were particularly pronounced in the Northern District, where, 
not coincidentally, many Christians resided. Representative in this respect was the 
Christian newspaper Miral al-Sharq, which warned: "Let the organizers of this Congress 
," 69 know that the country is not the private property of a few Jerusalemite families. 
Finally, Christians were concerned with their own representation as a community, and 
demanded that a pre-determined number of places be reserved for them at the 
Congress. 170 They were careful to frame their demands as part of the broader issue of 
representation per se ; 171 thus, they noted that it was notjust Christians who were unfairly 
represented, but certain districts as well. At the same time, they specifically demanded 
167 Palestine Bulletin, 30 May 1928, from an article appearing in Filastin. 
168 Porath, The Emergence, pp. 250-252. 
'Mir'61 al-Sharq, 24 May 1928. - 
" lbid, 7 June 1928, AI-Karmil, 30 May 1928. 
171 lbid, 10 June 1928; also II March 1928; FilastTn, 10 April 1928. 
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that invitations to the Congress should be "under the name of a mixed committee of 
Muslims and ChriStianS. "172 
Christian concerns about representation reflected the charged atmosphere in the aftermath 
of the Missionary Conference. In particular, many Christians were disconcerted by the 
decision taken by the Young Men's Muslim Associations to convene a congress in late 
April in response to the Conference. They feared that this "would deepen the differences 
between [Christians and MuSlirnSy1173 In large part, these associations had been formed 
in reaction to what had been a proliferation of Christian organisations since the beginning 
of the Mandate, Many Muslims considered these organisations to be British-funded, 174 in 
particular, the Young Men's Christian Associations (YMCAs). 175For many Muslims, 
Christian affiliation with such organisations raised concerns about the depth of their 
loyalty to the nationalist cause. By contrast, it was noted that the YMMAS had no 
European affiliation whatsoever, but rather served only the 'Arab cause. "76Addifionally, 
it was asserted that Christian organisations were exclusionary, and indeed, their 
memberships were almost exclusively Chrisfian. 177The YMMA Congress bemoaned the 
fact that there should be 'Orthodox' and 'Islamic' clubs rather than 'Arab' clubs, though 
for this, they held the Christians chiefly to blame. 178 
172 Al-Karmil, 10 June 1928. 
173 lbid, 22 April 1928. See also Khleh, Filastin, p. 437; al-MawsiVa al-FilastFni)ya, p. 554; and Porath, 
The Emergence, p. 300. 
Khleb, FilastIn, p. 438. 
175 Tibawi, Arab Educafion, p. 185. 
"6 From a letter appearing in alýfijmiah al-'Arabiyyah, 5 March 1928. 
"' Khleh, FilaslTn, p. 438. 
178 Albeit in a rather roundabout way. Thus, it was noted that "these sectarian clubs will not accept us 
because we are not agreeing with them regarding the participation of women. " FilasfTn, 20 April 1928. 
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Initially, the YMMAs took great pains to stress that they were not set in opposition to 
Christian Arabs. It was noted during the Congress that it should be "clear to all Christian 
factors that the formation of the Young Men's Muslim Associations [was] a new 
empowerment for the national movement and did not constitute a split of the national 
front. "179 Likewise, it was noted that the YMMAs intended to "keep the Muslim- 
Christian national front strong and unified. "180 Nonetheless, some Christians felt uneasy 
about the way in which the Congress tended to define the nationalist cause in Islamic 
terms. 181 Interesting in this respect was a letter sent to FilastTn by 'A Good Muslim' who 
supposedly had attended the YMMA Congress, and who claimed that it had actively 
called for a division between Muslims and Christians . 
182 It was also asserted that the 
Congress had been disseminating a paper in which Christians were condemned as 
disbelievers. 183 Likewise that, unlike what was the usual custom, the Congress had failed 
to issue a 'courtesy greeting' to Palestine's Christians. 184Whether any of this actually 
happened is questionable; 8' nonetheless, the fact of such incidents being recorded in the 
Christian press was indicative of what was a genuine concern on the part of Christians. 
As it was, the Young Men's Muslim Associations would take on an increasingly anti- 
179 Khleh, Filastin, pp. 438. 
180 lbid, pp. 437438; see also Filasifti, 20 April 1928. 
181 Ibid. 
"2 AI-Amiah al-Araboah, 8 May 1928, referring to a letter appearing in FilastTn, I May 1928. 
"' lbid, referring to an article appearing in Filasrin. 
'84 lbid, 8,24 May 1928, referring to an article appearing in FilaslTn. 
185 Ibid, 8,24 May 1928. All of the accusations were denied in the articles appearing in alVfimiah al- 
'Arabiyyah. 
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Christian tone as the Mandate progressed, particularly in connection with the supposed 
favouritism shown Christians in government employment. 186 
In the days leading up to the Seventh National Palestinian Congress, Christian Arab 
leaders met in Haifa, Jaffa and Jerusalem. It was decided to organise a separate Christian 
conference in order to determine the nature of Christian participation (if any) in the larger 
National Congress. 187 Taking the lead were such figures as Ya'q6b Farraj, Mughannam 
Ilyas Mughannam, and 'Isd al-'Isd. 188 Significantly, this was the first time s ince the 
Mandate had begun that Palestine's Christian Arabs had organised politically as a 
distinctly 'Christian' community, one cutting across the different denominations and set 
in opposition to the Muslim majority. In the end, it was determined that the Christians 
should try to work with the more moderate factions of the Opposition with an aim 
towards restoring national unity. At the same time, it was felt that a separate organisation 
should be founded that would be representative of specifically Christian interests. 189 
Initially, Christian demands for 'adequate' representation at the National Congress 
remained unaddressed, and it was even necessary at one point to postpone the Congress 
for fear of a Christian boycott. 190 Their demands were eventually met, however, and 
Christians were able to secure a guaranteed number of places in advance of the 
Congress. 191 Many Muslims were strongly chagrined with the Christians' attitude 
towards the Congress, and accused them "of working with the Government and of being 
"'6 Porath, The Emergence, pp. 300-301. 
187 Palestine Bulletin, 6 June 1928. 
"38 lbid; al-Karmil, 10 June 1928. 
189 A I-Kamdl, 10 June 1928. 
190 Palestine Bulletin, 13 and 19 June 1928. 
191 Porath, The Emergence, p. 252. 
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happy with what the Government [was] doing because it was a'Chfistian' 
Govemment. "192 Christians for their part attributed such 'rumours' to the machinations of 
HqJj Arn-In and his supporters, who, "when people don't agree with them and come to 
them with their heads bowed ... take their revenge on them and accuse them as they 
want. " It was additionally asserted that Hajj Am-in's "nationalist claims were fake and his 
,, 193 mixing of religion and nationalism just a way of hiding his true intentions. 
The Seventh Palestinian Arab Congress finally convened on 20 June 1928. Of the 
210 delegates attending, 48 were Christian. 194 Overall, the Congress was dominated by 
the more moderate Opposition. This was particularly evident in the composition of the 
newly elected Arab Executive, one moreover highly ý representative of Palestine's 
Christian Arabs. Twelve of its new members, out a total of 48, were Christian-one out 
of every four. 195 Two of these, Yaq5b Faffdj and Mughannarn Eyas Mughannam, were 
part of the Executive's upper committee, 196 the overall makeup of which represented a 
victory for the Opposition. Mfisd Kazim al-Husayff-a moderate in spite being a member 
of the Husayni family-retained the presidency. The two vice-presidents, Tawfiq Haqq! 
al-'Abddllah and WqGb Farraj, were both representative of the Opposition. The Husayn! 
faction was represented in the person of Jam5l al-Husaym, one of the three joint 
secretaries. The two other secretaries were Mughannam Ily5s Mughannam and 'Awn! 
19'2AI-Karmil, 10 June 1928; see also ibid, 28 June 1928. 
193 lbid, 10 Ame 1928. 
'94 Palestine Bulletin, 21 June 1928. 
195 Don Peretz, TheMiddle East Today, Sixth Edition (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994), p. 290. 
196 For a list of the names of all the Christian Arabs elected to the Executive Committee, see Palestine 
Bulletin, 22 June 1928. 
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'Abd al-HadT. The former was a moderate. The latter, though inclined towards radicalism, 
was no friend of Hajj Airim al-Husayni. 197 
The new Arab Executive quickly proclaimed its willingness to seek a negotiated solution 
with the Government in the hopes of achieving some degree of self-government. 
198 
Specifically, they wished to revisit the possibility of establishing a legislative council; 
overall, they pursued a policy of moderation. On the face of it, this was an outcome with 
which most Christian Arabs could be satisfied. Yet the campaign for control of the Arab 
Executive had seen accusations levelled against the other by both factions of undue 
Christian influence. Even members of the Opposition had too often felt compelled to 
emphasize their'Islamic' credentials. 199 The new Arab Executive was almost 
immediately looked upon disfavourably by those more radically minded. Much was 
made, for instance, of the fact that not a single resolution had been passed at the Congress 
opposing Zionism. 200 Many of the members of the Young Men's Muslim Associations 
were particularly dissatisfied. Thus, MuhammadIzzat Darwazah, who had organised 
their first Congress described the new Arab Executive as divided, weak, and lacking in 
enthusiasm, and characterised many of its members as little more than 'collaborators' and 
6spies. 201 
197 During the 1930s, al-Hadi would head the radical Istiqlal Party. (See below. ) 
198 Porath, Riols Io Rebellion, p. 20. 
'99 See, for example, al-Karinil, 17 June 1929; Sawl al-Shab, 9 June 1928. In similar fashion, Rdghib al- 
NashZish-ib-i and other Muslim members of the Opposition would later seek to challenge Hajj Amin al- 
Husayff's leadership in connection with the 1931 Islamic Conference-which he organised-by 
sponsoring a rival conference, the Congress of the Palestinian Muslim Nation (see below). 
200 Khleh, FilastTn, p. 439. 
201 lbid, p. 440; also Nels Johnson, Islam and the Politics ofMeaning in Palestinian Nationalism (London: 
Routledge and Kcgan Paul, 1982), p. 36. 
208 
Underlying the growing tension between Christians and Muslims was a divergence 
between what were two very different conceptions of Arab nationalist identity. As 
discussed earlier, in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, the question of what 
made one an Arab was still very much an open one. Christian Arabs generally conceived 
of Arab identity in secular terms-on the basis of a shared language and culture. 
Muslims, by contrast, tended to define it on the basis of Islam. The immediate threat of 
Zionism had allowed both Christians and Muslims to avoid dealing with what were 
conflicting understandings of Arab identity. By 1928, however, Zionism no longer 
seemed the threat it once had. Nonetheless, no strong movement developed seeking to 
define the nationalist cause in overtly Islamic terms. The leadership in Palestine, while 
dominated by individuals often happy to justify their positions on the basis of religion, 
was rooted more in tradition than Islam per se. Unlike the situation in most of the other 
Arab countries-where notable authority was quickly being eroded by newly created 
self-governing institutions M--the traditional social structures had been maintained in 
Palestine. Politics in Palestine remained largely the domain of the old notable families, 
203 
who would not be displaced until after the war in 1948-1949. While individual 
notables might sometimes find it useful to emphasise the Islamic character of the 
nationalist struggle, none of them desired that it should be defined in strictly Islamic 
terms. Neither did they desire a state founded strictly on Islamic precepts in any radical 
sense. Such a state was hardly likely to maintain a system of authority founded on 
tradition. In a very real sense, Muslim notables had as great a stake as Christians in not 
over-emphasising Palestine's Islamic character. To the extent that they did, it was 
generally for tactical reasons, and aimed at bolstering one's own political status. 204 
202 M. E. Yapp, The Near East Since the First World War, A History to 1995, second edition (London and 
New York; Longman, 1996). 
203 See ibid, p. 299; also Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, p. 2 1. 
204 Something of which Hajj Amin was often accused. See, for instance, Al Karmil, 10 June 1928. 
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On the other hand, the status of Muslim notables was dependent in large part on their 
being perceived as good MUSliMS. 205 If sometimes this meant partially alienating 
Palestine's Christians, most Muslims were quite prepared to do so. In truth, Christians 
had little leverage in this respect. What was most ironic about charges of undue Christian 
influence was the fact that the reality was quite the opposite. With respect to the 
nationalist movement, it was becoming increasingly clear that Christians were not even 
on an equal footing with Muslims, much less dominant. The formation of the Muslim- 
Christian Associations during the early days of the Mandate had, for many Christians, 
been symbolic of the beginning of a new political relationship between the two 
communities. It had not taken long, however, before the traditional Muslim notable 
families came to dominate the MCAs and the movement. 206 Christian nationalist leaders 
found it increasingly difficult to act in their own right, tending rather to become the 
207 
attach6s of Muslim leaders. The relationship between Yaq6b Farrdj and Raghib al- 
Nashashlib! might be understood as such; likewise that between Alfted Rok and Hajj 
AmIn al-Husaynl. 208 
The inclusion of Christians in nationalist activities often reflected a certain practical 
utility, particularly when representing the nationalist cause abroad. The inclusion of the 
Christians Ibrdhfirn Shammds and Shibli Jamal on various delegations, for example, 
reflected the fact that they were both completely fluent in English (unlike the majority of 
205 In connection with developments as discussed in the first chapter. 
206 See, for instance, CO 733/69, 'Secret Political Resum6 for Jerusalem-Jaffa District for Period Ended the 
2'd June, 1924, ' dated 2 June 1924. 
207 Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 77. 
208 The latter, reflecting, as noted above, the special relationship between the Husayni family and Greek 
Catholics. 
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MUSliMS)209; equally, that they were useful for generating sympathy among Westerners 
for the nationalist cause for the reasons discussed above. In general, it was also felt that a 
strong united-front between Muslims and Christian would produce a favourable effect on 
public opinion in Britain and the WeSt. 2'oWhatever their utilitarian value, Christians had 
increasingly to come to terms with the fact that they were becoming marginalized. This is 
not to say Muslims did not see a role for them in the nationalist movement; most were 
quite happy to make common cause with their Christian compatriots, even if seeing Arab 
identity as something inherently 'Islamic. ' Even there was an antecedent for this-thus, 
the movement of Muslim solidarity or asabiyya as espoused by 'Abdzillah al-Nadim had 
defined a limited political role for Christians and Jews within the umma. 
The only question was that concerning Christian loyalty, and increasingly, the burden of 
proof was falling on Christian shoulders. 211 In large part, this reflected the reality that the 
entire region was under the political domination of European 'Christian' powers. A 
growing perception existed that, just as Christians had benefited from a European 
'Christian' presence during the Ottoman period, they now constituted a privileged class 
under the present mandates. 212 Many seemed all too happy to take advantage of the 
situation, whatever they might profess with respect to the nationalist cause. 213 AS the 
demand for bi- or multi-lingual personnel grew, Christians, with their tradition of 
learning, experience in commerce, and greater familiarity with Western institutions, were 
209 CO 733/4, 'Notes on the Moslem-Christian delegation, ' attached to dispatch from Samuel to Churchill, 
2 July 1921; Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " pp. 77-78. 
210 Porath, The Emergence, p. 295. 
211 See, for instance, Filast7h, 2 March 1929. 
212 For example, al-Karmil, 10,28 June 1928; see also ISA, 1904/33, essay by Ben-Zvi entitled 'Christians 
and Muslims in the Land of Israel' [no date]. 
213 Filastin, 2 March 1928. 
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well placed to take advantage not only of new employment-opportunities, but of 
economic ones as well. Muslim concerns regarding the depth of Christian loyalty were 
not without basis, particularly if considering the behaviour of Christians in the 
neighbouring mandated countries. 214 On the other hand, Christians in Palestine were 
arguably less supportive of the mandates than their coreligionists in the other Arab 
countries. Much of this was no doubt due to their strong opposition to Zionism, but there 
were other factors involved as well. Thus, for instance, while many Orthodox Arabs 
benefited from the opportunities presented by the Mandate, the affluence enjoyed by its 
wealthier members was still founded in large part on their close relations with the ruling 
Muslim establishment. 215 As such, even during the mandate period, many Orthodox 
Arabs continued to see their interests as being aligned with the Muslim elite. 216 
The Supreme Muslim Council 
Any discussion of the political rivalry between the opposition and the Majlisfn must take 
into account the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC). Hajj AmIn's control of the SMC not 
only constituted a source of revenue and patronage (as discussed in the previous chapter); 
it was also a source of great prestige. 217 It was this institution that constituted his political 
218 power base. As noted in the previous chapter, the SMC was essentially a British 
creation, established so that the Muslim community might have responsibility for the 
214 See, for example, ibid. 
2'-' Betts, Christians in the Arab East, pp. 130-13 1. 
216 See, for instance, al-Kann il, 3 October 193 1. 
217 See, for instance, CO 733/19, dispatch from Deedes to Churchill, 23 February 1922; also Uri M. 
Kupferschmidt, The SupremeMuslim Council. - Islam under the British Mandatefor Palestine (Leiden; 
New York: E. J. Brill, 1987), p. 32. 
218 See, for example, F. H. Kisch, Palestine Diary (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1938), p. 263. 
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S. 219 It W Islamic religious courts and the administration of Islamic waqfi as also hoped that 
it might act as a counter-balance to the Jewish Agency (inasmuch as the British offer of 
an equivalent 'Arab' Agency had been rejected). Hajj Am-in al-Husayff's position in the 
SMC was greatly strengthened by the fact that the Palestine Government was reluctant to 
put any pressure on the institution for fear of being accused of interfering in Muslim 
religious affhirs. 220 More than simply not wishing to provoke Muslims, the Palestine 
Government saw the SMC as a medium by which it might earn their good-'Aill. 22' This 
was particularly apparent with regard to disputed waqfproperties, 222 inasmuch as a 
general perception existed among British officials that waqfs by definition were religious, 
and that any mishandling of them by a 'Christian power' would stir up trouble . 
22' Hajj 
AmTn was more than happy to take advantage of such British apprehensions. 224 A 
concern over Muslim sensibilities dictated to a large extent British policy regarding the 
Council's finances as well. Thus, the Government proved quite ready to provide advances 
and bank overdrafts whenever the Council found itself in financial difficulties. 225 
Government generosity also manifested itself in final settlements concerning properties 
219 Regarding the creation of the Supreme Muslim Council, see Kupferschmidt, The Supreme Muslim 
Council, pp. 21-25. 
220 fbid, pp. 38,52,128.153. 
221 See, for instance, CO 733/250/8, extract from a letter from Wauchope to the Colonial Secretary, 
14 April 1934. 
222 Barron, Mohammedan Wakfs, pp. 12,4445; see also Kupferschrnidý The SupremeMuslim Council, 
pp. 114 -115,118. 
223 lbid, pp. 117-118,121. 
224 See, for instance, ibid, pp. 91,117. 
225 See, for example, CO 733/213/ 8, dispatch from Wauchope to CurAiffe-Lister, 17 September 1932. 
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previously unrecognised as waqf and claimed as such by the Council 226; likewise in the 
fact that, whereas the Government chose not exercise any authority over the shar7'a 
courts, it paid the salaries for court personnel, as well as related travelling expenses, 
together with various other fees, inclusive in some cases of rent. 227 For the most part, the 
Palestine Government would remain generous in its dealings with the Supreme Muslim 
Council until the end of the Mandate. 
Coinciding with HaJj AmIn's rise in prominence was a growing tendency towards 
radicalisation among Palestine's Muslims, many of whom were becoming increasingly 
dissatisfied with the traditional leadership and their moderate policies. To many, it 
seemed that the notable class was more concerned with promoting its own commercial 
interests than with achieving nationalist objectives. 22" Many of these were newly 
educated Muslim youth frustrated, as discussed above, by their inability to find suitable 
employment. Added to this were the large numbers of semi-proletariatised peasants 
recently migrated to the cities and towns in search of employment. Under their new 
circumstances, many suddenly found themselves considerably less dependent on the 
notable class then had been the case in the villages, where the latter continued to remain 
economically dominant as landowners and moneylenders. Indeed, it was often the case 
that they had fled their villages in order to escape the debts they owed them . 
229 Thus, the 
negative feelings they harboured towards the traditional elite were often based on more 
than just a frustration that they were failing to achieve nationalist objectives. Added to 
this, through their experience in the wider labour market, peasants were increasingly 
being exposed to radical new political ideas and possibilities. Corresponding to this was a 
226 Kupferschmidt, The SupremeMuslim Council, p. 184. 
" [bid, pp. 59-60. 
228 Johnson, Islam and the Politics ofMeaning, p. 3 7. 
229 Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, p. 189. 
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greater willingness to challenge traditional modes of political and social organisation as 
well as the patron-client networks that until then had defined notable-peasant relations. 230 
Members of this latter group in particular were becoming increasingly aware of 
themselves as 'Muslim, ' significantly, in a manner that defined Islamic identity in a much 
more particularistic and rigid manner than had previously been the case-it was an 
identity more closely affiliated with Islamic institutions, and based more on right 
religious practice. It is perhaps not surprising then that many of these semi-proleteriatised 
peasants would come under the sway of such militant religious figures as Sheikh 'Izz al- 
D-in al-Qassdm. This theme is taken up more fully in chapter five. It is sufficient to note 
for now that Muslims were increasingly expressing their dissatisfaction in sectarian 
terms-hence the belief that they were being discriminated against as Muslims with 
respect to government positions, the establishment of the YMMAs, and so forth. As the 
1920s progressed, nationalist activity in general increasingly took on a religious 
character. It became more centred round Islamic institutions such as the mosques and the 
YMMAs. By the end of the 1920s, for instance, it was increasingly the case that 
nationalist demonstrations were organised around the Friday prayers at mosques. 231 
Inasmuch as this tended to link nationalist feelings with religious passions-such as were 
often aroused by the prayer services-such demonstrations tended to be much more 
fervent than those organised by the Muslim-Christian Associations. 232 
230 These developments would also have an impact on their home villages, as peasants recently migrated to 
the cities and towns generally maintained close contact with them. Ted Swedenburg, "The Role of the 
Palestinian Peasantry, " pp. 182-183,196. 
231 Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 78. Though to some extent, this had 
always been the case, and constituted a factor underlying the general low turnout of Christians at 
demonstrations among the Tank-and-file. Tsimhoniý The Brifish Mandate, pp. 247-248. 
232 Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 78. 
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Khalidi (1996) notes that during the Mandate, something akin to an alliance developed 
between second-rank notables-a group he characterises as 'the disadvantaged faction of 
the elite' and which Muslih refers to as the 'Younger Politicians 233 -and young 
professionals, both of whom would, over the course of the Mandate, grow increasingly 
dissatisfied with the traditional leadership. 234 One might very well group among the latter 
the aforementioned growing pool of newly-educated Muslim youth frustrated by their 
inability to find meaningful employment; in many respects they had a comparable 
educational experience and shared similar aspirations and outlook. Khalidi notes that both 
groups were attracted to a salafi brand of Arab nationalism, one that originally had called 
for the reform of Islam against the corrupting influence of the Turks, but now targeted the 
traditional leadership as the source of its corruption. More than just providing a basis for 
challenging the traditional leadership, it was suggestive of a more radical political 
programme than the one generally favoured by it. Khalidi points out that, under the 
Ottoman, its appeal had often been greatest among those who, while initially supporting 
constitutionalism and greater liberalism, had been greatly disappointed when the 
expected opportunities for advancement never materialised. 23' Under the Mandate, such a 
situation continued to exist, though this time it was the traditional leadership that was 
largely held accountable. Conveniently, salafi Arabism also provided a point of 
convergence with respect to the semi-proletariatised peasantry, which, as noted, was 
becoming increasingly attracted to Islamic reformers. 
2'3 Rashid Khalidi "Society and Ideology in Late Ottoman Syria: Class, Education, Profession and 
Confession7' in Problems of the Modern Middle East in Historical Perspective, Essays in honour ofAlbert 
Hourani, ed., John Spangnolo (Reading: Ithaca Press (for the Mddle East Centre, St. Anthony's College, 
Oxford), 1996), p. 119. Though he credits this terminology to Dawn. (See C. E. Dawn, "The Rise of 
Arabism in Syria" in Middle EaslJournal, Vol. 16 (1962), pp. 148-49). 
234 See Khalidi "Society and Ideology, " pp. 119-13 1. While Khalidi traces the process back to the late- 
Ottoman period, he sees it very much as constituting a factor during the Mandate. See in particular ibid, 
pp. 128. 
235 lbid, p. 129. 
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The radicalisation and Islamisation of the nationalist movement was something of which 
Hajj AmIn al-Husayff, in his position as Grand Mufti and President of the Supreme 
Muslim Council, was quick to take advantage, largely through a religious agitation that 
sought to lend a religious dimension to Palestinian politics. 236 Most important in this 
respect was his emphasis of Palestine's Islamic significance in connection with the 
Muslim holy sites, most notably the Haram al-Sharif. 237 All of this did not bode well for 
Christians-at best, it threatened to marginalize them; at worst, to see them alienated 
from the movement altogether. Certainly they fell on the wrong side as far as Muslim 
grievances concerning government employment. Equally, the Missionary Conference had 
only served to intensify pan-Islamic sentiment among Palestine's Muslims . 
23' The 
decisive event as far as the nationalist movement's Islamisation, however, would not 
involve Christians at all, but rather would reflect growing tensions between Muslims and 
Jews. 
Radicalisation 
The chain of events leading up to the Wailing Wall Riots might be traced back to 
September 1928, at the time of the Jewish Day of Atonement, when the government 
authorities had had a Jewish partition screen removed from the pavement in front of the 
Wailing Wall. The Wailing Wall adjoined the Haram al-Shadf, the most holy Muslim site 
in Jerusalem, and the question of whether Jews were permitted to bring religious 
appurtenances there was a hotly contested one. The incident quickly saw the mobilisation 
216 Kupferschmidt, "The General Muslim Congress, " p. 124; see also Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 109. 
237 Johnson, Islam and the Politics ofUeaning, pp. 25-26; also Kupferschmidt, The Supreme Muslim 
Council, p. 13 2. 
238 See FO 3 71/16009, document entitled 'The Pan Islamic Movement, ' attached to a letter from Wauchope 
to Cunliffe-Lister, dated 24 December 193 1. See also Uri M. Kupfersclunidt, "The General Muslim 
Congress of 193 1 in Jerusalem" in Asian and Afiican Studies, 12: 1 (1978: March) 77, p. 125. 
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of both Jews and Muslims, the latter most prominently in the formation of the Society for 
the Protection of the Muslim Holy Places. 239 A partial resolution was found with the 
White Paper of November 1928, wherein the British Government indicated its intention 
to uphold the status quo, 240 a decision understood as favouring the Muslim position. In 
late-July 1929, the sixteenth Zionist Congress convened in Zurich and passed a resolution 
expressing its dismay over the position adopted by the British and Palestine 
Governments. This had the effect of exciting Arab opinion in Palestine as it was taken as 
evidence of an attempt to pressure the British Government to reverse the decision taken 
in the 1928 White Paper. On 15 August, the day after the Jewish Feast of Tisha B'Av, 
Jews staged a demonstration in front of the Wailing Wall; the following day, a Muslim 
counter-demonstration took place. 241 
On 17 August, a Jewish youth was killed in an altercation with Arab youths. His funeral 
the following day quickly turned into a political demonstration directed against both the 
Arabs and the Palestine Government. Tensions continued to rise, and by 23 August, 
rumours had begun to spread among the Arabs that the Jews intended to attack the al- 
Aqsd Mosque. 242 Many of the Muslims attending Friday prayer at the Mosque that day 
had come armed with sticks and clubs. During the midday prayer, inflammatory speeches 
were made, and many of the worshippers, in a fanatical mood upon departing the Haram. 
area, quickly set upon whatever Jews they encountered. The disturbances soon spread 
throughout Jerusalem and shortly thereafter, to the rest of Palestine. The worst attacks 
took place in Hebron, where more than sixty Jews-many of them women and children- 
239 Formed in conjuncture with the 'General Muslim Conference' convened in November 1928. Command 
Paper Number 3530, Commission on the Palestine Disturbances ofAugust, 1929, Presented by the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, 1930, p. 32. 
240 Meaning the status quo as of the end of Ottoman rule. See ibid, p. 3 5. 
241 lbid, pp. 47-57,154-155. 
242 lbid, pp. 56-57,9 1. 
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were murdered, and almost as many severely wounded. 243 By 30 August, the disturbances 
had finally come to an end. The final tally saw 133 Jews killed and 339 wounded. Arab 
casualties came to 87 killed and 181 wounded, the majority at the hands of the Palestine 
police and British military forces. 244 
The Wailing Wall Riots would have a major impact on the internal political struggle 
within the Arab leadership, largely to the advantage of HaJ Amin a]-Husayni. The riots 
served to intensify religious sentiment among Muslims. Correspondingly, HaJ Am-in was 
quick to characterise the nationalist cause as a religious struggle by emphasising the need 
to defend the Muslim holy sites, chief among them the Haram al-Shariff. This would 
become most evident with his organisation of the World Islamic Conference two years 
later (discussed more fully in the following chapter). The Wailing Wall Riots certainly 
made one thing clear-for the majority of Muslims, religious sensibilities ran a good deal 
deeper than nationalistic ones. Certainly nothing that had happened till then with respect 
to the nationalist movement had elicited such a reaction. Arguably, most Muslims, 
particularly among the peasantry, made little distinction between the Palestinian cause as 
a nationalist one and as an Islamic one. 
Till then, it had been possible for Christians to see for themselves a role in directing the 
nationalist movement; in shaping the nature of Arab identity; likewise in determining the 
nature of any future Arab state. Christians might have maintained the notion that they and 
their fellow Muslims shared a similar understanding concerning all these things; likewise, 
the relationship between Arab identity and Islam. Following the Wailing Wall Riots, such 
a belief became considerably more difficult to maintain. From that point on, Christians 
243 Other places in Palestine that saw major disturbances were Safed, Haifa, Beisan, and Jaffa. Safed was 
particularly badly hit and saw some 45 Jews either killed or wounded. Several Jewish colonies were also 
subjected to attacks, amongst them Motza. Counter-attacks in which Jews attacked Arabs also took place, 
the most notable of these being in Jaffa and Jerusalem. lbid, pp. 63-65. 
244 lbid, p. 65. 
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would become increasingly marginalized, able to do little beyond following the'lead set 
by their Muslim compatriots. 
Christians had, from the beginning, tried to maintain the nationalist movement along 
more national-secular lines. Thus, where possible, they had opposed the use of religious 
arguments and the arousing of religious feelings, even when directed against Jews. An 
article appearing in the Christian-edited newspaper Mir& al-Sharq on 14 May 1924, for 
example, had called for a clear distinction between religion and the national struggle and 
denounced the circulation of songs cursing the JeN&rish religion, noting that "such songs 
are meaningless and moreover, were opposed to the principles of a monotheistic religion, 
be it Islam or Christi anity. 24' Among other things, there had always been a concern that 
aroused Muslim feeling might turn against thern. 246 What was becoming increasingly 
clear however was that there was no way to prevent Muslim leaders from using religion 
as a means of appealing to the masses. Initially, Christians responded by trying to ensure 
at least that Christianity was kept on an equal footing with Islam . 
247 Before long, 
however, it would seem that the only way for Christians to maintain a role for themselves 
with respect to the nationalist movement was to somehow demonstrate that a special 
relationship existed between them and Islam. By the end of the 1930s, Christian Arabs 
would be more concerned with trying to define their relationship to Islam than with 
defining a model of Arab identity intrinsically inclusive of non-Muslims (as discussed 
more fully in the fifth chapter). 
Within the Orthodox community, the cracks in Muslim-Christian unity were somewhat 
obscured by the ongoing conflict between the laity and clergy. Since the beginning of the 
Mandate, the conflict had actually escalated, significantly, in a manner that alienated the 
245 Mir'af al-Sharq, 14 May 1924. 
246 Tsirnhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movementl" p. 80. 
247 lbid, p. 80. 
220 
clergy not only from its own lay community, but equally from the broader Arab 
community. From the beginning, the Orthodox clergy had shown little support for Arab 
nationalist aspirations, and indeed, were less concerned with Zionism than with the 
movement for the Arabisation of the Patriarchate. Thus, they had shown themselves to be 
cooperative with the British government right from the start and had opposed Palestinian 
unity with Syria. 24' A few years into the Mandate, in an effort to resolve its financial 
crisis, the Patriarchate began selling church properties to Jews. 249 Not surprisingly, the 
Arab laity took strong issue with this, and in 1922, it expressed its anger by opposing the 
appointment of the Bishop Cleopas as Metropolitan of Nazareth. The following year, the 
first Arab Orthodox Congress was convened in Haifa under the presidency of Iskandar 
Kassab. The Congress demanded the reestablishment of the mixed council that had been 
abandoned at the beginning of the First World War, only now with a clear majority of lay 
members in a proportion of two to one. The council was also to have authority over 
political and economic matters as well as administrative ones. Finally, the Patriarch was 
not to speak on behalf of the Orthodox community except with the expressed permission 
of the mixed council. 250 
The British responded in 1925 with the fon-nation of the Bertram-Young Commission. Its 
report proposed that Arab Orthodox Christians be accepted into the Brotherhood of the 
Holy Sepulchre, and that they be given a greater say in the Patriarchate's financial 
decisions. As vAth the Bertarn-Luke Commission before it, it opposed the taking of a loan 
248 O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 48. 
249 See, for instance, CO 73 3/8, draft reply from Deedes to Churchill, 22 December 192 1. 
2'0 Elie Kedouric, "Religion and Politics: The Diaries of Khalil Sakakini, " Middle Eastern Affairs, 1, St. 
Antony's Papers, 4 (1958), p. 86, footnote 22. Concerning the resolutions passed by the Congress, see 
CO 733/48, attachment to a correspondence from Luke to the Chief Secretary, 3 August 1923. For an 
overview of the Congress, see Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, pp. 80-86; also Derek Hopwood, The 
Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine, 1843-1914, Church and Politics in the Near East (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 203. 
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from a Greek bank. Conversely, it allowed that the Brotherhood should continue to draw 
its membership primarily from Greeks so long as they adopted Palestinian nationality and 
learned Arabic. Moreover, in acknowledgement of the Patriarchate's special relationship 
with the Holy Places, there was no insistence that there be an Arab patriarch or Arab 
hierarchy. 251 In any event, it would be some time before any attempt was made at 
implementing the Commission's recommendations-not until 1938, in fact-and almost 
another twenty years before any of them were ratified. 252 The Orthodox community 
protested strongly against the Commission's recommendations. In particular, they were 
incensed at the Commission's acknowledgement of Greek rights in connection with the 
Patriarchate's function as guardian of the Holy Places. Protests eventually gave way to a 
second congress, held in Ramallah in June of 1926, under the presidency of Isd al-Isa, 
the proprietor of FilaslTn. By now the Orthodox cause was defined almost exclusively in 
nationalist terms. Among the resolutions passed was the demand that an Arab patriarch 
be elected; correspondingly, an insistence that the Arab laity should participate in the 
election . 
253 In November 1927, the Orthodox People's Party was founded, which pledged 
itself "to restore the Arabs' national rights usurped by the Greeks. "254 
While Muslims had always been supportive of the Orthodox laity in their struggle with 
the Greek-dominated clergy, they had nonetheless tended to see it as largely a communal 
matter . 
255The revelation that the clergy had been selling church properties to Jews, 
251 Ibid, p. 204. 
252 Under the Jordanian government. Sir Steven Runciman, The Historic Role ofthe Christian Arabs in 
Palestine, the Second Carreras Arab Lecture of the University ofEssex, 26 November 1968, London: 
Longman for the University of Essex, 1970, pp. 15-16. 
2" Hopwood, The Russian Presence, p. 205. 
254 Filaslin, 16 October 193 1. 
255 See, for instance, CO 733/4, Minutes of the Advisory Council for 14 June 192 1. 
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however, elevated it to one of national concern. Correspondingly, many Muslim 
organisations came out strongly in support of the Orthodox cause. 256 The fact that 
Orthodox Arabs had from the beginning defined their struggle in overtly nationalistic 
terms did much to strengthen this feeling of empathy. Thus, it was one of the more 
important issues discussed at the Sixth Palestinian National Congress, held in June 
1923.257 In this sense, the Orthodox laity's struggle against the clergy did much to assure 
Muslims regarding the loyalty of Orthodox Arabs to the nationalist cause. At the same 
time, not all of the Orthodox laity was opposed to the Patriarchate. 2,58 Many Orthodox 
Arabs reacted to the first Orthodox Congress by forming a rival 'moderate' party, one 
which had the support of the Patriarch, and which, while supporting some of the demands 
made by the Congress-for instance, the recalling of the mixed council-considered the 
matter a communal one and not a nationalist one. 29 Added to this was the fact that from 
the beginning of the Mandate, Orthodox Arabs had adopted a relatively moderate 
position towards the British. Many had been accustomed to Russian support, a support 
suddenly withdrawn following the Bolshevik Revolution; some now looked to Britain to 
fill that role . 
260 It was not entirely unreasonable then if Muslims were not entirely 
convinced regarding Orthodox commitment to the nationalist cause. In any case, 
256 See, for instance, Kisch, Palestine Diary, p. 3 9. Also Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National 
Movement, " p. 83; and Hopwood, The Russian Presence, p. 203. 
257 Hopwood, The Russian Presence, p. 203. 
7' 5" O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians, " p. 28. 
259 See CO 733/139/1, draft report of the Commission on the Controversies in the Orthodox Patriarchate, 
26 June, 1925, produced by Bertram and Young, pp. 11 -19. Overall, their demands were much more 
moderate-thus, for instance, they only insisted on equal lay representation on the mixed council (that is, 
that it should consist of six lay and six ecclesiastical members). CO 733/139/1, draft report of the 
Commission on the Controversies in the Orthodox Patriarchate, 26 June, 1925, produced by Bertram and 
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260 Porath, The Emergence, p. 296. 
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whatever support lent the Orthodox cause by Muslims, it did not necessarily translate into 
a greater role for Christians within the nationalist movement. 
"art from its growing Islamic character, Christian marginalization in the nationalist lp 
movement was also an aspect of its growing militancy. Christian participation in the 
nationalist movement had until then largely manifested itself at the organisational 
level. 261 Christians, for instance, had always been strongly represented at the various 
national congresses. At the first congress-the All-Palestine Congress-held at the 
beginning of 1919 in Jerusalem, 6 of the 27 delegates were Christian. 262 10 Christians 
were present at the Third Palestinian National CongreSS263; and 16 out of a total of 108 
delegates attended the Fifth National Congress. " More telling perhaps was their strong 
representation on the Congresses' Executive Committees. Thus, there were 2 Christians 
out of a total of 9 for the Third Palestinian National Congress; 5 out of 15 for the Fourth 
National Congress; 4 out of 23 for the Fifth National Congress; and 5 out of 31 for the 
Sixth National Congress. " 
Conversely, among the rank-and-file, there were few Christians to be found; certainly 
few had been actively involved in the various riots or the more violent demonstrations 
that had taken place till then. 266 In any case, early on at least, nationalist activity had 
confined itself largely to pefitions, the formation of delegations, and the occasional 
261 Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 78. 
2'52 ISA 7/12-n, secret report by Captain Camp's report to CIETA Headquarters, 15 February 1919. 
263 ISA 7/15 -n, CID report for 4 November 1920; and ISA 7/16-n, CID report for 4 January 192 1. 
2"' Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 3 54, Appendix IX. 
265 Ibid, p. 255, Appendix X. 
266 lbid, pp. 247-248. 
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peaceful demonstration, and had generally avoided extralegal tactics. "' Activities such as 
these were well suited to organisations like the Muslim-Christian Associations and the 
Arab Executive, given their dominance by the notable class. The extent to which the 
MCAs and AE were associated with moderate politics is perhaps best reflected in the 
response received by the Acting Commissioner when he approached one of the MCAs 
out of a concern that, should Arab demands continue to be frustrated, they might "resort 
to other means of attaining their ends, and that a situation might arise containing elements 
of danger to public peace and security. " He was quickly assured by one of its higher- 
ranking members that "even if no change of policy or any material alteration in the 
existing system of Government [were] secured... [t]hey intend[ed] to continue their 
policy of constitutional opposition in the belief that... they [would] eventually convince 
I-Es Majesty's Government of the necessity of meeting at least some of their demands. , 268 
Christian political activism was fully compatible with an approach that emphasised legal 
constitutional means of protest '269 and through their affiliation with the 
MCAs and the 
Arab Executive, Christians were able to feel an equal part of the movement, at least early 
on. The Christian tendency towards moderation was evident from the start of the 
Mandate. In the Arab delegation sent to London in 1921, for example, it was its two 
Christian members-Sh-ibli al-Jarnal and Ibrahim Shamm5s-who took the most 
accommodating position, both with respect to continued British authority and Zionism. 270 
267 Ann Mosely Lesch, "The Palestine Arab Nationalist Movement Under the Mandate, " The Politics of 
Palestinian Alationalism, eds., William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber, and Ann Mosely Lesch (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1973), pp. 19-20; also Johnson, Islam and the Politics ofMeaning, p. 36. 
268 CO 733/48, letter from the High Commissioner to the Duke of Devonshire, 24 August 1923. 
269 See, for instance, CO 733/54, note from Samuel to Ormsby-Gore, 19 July 1923, where Wadr al-Bdstan! 
is characteri sed by a high-ranking Government official as a 'petition writer. ' 
270 ISA 4/343, report by the Director of Public Security to Deedes, [no date]. See also Tsimhoni, The Brifish 
Mandate, p. 276. 
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Shlibl-1 a]-Jarnal, in an interview with the The Moming Posi, for example, agreed to 
limited and controlled Jewish immigration '271 an attitude certainly not shared 
by the 
Muslim delegates, who opposed any compromise with respect to ZioniSM. 272 A 
willingness of Christians to compromise had also been evident with respect to the 
Legislative Council. Though equally active in boycotting the elections, beforehand, it was 
Christians who were most active in trying to reach some kind of accommodation with the 
273 Government. Notable in this respect again were ShIbl! al-Jamal and lbrýdiirn Shammas, 
though not only them. BuRis Shahdda, the editor ofMir& al-Sharq, for instance, argued 
in his paper that participation in the Council did not necessarily equate to an acceptance 
of the Balfour Declaration and that the Arabs might more effectively combat Zionism by 
working through such a political body. 274 The Protestant Sulaym5n Nasif organised a 
group of notables in Haifa (all of them Muslim excepting himselo to discuss the basis for 
reaching an accommodation with the Government. 275 Finally, there was the Orthodox 
clergy, which called on the Orthodox community to participate in the elections. 276 
Following the Council's rejection, Christians would remain among the stronger 
27'Al-Karmil, 10,20 August 1921. 
272 Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 277. 
273 ISA 4/16-n, Storrs to the Assistant Chief Secretary regarding a conversation with al-Jamal, 
26 September 1922; and conversation with Shammas, 23 September 1922. 
274 Mir'51 al-Sharq, 4 September 1922. 
275 ISA 6/19-? ý, Samuel's report on his meeting with Nasif, II February 1923. 
276 Tsimhoni, The British Mandate, p. 280, F. H. Kisch, Palestine Diary, p. 39; also al-Karmil, 24 February, 
29 March 1923. 
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proponents of the establishment of a representative body along the lines of the proposed 
2W legislative council . 
In addition to those factors discussed above, the movement's radicalisation also reflected 
what were broader regional developments, among these, a growing anti-colonialism, 
disillusionment with Western liberalisation, and militarism. In some countries, this saw 
the rise of a grass-roots based Islamic fundamentalism, such as the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt. Palestine was quite exceptional in this respect. While there did exist a rising 
Islamic sentiment, it generally found its expression within the framework of traditional 
notable politics. In Palestine, the British authorities had maintained the traditional elite 
pretty much intact. This in part explains why they were able to maintain control of the 
leadership of the nationalist movement for as long as they did. For most of the Mandate, 
rising Islamic sentiment in Palestine never took the form of Islamic fundamentalism. 
Moreover certain elements within the traditional leadership-Hajj Armn a]-Husayn! in 
particular-proved particularly adept at channelling this sentiment to their own purpose. 
The discrediting of Western liberalism reflected the experience of living under European 
colonial rule. Many Muslims (and some Christians) had become increasingly 
disillusioned with the European powers and the supposed values they represented, and 
many were sceptical that they would ever achieve their independence through an 
adherence to liberal principles, principles increasingly associated with the passive 
acceptance of foreign rule. Not lost on many Arabs were developments in Europe during 
this period-the rise of fascism in Italy and other European nations-which offered an 
alternative form of nationalism, one based not so much on liberal notions of contractual 
government and democracy, but on the glorification of the nation, often at the expense of 
individual rights. It was a nationalism moreover which romanticised the past-for many 
Muslim Arabs, this meant an emphasis of their Islamic heritage and the greatness that 
was Islamic civilisation. Related to this was the growth of militarism and the belief that it 
277 See, for example, Mir'dlal-Sharq, 18 June 1924; also ISA6/20-n, Samuel's minutes on his 
conversation with Nasif, I June 1924. 
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was only through the strength of arms that the Arabs would ever become liberated. For 
many Muslims, the example of Mustafa Kemal in Turkey-first and foremost seen as a 
'Muslim' hero (see above)-lent a great deal of substance to this contention. 
Within this context, the Islamic umma lent itself quite well to fascist notions concerning 
the primacy of the nation. An emphasis on Islam also lent fascist movements a broader 
appeal than they might otherwise have had. As in the rest of the Arab world, fascism had 
its adherents in Palestine; during the 1930s, when, following the rise of Hitler in 
Germany, fascism became more strongly associated with anti-Semitism, its appeal would 
broaden considerably. Thus it was noted by one British official that "[t]he anti-semitic 
character of present day Germany, the pre-war German sympathies of the former 
Ottoman subjects, and a desire to seize upon any opportunity for change, [we]re amongst 
,, 278 the motives. Many young Muslims saw in fascism the best possibility of uniting the 
different Arab countries against colonialism and Zionism. 279 In the end, fascism in 
Palestine never really developed into a significant movement, something attributable to a 
number of factors, not the least being its active suppression by the British administration. 
Unlike the case in Egypt, or even Iraq, the British were more directly involved in 
Palestine's administration, and thus able to stifle such developments. The strong role 
played by the older notable families in Palestinian politics was also a factor, inasmuch as 
they were quick to check the rise of any militant group that might challenge their 
authority. In this sense, the British authorities and the older notable families found 
common cause in maintaining the political status quo. In the short-term, this no doubt had 
a positive effect on Muslim-Christian relations, the nature of which was still largely 
determined through the interaction of their respective political leaders at the level of the 
notable elite. At the same time, it was recognised by Christians that over the long term, 
such an arrangement might do more harm than good with regard to Muslim-Christian 
relations. Thus, in a open letter to the Pope published in his newspaper al-Kannil, NajTb 
278 FO 371/16926, CID Report, dated 30 August 1933. See also Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 76. 
279 See ibid, CID Report, dated 22 September 1933. 
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Nassdr expressed a concern that the good relations between "Muslims and Christians, 
who had lived side by side under Muslim rule for hundreds of years, would not survive a 
,, 280 further twenty years under Christian rule. While the development of more radical and 
militant organisations may have been somewhat checked in Palestine, the underlying 
sentiment remained. Moreover, it was a sentiment that would be increasingly directed 
against the traditional leadership, something that would have negative consequences for 
Christians. 
280AI-Karmil, 12 November 1924. 
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Chapter IV, The World Islamic Conference 
The ascension of Hajj Amin al-Husayn! 
In a manner reminiscent of Sir Herbert Samuel's description of the 'three currents of 
thought' underlying Arab opposition to the British occupation in the 1922 annual survey, ' 
Uri Kupferschmidt speaks of three different orientations underlying how Palestinian 
Arabs defined both their identity and their struggle: a local Palestinian one, a pan-Arabic 
one, and a pan-Islamic one. As he explains, "[t]he three were inextricably interwoven, as 
long as all three could be of assistance to the Arabs of Palestine in attempting to shake off 
the yoke of British rule and to ten-ninate the Jewish National Home policy. "2 I would take 
it one step ftirther, and propose that the local or purely 'Palestinian' orientation was 
largely defined by elements of the latter two, and whether one was a Christian or Muslim 
played a significant role in determining which of these two broader orientations 
predominated. As discussed earlier, Christians were most likely to define the Palestinian 
movement as essentially a secular nationalist one, albeit, one within which Islam had a 
place as part of the Arabs' shared cultural heritage. For the majority of Muslims, the 
emphasis was generally the reverse. The Palestinian movement was first and foremost an 
Islamic one. What was 'Palestinian' about it were the circumstances particular to that 
comer of the Muslim world, and what was most significant about being Palestinian was 
that one's homeland contained the Haram al-Shafff (along with other Islamic holy sites). 
The significance of being Arab was largely determined by the special place allotted them 
with respect to Islam, not the other way around. For the most part, and particularly in the 
face of the larger threat of Zionism, differences of emphasis were generally obscured 
within the context of the local orientation-that is, the Palestinian one, which was largely 
defined by that threat. This was not always the case, however, as circumstances related to 
1 See Introduction. 
2 Uri M. Kupferschmidt, "The General Muslim Congress of 1931 in Jerusalem" in Asian andAfrican 
Studies, 12: 1 (1978: March) 77, pp. 123-125. 
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specific events were often such that Christians and Muslims were no longer able to ignore 
what in the end were fundamentally opposing orientations. One such event was the World 
Islamic Conference, which convened in Jerusalem in 193 1. 
How individuals within the Palestinian leadership chose to define the movement was 
further determined by the power struggle between its two main factions; the moderate 
camp, best represented by the NashashTibi family and the more radical faction represented 
by Hajj Am-in al-Husayff, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and President of the Supreme 
Muslim Council, and his supporters, For the latter, given the religious basis of Hajj 
Am-in's status, accentuation of the 'Islamic' character of what were, after all, issues that 
might just as easily have been defined as essentially nationalist served to strengthen his 
position with respect to this internal rivalry. One such issue was the Wailing Wall 
controversy, which HaJj AmTn immediately tried to characterize as a matter of general 
Muslim concern on the basis of its Islamic significance. 3 More specifically, he sought to 
transform the Palestinian struggle against Zionism into an Islamic one, by demonstrating 
the danger Zionism posed to the Islamic holy sites. 4 
One of the first actions he took following the Wailing Wall disturbances was to invite 
Muslim witnesses from countries other than Palestine to speak before the Wailing Wall 
Commission, which had been sent under the auspices of the League of Nations at 
Britain's request to determine rights and claims in connection with the Wailing Wall. 5 
Likewise, he sought to raise money from Muslim countries for the related Arab victims. 
3 See, for instance, CO 7331195n, letter from Hajj Amin to the High Commissioner, II October 193 1. 
4 Ychoshua Porath, The Palestinian Arab NationalMovement., From Riots to Rebellion, 1929-1939, 
Volume II, (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1977), pp. 6-9. 
5 H. A. R. Gibb, "The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December 193 1" in Survey ofInlemationalAffairs, 
1934, ed., Arnold J. Toynbee (London, Humphrey Milford: Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 100; see 
also FO 371/14489, the Wailing Wall Commission's final report, copy addressed to Henderson, 
24 December 1930. 
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In connection with these activities, Hajj Am-in also began cultivating old and establishing 
new contacts with Muslim representatives throughout the Islamic world, from Cairo to 
India. More importantly, perhaps, was the impact the Islamisation of this issue had in 
Palestine, where his popularity reached new heights. As observed by a British officer in 
the aftermath of the 1931 Islamic Conference, "leaders who fail to rouse the masses on 
political issues may find no difficulty in arousing them by encouraging religious 
susceptibilities, and in order to achieve their ends may either exaggerate any religious 
issue or endeavour to convert a political grievance into a religious one. ý16 
Haii AmTn quickly established himself as the champion of the Haram al-Shaiif Almost 
immediately, he exonerated those who had participated in the disturbances as being 
'rightly guided. ý7 Significantly, Arabs involved in the rioting had been exclusively 
Muslim. 8 The riots clearly had been triggered by the perceived need to defend the Islamic 
holy sites against Jewish incursion, a fact that served to accentuate the religious character 
of the event. At the same time, the incident was characterised as a nationalist one-the 
three Arabs later executed by the British for their involvement in the riots were 
immediately upheld as martyrs to the national cause. For Christian Arabs, this presented a 
dilemma. On the one hand, they were under great pressure to demonstrate their solidarity 
with their Muslim compatriots. On the other hand, many found it difficult to actively 
condone the violence connected with the incident. Given the religiously fanatical tone of 
the riots, the whole incident sat rather uneasily with many Christians. Such fanaticism 
might just as easily be directed against them. Thus, for example, Christians in mixed 
neighbourhoods in Jerusalem had found it necessary to paint red crosses on their doors 
C0733/195/4, extract from 'Political Summary for the Month of February, 193 1, ' concerning 'The 
Walling Wall Question' (original in 87021/3 1). 
7 Pordi, Riot8 to Rebellion, p. 45. 
8 Yehoshua Po"Ith, The Palestinian Arab NationalMovement- The Emergence, 1918-1929, Volume I 
(London: Frank Cass and Company), 1977, p. 303. 
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during the rioting in order to ensure that their homes were spared. 9 Indeed, they were. 
Nonetheless, Muslim chants during the rioting of "Friday... death to the Jews; Saturday, 
death to the Christians... and Sunday, death to the Government officials" must have 
remained somewhat disconcerting. 10 The fact that those found guilty of having taken part 
in the riots faced serious repercussions from the administration was an additional 
inducement for Christian Arabs to distance themselves from the incident, " and in fact, 
there is little evidence of any Christian involvement. In some cases, they had actually 
played an active role in stemming the violence. The city of Acre, for instance, was largely 
spared the worst of it thanks to the actions of the Christian Arab District Officer there. 12 
Most Christians were inclined to disown any involvement in the riots. Typical in this 
respect were Yaý qUb Farraj and Mughannam Hyds Mughannam, who almost immediately 
after the disturbances, made a public expression in favour of moderation during a public 
encounter with high-ranking Zionist figures. 13 At the same time, it behoved them to at 
least demonstrate some degree of support for their Muslim compatriots. While not 
condoning the violence, the Christian press tended to put the onus of blame on the Jews. 14 
Additionally, they stressed the incident's nationalist aspect. During the early part of the 
9 F. H. Kisch, Palestine Diary (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1938), pp. 272- 273. See also Daphne 
Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the Palestinian Arab National Movement during the Formative Stage, " 
in The Palestinians and the Middle East Conflict, An International Conference held at the Institute of 
Middle Eastern Studies, University ofHaifa, April 1976, ed., Gabriel Ben-Dor, (Ramat Gan, Israel, 
Turtledove Publishing, 1978), p. 78. 
10 Kisch, Palestine Diary, p. 273. 
11 Porath, The Emergence, p. 303. 
12 Kisch, Palestine Diary, p. 288. 
13 lbid, p. 314. 
14 See ibid, pp. 251,33 9. 
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Mandate, issues related to the Muslim holy sites had been considered a strictly 'Muslim 
affair, "' and Christians had even taken issue with attempts by Muslim leaders to 
emphasise their importance in connection with the nationalist cause. As the Mandate 
wore on and the nationalist movement took on an increasingly Islamic character, 
however, Christian Arabs began to recognise the need to accommodate this decidedly 
Muslim concern. Articles began to appear in the Christian press explaining why 
Christians should care about the Muslim holy sites on nationalistic grounds. 16 Thus, it 
was pointed out that Islam was an 'Arab' religion, and since the Christians living in 
Palestine were Arabs, they had a duty to respect Islam and preserve its holy places. 17 
With respect to the Wailing Wall disturbances, Christians demonstrated their support first 
and foremost at the organisational level, particularly through those organisafions that 
were neither Muslim nor Christian but representative of Palestine's Arabs as a whole. On 
26 October 1929, a few months after the riots, for instance, a Palestine Women's 
Congress, chaired by Madame Kazim Husayni, the wife of MUsd Kazim al-HusaynT, was 
convened in Jerusalem. In a show of solidarity, it was attended by over two hundred 
Muslim and Christian female delegates. "' In keeping with one of its resolutions, the Arab 
Women's Association of Jerusalem subsequently bought two plots of land in Hebron, 
which were dedicated as a trust to benefit the families of the three men who were 
hanged. 19 Likewise, many of the Muslim-Christian Associations submitted letters 
15 AI-Jamiahal- A rabiýyah, 15 November 1928, referring to an article that appeared in al-Ahfir, also 
al-Karmil, 14 January 1930. 
16 lbid, 14 January 1930; alýJamiah al-'Arabiyyah, 15 November 1928. 
"Al-Kannil, 14 Januaiy 1930. 
18 Mrs. Matiel E. T. Mogannam, The Arab Woman and the Palestine Problem (London: Herbert Joseph 
Limited, 1937), p. 70; also Steuart Erskine, Palestine oftheArabs, pp. 180-181. 
19 Mogannam, The Arab Woman, pp. 56-58. The same organisation later transmitted a telegram to the 
Colonial Secretary protesting the findings of the Commission. The telegram was signed by both its Muslim 
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protesting the findings of the Wailing Wall Commission (see below). 20 Political parties in 
which Christians figured prominently also issued letters of protest. Typical in this respect 
was a letter issued by the Liberal Party, among whose founders were 'Isd al-'Isd, the 
Orthodox proprietor of Filastin, and Hanna Asfu-r, a Christian lawyer based in Haifa. 
Apparently drafted by the latter, the letter ran on at great length-eleven pages in total- 
and spared no superlatives in describing the Hararn al-Shafff s Islamic importance. 21 
Christian support with respect to the riots was also evident in Christian testimonies 
verifying Muslim ownership of the Wailing Wall as an integral part of al-Aqsd Mosque. 
The Supreme Muslim Council later tried to derive as much capital as possible from these 
supposedly unbiased testimonies, complaining in a correspondence following the release 
of the Commission's findings that "[flhe Moslem side [had] procured unbiased witnesses, 
Palestinian Christians as well as foreigners, including Priests, Monks and guides to prove 
that [Jewish claims to the Wailing Wall were unfounded]... [but] the Commission [had] 
paid no heed to such evidence although the majority of these witnesses were impartial 
non-Moslems, Palestinians as well as foreigners. "22No doubt, such avowals were, at least 
in part, genuine. On the other hand, such testimonies were generally elicited, and it is 
hard to imagine, given the circumstances, how a Christian Arab might actually decline 
President and its Christian Secretary. see con33119515, telegram from the Arab Women's Association to 
the Colonial Secretary, 22 June 193 1. 
20 See for example, CO 7331195n, letters of protest addressed to the High Commissioner from the Muslim- 
Christian Associations of Nablus and Jaffa, II June and 4 July 1931 respectively. 
21 lbid, letter from the Liberal Party, signed by the 'Standing Committee, ' and apparently drafled by Hanna 
Asfur, to the High Commissioner, 15 June 193 1. 
22 lbid, correspondence from Haj Amin to Wauchope, II October 193 1; also Fihisfin, 30 October 1929. 
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such an invitation regardless of any personal views he might hold to the contrary; indeed, 
the Commission was somewhat sceptical concerning Christian support. 23 
Perhaps more significant than the actual riots with respect to Muslim-Christian relations 
was the broader political shift following them, something not brought about solely by 
their occurrence, but no doubt intensified by them. The national movement was taking on 
an increasingly Islamic (and correspondingly, radical) colour, something of which Hajj 
Am7in was quick to take advantage. Within a month of the nots, he had established a 
Central Relief Committee to provide for the financial needs of the family members of 
those Arabs that had been injured or arrested. Significantly, the Committee was 
established outside the framework of the Arab Executive, and was under his direct 
contro 1.24 In an effort to turn the disturbances into an Islamic issue of regional 
significance, he began appealing to Muslim organisations in other countries. Among 
these was the Muslim Indian Congress, which in an act of solidarity, designated the 
16'h of May 'Palestine Day. '25 The Arab Executive, still dominated by the more moderate 
faction, responded as well, convening a countrywide meeting at the end of October. Its 
response, however, came across as relatively tentative and uninspired. Hajj Amlin had 
taken the initiative in responding to the situafion, and from that point on, a good deal of 
the activity of the Arab Executive resembled more a feeble attempt at keeping pace than 
anything else. The High Commissioner expressed the dilemma well when he noted that 
the chief weakness of the Opposition lay "in the power of the mufti to raise some 
23 FO 371/14489, The Wailing Wall Commission's final report, copy addressed to Henderson, 
24 December 1930. 
24 Porath, Riols to Rebellion, p. 3. 
25 lbid, p. 38. 
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religious cry, which in time of unrest might sweep the country and compel his present 
opponents to follow his banner. "26 
At the same time, Hajj AmTn was operating under some very real constraints. Even his 
control of the Supreme Muslim Council was not absolute, as evidenced by the election of 
an Opposition candidate to its board in October 1930, following the death of one of its 
members. 27 Additionally, moderation had not yet fallen completely out of favour; a fair 
portion of the Palestinian Arab leadership were still hopeful of arriving at some kind of 
equitable compromise with the British regarding Zionism. 28 Finally, there was the fact 
that, as noted above, Hajj Am-in's positions as President of the Supreme Muslim Council 
and as Grand Mufti were effectively government posts, and were therefore largely 
dependent on British support. This last factor was a particularly powerful constraint, 
given that any attempt to directly challenge the Opposition for the leadership of 
Palestine's Arabs would have meant the unequivocal adoption of a more radical stance 
(as a counterpoint to their more moderate one), and would thus have required him to 
openly confront the Palestine Government. For the time being, Hajj Am-in and the 
Opposition-dominated Arab Executive made a show of unity. Neither was in a position to 
dominate the Palestinian Arab leadership. Nonetheless, the latter was clearly becoming 
weaker. 29 Moreover, it was fast splintering. In the aftermath of the Wailing Wall riots, 
many of the members of the Opposition had begun forming their own parties, a process 
26 See FO 371/16009, secret correspondence from Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 30 January 1932; also 
Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p 49; and Uri M. Kupferschmidt, The Supreme Muslim Council. - Islam under the 
British Mandatefor Palestine (Leiden; New York: E. J. Brill, 1987), p. 45. 
27 Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p 55. 
28 See ibid, pp. 22-23. 
29 The Arab Executive was also running into financial difficulties, and even had, at one point, to borrow 
money from the aforementioned Central Relief Committee, a body largely under the Hajj Amin's control. 
See ibid, p. 136. 
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which would accelerate rapidly over the coming years. Most of these parties took a 
moderate position with respect to the issues of the day, and in some cases, even 
demonstrated a willingness to compromise with the Je'Arish Agency and the British 
administration. 30 Unable to form a united front on account of personal divisions, the 
Opposition would provide little effective opposition to Hajj AmTn al-Husayn-i. 31 
Christians continued to affiliate with the Opposition through the newly formed political 
parties. This was particularly true in the Galilee, where many Christians resided, and 
where many of these parties were based. Most Christians continued to favour moderation, 
as it was considered that the adoption of a more radical platform-particularly one under 
the leadership of Hajj Amin al-Husayn-i-would most likely result in further religious 
agitation. 32 At the same time, many Christians could see which way the wind was 
blowing and recognised what was a certain inevitability with respect to the radicalisation 
of the nationalist movement, likewise its Islamisation. Many Christians still hoped to 
channel these developments in a manner that would not see them completely 
marginalized. One way of doing this was to define Palestine's Islamic significance as 
something ýpart from the nationalist movement; likewise to ensure that Hajj Am-in al- 
Husayn! was not able to utilise such a characterisation for bringing the movement under 
his control. The aforementioned letter from the Liberal Party, for instance, was 
particularly critical of the fact that 
the persons who represented the Moslems of the world before [the Wailing 
Wall Commission], appeared on behalf of the Supreme Moslem Council 
of Palestine only [which] did not hold any powers of representation from 
the Moslem Kings and Princes and consequently should not have been 
30 See, for instance, ibid, pp. 50-52. 
31 See, for instance, CO 7331195n, correspondence from the High Commissioner's office to Cunliffe- 
Lister, 19 November 193 1. 
32 See, for instance, al-Karm il, 10 June 1928. 
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regarded by the Commission to have represented the whole of the Moslem 
world. 33 
Christians likewise maintained that, analogous to Palestine's worldwide Islamic 
significance was its worldwide Christian significance. 34 Arguably, Christians hoped in 
this way to maintain for themselves a role in the nationalist movement in spite of its 
Islamisation. Thus, for instance, many called for an Islamic-Catholic alliance against 
Zionism. In one lengthy editorial, al-Karmil called on Hajj Am-in al-Husayn! to seek out 
an alliance with the Vatican. " The belief that such an alliance was possible was not 
entirely without basis, as indeed the Vatican had often expressed its concem about 
Zionism. 36 Additionally, it had shown sympathy regarding Muslim interests in Palestine, 
expressing on a number of occasions a preference that Palestine should remain under 
Muslim control rather than fall into Jewish hands. 37 In some cases, the proposed alliance 
was set out as one directed against Zionism and Protestantism (thus touching on the 
strong hostility many Muslims felt towards missionary activity). 38 In other cases, 
Protestant Britain was called upon to wake up and reject ZioniSM. 39 
33 CO 733/195/7, letter from the Liberal Party, signed by the 'Standing Committee, ' and apparently drafted 
by Hanna Asfur, to the High Commissioner, 15 June 193 1. 
34 Al-Karmil, 3 October 1929. 
35 lbid, 26 October 1929; see also ibid, II March 1928. 
36 See the second chapter. 
" Sergio I. Minerbi, The Vatican and Zionism, Conflict in the Holy Land 1895-1925 (New York, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 2 1. 
38AI-Karmil, 26 October 1929. 
39 See also ibid, 21 September 1929; Fildstin, 18 June 1936. 
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Shortly after the Wailing Wall riots, Hajj AmIn, approached one of the members of the 
Muslim Indian Congress, Shawkat'Ali, about the possibility of establishing a worldwide 
Muslim organization in defence of Palestine and its Islamic holy places. Shawkat'Ali, as 
a leading member (and later President) of the Indian Muslim Khalifat Committee-an 
organization which sought the restoration of the caliphate in the Muslim Worl&ý-was 
quite willing to cooperate in such an endeavour. 41 FEs organization sought to promote 
pan-Islamism, and had as early asý 1929, begun promoting the idea of creating a 'Supreme 
Islamic Council' in Jerusalem composed of representatives from the various Muslim 
countries . 
42 For 'Ali, the conference would serve as a venue for promoting pan-Islamism 
and revitalising the caliphate; for Haj Amin, it would serve as a means of drawing 
attention to the threat posed by Zionism to Jerusalem's Muslim holy sites. 
Moderation in trouble 
Beginning in April 1930, special one-judge courts established in Palestine by the British 
began pronouncing judgment on those charged in relation to the Wailing Wall riots-of 
the 27 sentenced to death, 26 were Arab, all of them MUSliM. 43 In the end, only three 
Arabs were hanged, on 17 June 1930.44 A general strike was called for by the Arab 
40 See Kupferschmidt, "The General Muslim Congress of 193 1, " p. 130. 
41 Concerning the long-standing relationship between the Supreme Muslim Council and the Indian Muslim 
Khalifat Committee, see CO 733/49, dispatch from Samuel to the Colonial Office, 23 September 1923; also 
a telegram sent from Samuel to the Colonial Secretary, 26 September 1923, and an 'urgent memo' to 
Downing Street from the Under Secretary of State for the India Office, I October 1923. See also 
Kupferschmidt, "The General Muslim Congress of 193 1, pp. 128-129. 
42 FO 371/16009, police report on the 1931 Islamic Conference, attached to correspondence from 
Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 24 December 193 1; also FO 371/15332, 'Note of Interview of Shawkat Ali, 
10 February 193 1, ' enclosure to confidential dispatch, 14 February 193 1. 
41 Porath, Riots to Rebellion, pp. 4-5. 
44 See FO 371/14489, telegram from the High Commissioner, to the Colonial Secretary, 18 June 1930. 
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Executive, to be held two days prior as a gesture of protest. 45 The Arab Executive's 
leadership of the nationalist movement was being challenged by more radical elements, 
and it was finding itself increasingly under pressure to adopt a more confrontational 
stance towards the Govemment. 46 At the same time, the traditional elite was hesitant to 
take any action that mightjeopardise its own commercial interests, and thus found itself 
incapable of adopting more extremist tactics, even on a modest scale. 
On 20 October 193 0, the British Cabinet under Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald 
submitted to Parl iament a draft of the Passfield White Paper, 47 prepared by the Colonial 
Office, outlining proposed Government policy on Palestine. Published the next day, it 
called for a legislative council along the lines proposed in 1922. It also called for a 
stronger line against Jewish immigration and Jewish land purchases. The more moderate 
Opposition received the Passfield White Paper well, particularly the passage concerning 
48 the proposed legislative council . While not explicitly abrogating the Balfour 
Declaration, its terms held the promise of ensuring Zionism's failure. Hajj Amin a]- 
Husayn-i and his faction were less sanguine, and, particularly as expressed in al-J'ami ah 
al-Arabiyyah, were extremely critical of the White Paper. At the same time, in deference 
to the fact that overall Arab opinion was favourable (if not enthusiastically so), they 
stopped short of rejecting it out of hand. 49 Jewish reaction, by contrast, was bitter and 
furious-they saw the White Paper as a complete betrayal of the Balfour Declaration, and 
45 lbid, reference to telegram No. 178 in Colonial Office internal memorandum, 16 June 1930. 
46 See, for instance, CO 733/204)2, correspondence entitled 'Arab Incitement, ' circa mid-1931, 
47 Named after the Colonial Secretary at die time, Lord Passfield. 
48 Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 3 1. 
49 See, for instance, CO 733/182/8, telegram from Wauchope to Lord Passfield, 4 November 1930. For the 
overall Arab press reaction, see ibid, 'Palestine Arabic Press Summary No. 57 for the week ending 25h 
October 1930. ' 
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the British Government was soon flooded with letters of protest from Jewish 
organizations from around the world. 50 In response, on 13 February 193 1, Prime Minister 
MacDonald issued his famous letter to Chaim Weizmann, 'reinterpreting' the prmciples 
of the White Paper in such a way as to nullify any impact they might actually have had on 
the Zionist enterprise. " This spelled the beginning of the end for the moderates-the 
'black letter' as it was dubbed lent weight to those arguing for the adoption of a more 
militant stance against the British, and discredited the Arab Executive's efforts at a 
negotiated settlement. 52 
Shortly after the release of the MacDonald Letter, the Arab Executive published a 
'Declaration of the Noble Arab Nation. ' In it, they expressed their utter disillusionment 
with the British government and their conviction that further cooperation with the British 
Government was useless. Among those signing the declaration were Ya'qfa-b Farraj and 
Mughannam Eyas Mughannam. 53 On 2 March, a meeting was convened over how best to 
respond to the MacDonald Letter. Some members called for a policy of civil 
disobedience and non-cooperation with the Government. Others suggested that reaction 
be limited to a political and economic boycott of the Jews. 54 Christians figured 
prominently among the latter, the most notable among them being 'Isd al-'Isd, the 
proprietor of Filastin. in the end, neither proposal was carried out; once again, the Arab 
Executive had proven incapable of taking decisive action. 
50 See Walter Laqueur, A History ofZionism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), p. 492. 
" Concerning the fact that the letter represented official policy as such, see CO 733/197/lD, in particular, 
'Extract from the Official Report of 12dFebruary 193 1'; also Laqueur, A History ofZionism, p. 493. 
52 See Ann Mosely Lesch, Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917-1939: the Frustration ofa NationalMovement 
(Ithaca and London, Comell University Press, 1979), p. 104. 
53 ISA, AE, 1022, Salim Salamah, Secretary of Ramallah MCA to the AE, on the Legislative Council. 
54 See Porath, Riots to Rebellion, pp. 34-35. 
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It was around, this time that the idea of holding a World Islamic Conference in Jerusalem 
began to take on definite shape. Earlier, Hajj Amin had gotten in contact with Shawkat 
'Ali, who in January had become the head of the Indian Muslim Khalifat Committee. 
After some discussion, it was agreed that the two would act as co-sponsors for the 
proposed conference . 
55 A short time prior, the Wailing Wall Commission had released its 
56 report on the Wailing Wall disturbances. The Commission's report proposed a 
compromise, with Muslim ownership of the Wailing Wall being retained, but the right of 
Jews to worship there guaranteed. The Zionists accepted the Commission's findings; the 
Palestinian Arabs, following the lead of Hajj Amin, did not. In spite of the opposition 
expressed by the Arabs, the Palestine Government chose to uphold the findings of the 
Commission. One last attempt at presenting a unified front was initiated by the Arab 
Executive; true to form, they responded by initiating a writing campaign appealing to 
Arab leaders outside of Palestine to intervene on their behalf Not surprisingly, many 
found the Arab Executive's response wanting, and were beginning to lose patience with 
its continued refusal to adopt a more hard-line position. Towards the end of 193 1, the 
Arab Executive's situation would deteriorate further. A report prepared by the Director of 
Development, Lewis French, in connection with a government sponsored development 
plan, indicated among other things that a number of prominent members of the Arab 
Executive had been involved in land transactions with Jews. While members of the 
Supreme Muslim Council were also indicted, the report nevertheless proved more 
damaging to the Arab Executive on account of its moderate PolifiCS. 57 
55 See Kupferschmidt, "The General Muslim Congress of 193 1, " p. 130; and R. M. Coury, "Egyptians in 
Jerusalem: Their Role in the General Islamic Conference of 193 1" inMuslim World, 82i-ii (1992), p. 37 
CO 733/195/5, telegram from the High Commissioner, to the Colonial Secretary, 16 June 193 1. 
37 Porath, Riots to Rebellion, 39-40. 
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The World Islamic Conference 
At the end of July 1931 Hajj Anuh began sending out official invitations for the World 
Islamic Conference scheduled for that fall in Jerusalem. 58 Twice deferred, the starting 
date was eventually set for 7 December, the anniversary of the Night Journey of the 
Prophet to Jerusalem. While the financial burden of the Conference would, for the most 
part, be bom by Shawkat'Ali and his organization, the Indian Muslim Khalifat 
Committee, its organisation was largely left in the hands of HaJj AmTh. With Hajj Arn-in 
serving as president of the preparatory council, the Conference quickly evolved into his 
own personal project. 
The Conference opened with 130 delegates in attendance, representative of almost all the 
Muslim countries, the only notable exceptions being Saudi Arabia and Turkey. 59 The 
latter was particularly sensitive to the question of revitalising the caliphate. The most 
60 
viable candidate for caliph was the deposed Ottoman caliph 'Abdulmeclid, the 
reinstatement of whom, needless to say, would have proved problematic for the recently 
secularised Turkish state. Interestingly, the Turkish Minister of Justice characterised the 
caliphate as "a kind of Muslim imperialism" that had until then only "promoted hatred 
amongst peopleS. "61 The Turkish government was also concerned about the overall 
political character of the Conference, which it viewed as running Contrary to the 
principles upon which newly established Turkish Republic was founded, principles that 
5" Gibb, "The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December 193 1, - p. 10 1, from Statement by the Mufti, 
published in The Times, 27 November 193 1. 
59 For a breakdown of the numbers attending by country, see Thomas Mayer, "Egypt and the General 
Islamic Conference in Jerusalem in 193 1" in Middle Eastem Sludies (July 1982), p. 316. 
60 See chapter eleven, 'In Defense of Jerusalem, ' in Martin Kramer, Islam Assembled (New York, 1986). 
61 OrienteModemo, December 193 1, p. 579, from Tarkische Post, 24 November 193 1. 
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were decidedly secular. 62 In an official statement issued by the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, it was noted that Turkey was "opposed to any internal or external policy which 
makes use of religion as a political instrument. ýiO Finally, scepticism was expressed 
concerning Hajj Anifin's motives. The aforementioned Turkish Minister of Justice noted 
that "the Mufti of Jerusalem, who today was organising the 'Congress of the Caliphate' 
had yesterday worked against Turkey, for the union of the Arabs, not that of the 
MuSliMS. i)64 
Turkey was not the only country concerned about the issue of the caliphate, likewise the 
Conference's overall political character, and Hajj Arffn found it necessary, prior to the 
Conference's commencement, to provide assurances to several of the Arab countries. 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt proved the most difficult in this respect. The former, as noted, 
ended up not sending any representative at all to the Conference .0 The latter did, but 
only after being paid a personal visit by Hajj AmIn. Egyptian reticence reflected in large 
part the fact that the Egyptian King, Fu'dd, had pretensions of his own to the caliphate. 66 
Al-Azhar University in Cairo took the official government position, and denounced any 
attempt to raise the caliphate question at the upcoming Conference, 67 though arguably, it 
was more concerned with the proposal to establish an Islamic University in Jerusalem, 
62 Ibid, December 193 1, pp. 579-580. 
61 Ibid, December 193 1, p. 580. See also Gibb, "The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December 193 1, " p. 
102. 
64 OrienteModemo, December 193 1, p. 579, from Tifrksche Post, 24 November 193 1. 
6' [bid, December 193 1, p. 590, from al-Ahrdm, 23 November 193 1. See also Kramer, Islam Assembled, 
p. 129. 
66 See Mayer, "Egypt and the General Islamic Conference, " p. 312. 
67 OrienteModemo, November 193 l, p. 527, from al-Ahram, 3 November 193 1. See also Mayer, "Egypt 
and the General Islamic Conference, " p. 313. 
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one which might conceivably threaten its own status as the most prestigious university in 
the Islamic world . 
68 Hajj AmTh assured King Fu'dd and official Egyptian circles that the 
Conference would not promote the caliphate; likewise, that the planned Islamic 
University did not seek to challenge the pre-eminence of al-Azhar. 69 
The British were equally reluctant to see the subject of the caliphate taken up at the 
conference, and it was indicated that under no circumstances would the former Ottoman 
caliph, 'Abdulmec7ld, be permitted to enter Palestine. 70 The British were concerned in fact 
that any political issue should be taken up, and prior to the Conference, the Iligh 
Commissioner, Sir Arthur Wauchope, met with HaJ Am-in and received assurances that 
there would be no discussion of political questions, neither concerning the caliphate nor 
Italian policy in Libya 71 and that the conference would be strictly religious in nature. 72 
As it turned out, HaJ Amin made no effort to inform any of the participants that such 
assurances had been given; in fact, he barely acknowledged that such discussions had 
even taken place. As a result, political questions were very much on the agenda, not only 
68 Ibid. Shawkat 'Ali, in elaborating his program for the restoration of the caliphate, had called for the 
establishment of an Islamic university in Jerusalem, as in his opinion, al-Azhar had lost its religious zeal. 
See Kupferschmidt, "The General Muslim Congress of 193 1, " p. 130. 
69 Oriente Moderno, November 193 1, p. 529, from al-Ahram, 6 November 193 1. See also Kramer, Islam 
Assembled, p. 128. 
70 See FO 371/15283, exchange between the Foreign Office and the High Commissioner on the question of 
admitting the ex-caliph into Palestine, 23 and 20 November 193 1. 
" Concerning the Italians in Libya, see FO 371/15282, correspondence from Rendel to Williams, 
17 November 193 1; also ibid, correspondence from the Italian ambassador to the British Foreign Office, 17 
November 193 1. 
72 Gibb, "The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December 193 1, " p. 103; also OrienteModerno, December 
193 1, p. 579, from al-Ahram, 29 November 193 1. 
246 
concerning Palestine, but with respect to the entire region . 
73 The British nonetheless 
found it difficult to bring themselves to interfere in what was, in principle at least, a 
religious affair, for fear of rousing Muslim sensibilities. 74 
Almost immediately after the Conference had commenced, it was apparent that the two 
men responsible for it, Hajj Am-in and Shawkat'Ali, had very different agendas. The 
former wanted to focus strictly on Palestinian issues, issues not coincidentally that would 
strengthen his own political position within Palestine. These included issues related to the 
Wailing Wall and the promotion of an Islamic University in Jerusalem. Shawkat'Ali, on 
the other hand, was more concerned with reviving the Islamic caliphate as a basis for 
Pan-Islamic solidarity. Both spoke the language of pan-Islamism; the difference was that, 
whereas the former saw in pan-Islamism a utility, both in drawing attention to the 
Palestinian struggle and in enhancing his own political status, the latter saw it as an end 
in itself In any case, that the Conference was first and foremost an 'Islamic' affair- 
whatever the nationalist aspect of any particular issue raised-was something recognised 
from the start. Thus Alfred Nielsen, writing about the conference a year later in the 
journal Moslem World, defined it as a'modem expression of pan-Islamism. 975 In Egypt, 
press supportive of the Islamic Conference characterized it as an Islamic rather than a 
nationalistic event, 76 and H. A. R. Gibb writing about the same time, noted that he saw in 
73 Kramer, Islam Assembled, pp. 134-35. See also Gibb, "The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December 
193 1, " p. 105, footnote 1, from Orienle Modemo, January 1932, p. 42. 
7' Kramer, Islam Assembled, pp. 126,135. See also CO 732/47/6, Colonial Office internal memorandum, 
8 September 193 1. 
7' Alfred Nielsen, "The International Islamic Conference at Jerusalem"in Moslem World, 22(1932), p. 341. 
Nielsen's article appeared almost immediately after the Conference and in many respects, resembles a 
journalistic account of the event. Much of the information provided was, in fact, taken from the newspaper 
Fildslin. 
'6 Mayer, "Egypt and the General Islamic Conference, " p. 319. 
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the Conference evidence of a developing 'organizational aptitude' in Islam. 77 This may 
seem a case of overstating the obvious, but given that most of the issues raised at the 
conference could very easily have been defined in nationalistic terms, it is a point which 
bears emphasising. 
The Conference appealed to the Muslim world for unity. Not a single speaker failed to 
stress the importance of this at the inauguration ceremonies. 
78 Muhammad RashYid RTda 
called for the unification of the different schools of law in Islam, 
79 and the Conference 
adopted a recommendation that new branches of the Young Men's Muslim Associations 
(or YMMAs) be established throughout the Muslim world to act as the vanguard of a 
cultural anny. "O Most significant with respect to the pan-Islamic character of the 
conference was the proposed al-Aqsd Mosque University. As one of the Iranian 
representatives noted, the university was to be called 'Muslim' and not 'Arab' and that 
therefore, "any national distinction in connection with it should be avoided. "81 Shawkat 
'Ali, in arguing for the study of languages other than Arabic, likewise emphasised its 
Islamic character-it was to be a university for all Muslims, not just those from the Arab 
countries. 82 
77 Kramer, Islam Assembled, p. 135. 
78 Kupferselunidt, "The General Muslim Congress of 193 1, " p. 148. 
'9 Al-Amiah al-'Arahtýyah, 7,10,14 and 16 December 1931; also Kupferschmidt, "The General Muslim 
Congress of 193 1, " p. 14 
80 FO 371/16009, police report on the 1931 Islamic Conference, 24 December 193 1; also al-J&niah al- 
'Arabiyyah, II December 193 1. 
8' Oriente Moderno, January 1932, p. 30, from Fildstin, 6-18 December 193 1. 
82 Ibid. 
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At the same time, the conference was very much about Palestine. Most importantly, it 
defined the Palestinian cause as an Islamic one. In the days leading up to the Conference, 
Hajj Am-in al-Husayn! claimed that the Zionists sought through propaganda to cause the 
Conference to fail in order to "separate the Palestinian question from Muslim questions 
and to convince the West that the Palestinians are alone in defending their holy sites, 
when in fact they are supported by Islam and the Arabs. "83 The linking of the Palestinian 
cause with Islam was further evident in the choice of the opening-day for the 
Conference-the 27th of Raj ab, commemorating the Night Journey of the Prophet, when 
he ascended to heaven from the Temple Mount. In his speech opening the conference, 
Hajj Anun noted that "it was in view of the religious position of Palestine and of the 
Mosque of Omar [that] the Congress was arranged. 1784 One British official commented 
that "the attention of the Congress was directed almost exclusively to Moslem affairs in 
Palestine, "" but indeed, it might be said that Palestine had itself become a Muslim affair. 
During the Conference, the Mufti emphasized with great regularity the need of the 
Muslim world to unite behind the Palestinian cause-specifically, the need to preserve 
the Arab-Islamic character of Palestine. 86 The focus of the Conference on the Palestinian 
cause, moreover its characterization as an Islamic cause, was clear even to outsiders. 
Thus, Nielsen in his account noted that "[t]he third international Islamic conference owed 
its origin to the Zionist movement ... 
if all Moslems would take up the case as their own 
and protest, Great Britain might choose a Palestinian policy that would be less an 
83 OrienteModemo, November 193 1, p. 529, from al-Ahram, 6 November 1931. 
84 FO 371/16009, police report on the 1931 Islamic Conference, 24 December 193 1. 
85 Ibid, handwritten secret cover memorandum from the Colonial Office (No. 98036/32), dated 12 February 
1932, concerning the police report on the Islamic Conference. 
86 OrienteModemo, January 1932, p. 25, from Filfislin, 7 December 193 1. See also al-Ji2miah al- 
Arabiyyah, 12 June 1931 and al-Karmil, 24 June 193 1; also Kramer, Islam Assembled, p. 123. 
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irritation to Moslems in India, Egypt and Mesopotamia. " 87 The Muslim holy sites in 
Jerusalem were the subject of what was probably the most important of the eight sub- 
committees of the conference-, 88 as if to emphasize its regional significance, the chairman 
was not even a Palestinian, but rather the former Egyptian Minister of Waqfs, 
Muhammad 'Ali Pasha. It was in connection to the holy sites that the uniquely 
Palestinian problem of Zionism was given an Islamic context-namely that it posed a 
threat to the Islamic integrity of the third holiest city in Islam. In his opening speech, Hajj 
AmTh noted that in "comparison to other Islamic territories, Palestine, this Holy Land 
which called for the Congress ... suffered most 
by reason of the establishment of the 
Jewish National Home. On this account and in view of the religious position of Palestine 
and of the Mosque of Omar, the Congress was arranged. "89 As one participant at the 
Conference put it, had it not been for the Mandate and by extension, Britain's support for 
the Zionism, the Jews would never have even dared to try to appropriate the Wailing 
Wall. The general feeling expressed at the Conference, moreover, was that the Jews 
would not stop there. Eventually they would seek to appropriate the entire complex of the 
Haram al-Shadf. 90 
The Islam-Palestine connection was further emphasised by the decision to have the 
names of rulers and notables who contributed funds for the implementation of congress 
resolutions placed on special boards, to be hung inside al-Aqsd Mosque; 91 likewise, in the 
87 Alfred Nielsen, "The International Islamic Conference, " pp. 341-42. 
8" Concerning the subjects of the eight sub-committees, see Gibb, "The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in 
December 193 1, " p. 105. 
89 FO 371/16009, police report on the 1931 Islamic Conference, 24 December 193 1. 
90 The general view being that they intended to rebuild the Jewish temple on the sight of the Haram al- 
Sharif See ibid. 
91 Kupferschmidt, "The General Muslim Congress of 193 1, " p. 152. 
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proposed university, which sought to promote Jerusalem as a regional centre of Islamic 
leaming, while simultaneous countering the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and thus 
92 
addressing the Zionist challenge . 
In this sense, the proposed university was strongly 
symbolic of the link forged at the Conference between pan-Islamism and the Palestinian 
cause. Finally, it was evidenced in the decision taken that future conferences should be 
held in Jerusalem on a permanent basis. As noted by RashTid Rida, the Conference "had 
been convened specifically in defence of Palestine, and so should always be held in 
Jerusalem. "93 That the cause of Palestine was now an Islamic one was clearly evident. As 
one British official noted, "[the] aim [of the Conference was] to show to the Zionists a 
united Muslim front, and to make Muslims all over the world notice the injustice being 
done to their Palestinian. co-religioni StS. 704 
Arab nationalism subsumed 
Alongside the World Islamic Conference, a gathering was held on 16 December 193 1, 
around the theme of Arab nationalism at the home of'Awn! 'Abd al-Hadi. 95 Attending it 
were the Arab participants from the Conference, all of whom signed a pact-'The 
Manifesto to the Arab World'-calling for Arab unity and the full independence of the 
Arab countries. 96 The gathering was intentionally organised as something apart from the 
92 lbid, p. 145. 
93 AIJdmiah al- Arabijý, ý, 15,18 December, 193 1. 
94 Nielsen, "The International Islamic Conference, " p. 354, quoting from an article appearing at the time in 
a journal called Near East-uncited. 
95 The 'gathering' was essentially a party given by the Palestinian lawyer, 'Awn! 'Abd al-1-15dT, to about 
forty guests, and only later became known as the 'Arab Conference. ' See Mayer, "Egypt and the General 
Islamic Conference, " p. 3 18. 
96 See Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 124; also Gibb, "The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December 
193 1, " p. 107; Nielsen, "The International Islamic Conference, " p. 348, see al-Karmil, 27 January 1932, for 
text of the manifesto. 
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Islamic Conference in order to avoid the latter assuming the appearance of a pan-Arab as 
opposed to a pan-Islamic event. 97 At the same time, though on the face of it 
representative of what would appear to be strictly Arab nationalist demands, there was no 
question of its affiliation with the Conference. In many respects, the relationship between 
the two was illustrative of that between Arab nationalism and pan-Islamism, at least from 
the perspective of most Muslims. Arab nationalist issues were but one component of a 
much broader Islamic agenda, and the problems of the Arabs were inherently those of the 
broader worldwide Muslim community. Of course, this dovetailed quite nicely with the 
salafi model of Arab identity favoured by most Muslims. Though the pan-Arab gathering 
received hardly any publicity, its manifesto would provide the inspiration for more 
extremist nationalist organisations and political parties, the most notable being the Istiqlal 
Party (formed under'Awni'Abd al-Had7i). 98 The Istiql5l Party in particular would appeal 
strongly to those disaffected with the traditional leadership, and would come to constitute 
an important factor in Palestinian Arab politics. 
Arab nationalists attending the World Islamic Conference were not entirely unaware of 
the need to maintain at least some distinction between purely Islamic issues and those 
that might be qualified as Arab nationalist, and thus of importance to non-Muslims. More 
specifically, there was a concern that the Conference should not have a negative impact 
on Muslim-Christian relations. Thus, for instance, Hajj Amin was more than a little 
alarmed when the Iranian ex-Prime Minister, Ziya a]-D-in al-Tabataba'!, while speaking 
before the other delegates, defined the purpose of the Conference as being to combat the 
'Christian' Government in Palestine that discriminated in favour of the local Christians. 
Hajj Amlin Was genuinely concerned that the Conference should not alienate Palestine's 
97 Gibb, "The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December 193 1, " p. 107; also Kupferschmidt, "The 
General Muslim Congress of 193 1, " p. 14 1. 
98 Five of the Manifesto's signatories, in fact, were among the founding members of the IstiqUil Party. See 
Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 124; also Kupferschmidt, "The General Muslim Congress of 193 1, " pp. 155- 
56. 
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Christian Arabs. 99 His cosponsor, Shawkat'Ali, seemed sensitive to this concern as well, 
and took great pains to emphasise the positive reception he received from the local 
Christians whenever visiting Palestine. Referring to a trip he had made to Jerusalem just a 
few months prior to the Conference, he noted that 
[w]hile coming this morning on the train I was recognised on the journey 
by some Christian Arab brothers and they all complained to me of not 
informing them of my arrival so that the whole town would have come to 
welcome me... They showered on me hospitality which was genuine Arab 
hospitality. "' 00 
Nonetheless, the theme of 'Christian favouritism'-that is, that the mandate governments 
were discriminating against Muslims in favour of local Christians-was not one so easily 
stifled. Thus for instance, a Syrian participant, when complaining about French 
interference with Muslim preachers and Muslim waqfs, could not resist noting that 
Christians did not suffer the same treatment. 'O' 
What impact the conference might have on Muslim-Christian relations was not only a 
concern in Palestine. Other Arab countries had relatively large Christian minorities, most 
notably Egypt. Thus, the Egyptian delegate 'Abd al-Rahm5n 'Azzam, in a speech given 
as part of the opening ceremonies, greeted the participants on behalf of Egypt's Muslims 
and Christians, noting that the latter were equally supportive of the Conference and that 
they stood to benefit as much as Muslims from its success. 102 The impact of the 
99 ZA, S/25,4142, Kalvarisky to Arlosoroff, on a talk with al-Tabataba'i.. 
'00 From a statement made be Shawkat'Ali appearing in Rh5sfin. See CO 732147/6, collection of speeches 
and statements made by 'A] i, collected by Arlosoroff, and addressed to Brodetsky, 3 October 193 1. 
101 OrienteModemo, January 1932, p. 39, from Filtisfin, 6-18 December 193 1. 
102 Coury, "Egyptians in Jerusalem, " p. 42. 
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Conference on Muslim-Christian relations was of general concern to all the Egyptian 
delegates, who feared that a manifestation of unity which took on too Islamic a colouring 
could fan the flames of sectarianism back home. It was this concern in part that had 
motivated the Wafdist al-Nuqrash-i not to attend the Islamic Conference at all. 'O' For 
Egypt, this would remain an important consideration, particularly with respect to the 
Palestinian cause. 104 Even years later, when speaking on British policy in Palestine, the 
Egyptian nationalist al-Nahh5s took great pains to express his objections on three 
different bases-as an Arab, as a Muslim, and as an Egyptian-thus, in the first case, he 
saw Palestine as belonging to the native population whether Christian, Muslim (or 
Jewish); in the second, he found British (that is, Christian) protection of the Muslim holy 
sites intolerable; and in the third, he considered the possibility of a neighbouring Jewish 
state as a danger. 105 Which of the three took precedence often seemed a factor of the 
audience being addressed. 
As noted above, emphasising Palestine's Islamic significance was also a matter of 
political expedience. That such an emphasis served to enhance the status of Hajj Amlin 
goes without question. Certainly the topics slated for discussion at the Conference 
worked to his benefit: the Hararn al-SharTf was, after all, under the control of the 
Supreme Muslim Council, and the establishment of a pan-Islamic university in Jerusalem 
could only add to his status as the most pre-eminent 'Muslim' leader in Palestine. 'O' By 
103 lbid, p. 5 1. 
'0' Concerning Egypt's response to the Palestinian issue and the fear of sectarianism, see James Jankowski, 
"Egyptian Responses to the Palestine Problem in the Interwar Period, " in WES, vol. 12,1980, pp. 8-9; 
also Coury, "Egyptians in Jerusalem, " p. 52. 
10' Ibid, p. 47. 
106 As President of the Supreme Muslim Council, Haj Amin also held the title Ra Ts al-Ulamd, which 
might be translated as President or 'head' of the Muslim leadership or 'learned community. ' See 
Kupferschmidt, The Supreme Muslim Council, p. 79. 
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any measure, the conference was Hajj Amin's project, and his hand was fully evident in it 
from start to finish. The Rawdat al-W drif College, under the authority of the Supreme 
Muslim Council, served as the assembly hall; the musical band and boy scouts of the 
Muslim Orphanage, likewise under the SMC's authority, were at the opening ceremony 
at al-Aqsd Mosque; finally, al-Jdmiah al-Arabiyyah, Hajj Amin's mouthpiece, had 
begun making propaganda long before the Conference by publishing articles on the 
delegates scheduled to attend. 107 Concerning the composition of the participants, very 
little had been left to chance in fact, and it soon became apparent that the majority of 
those attending were there primarily on the merit of being supporters of Hajj Amin. His 
faction fairly dominated the Conference, and right from the start, he was acknowledged 
as Congress President. "' It was this, in fact, which underlay much of the hostility 
towards the Conference of the Opposition, "9 which criticized him for his autocratic 
handling of the nomination of the Palestinian delegates. 110 The Opposition argued that 
Hajj Amin was using the Congress as a tool for his own self-aggrandizement, and 
attacked the Congress and its preparatory committee in a manifesto. " 1 Hajj Amin, for his 
part, portrayed himself as a national leader representative of the majority of Palestine's 
Arabs, and dismissed the Opposition as being of little significance. "' 
"'7Kupferschmidt, "The General Muslim Congress of 193 1, " p. 14 1. 
108 See FO 371/16009, police report on the 1931 Islamic Conference, 24 December 193 1; also Fildstin, 8 
December 193 1; alVdmiaý al-'Arabiyyah, 9 December 193 1. See also Uri M. Kupferschmidt, "The 
General Muslim Congress of 193 1, " pp. 13 9-40; and Kramer, Islam Assembled, p. 133. 
109 Kupferschmidt, "The General Muslim Congress of 193 1, " p. 139. 
"0 OrienteModerno, November 193 1, pp. 527-528, from al-Ahram, 25 October 193 1. 
111 See Gibb, "The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December 193 1, " p. 104, footnote 1; also Kramer, 
Islam Assembled, p. 127. 
112 Mayer, "Egypt and the General Islamic Conference, " pp. 314-315, from the Egyptian Gazette, 14 
November 193 1. 
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The Opposition's campaign against Hajj Amin was initially successful in generating 
scepticism about the Muffi's intentions. Primarily, they attacked the partisan way in 
which he and his associates had organized it, suggesting that his purpose was to exploit it 
for his own political and personal gain! 13 This was certainly a view shared by many in 
the British administration, who noted that there was "some foundation ... that the Muffi 
was exploiting the Congress for the [furthering] of his own personal ambitions. "' 
14 The 
Opposition, led by Rdghib al-Nashiishlibi, quickly followed up on this by organising a 
rival conference, the Congress of the Palestinian Muslim Nation, which opened session 
on II December 1931 at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. "' About 1,000 individuals 
attended, and it was the first time all the Muslim factions opposing Hajj Affin had come 
together in one event. The Congress used the Conference as a forum for directly attacking 
the Supreme Muslim Council, and called for new elections and reforms aimed at limiting 
116 
the Council's control of the sharia courts . 
It was generally understood that the 
Congress of the Palestinian Muslim Nation also stood for moderation and cooperation 
with the Government. ' 17 
The World Islamic Conference concluded on 17 December with the establishment of a 
permanent Executive, with Hajj Amin as its chair. 118 Shawkat 'Ali, also elected to the 
Executive, relinquished his seat in frustration over the manner in which Hajj Amlin had 
113 Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 47. 
114 FO 371/16009, secret correspondence from Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 26 March 1932. 
115 Kupfersclunidt, "The General Muslim Congress of 193 1, " p. 140. 
116 See FO 371/16009, secret correspondence from Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 30 January 1932. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Kupferschmidt, "The General Muslim Congress of 1931 ," pp. 
150-51 
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dominated the entire Conference! 19 A number of resolutions were passed, among them 
the intention to convene again in Jerusalem in two years time. '20 Other resolutions 
particular to Palestine included the intention to establish an Islamic university in 
Jerusalem (to be called the al-Masjid al-Aqsd University); the condemnation of the 
selling of land to Jews, and the intention to establish a company to save Palestinian land 
from being purchased by them; 121 a proclamation concerning the sanctity of al-Buraq (the 
Wailing Wall) and the willingness of Muslims to protect it; and, perhaps most relevant to 
Palestine's Christian Arabs, the intention to combat Christian missionary activity directed 
at MUSliMS. 122 Notably, this last resolution was tempered with another one expressing 
gratitude to Palestine and Transjordan's Christians for having supported the Conference, 
together with a message of congratulations to the Second Arab-Orthodox Conference, 
then taking place in Jaffa. '23 
The Second Arab Orthodox Congress 
Christian reaction to the Islamic Conference, at least on the face of it, was generally 
positive, and many of Palestine's Christian Arabs publicly declared their support. 
124 
119 Kramer, Islam Assembled, p. 137. Concerning the manner in which Haj Amin dominated the 
Conference, see also FO 371/16009, police report on the 1931 Islamic Conference, 24 December 193 1. 
120 See Nielsen, "The International Islamic Conference, " p. 3 52; also Kupferschmidt, "The General Muslim 
Congress of 193 1, " p. 150. 
121 OrienteModemo, January 1932, pp. 38-39, from Filastin, 6-18 December 193 1. 
'22 This was to be done largely through the printing of polemical pamphlets on the Crucifixion and the 
Redemption, spelling out what it was that Muslims did and did not believe concerning Jesus. Ibid, p. 3 5, 
from FiOsfin, 6-18 December 193 1. 
12' A complete list of the resolutions can be found in Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 12. 
124 See F0371116009, pofice report on the 1931 Islamic Conference, 24 December 1931. 
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Thus, for instance, George Antonius endorsed the conference without reservation, stating 
unequivocally that he regarded the conference as "potentially the most important 
constructive effort among Moslems in recent years, and one which [was] fraught with far- 
,, 125 reaching possibilities. Shortly after it began, the President of the Jerusalem Muslim 
Christian Association paid the Conference a visit as an indication of Muslim-Christian 
solidarity. 126 Whether such gestures were representative of Christians as a whole is 
questionable however. Certainly not all Christians were happy with the World Islamic 
Conference, particularly the fact that it stressed Jerusalem's role as a centre of Muslim 
religious and cultural revival'27; an article appearing in the Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram 
suggested that Christians (along with Zionists) generally opposed the Conference. 128 
The Islamic Conference made some effort to keep on good terms with Palestine's 
Christian Arabs, though often in what seemed a somewhat patronising manner. "9 Thus, 
for instance, on the third day of the Conference, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, in referring to a 
telegram of congratulations from the Arab Orthodox Congress "mentioned briefly the 
collaboration and solidarity which Palestinian Christians had given the Muslims in the 
national struggle and proposed that they be saluted and that a letter of gratitude be sent 
them. "130 Implied in such statements was that the national struggle was at heart a 
'Muslim struggle'; Christian Arabs, it seemed, might choose to lend their support or 
125 Kramer, Islam Assembled, p. 13 5. 
116 Coury, "Egyptians in Jerusalem, " p. 45. 
127 Ann Mosely Lesch, "The Palestine Arab Nationalist Movement Under the Mandate, " The Politics of 
Palestinian Nationalism, eds., William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber, and Ann Mosely Lesch (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1973), p. 19. 
1280rienteModemo, November 193 1, p. 528, from al-Ahram, 25 October 1931. 
129 Kupferschmidt, "The General Muslim Congress of 193 1, " p. 156. 
130 OrienteModemo, January 1932, p. 27, from Fildstin, 6-18 December 193 1. 
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not. 131 In any event, for most of the participants at the Conference, it was sufficient 
simply that nothing was said or done that might be seen as blatantly hostile towards the 
Christian community (see above). Ironically, supposed Muslim-Christian harmony was 
often cited at the Conference as a model to be imitated; as characterised by one 
participant, a relationship of 'sympathy and brotherhood, ' the very attitude, he went on to 
note, so amply demonstrated by the Islamic Conference towards the Christian 
community. 132 More than once, the lack of cordiality between the different factions at the 
Conference was contrasted with the supposed harmonious relations that existed between 
Muslims and Christians. Thus, one participant, when addressing religious divisions 
within Islam, commented that different trends should be respected, and drew a contrast 
with the situation in Palestine, where an "attempt [was being made] to promote harmony 
between Christians and MUSliMS.,, 133 
Various Christian associations did send the World Islamic Conference telegrams and 
mazbatas of support, 134 among them, the Second Arab Orthodox Congress. 135 Again, 
whether such sentiment was representative of the broader Christian community is 
debatable, though arguably, this was the case with many in the Orthodox community. 
There, the struggle between the Arabic-speaking laity and Greek-do rain ated clergy had 
come to a head (see below). Strong nationalist feelings had been stiffed, and by 
extension, feelings of solidarity with Muslims. Members of the Orthodox community 
were prepared to do more than send words of congratulations. Most notable in this - 
131 A similar attitude was evident with respect to the boycott of the elections for the legislative council in 
1923 (see the second chapter). 
132 Nielsen, "The International Islamic Conference, " p. 346. 
133 OrienteModerno, January 1932, p. 35, from Fildslin, 6-18 December 193 1. 
134 See FO 371/16009, police report on the 1931 Islamic Conference, 24 December 193 1. 
135 Oriente Moderno, January 1932, p. 27, from Palestine Bulletin, 7 December 193 1. 
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respect was Isd al-'Tsa, the editor of Fildstin, who sent the World Islamic Conference a 
proposal outlining a scheme for saving Palestinian lands from the Zionists through their 
endowment as waqfs. Specifically, he proposed that Palestinian lands still owned by 
Arabs be assigned a value per dunam, high enough to attract the interest of rich Muslims, 
who might then buy them and donate them as religious endowments. All profits would go 
to the proposed Islamic University. In reading the proposal to the participants at the 
Conference, the Secretary, Riyad al-Sulh duly noted the overall solidarity demonstrated 
by Christians towards their Muslim brethren. 136 
Underlying this feeling of solidarity was the fact that the Second Arab Orthodox 
Congress was being held concurrently with the World Islamic Conference. The Congress 
was precipitated by the death earlier that year of the Jerusalem Orthodox Patriarch 
Darnianos. The long-standing feud between the Greek-dominated higher clergy and the 
Arab laity had thus been rekindled around the question of who would be the next 
Patriarch and, equally important, how he would be selected and by whom. As in the past, 
the Orthodox community defined the conflict in strongly nationalistic terms-that is, as 
but one component of the larger nationalist cause. This was perhaps best expressed in an 
editorial appearing in Filastin at the time: 
Palestine is oppressed not only by the British mandate but also by those of 
the Zionists and Greeks which are no less severe. These three mandatories 
have aided one another in depriving Palestinian Arabs of their rights. The 
Greek patriarchate supports the Zionists against the Arabs... All 
Palestinian Arabs have a duty to combat these three foreign mandates. 137 
136 lbid, p. 33, from FiMsfin, 6-18 December 1931. See also Nielsen, "The International Islamic 
Conference, " p. 345. 
137 Derek Hopwood, The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine, 1843-1914, Church and Politics in the 
Near East (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 205, original in Filastin, 16 October 193 1. 
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For most Orthodox, the defence of the Hararn al-SharTf was equally but one component 
of the larger nationalist cause. Zionism-as manifested in the sale of church properties by 
the Greek-dominated clergy and the Jewish contestation of religious rights with respect to 
the Wailing Wall-defined the link between the two. As such, the nationalist cause 
belonged equally to Christians as to Muslims. 
Responsibility for choosing the next Patriarch rested with the Electoral Assembly, a body 
strongly dominated by the Greek-speaking higher clergy as represented by the Holy 
Synod of the Patriarchate, The laity was represented on the Electoral Assembly, but was 
outnumbered. 13' They now demanded equal representation; also that the Fundamental 
Law determining the constitution of the Assembly be altered. The Betrarn-Young Report 
of 1926 had recommended such a change, further that "in the event of the present 
Patriarch dying, or vacating his office, the [related] ordinance [which was in draft form in 
the appendix of the report] should be passed before the election of his successor. ', 139 The 
High Commissioner had, in January 1930, sought to bring the substance of the bill. into 
force as part of the Religious Communities Organisation Ordinance. The Foreign Office, 
however, fearful of Greek interference, 140 decided it would be better to implement the 
suggested changes after the "[t]hrone was firmly occupied. ý441 
138 Concerning the fitnctioning of the Electoral Assembly, see CO 733/204/9, article clipping from the 
Church Thnes, entitled "The Jerusalem Election. How the New Patriarch Will Be Chosen, " 16 October 
1931. 
'39 Ibid. 
'40 Concerning the involvement of the Greek government, see ibid, internal British memorandum (no date), 
circa late-December 193 1, and letter from the Office of the High Commissioner to Thomas, 31 October 
193 1; also Kirsten Stoffregen Pedersen, The Ho, ýv Land Chrisfians, ed., Natalie King (Jerusalem: Private 
Publication, 2003), pp. 97-98. 
141 CO 733/204/9, internal British memorandum (no date), circa late-December 193 1. 
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When it became clear that the Government had no intention of changing the Fundamental 
Law prior to the election of a new Patriarch, the Orthodox community immediately began 
petitioning the Government, and numerous memorials were sent calling for the Law's 
immediate revision. The Second Arab-Orthodox Congress finally convened in Jaffa, and 
immediately appealed to the Government to reconsider its position, claiming that, based 
on Ottoman precedent, it had the right to "assert and secure the constitutional rights of its 
subjects and to impose such law on all concerned" independent of the will of the 
Synod. 142 The Congress called for a boycott of the election until its demands had been 
met. 14' The election of the new Patriarch, already delayed from its original starting date 
of 23 September-the day the Electoral Assembly was scheduled to meet in order to 
begin the process-was indefinitely postponed. 144 
The Second Arab Orthodox Congress elicited strong Arab-nationalist sentiment within 
the Orthodox community, and many felt a sense of common purpose with the World 
Islamic Conference, then taking place. Ostensibly, both events were religious affairs, yet 
just as the Orthodox Arab community saw their struggle as but one component of the 
larger nationalist one, likevAse, they saw the need to defend Palestine's Muslim holy 
sites-the reason for convening the World Islamic Conference-as but one aspect of the 
broader nationalist struggle. 14' Both were two sides of the same coin so to speak. 
Correspondingly, each community might expect the other's support. In this vein, the 
Arab Orthodox Congress demanded that the Islamic Conference address the authorities 
142 Ibid, representation submitted by the Executive Committee of the Second Arab Orthodox Congress to 
the High Commissioner's Office, 22 October 193 1; and ibid, letter from Douglas to Gaselec, 2 October 
193 1. See also Daphne Tsirnhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians under the British Mandate in 
Palestine" in Middle Eastern Studies, 20 iv, 1984, p. 171 and footnote 34. 
143 CO 73 31204/9, letter from Office of the High Commissioner to Thomas, 31 October 193 1. 
144 Ibid, article clipping from the Church Times, 16 October 193 1. 
145 See, for example, Filastin, 8 December 193 1. 
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on their behalf regarding the election of a new Patriarch. 
"6 Such thinking was evident in 
an article in Fildslin that had appeared a few months earlier. In it, it was noted that the 
Orthodox cause "ought to be the cause of all the Arabs, Muslim as well as Christian. 
19147 
There was certainly no reason for Muslims not to endorse the Orthodox cause, and 
indeed, it was resolved at the World Islamic Conference that "the Orthodox question 
[be 
considered] as pail of the bigger Arab question, and to draw the attention of the 
Government to the right of Orthodox Palestinians to elect an Arab patriarch. " 
148 In the 
end though, however much Orthodox Arabs may have wanted to see it as such, the two 
struggles were not analogous; neither the manner in which they were represented by their 
respective conferences. Whereas the Arab Orthodox Congress rejected the position of the 
Greek-dominated higher clergy-wherein the community's ties with the universal Greek 
Orthodox community were greatly stressed, largely in connection with the Christian holy 
sites in Palestine of which the clergy considered itself the guardian-the Islamic 
Conference sought to emphasise Palestine's ties with the larger Islamic world on the 
basis of that country's Muslim holy sites. 
The Islarnisation of the Palestinian cause 
One should be careful not to exaggerate the impact of the Islamic Conference, nor the 
degree to which it boosted Hajj Amin's status. Muhammad 'Ali al-Tdhir, Hajj Amin's 
publicist, noted with disappointment in his account of the Conference that, within six 
146 OrienteModemo, January 1932, p. 35, from Fd5stin, 6-18 December 193 1. See also FO 371/16009, 
police report on the 1931 Islamic Conference, 24 December 193 1, where it is noted that "Nachleh Kattan of 
Jerusalem sought the support of the [Islamic] Congress of Christian Orthodox demands... " Also Nielsen, 
"The International Islamic Conference, " p. 344. 
147 Elie Kedourie, "Religion and Politics: The Diaries of Khalil Sakakini, "Middte Eastern Affairs, 1, St. 
Antony's Papers, 4 (1958), p. 86, footnote 22, original from Filastin, 16 October 193 1. 
'48 OrienteModerno, January 1932, p. 35, from Fildstin, 6-18 December 193 1. See also Gibb, "The Islamic 
Congress at Jerusalem in December 193 1, " p. 106. 
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months of its having concluded, it had been largely forgotten by the Arab pUbliC. 149 
Certainly none of the resolutions passed at the Conference ever really amounted to 
anything, including the decision to convene subsequent conferences. The proposed 
Islamic University proved a non-starter as well, mostly due to a lack of funds. 150 
Concerning the impact the Conference had on Hajj AmYn's status, the net effect was to 
his benefit. The Palestinian cause had become regional in scope, and Hajj Amin would 
remain in regular contact with Muslim religious leaders around the world, often soliciting 
their support in the name of Islam. Typical was a letter he wrote in 1935 to various 
Muslim religious leaders concerning "the grave situation of the Muslims in this Arab 
Muslim country, " and "the great danger which has befallen this sacred and blessed 
Moslem country. " 151 Arguably, Hajj Armn had become a leader of international 
stature. 152 Thus, for instance, when the British considered deporting him in 1936, there 
was some concern about possible repercussions in India, Egypt, Iraq and Arabia. 153 In the 
aftermath of the Conference, many in the administration wondered if allowing the 
Conference had not been a mistake. As noted by the French consul in Jerusalem, "a 
dangerous instrument of propaganda and agitation ha[d] been put in Hajj AmYn's hands 
which, if he use[d] skillfully, could complicate the task of those powers in authority in 
,, 154 Muslim lands. 
149 Mayer, "Egypt and the General Islamic Conference, " p. 319. 
150 See Kupferschmidt, "The General Muslim Congress of 193 1, " p. 152; also Gibb, "The Islamic Congress 
at Jerusalem in December 193 1, " p. 108. 
15' Erskine, Palestine ofthe Arabs (London: George G. Harrap and Company, Ltd., 1935), p. 165. 
152 See, for instance, Lesch, Arab Politics in Palestine, p. 107. 
... See, for instance, CO 733/311/5, telegram from the Home Department of the Government of India to the 
Secretary of State for India, 10 October 1936. 
154 Kramer, Islam Assembkd, p. 136. 
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At the same time, Hajj AmTh's heavy-handed managing of the Conference had 
disaffected not only Arabs in Palestine, but some of the participants from the other 
countries as well, "' including Shawkat'Ali. 156 There was a strong negative reaction in 
official circles in Egypt, 157 criticism being levelled at the Palestinian focus of the 
Conference, evident in the fact that the preponderance of participants, all of whom were 
effectively appointed by the Mufti, had come from Palestine and Transjordan. One 
Egyptian newspaper remarked it odd that a conference touted as being regional in scope 
should have as many as 88 participants representing the approximately one million 
Muslims residing in Palestine and Transjordan, and only 70 participants representing the 
roughly 400 million Muslims that made up the rest of the Islamic world. "8 The 
Conference's impact on his status within Palestine was in some ways equally mixed; as 
noted in an article appearing in the journal Near East written in the immediate aftermath 
of the Conference, "[i]n the Islamic world the mufti's name has grown more famous, but 
what will be the results in Palestine itself? "159 On the one hand, the counter-conference 
organized by the Opposition seemed to have a limited impact'60 -by the time of the Nabi 
Musa festival in 1932, less than half a year later, the Opposition's status had reached an 
all-time 10W. 16' At the same time, the Mufti's ability to work with certain important 
155 See FO 371/16009, police report on the 1931 Islamic Conference, 24 December 193 1. 
156 See Nielsen, "The International Islamic Conference, " p. 352. 
157 FO 371/16009, secret correspondence from Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 26 March 1932. 
1-'8 Mayer, "Egypt and the General Islamic Conference, " p. 319. 
159Alear East article [no date] quoted in Nielsen, "The International Islamic Conference, " p. 354. 
160 See, for instance, ZA, S/25,3557, report from A. H. Cohen, II October 1933, concerning the long-term 
impact of Opposition Congress. 
161 See, for instance, FO 371/16926, CID Periodical Appreciation Summary, 25 March 1933. 
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members of the Palestinian leadership was damaged beyond all repair. 162 As far as 
turning the Palestinian cause into an Islamic one regional in scope, the 193 1 Islamic 
Conference was an unqualified success. From that point on, Arabs and Muslims in other 
countries became increasingly vocal in their opposition to Zionism. Resolutions and' 
petitions in support of the Palestinian Arabs were issued with ever increasing frequency. 
Equally, demonstrations against Zionism became a common phenomenon in Muslim 
countries. Many of those who had participated in the Conference went on to become 
outspoken critics of Zionism in their home countries. 163 Significantly, the great majority 
of movements in support of Palestine in the other Arab countries were initiated by 
Islamic organisations, and it was generally on the basis of Islam, not pan-Arabism, that 
they sought to generate support. Nationalist organisations, by contrast, proved disinclined 
to become involved. 164 
The nationalist cause was being transformed into an Islamic one, and while this certainly 
had the benefit of generating regional support, it also had the effect of marginalizing 
Christian Arabs. As long as Palestine remained predominantly a 'Palestinian' issue, or 
even an 'Arab' issue, in principle, it belonged to non-Muslims as much as Muslims. The 
accentuation of ties with the larger Muslim world also raised questions regarding with 
whom Palestinian Muslims saw their primary affiliation. Was it with other Muslims or 
with non-Muslim Palestinian Arabs? The proposed al-Aqsd University was case in point. 
On the one hand, it was often described as being meant to counter the Hebrew University 
in Jerusalem-in effect, to promote the Palestinian cause against Zionism. At the same 
162 See, for instance, ZA, S/25,3478, K/272/30, report from F. H. Kisch, 16 February 1930, concerning 
H. M. Kalvarisky's encounter with Musa Kazim al-Husayni; also Kupferschmidt, "The General Muslim 
Congress of 193 1, " p. 155. 
163 See, for instance, CO 733/231/3, correspondence from different Muslim countries indicating solidarity 
with Palestine's Arabs and a concern for the Muslim holy sites there; also Kupferschmidt, "The General 
Muslim Congress of 193 1, " pp. 156-57. 
"' Porath, Riots to Rebellion, pp. 200-20 1. 
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time, as one of the delegates to the Conference noted, it was a university for 'Muslims, ' 
not 'Arabs. ' Moreover, as expressed in a report on the Conference put together by the 
High Commissioner's Office, it was meant "to enable Moslems [seeking a secondary 
education] to dispense with non-Moslem institutions .,, 
165These 'non-Muslim' institutions 
were certainly not Jewish ones. '66Additionally, the proposed Islamic university was also 
to have a regional significance. Orthodox Arabs might well imagine that the Arab 
Orthodox Congress and the World Islamic Conference were somehow cut from the same 
cloth; that participants in both saw their respective events as part of the same broader 
movement. Perhaps this was true in part; but surely then, both saw their respective roles 
within the 'shared movement' somewhat differently. In any case, the fact remained that, 
whereas the Second Arab Orthodox Congress had sought to redefine what was on the 
face of it a 'church' issue-the question of the succession of the Patriarch-in overtly 
nationalist terms, the Islamic Conferenc e had set about to do exactly the opposite-to 
redefine the Palestinian cause in Islamic terms. 
165 FO 371/16009, police report on the 1931 Islamic Conference, 24 December 193 1. 
"6 While they might equaHy have been referring to government schools as missionary-founded ones, it is 
worth noting that one of the main criticisms of the govemment schools was the fact that a preponderance of 
the teachers in them were Christian Arabs. For example, al-Jwniah al-'Arabý, yah, 15 November 1929. 
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Chapter V, The Road to Radicalisation 
Muslim-Christian disunity 
The early 1930s marked a period of increasing tensions between Muslims and Christians, 
particularly following the murder of JamTI Baha, the Christian journalist and editor of the 
newspaper al-Zuhar, during a communal dispute over a cemetery in Haifa claimed by 
both Muslims and Greek Catholics. ' Ownership of the cemetery had been in dispute for 
some time, and the British authorities had forbidden both Christians and Muslims from 
burying their dead there until a ruling could be made. The recently appointed director of 
the Haifa Waqf, Rash-id al-Hajj lbrdhim, had challenged this suspension however, and 
had begun erecting an iron-wire fence around the cemetery. The Greek Catholic 
community saw this as a provocation, and responded by granting two poor Christian 
families permission to build living accommodations on the site of the cemetery. On 
6 September 193 1, while supervising their construction, Bahff was confronted by a mob 
of Muslims and killed by a revolver shot. Most alarming to the Christian community was 
the possibility of complicity on the part of Rashld al-Hajj Ibr5hTm, a Muslim of high- 
standing in the community, 2 and Ranfff Am7ir, the Secretary of the local Young Men's 
Muslim Association. Both were formally charged with instigating the mob, 15 of whom 
were later charged with murder. To make matters worse, a Muslim policeman present at 
the scene had helped some of the Muslims involved escape. 3 
'Anthony O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians: Religion, Politics and Society, c. 1800-1948" in Palestinian 
Christians, Religion, Politics and Society in the Holy Land, ed. Anthony O'Mahony (London, Melisende, 
1999), p. 49. 
2 In addition to his position as director of the local waqf, he was the manager of the Arab Bank in Haifa. 
'The account given here is derived primarily from the English-language journal, The Palestine Bulletin, 
7,8,14 September, 3 October 193 1. 
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Both Muslims and Christians reacted strongly to the incident. The family of the murdered 
Christian editor rejected the; EP 2000 offered by the Haifa Waqf as compensation. 4 The 
Christians in Haifa were reticent about receiving a proposed delegation from the Arab 
Executive, particularly if for the purpose of mediating the dispute. The local leadership 
responded by noting that "if the delegation arrives all [we] will want to hear from it will 
be an expression of regret and not a discussion of peace terms. "' Christian women in the 
Arab Women's Association withdrew their membership and began taking steps to 
establish a rival Christian Women's Association 6 and al-Zuhi7r ran an article strongly 
questioning the value of supposed Muslim-Christian unity. 7 Feelings ran strong in the 
opposite direction as well; a few weeks later, it was reported that Muslim owners of wells 
in mixed quarters were refusing to sell water to Christians. 'AI-Yarmfik, a Muslim-owned 
newspaper, published an article claiming that Christians were in favour of transferring the 
Mandate to Italy. 9 Strangest of all was when both Rashid al-Hajj IbrdhIm and RdM21 
AmIr, while being transferred from the Police Station to the Court Magistrate after having 
turned themselves in, expressed a preference that the Christian policeman accompanying 
them in the car be replaced by a Jew! 'O 
The Christian press in Palestine reacted for the most part by trying to minimize the 
incident's impact on national unity. Typical of this was an article appearing in al-Kannil 
4 The Palestine Bulletin, 15 September 193 1. 
5 lbid, 14 September 193 1. 
lbid, 15 September 193 1. 
7 Referenced in al-Karmil, 4 October 193 1. 
"The Palestine Bulletin, 19 September 193 1. 
9 Referenced in ibid, 17 September 193 1. 
10 lbid, 16 September 193 1. 
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on 14 September 193 1, reproaching both sides for wasting valuable time and energy in 
internal squabbling instead of focusing on the task at hand-the defence of the homeland 
against Zionism. " A similar appeal was made in an article on 4 October 1931, wherein 
al-Kannil's editor called on Muslim and Christian leaders to restrain their respective 
communities, and unite in the face of the common enemy. "Leave the matter to the 
judiciary and show the people that there are wise men among you, and let your unity not 
,, 12 weaken. Christian nationalist leaders were also active in trying to close the widening 
breach between the two communities. Thus, for instance, YUsuf Gregorius Hdjjar, 
Palestine's Greek Catholic Archbishop, left almost immediately after the incident for 
Jerusalem in order to consult with members of the nationalist leadership. Shortly 
thereafter, he received a delegation of Muslims consisting of Tawffq'Abddllah, the 
mayor of Acre, Hasan Bey Shuka, the mayor of Haifa, and Abd5llah Mukhlis, a Muslim 
leader in Haifa. 13 
That the nationalist movement was taking on an increasingly Islamic character-one with 
which Christians were extremely uncomfortable-was strongly evident at a nationalist 
conference convened in Nablus on 20 September 193 1. The conference was c onvenedin 
response to calls fo 
'ra 
boycott of the Government, as well as the Jews, by what turned out 
to be a rather short-lived radical organisation, the Committee of the Nablus Congress. 14 A 
boycott of the Jews was a strategy with which most Christians could agree; indeed, 
11 Al-Karmil, 14 September 1915. A brief summation of the article appears also in The Palestine Bulletin, 
15 September 1915. 
12 Al-Karmil, 4 October 193 1. 
13 The Palestine Bulletin, 15 September 193 1. 
14 Ychoshua Porath, The Palestinian Arab ArationalMovement. From Riots to Rebellion, 1929-1939, 
Volume II, (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1977), pp. 119-120. 
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throughout the Mandate, many had suggested adopting exactly such a strategy. 15 
Boycotting the Government, however, was another matter. In any event, the atmosphere 
was so religiously charged that Christians declined to attend, and in the end, not a single 
one participated. 16 The Conference was in fact boycotted by the more moderate members 
of the Arab Executive, and in the end, only about 250 of the roughly 750 invited turned 
UP. 17 Among other things, the speakers demanded that Palestine's Arab women renounce 
Western dress. " 
Coinciding with the movement's Islarnisation. was a growing Muslim hostility towards 
Christians. During the latter part of 1932, Christians were subjected to sporadic attacks 
by gangs of Muslims in a number of Palestinian towns, and in Lydda, a church was 
desecrated. " The growing dissension between Muslims and Christians was evident as 
well in a dispute around that time between the editors of Filasifn and al-jamiah al- 
Islamiyyah-a paper once associated with moderation, but more recently adopting a 
strong pan-Islamic slant-conceming whether or not Amir'Abdallah of TransJordan was 
scheming with Zionists. The latter made such a strong appeal to Muslim religious fervour 
in support of its position that the British authorities were certain there would have been a 
breach of the peace between the two communities if the editors of the two papers had not 
been ordered to discontinue the subject. As noted by one British official, "the existing 
15 See, for instance, ISA, AE, 177 1, 'Isa al-'Isa's proposal for an economic boycott of the Jews, Sixth 
National Congress, 1926. 
" Their decision not to attend was also influenced by the fact that the Nashdshibi-led Opposition had called 
for a boycott of the meeting. Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 120. 
17AI-JCzmi'ah al- Arabtýyah, 24 September 193 1; andMirat al-Sharq, 25,30 September 193 1. 
18 FilastTn, 22 September 1931. 
19 FO 3 71/16926, CID Secret Report, dated 19 January 193 3. 
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discord between Moslems and Christians in this country [was] only kept beneath the 
,, 20 surface by the constant efforts of political leaders. 
In addition to this was a growing sentiment among Christian Arabs that relative to the 
Muslims (and Jews), the Palestine Government was neglecting them. Often it seemed that 
the British were more sensitive to 'Muslim' issues than 'Christian' ones. Christians 
complained that, in fulfilling their obligations to the Arabs as stipulated in the Mandate, 
the British had seemingly confused 'Muslim' with 'Arab. 12l In similar fashion, the 
Orthodox community was resentful that the Government had not taken any steps to 
resolve their conflict with the Greek-dominated clergy. They complained that whereas 
"the Government lost no time in acting with regard to both the Moslem and Jewish 
communities, " they had yet to resolve their own controversy with respect to the 
Patriarchate. 22 In another instance, Christians complained that they had not been allotted 
time for religious broadcasts as had Muslims and Jews, something they attributed to "a 
certain lack of maintaining Christian standards [on the part of the authorities] for fear that 
these standards should be taken to infringe Moslem or Jewish rights or be considered in 
the light of Christian propaganda. "23Another complaint was that Muslim and Jewish 
holidays were given precedence over Christian ones-thus, whereas they might take off 
their respect ive days of rest, "the Christian official, in fact, frequently [had] to do the 
work of the Jewish and Moslem Arab official on his own nominal day of rest. 1)24 There 
20 Ibid. 
21 C0733/347/10, Second Revision of section on'The Christian, ' report of the Royal Commission, 1937. 
22 CO 733/346/7, letter from Farraj to the Chairman of the Royal Comn-ýission of Enquiry, 16 February 
1937. See also CO 733/347/10, Second Revision. 
23 CO 733ß47/10, Second Revision, p. 9. 
24 Ibid, p. 8. See also Daphne Tsimhoni, The British Mandate and theArab Christians in Palestine 1920- 
1925 (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, SOAS, University of London, 1976), pp. 140-142. 
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was some truth to their contention that relative to the Muslims and Jews, they were 
somewhat neglected. Of the three religious communities, they were arguably politically 
the weakest, and often, the Government's consideration of them was only in relation to 
legislation concerning the other two. 2*' The legislative council proposed by the 
Government in 1922, was case in point. The electoral scheme finally arrived at for 
determining the council's composition was largely in reaction to Jewish demands that it 
not be dominated by Muslims; that Christians ended up with more seats than would 
otherwise have been the case (two versus one) was almost entirely incidental. 26 
In November 1932, the Congress of the Educated Muslim Young Men was established. 
Almost immediately, its Executive Committee initiated a campaign calling for more 
Government jobs for Muslims in proportion to their majority in the country. Almost from 
the start, it took a strong anti-Christian tone. 27 Eventually, a delegation of Christians met 
with the Congress to register a protest, demanding that measures be taken to prevent 
actions that could affect "the good atmosphere which exists among the children of the 
single homeland. " Especially singled out was the Young Men's Muslim Association in 
Jaffa, which Alfred Rok, a member of the delegation, referred to as the "root of the evil. " 
The response of the Congress was that it was not acting against Christians but rather in 
favour of Muslim rights. 28This anti-Christian tendency when dealing with the subject of 
Muslim unemployment was also evident in the newspaper al-J'ami ah al-Isldmiyyah, 
which often came close to openly incifing Muslims against Christians. 29Chrisfians for 
25 lbid, p. 143. 
26 See ibid, pp. 151-152. 
27 ISA, CS, K/190/32, letter from the Congress of the Educated Muslim Young Men to the High 
Commissioner, 6 December 1932. 
28 Ibid. See also Porath, The Emergence, p. 302. 
29 Yehoshua Porath, The Palestinian Arab NationalMovement. - The Emergence, 1918-1929, Volume I 
(London: Frank Cass and Company), 1977, p. 30 1. See also alýJami`ah al-IsIdmiyyah, 9 November 1932. 
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their part tried to draw attention away from themselves by noting that they too were 
losingjobs, and by asserting that the real culprits behind the lack ofjob opportunities for 
Muslims were the Jews. 30 
It was not only the Christian Arabs of Palestine that were experiencing problems. The 
situation of Christians throughout the Middle East had begun to deteriorate. With the 
pullout of the British in Iraq that summer, for example, a wave of anti-Christian 
sentiment swept the country. Especially targeted were the Assyrian Christians in the 
north, who had separatist goals and had acted as military mercenaries under the British. 
Their persecution culminated in the machine-gun massacre of hundreds of Assyrian men, 
women and children by the Iraqi army at Simayl in the summer of 1933 . 
31 Nestorians 
were harassed as well and were eventually forced to flee into neighbouring French Syria, 
where they were eventually resettled in Jazira, in Syria. 32 Only the Chaldaean Catholics 
managed to escape persecution, mostly by acquiescing quietly to the nationalist 
33 
administration in Baghdad. For Christians in Palestine, events in the newly independent 
Iraq augured ill for those contemplating a fature under an independent Muslim- 
dominated government. 
30 FilastTn, 8 Decmeber 193 2. 
3' Robert Brenton Betts, Chtistians in the Arab East-A Political Study (Athens: Lycabettus Press, 1975, 
1978 revised edition), page 37-38. See also Khaldun S. Husry, "The Assyrian Affair of 1933 (1)" in 
1ntemationalJoumal ofMiddle East Studies, vol. 5, no. 2, April 1974, pp. 161-176, and Khaldun S. Husry, 
"The Assyrian Affair of 1933 (11)" in Intemationaldbumal ofMiddle East Studies, vol. 5, no. 3, June 1974, 
pp, 344-360. 
32 See Betts, Christians in the Arab East, pp. 37-38. In 1937, the Christian population of Jazira would 
become greatly distressed when the district was brought under the direct administration of Damascus. A 
massacre of Christians that year in 'Amuda would initiate a strong movement for local autonomy and even 
independence, led by the Syrian Catholic Patriarch. Ibid, pp. 36-37. 
33 lbid, p. 3 8. 
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More relevant in this respect, perhaps, was the situation in Transiordan, perhaps the 
closest proxy of what they might expect should Palestine ever achieve independence. The 
situation did not look particularly promising there either. In early 1933, an incident took 
34 
place in Madaba when-the local qaimmaqdm broke up a meeting of Latin Catholics. 
This was apparently the latest in a series of such incidents, and the Christian community 
35 
called on Am-ir'Abddilah to have him dismissed . Much to their 
disappointment, he 
proved reluctant to do so. 36 Christians were already apprehensive about a proposal put 
fourth in the Legislative Council the previous month, calling for an amendment to the 
Electoral Law so as to reduce the number of Christian representatives. 37 Shortly 
thereafter, it was reported that 'Abddllah had congratulated the newspaper al-jami'ah al- 
IsIdmiyyah for its anti-Christian propaganda. 38 Matters became worse when he and his 
Chief Minister questioned the signature of a local Christian. This saw a series of articles 
appearing in the Christian newspaper Mir'& al-Sharq, which criticised the Arn-Ir's 
attitude towards Christians in general. Shortly thereafter, on 27 June, a Muslim attacked 
the Christian Chief Clerk of the Judicial Department on a main street in Amman. It was 
considered by many that the Clerk had been "partly responsible for the offensive 
articles, " and it was maintained by the Christian community "that the offender [had been] 
instigated by more highly places persons" as an act of retaliation. " Whether this was the 
34170371/16926, 'Report on the Political Situation for January 1933, ' 28 February 1933. 
35 Ibid, attachment to Colonial Office minutes, 24 April 1933, addendum to the February report, Cox. 
36 Ibid, 'Report on the Political Situation for February, ' 28 February 1933. 
37 Ibid, 'Report on the Political Situation for December, ' 31 January 1933. 
38 lbid, 'Report on the Political Situation for February, ' 28 February 1933. 
39 lbid, 'Report on the Political Situation for June 1933, ' 22 July 1933. 
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case or not, it was clear that Christians in Jordan did not feel fully accepted by the 
Muslim majority. 
Christian versus Arab 
Beyond any specific problems between Muslims and Christians was the fact that the 
nationalist cause was increasingly being characterised in Islamic terms as a holy war 
against a'Chrisfian' mandate. 40 Correspondingly, the loyalty of Christian Arabs to the 
nationalist cause was increasingly considered suspect. This reality was perhaps best 
summed up in the oft-cited observation by Khalil al-Sakak7ini in a letter written to his son 
in December 1932: 
No matter how sincere my patriotism is, no matter how much I do to 
revive this nation... as long as I am not a Moslem I am nought. If you 
desire to amount to anything, then be a Moslem and that ýArill be peace. 41 
Much space in the Christian press was devoted to the assertion that Christians were as 
'Arab' as Muslims. An article appearing in Mir'dt al-Sharq, for example, took issue with 
the notion that Christians constituted a 'minority. ' "I, a Christian Arab, who write in this 
noble tongue, and belong to that noble Arab race protest most vehemently with all my 
power, against the term 'minority. "' Continuing, he argued that, "between Christians 
whose language and characteristic are Arabic and their Muslim brothers there is no 
difference, except that the Muslim worships God in his Mosque and the Christian in his 
Church. , 42 Christians also asserted that they were an integral part of Palestinian society. 
40AI-MawsiVa al-Fdasffn"a (Palestinian Encyclopedia), Part ll, 'Special Studies' (Beirut, 1990), p. 555. 
" In Daphne Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the Palestinian Arab National Movement during the 
Formative Stage, " in The Palestinians and theMiddle East Conflict, An International Conference held at 
the Institute ofMiddle Eastern Studies, University ofHaifa, April 19 76, ed., Gabriel Ben-Dor, (Ramat Gan, 
Israel, Turtledove Publishing, 1978), p. 76. 
42 The Palestine Bulletin, 16 October 1930, reprinted from Mir61 al-Sharq. 
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The aforementioned article appearing in al-Karmil following the shooting of JamTil Bahff, 
for example, noted that Christians had in "their hands the manufacturing and trading, " 
ý743 
while "Muslims ploughed the earth . 
Christians were finding themselves increasingly 
confronted with the question of where they fit in with respect to the larger Muslim 
community. From a secular nationalist perspective, one maintained by a large number of 
Palestine's Christian Arabs, the objective had been to define a shared identity where 
religious affiliation was of secondary importance. Muslims and Christians were, 
nonetheless, more than ever spoken of as constituting two distinct commuriffies. 
Especially since the Wailing Wall riots, the link between Arab identity and Islam had 
become increasingly emphasised, 44 almost to the point where for many, the two were one 
and the same. In August of 1930, a series of articles appeared in al-Kannil asserting that 
the only solution to the 'disputes' between Muslims and Christians was that "the 
Christians adopt their [that is, the Islamic] faith. In this way the constant conflicts which 
hinder the development of the national movement [would] be brought to an end. ý, 45 This 
was not the first time that a Muslim had called on Christians to embrace Islam as the 
basis of the nationalist movement. As early as 1922, Hdfiz TUq5n, one of the members of 
the first Arab delegation sent to London, had suggested the same during a reception held 
in the delegation's honour. 461nterestingly, some Christians were beginning to see it the 
same way. Most notable in this respect was the Orthodox Khalil Iskandar al-Qubrus-1, 
43 Al-Kannil, 4 October 1930. 
44 Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 54. 
4' From a series of articles written by the Muslim author Ihs5n al-Ninir and published in the Christian 
edited Arab newspaper al-Karmil. Taken here from a partial reprinting in The Palestine Bulletin, I October 
1930. See also al-Karmil, 6,16 August 1930; also Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National 
Movementl" p. 9 1. 
46 ISA 4/16-n, secret report by the Sub-Govemor of Tulkarm, 18 September 1922. 
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who in 1931 issued a pamphlet entitled Tawat Nasdra al-'Arab ild al-Dukhfilftl al- 
Islam' CA Call on the Christian Arabs to Embrace Islam'). In it, he denounced European 
Christianity as a corrupt religion and accused European monks and missionaries of 
sowing discord between Palestine's Muslims and Christians. By contrast, he described 
Islam as a benevolent and egalitarian religion, and concluded by calling on all Arab 
Christians to become Muslim "in order to free them from the trivialities of the foreigners 
and to rid them of their corruption. "47 In similar fashion, the editor of al-Kannil, Najib 
Nassdr, asserted that Christians should convert to ISlam. 48 
Palestinian Arab politics were becoming increasing radical. On 4 January 1932, the 
National Congress of Arab Youth convened for the first time in Jaffa, and adopted the 
National Covenant of the General Arab Congress (the 'Manifesto to the Arab World'), 
which had convened concurrently with the World Islamic Conference (see the previous 
chapter). 49 The Istiql5l Party, established on 4 August 1932 by 'Awn-i'Abd al-Had-i as the 
first regularly constituted Palestinian political party, also adopted the National Covenant. 
The latter in particular was representative of a new kind of leadership. Its founders were 
generally individuals who had attained social or professional status by their own merit. 
None came from Jerusalem, and in this sense, the party constituted a real break with the 
traditional leadership. The more confrontational approach represented by the Istiqlal 
Party proved particularly attractive to members of the younger generation, and it was not 
long before the Young Men's Muslim Associations and later, the Independent Boy Scout 
troops, fell under its influence. 50 
Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " P. 75. 
48 Al-Kannil, 5 October 1931 
'9 Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 12 1. 
50 Ibid, pp. 124-126. 
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The Istiql5l Party in particular emphasised an Arab nationalism inspired by salayri 
Arabism along the lines discussed above-that is, an Arab nationalism which emphasised 
the relationship between Arab identity and Islam. While not explicitly exclusive of 
Christians, it was hardly a model within which Christians might play a proactive role as 
far as shaping Arab identity. Their ability to do so was largely predicated on to what 
extent they were able to appropriate Islam as a part of their own national heritage. At 
minimum, this meant trying to redefine Islamic festivals as nationalist ones-not only the 
Nabi Musa festival, but even the Prophet's Birthday; 51 at most, a relinquishing of one's 
faith and conversion to Islam. The fact that the party sought to shift control of the 
nationalist movement away from Jerusalem to Nablus was in many ways indicative of the 
diminishing role of Christians. Indeed, it was commented by one British official that the 
attempt to do so was motivated in large part by a "desire to keep Christians away from 
the national movement, as [it was believed] that the Christians, despite all their 
professions, will not oppose [the] Government. 1ý52 Nablus, a town known for its strong 
Islamic character, had few Christians as contrasted with Jerusalem, where they were 
roughly equal in number to Muslims. It was also a place where anti-Christian sentiment 
often found strong expression. 53 Of course, attempts at such a shift were meant primarily 
as a challenge to the traditional leadership, but even in this respect, there were significant 
consequences for Christians. It was only within the framework of the traditional 
leadership that Christians had been able to appropriate for themselves an effective role in 
the nationalist movement. It is perhaps not irrelevant then that in connection with the 
aforementioned radical nationalist conference (see above), the Nablus branch of the 
14 Muslim-Christian Association had changed its name to the Patriotic Arab Association. 
"In justifying this, the Christian editor ofal-Karmil noted that it was Muhammad who had made the Arabs 
great, and that it was because they had "stopped following his teachings [that] they had become divided and 
weak and ofno account" Al-Karmil, 9 September 1927. 
52 FO 371/16926, CD Se cret Report, I April 1933. 
53 See, for instance, ibid, CID Secret Report, 10 March 1933. 
54 In Arabic, al-Jam'iyyah al- Arabiyyah al-Wataný, yah. Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 120. 
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The death of moderation 
Beginning in 1933, external factors only served to exacerbate tensions. Following the 
establishment of the Nationalist-Socialist regime in Germany, there was a large jump in 
Jewish immigration to Palestine, up from 9,553 the previous year to 30,327.55 The threat 
posed by Zionism took on more serious dimensions, and moderation increasingly came to 
be seen as an unviable policy. Another blow to moderation was the release of the French 
Report towards the end of 193 1, which-as discussed in the previous chapter-brought 
to light the fact that some of the more prominent members of the traditional leadership 
had been selling land to Jews. As noted, many of these were members of the Arab 
Executive. Members of the Supreme Muslim Council were also implicated, but the 
overall effect proved more damaging to those associated with moderation. Thus, during a 
meeting held the following year in Jaffa, the Nash5shlib! faction in particular was singled 
out for rapprochement for having sold land to Jews. 56 The French Report would prove a 
thorn in the Arab Executive's side, and as much as anything else brought about its 
eventual demise. The report implicated the very organisation that, if it harboured any 
hope of continuing to lead the nationalist movement, had actually to deal with it. It was 
not until 9 September 1932, that the Arab Executive began addressing the French Report, 
and then, only to defer further discussion until the next meeting. The growing 
inconsequence of the Arab Executive is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that they 
would not reconvene until October 1933, more than a year later. 57 
Command Paper Number 5479, Palestine, Palestine Royal Commission Report, Presented by the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, July 1937. Compare with 
Porath (1977) who provides figures of 12,533 and 37,337 respectively. See Porath, Riots to Rebellion, 
pp. 39-40. 
56Mir'al al-Sharq, 29 March 1933; also al-Jilmiah al- Arabiyyah, 27 March 1933. 
57 See, for instance, ZA, S/25,3557, report of 4 August 1933; also Porath, Riots to Rebellion, pp. 38-39. Its 
office met only once, on 19 May 1933, during the period in-between. Ibid. 
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The Arab Executive was fighting for its very survival, and the growing tension between 
58 Christians and Muslims did not help . Increased Jewish 
immigration due to the 
worsening situation in Europe was putting heavy pressure on the Arab Executive to be 
seen to be doing something. Its status was rapidly diminishing, and already some of its 
members had suggested the body's dissolution; many, particularly those affiliated with 
the Istiqldl Party, had already withdrawn. The Arab Executive managed to organise a 
number of demonstrations in October 1933, some of which even turned violent and 
resulted in the arrest of some of its members. A series of additional demonstrations were 
scheduled for later that fall, though in the end, nothing came of it, largely due to the 
influence of merchants and citrus growers fearful of the economic loss they would incur 
if demonstrations and strikes continued. 59 As usual, the traditional elite making up the 
leadership of the Arab Executive proved reluctant to promote the nationalist cause when 
it ran contrary to their own economic interests. 
Christians and the nationalist movement 
On the surface, cooperation between Muslims and Christians was still very much in 
evidence, though not anywhere near to the same extent as had been the case during the 
early part of the Mandate. Muslim-Christian solidarity was most apparent in women's 
organisations. Thus, for instance, on 15 April 1933, Muslim and Christian women 
organised a coordinated protest against Jewish immigration timed to correspond with 
Lord Allenby's visit to Jerusalem. The Arab Women's Association of Jerusalem marched 
in unison to the two most important Christian and Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem. Tarab 
'Abd al-Hadf, the Muslim wife of'Awn! 'Abd al-Hadli, spoke at the Church of the Holy 
58 See, for example, ZA, S/25,4143, Intelligence Report, 29 January 1933. 
59 Though officially, the reason given was that the "High Commissioner had promised to consider [the 
Arabs'] demands. See Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 46. AI-Jamiah al- Arabiyyah, 8 November 1933. 
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Sepulchre, while Matiel Mughannam, the Christian wife of Mughannam Ily5s 
60 Mughannam, spoke at the al-Aqsa Mosque. In some ways, women's organisations 
seemed better able to bridge the gap between religious communities and political factions 
than the mainstream (that is, men's) political parties. In many respects, this seemed their 
raison d'&re. 61 The Arab Women's Association, for instance, represented itself in overtly 
non-sectarian terms . 
62 Its president, Walid! a]-KChalidi, the wife of Husayn Fakhif al- 
Khdlidi, and one of its two secretaries, Mrs. Jamdl al-Husayff, were Muslim, while the 
other secretary, Matiel Mughannam, was Christian. 63 Though ostensibly its purpose was 
to assist poor and distressed Arab women, it was quite active politically. Other women's 
organisations included the Arab Union of Haifa, run by. Madame Sadj Nass5r, and the 
Arab Women's Society of Jaffa. Overall, Christian women featured quite prominently in 
such organisations, a reflection of the fact that, generally speaking, they were better 
64 
educated and had greater freedom of movement than their Muslim counterparts. In 
terms of the active role played by Christians, the women's organisations seemed to 
hearken back to the Muslim-Christian Associations of the early days of the Mandate. 
Women's organisations aside, however, the great majority of Christian Arabs were not 
happy with the direction the nationalist movement was taking. The British Deputy 
Inspector-General noted in the monthly CID Report for February 1933, that Christians 
60 Mrs. Matiel E. T. Mogannam, The Arab Woman and the Palestine Problem (London: Herbert Joseph 
Limited, 1937), p. 70; also Steuart Erskine, Palestine ofthe Arabs, pp. 93-100; also Steuart Erskine, 
Palestine ofthe Arabs (London: George G. Harrap and Company, Ltd., 1935), p. 182. 
61 See, for instance, FO 371/16926, CID Secret Report, dated 23 October 1933. 
62 See various declarations and official correspondences as presented in ý&s. Matiel E. T. Mogannarn, The 
Arab Woman and the Palestine Problem, pp. 67-102. 
61 lbid, p. 76. 
64 Ylana Miller, Government and Society in Rural Palestine, 1920-1948 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1985), p. 106. 
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were becoming concerned with the 'fanatic' policy being expressed in al-Jami'ah al- 
Isldmiyyah, a paper until then generally associated with moderation. 65 Immediately 
following the murder of the Christian journalist, Jam-il al-Bahri, the British Government 
began receiving petitions from Christian Arabs disavowing any connection with the 
national movement as well as with Muslims. 66 The following year, the I-Egh 
Commissioner commented that 
Christian Arab leaders ... 
have admitted to me that in establishing close 
political relations with the Moslems the Christians have not been 
uninfluenced by fear of the treatment they might suffer at the hands of 
67 
the Moslem majority in certain eventualities. 
For their part, Muslim expressions of anti-imperialist sentiment seemed increasingly 
directed at Christians per se. The Istiqldl Party organised a demonstration in Nablus 
protesting the dedication of the Y. M. C. A. in Jerusalem. 68 While ostensibly directed 
against Lord Allenby, who was to take part in the event, it also reflected a general 
antipathy among Muslims with respect to the YMCAs in general, which they very 
strongly associated with British imperialism. Not a single Christian took part in the 
demonstration. Christians were even finding themselves subjected to harassment in 
connection with events with which they clearly had nothing to do. Thus, for instance, it 
was noted in the Transjordanian Political Situation Report for the month of September 
1933 that the reaction in Jordan to the death of King Faysal of Iraq was a "somewhat 
65 FO 371/16926, CID Secret Report, dated 18 February 1933. 
66 Porath, The Emergence, p. 303. 
67 CO 733/202, secret dispatch, the High Commissioner to the Colonial Secretary. 
68Tibawi, Arab Education, p. 185. See also FO 371/16926, CID Secret Report, dated 2 May 1933, signed by 
Smith. 
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hysterical outburst of grief with a distinctly anti-European and anti-Christian bias. 1,69 
Many of the Muslim nationalist leaders, including Hajj Amin al-Husyan-1, were concerned 
about the growing hostility expressed by Muslims towards Christians. If nothing else, it 
was considered imperative to present a united front before the British, and attempts were 
made to ease tensions, and where necessary, reconcile the two communities. 70 
Many Christians had serious doubts as to whether Muslims accepted them at all as having 
a role in the nationalist movement. In the aforementioned letter to his son Sari, Khal-il al- 
SakdkThT noted bitterly that 
if the people love me and respect me, it is because they think that I am 
nearer to Islam than to Christianity, because I am wealthy in the Arabic 
language, because they fancy that I am a conservative and will not depart 
from Oriental customs under any circumstances. But if I were to struggle 
with a Moslem who is less founded in knowledge and heritage than I, I 
would not doubt that they would prefer him to survive. " 
Christians were finding it increasingly necessary to demonstrate their commitment to the 
cause by taking as radical a stance as possible towards the Government. It was becoming 
increasingly difficult for a Christian Arabs to come out against hard-line policies without 
making themselves suspect. Thus, for instance, when the Arab Executive was debating 
whether or not to continue organising strikes in the fall of 1933, Ya'qUb Farrdj and 
Mugharmarn Eyas Mughannam, came out strongly in favour. How sincere they were is 
another matter-as noted by Porath, as the Arab Executive's most prominent Christian 
69 Transjordanian Political Situation Report for the month of September 1933, signed by the Acting British 
Resident, and attached to the Minutes from the Colonial Office, 27 October 1933. 
70 Porath, The Emergence, p. 303; see also F0371/16926, CID Secret Report, I OMarch 1933. 
" Tsimhoni, "The Arab Christians and the National Movement, " p. 76. 
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members, Farrdj and Mughannam. could hardly afford to adopt a moderate stance at a 
time when the organisation was fighting for its very survival. 72 For most Christians, if the 
movement was going to take a radical turn, it was certainly preferable that it should do so 
under the leadership of the Arab Executive-theoretically at least, a role for Christians 
still existed in that body, arguably to a greater extent than might be hoped for within the 
framework of any other nationalist organisation, either existing or potential. Spawned in 
large part by the Muslim-Christian Associations, it had had a strong Christian presence 
from the beginning, a presence reckoned not only in numbers, but also in a qualitative 
sense-there they had a role in setting policy; conceivably, also in formulating 
Palestinian (that is, Arab) national identity and defining the kind of state to which they 
collectively aspired. 
Hajj Am-in 
On 16 January 1934, 'Id al-Filr, the Arab Executive called for demonstrations to take 
place in all the main towns. 73 The demonstrations went along peacefully enough, in large 
part because the turnout was so poor. The Arab Executive as a political entity was largely 
spent, the final knock-out blow coming only a few months later with the death of Masd 
K5zim al-HusaynT, its much revered President. 74 Whereas the status of the Arab 
Executive was in decline, that of Hajj AmTh was on the rise. Though reluctant to openly 
confront the government, he had nevertheless proved more adept at giving the impression 
at least that he was prepared and willing to do so. He was also more capable at political 
manipulation of the more traditional variety. In January 1933, the new Municipal 
Corporations Ordinance came into force, calling for elections for twenty municipal 
72 See, for example, Miralal-Sharq, 21 August 1933; also Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 62. 
73 Ibid, p. 46. 
74 For more details, see, for instance, FO 371/17878, CID Periodical Appreciation Summary, 8 March 
1934, and CID Periodical Appreciation Summary, 26 April 1934; FO 371/18957, CH) Periodical 
Appreciation Summary No. 8/35,20 April 1935; also Porath, Riots to Rebellion, pp. 4748. 
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councils, to be held later that year. Hajj AmIn quickly forged an alliance between the 
Husayff and Khalidi families against the Nashash-ib-is. Though the latter did well in Jaffa 
and Gaza, they were unsuccessful in Jerusalem-there, Rdghib al-Nash5shlib! lost the 
mayorship to Husayn al-KhdlidT. 75 Significantly, the vote was largely split along sectarian 
lines: in three out of four Muslim wards, the Husayms and KhWidi-s scored a clear-cut 
victory; the Nash5sh-lb-is by contrast won only one Muslim ward, though both Christian 
wards. 76 
Later that year, Hajj AmIn initiated a campaign through the Supreme Muslim Council 
against the selling of land to Jews. n In order to reach the smaller villages, he made 
extensive use of village sheikhs and preachers in the mosques. As part of his instruction 
campaign, it was argued that, on Islamic grounds, it was a sin to sell land to Jews. Those 
who broke the prohibition against the selling of land to Jews were threatened with being 
78 denied a Muslim burial .A number of other tactics were adopted as well. For instance, 
the Supreme Muslim Council sought to create new waqfs, as the sale of such endowed 
properfies was strictly forbidden by Islamic law. 79 Another tactic was to ensure that the 
shar7'a courts-which were controlled by the SMC-refiased to sanction the selling of 
75 lbid, pp. 62-63. 
76 See Ibid, pp. 63 -64. Concerning Christian support for RZighib al-Nash5sh-ibi, see below. 
77 See Ibid, pp. 95-96; also Ted Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry in the Great Revolt 
(1936-1939), " in Islam, Politics and SocialMovements, eds., E. Burke III and 1. Lapidus (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988), p. 188. 
78 Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 97. See also CO 733/234/2, translated article ftom al-Jamiah al- 
lsldmýyah, 27 March 1933, attached to official dispatch from Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, I April 1933. 
79 Uri M. Kupferschmidt, The SupremeMuslim Councib Islam under the British Mandatefor Palestine 
(Leiden; New York: E. J. Brill, 1987), p. 106. 
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land in which legal minors had a share. "' The campaign against the selling of land to 
Jews culminated with a large meeting of village sheikhs and elders, held in Jerusalem on 
29 December 1934. At the meeting, Hajj Amin issued a specialfatwa prohibiting the sale 
of land by Muslims to JeWS. 81 Those attending took an oath never to sell land to Jews or 
in any way facilitate the purchasing of land by Jews, and it was not long before thefatwa 
had been circulated throughout the country. The campaign well illustrated the link 
between Hajj Am-in's growing prominence in the nationalist movement and its 
Islamisation. 
Hajj Amlin further consolidated his position as the dominant Arab political figure in 
Palestine with the establishment in March 1935, of the Palestine Arab Party (al-Hizb al- 
ArabTal-Filastinji. The leadership of the party was dominated by well-educated 
Muslims, many of whom were religious functionaries. In general, they came from a more 
traditional background, with a fair number being members of notable rural families. 
Though its President was Jamd] al-Husayni, Hajj Amin's cousin, there was no question 
conceming who actually ran the party. During this period, Hajj Amin was also able to 
assert his authority over the extremist camp as a whole, most importantly, over the 
82 National Congress of Arab Youth and the Istiqldl Party. 
The splintering of the Opposition 
Even as Hajj Amin was consolidating his position, the Opposition was splintering into a 
number of rival political parties. The most important of these was probably the National 
"0 The sale of property by a custodian on behalf of a minor needed the consent of a sharta court. See 
Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 94, footnote 8 1. 
"' Nels Johnson, Islani and the Politics ofMeaning in Palestinian Arationalism (London: Kegan Paul 
International, 1982), p. 24; Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 97. 
132 AI-JdmiahaI-Arabiyyah, 7 September 1932; FO 371/16926, Periodical Appreciation Summary, 
10 August 193 3, and Periodical Appreciation Summary, 19 August 1933. 
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Defence Party (Hizh al-DiJaVal-Watanil-formed in December 1934-which stressed a 
platform of cooperation with the Government. Their policy was determined in large part 
by the fact that among its members were some of the richest landowners, orange-growers, 
and entrepreneurs in Palestine. 83 The party enjoyed the support of many of the local 
councils as well as several important newspapers, including al-Jdmiah al-Isldmiyyah, 
84 FilaslTn, Mir& al-Sharq, and al-Difa- . 
It a] so enjoyed the support of a many of the 
more notable landowners, among which were some of the more important citrus 
cultivators. 85 Two other Opposition parties quickly followed, the Reform Party (Hizb al- 
JSIdh86 ), under Husayn al-Kh5lidl , 
87 and the National Bloc Party (Hizb al-Kutla al- 
Wataniyya 88), under'Abd al-Lafff Sal5h, a Nablusite lawyer. 89 
Christians were affiliated with all three parties to one degree or another. The National 
Defence Party enjoyed strong support among Christians, who were well represented on 
its Central Committee, constituting three out of its twelve members. 90 These were Ya'q5b 
Farrdj, the Greek Orthodox Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem who was its Vice President, the 
Protestant Mughannarn Eyas Mughannam, one of its two Secretaries, and 'Isd al-'Isd, the 
"3 Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 67. 
"' See FO 371/18957, CID Periodical Appreciation Summary, 30 January 1935. 
85 Erskine, Palestine of the Arabs, p. 177. 
86 hi Arabic, Hizb at-Islah. 
137 See Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 64. 
In Arabic, Hizb al-Kutlah al-Wataniyyah. 
'39 See Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. pp. 78-79. 
90 lbid, p. 64. 
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proprietor of Filastin. 91 Two of the major Christian-run newspapers-Filastin and Mir'61 
al-Sharq-were strong supporters of the National Defence Party. The Reform Party 
counted as one of its secretaries the Protestant, Shibl! Jamal, 92 and among the leadership 
of the National Bloc Party was Fu'dd BustdnT, a Christian lawyer from Beirut, who 
served as its Secretary General. 
The great majority of Christians still supported political moderation. The Christian-run 
paper Mir'& al-Sharq went so far as to demonstrate a strong willingness to compromise 
with the Zionists. Commenting on a proposal for cantonisation put forward by the 
Hebrew daily Dolar Ha-Yom, Mirlat al-Sharq noted in a favourable tone that the Arab 
journalist YUsuf al-Isa, the brother of 'Isd al-'Isd and cofounder of FilastTn, had 
suggested the same proposal several years earlier. 93 The same newspaper, when later 
discussing the possibility of uniting Palestine with Trans-Jordan, even acknowledged that 
the Jews should have a say in the matter, something tantamount to saying they had 
political rights with respect to Palestine! 94 It would be a mistake to see Christians as 
being opposed to radicalism across the board, and there were a number who fell in with 
the Husayn-I camp. Thus, serving on the party bureau for the Palestine Arab Party was not 
only Alfred Rok (as might be expected), but Emil al-GawhiT, a Latin Catholic and the 
Party's Secretary, and Michel 'Azar. While to some extent, this reflected the historical 
tendency of Catholics to affiliate with the HusaynT family, it was also indicative of the 
fact that these individuals actually tended towards radicalism. Emil al-Gawhri, for 
example, was active in connection with the militant organisation, al-Jihad aI-Muqaddas9-' 
91 Mogarmam, The Arab Woman, pp. 237-238; also MjraIaI-Sharq, 5 December 1934. 
92 Mogannam, The Arab Woman, p. 243. 
93 Mirat al-Sharq, 29 September 1933. 
9' lbid, 7,14 March 1934. 
95 In Arabic, alJih5dal-Muqaddas. 
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(see below). 96 While there was never any question that the base of Hajj Am-in's support 
was the Muslim peasantry, 
97 their inclusion might be understood as an attempt to reach 
out to Christian S. 98 
Al-QassAm 
In the fall of 1935, a chain of events was initiated which would see the nationalist 
movement shift irreversibly towards extremism, eventually culminating in the General 
Strike and the Great Revolt. On 18 October 193 5, an arms shipment hidden in a cargo of 
cement imported from Belgium and destined for a Jewish merchant was discovered in 
Jaffa harbour. 99 At a mass meeting held in Nablus in early November, some of the 
younger, more radical participants called for a more militant policy against the 
Government. Later that month, a'Jewish police sergeant was killed in the countryside just 
outside of Haifa by a militant group centred round the Young Men's Muslim Association 
in Haifa and led by the radical Islamic reformer Sheikh 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam. He in turn 
was killed several days later, on 21 November 1935, in a gun battle with pursing police 
officers near Ya'bad. 100 The funeral of Sheikh 'Izz al-D-in al-Qassdin transformed into a 
nationalist demonstration, and al-Qass5m was immediately hailed as a national hero. 101 
96 He was , in fact, one of three Christians involved with that organisation. 
97 See FO 371/16926, CID Secret Report, dated 18 February 1933. 
98 Don Peretz, The Middle East Today, Sixth Edition (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994), p. 29 1. 
99 Johnson, Islam and the Politics ofMeaning, p. 44. 
100 See Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 116. 
101 Johnson, Islam and the Politics ofMeaning, p. 45. 
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This was the first time an Arab militant group had come into open confrontation with the 
British authorities since the early days of the Mandate. Until now, attacks had been 
directed primarily at Jews, and in fact, al-Qassdm's organisation had initiated its militant 
campaign several years prior by attacking Jewish settlements in the Jezreel valley. 102 
Starting in 193 5, while campaigning among the peasantry against the selling of land to 
Jews, al-Qassdm began actively recruiting peasant youths. 103 It was following the 
discovery that October of the arms shipment in Haifa supposedly headed for Jews, that 
al-Qassam decided the time had come to initiate a campaign of guerrilla warfare. It was 
while looking for a suitable base in the hills of northern Samaria, from where he might 
later launch armed attacks against both the Government and Jewish settlers, that the 
above incident occurred. 
In many respects, al- Qassdrn's militant group heralded those affiliated with the Great 
Revolt. Many of these latter would in fact base themselves on al-Qassdm's group. 104 Al- 
Qassdm. and his followers operated independently of the traditional leadership and were 
intimately connected with the peasantry, inclusive of those recently migrated to the cities 
and larger towns seeking employment. Al-Qass&n appealed to Islamic sensibilities rather 
than secular nationalist ones, and his group bore a distinctly Islamic character. 'O' In many 
respects, it resembled a Sufi order-his followers referred to themselves as sheikhs and 
allowed their beards to grow wild, and frequently associated their struggle with the wars 
against the Crusaders centuries earlier. 106 All its members were imbued with a message of 
strict piety, and were encouraged to emulate early Islamic heroes. 107 
'02 For more details concerning al-QassZim's involvement in the attack, see Porath, Riots to Rebellion, 
p. 135. 
10'ZA S/25,4127, Report from Haifa, 24 January 1935, concerning recruiting activities of al-Qassam. 
104 Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry, " p. 190. 
105 Johnson, Islam and the Politics ofMeaning, p. 46. 
'0' lbid, p. 190. 
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Al-Qassdm himself was a graduate of al-Azhar, and a student of Muhammad 'Abduh, 
with whom he shared a similar outlook. After being sentenced to death in absentia by a 
French military court for his militant activities against the mandate government in Syria, 
he had fled to Haifa, where he became established as a teacher in the Haifa Islamic 
school and shortly thereafter, as a preacher in the new Istiqldl Mosque. He was later 
appointed as a marriage registrar in the local sharta court. 'O' It was not long before he 
became a leading figure in the nationalist movement, in large part based on his affiliation 
with the Young Men's Muslim Association in Haifa, which he himself had helped 
establish, together with Rashid al-Hajj IbrAh-im-the selfsame director of the Haifa waqf 
who had figured so prominently in the murder-case of Jamil Bahff, the Christian editor of 
al-Zuhi7r. Unlike most other political activists in Palestine at the time, al-Qassdm focused 
his efforts exclusively on the lower classes among whom he lived. '09 He was later able to 
extend these efforts to the surrounding countryside on the basis of his position as 
marriage registrar, which required that he frequently tour the northern villages! 10 By 
1932, he had begun to achieve national prominence, and was elected acting president of 
the national conferences of YMMAs. 111 From an early point, al-Qassdm had become 
actively involved with the growing militant movement centred round the local YMMA, 
107 Ibid, p. 189. 
10" lbid, pp. 3 9-4 1. 
109 For instance, he set up a night school to combat illiteracy amongst the migrant labourers occupying the 
Haifa shantytowns. Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry, " p. 189. See also Johnson, Islam 
and the Politics ofMeaning, p. 40. 
"0 Thus, he encouraged peasants in the villages to set up growing and distribution cooperatives. 
Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry, " p. 189. 
111 AI-Jfim Pah al-'Arabzýyah, 21 July 193 2. 
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and was one of the nascent movement's principal organizers! 12 The authority he enjoyed 
was based in large part on his reputation for Islamic piety, something shared by his 
immediate followers, who fulfilled the precept of prayer five times a day and would often 
read from the Qur'dn and speak of the merits ofjihad and self-sacrifice. 
113 It was largely, 
in fact, on the basis of his religious reputation that al-Qassam was able to recruit 
followers. 114 
Aside from a few members of the religious establishment in Haifa, almost all of his 
followers came from the lower strata of society, being either peasants living in the small 
villages surrounding Haifa, or recently migrated labourers residing in Haifa itself 115 The 
majority of them, whether living in the villages or as migrant-workers in the cities and 
larger towns still saw their primary identity as an Islamic one. As such, they were easily 
drawn by leadership figures who defined the nationalist cause in Islamic terms, and who 
behaved as exemplary Muslims. This is not to say that they did not see their identity as 
also being Palestinian Arab. For the majority of Muslim peasants, however, even this 
identity was informed first and foremost by a sense of Islamic communalism; likewise it 
was an identity understood primarily in connection with Palestine's Islamic significance. 
This aspect of Palestinian Arab identity had become particularly pronounced following 
the Wailing Wall riots. The majority of those who had participated in the riots had been 
drawn from the Muslim peasantry, their involvement having been solicited through an 
appeal to religious sensibilities in connection with the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem. 
The World Islamic Conference of 1931 had only served to accentuate this tendency. 
112 Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 132. 
113 Ibid, p. 136; also Lesch, Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917-1939: the Frustration ofa NationalMovement 
(Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1979), p. 108. 
"' Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry, " p. 199. 
115 Johnson, Islam and the Politics ofMeaning, p. 40; also Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 137. 
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The formalisation of Islamic practice 
It is worth considering at this point why the peasantry were so drawn to militant figures 
of a strongly religious character. For centuries the peasantry had practiced what might 
best be thought of as a traditional, and decidedly flexible, form of Islam, one that did not 
necessarily translate into support for an Islamic political movement. What would 
distinguish the revolt in Palestine from similar movements in other parts of the Middle 
East was the strong support it enjoyed among the peasantry. 116 This might be contrasted, 
for instance, with the situation in Egypt, where nationalist activity was largely an urban 
phenomenon, and very few of the peasantry actually became involved. Much of this 
reflected geography. Unlike the situation pertaining in Egypt, peasants in Palestine were 
in regular close contact with larger urban centres. Often, a town and its respective 
satellite villages were collectively known by the name of the former (Jabal Nablus or 
Jabal Hebron, for instance). Significantly, such designations reflected not only physical 
proximity, but what were strong social, economic and political connections as well. The 
changes brought about by the reforms of the mid-nineteenth century, together with 
increased European economic penetration, impacted on town-village relations in a 
profound way, not least in the way Muslim peasants understood and practiced their faith. 
Changes wrought in this respect would make them more predisposed to support militant 
nationalist movements of an Islamic character during the Mandate. What had been a more 
traditional and flexible form of religious practice became increasingly legalistic, less 
based on existing practice and more on a 'correct' interpretation. As such, it was one 
more susceptible to control by Islamic 'authority-figures. ' 
Recapping what was discussed in the first chapter, the relationship between local elites 
and the peasantry had through the early part of the nineteenth century been at least 
partially one of mutual obligation. That the former, made up of urban notables and 
country sheikhs, had the better end of the deal is without question. At the same time, the 
peasantry was not without some leverage, inasmuch as the ability of local elites to rule 
116 fbid, p. 137. 
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was in no small part dependent on the willingness of the peasantry to accept their 
authority. 117 This was all the more so given that there often existed strong internal 
rivalries between various notable families, such that each family sought to attract the 
largest number of supporters. A good deal of effort was devoted to cultivating good 
relations with members of the peasantry in order to elicit their backing, often enough 
through patronage. Moreover, the ability of notables to maintain their authority depended, 
in many respects, on their reputations, something determined in large part by what one 
might deem an Islamic criterion-whether one held an important position within an 
Islamic institution, as a qddl- or a mufiT, at the very least, whether one enjoyed a 
reputation as a good Muslim (as being just, honest, hospitable, and so forth). With the 
appropriation of newly created administrative structures by local elites, elites moreover 
driven increasingly by commercial considerations, the peasantry soon lost this leverage. 
Power was increasingly defined by one's position in the new administrative structure, and 
was no longer dependent on tacit support from below. 
It is worth examining more closely the changing role of the country sheikh as this 
perhaps best exemplifies the process by which the relationship between local elites and 
the peasantry was so radically altered. While enjoying a certain degree of authority, it 
was an authority that, to an even greater degree than had been the case with the urban 
notables, was dependent on the goodwill of the peasantry. Thus, as observed by Elizabeth 
Anne Finn, the wife of the mid-nineteenth century British consul James Finn, members of 
the peasantry were quite likely to resist an arbitrary application of the law by any given 
sheikh. "[S]hould he utter a decision or express an opinion contrary to the traditionary 
code, he is liable to be corrected, and to have his sentence questioned by the merest 
child. ""8 She further observed that sheikhs took great pride in being sought after and 
1" Dick Douwes, The Ottomans in Syria, A History ofJustice and Oppression (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 
pp. 71-72. 
118 Elizabeth Anne Finn, Palestine Peasantry Notes on Their Clans, Warfare, Religion and Laws, London 
and Edinburgh: Marshall Brothers, Limited, 1923, p. 2 1. 
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respected in connection with their ability to dispense justice wisely. "9 Country sheikhs 
were expected to look after the welfare of the peasantry, both in mediating between the 
villages and neighbouring urban centres, and in maintaining law and order within the 
villages themselves. As with the urban notables, the trust and respect accorded country 
sheikhs had, in many ways, a religious dimension, defined on the basis of the 
aforementioned 'Islamic virtues'-that he should be pious, that he was considered fair 
and just, and so forth. 
It was an Islam of the most informal kind, defined more by tradition and recognized 
practice than legalism, often enough incorporating folk religious practices. Thus, for 
instance, very few villages had mosques. More common were shrines (maqams) 
dedicated to saints (walis), and nearly every village had at least one where peasants might 
plead for holy intercession. 120 Religious practice was defined by a set of legal and 
cultural norms, best defined by the term 'urf As described by Elizabeth Finn, sheikhs 
ruled by "a code of unwritten traditional laws, " some of which could be traced to the 
Qur'dn (shar'iyyat Muhammad), but others only to regional codes. Thus, in the south of 
Palestine, cases were often judged under the 'Law of Abraham' (shar'iyyal KhalTo. 
Qur'dnic law was generally associated with the cities, and it was noted that the 
cc peasantry always prefer(red] the law of Abraham to that of the Koran, [moreover that] it 
[was] administered by the sheikh and the elder. " 121 Often, legal codes drew on Bedouin 
"9 lbid, p. 22. 
120 Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry, " p. 172. See also Beshara Downani, Rediscovering 
Palestine: TheMerchants andPeasants ofJahaINahlus, 1700-1900 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995), page 167; Porath, The Emergence, p. 9. For a first-hand observation, see James Finn, Stirring 
Times: OrRecordsfrom Jerusalem Consular Chronicles of 1853 to 1856, Volume I, ed., Elizabeth Anne 
Finn (London: C. Kegan Paul and Company, 1878), p. 216. 
121 Finn, Palestine Peasantry, pp. 20-21. See also Finn, Stirring Times, p. 216; and Ermete Pierotti, 
Customs and Traditions ofPalestine, Illustrating theManners ofthe Ancient Hebrews, trans., T. G. Bonney 
(Cambridge: Deighton, Bell and Company, 1864), pp. 201-202. Concerning the'Law of Abraham, ' see 
also Gabriel Baer, "The Office and Functions of the Village Mukhtar" in Palestinian Society and Politics, 
ed., Joel S. Migdal (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 120-12 1. 
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social norms. Thus, in the area around Bethlehem, Elizabeth Finn noted that, in certain 
cases, sheikhs found it necessary to resort to ' 'Bedawy or wild Arab code. "122The ability 
to resort to different codes of law allowed the country sheikh a certain degree of 
flexibility in discharging his responsibilities, particularly those of ajudicial nature. 123 
Judicial arrangements were generally based on rural custom and trials were held before 
the sheikh S, 124 such that village peasants rarely took recourse to the formal Islamic 
courts. 125 In fact, as one missionary noted, it was generally considered preferable to 
"settle their disputes so far as possible without resort to the govemment. "1261ndeed, 
among many of the peasantry, it was considered that "going to accuse in towns show[ed] 
a decadence of their independence. 7A27 
As long as the interests of these rural elite coincided with those of their respective 
villages, the system worked reasonably well. With the institution of the Tanzimat 
reforms, however, the status of the country sheikhs as mediators between town and 
village began to erode. 128 In connection with this, their authority became less based on 
'22 Finn, Palestine Peasantry, p. 24. See also Dournani, Rediscovering Palestine, p. 28. 
12' Baer, "The Office and Functions of the Village Mukhtar, " p. 120. 
17A See, for instance, Pierotti, Customs and Traditions, pp. 209-209. 
125 Porath, The Emergence, p. 9; Dournani, Rediscovering Palestine, pp. 28,152; and Moshe Ma'oz, 
Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861, The Impact of the Tanzimat on Politics and Society 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1968, p. 156. 
126EIihu Grant, The People ofPalestine, an EnlargedEdition of 'The PeasantryofPalestine, Life, Manners 
and Customs of the Village'(Westport, Connecticut: Hyperion Press Inc., 1921, reprinted 1976), p. 227. 
127 Philip J. Baldensperger, "Morals of the Fellahin (Answers to Questions), " Palestine Exploration Fund 
Quarterly Statement, 1897, p. 124; also p. 127. 
128 See, for instance, Dournani, Rediscovering Palestine, p. 179. 
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whatever personal qualities might have earned them the respect of the peasant class, and 
more on their political position as defined within the rapidly consolidating Ottoman 
hierarchy. As discussed in the first chapter, they were transformed into servants of the 
state wherein their authority stemmed entirely from the urban centre. '29Those able to 
take advantage of newly arising commercial opportunities soon aligned their interests 
with the developing merchant class. What remaining status they enjoyed with respect to 
the peasantry became the basis for their exploitation. Thus, for instance, in an effort to 
compete with other merchants in gaining access to the surplus crops needed for the 
manufacture of various goods, textiles or soap, country sheikhs sought to use their 
position of authority in the villages and the relationships they had cultivated to their own 
advantage. Moreover, as with their urban counterparts, country sheikhs increasingly 
sought to define their right of exploitation as one of legal prerogative. 130 
The peasantry was no longer able to rely on the country sheikhs, neither the urban 
notables, forjustice, and increasingly its members found it necessary to take recourse to 
the formal judiciary institutions of the Islamic courts in the larger urban centres. Often 
enough, recourse to the urban-based Islamic courts was for the purpose of challenging the 
authority of the country sheikhs, the exercise of which seemed increasingly arbitrary. As 
expressed by Doumani, for many peasants the "best of hope of carving out a political 
space for themselves lay in involving the state and appealing to its sense ofjustice. "131 
This phenomenon was perhaps most evident in the prono unced rise of cases appearing in 
the Islamic courts duringthis period. 132 This process extended beyond mere court visits. 
129 Country sheikhs had become little more than tax collectors and rural administrators, their authority 
stemming entirely from the urban-centre. See ibid, p. 170. 
130 See, for example, ibid, pp. 142,153,167. 
131 Ibid, pp. 169,175. One might contrast this was the situation as it had stood earlier, when the peasantry 
made every effort to avoid state institutions! (See above. ) 
132 lbid, p. 180. 
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Islamic law increasingly came to provide guidelines with respect to business practices, 
the resolution of social conflicts, and the defining of social roles (for instance, on the 
basis of gender). 133 Indeed, over the course of the Mandate, the number of cases handled 
by the shat-id courts would continuously rise, particularly towards the end. 134 
Interestingly enough, this phenomenon would be particularly pronounced in those cities 
and towns-for instance, Haifa and Jaffa-that were mixed and had large Christian 
populations. 135 The Islam practiced by the peasantry was becoming increasingly tied to 
Islamic legal institutions. As such, it constituted an important factor in what Doumani 
refers to as the 'urbanisation' of Islamic practice among the peasantry. 136 
At the same time, folk practices were increasingly coming under attack by religious 
reformers. Al-Qass5m was exactly one such reformer, establishing a reputation for 
himself during the 1920s by attacking folk religious practices, then still common in the 
Haifa area, as being un-Islamic. 137 Mosques preaching Islamic orthodoxy replaced 
maqams (saints' shrines) as centres of village worship, and peasants were increasingly 
educated as to which practices were authentically 'Islamic. A38 Through this process, the 
peasantry was becoming increasingly conscious of their identity as an Islamic one in a 
radically new way. Where previously recognised as an inherent aspect of a traditional 
mode of living, it was now taking on a new dimension; it was an identity less defined by 
133 Ibid. 
13' Though it would appear that this phenomenon was not as strong in the north of Palestine as elsewhere. 
Kupferschmidt, The Supreme Muslim Council, pp. 98-100,106. 
135 Ibid, p. 100. 
136 See Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, p. 167. 
137 Schleifer S. Abdullah, "The Life and Thought of 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam, " in The Islamic Quarterly 22, 
no. 2 (1979), p. 68. 
138 Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry, " p. 177. 
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practice and more by ideal, an Islam defined less by tradition and more in connection 
witli its formal institutions-by extension, it was an Islam within which there was a right 
practice and wrong practice, based no longer on utility but more on archetypes. 
Significantly, it provided the basis of a definable shared Islamic identity. As expressed by 
Doumani, "Islamic law offer[ed] a common denominator or... a set of shared reference 
points that made it an appealing framework at a time when market relations were carving 
an ever-larger space in the hinterlands of the interiors. " 1'9 It was also an identity that 
might be set in opposition to other identities, as the particulars of what the former should 
entail-as far as proper Islamic behaviour and beliefs- became more rigidly defined. 
Significantly, this formalisation of Islamic practice would also play a crucial role in 
determining how the peasantry came to view the notable class. 
For a large majority of the peasantry, their sense of Islamic self-identity had, during the 
latter part of the nineteenth century become more particularistic and more pronounced. In 
this sense, it was also more susceptible to appropriation by nationalist leaders of a certain 
religious qualification during the Mandate. By the mid-1930s, it is not surprising that a 
figure such as al-Qassam should have had such a strong appeal among the peasantry, a 
peasantry that was becoming increasingly literate and politically aware as well. Figures 
such as al-Qass5m, more than just representing a continuation of the process of religious 
reform, situated it within the context of the nationalist movement. Through such reform, 
he sought to instil within the peasantry a commitment to the nationalist cause founded on 
religious discipline and piety. As described by Schleifer, for al-Qassam, 
[t]he perfect mujahid helps the poor, feeds the hungry, comforts the sick 
and visits his relatives, and all of these good deeds must be crowned by 
constant prayer. Therefore the mujahid must concentrate upon his 
prayer. 140 
139 Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, p. 167. 
"0 S. Abdullah Schleifer, "The Life and Thought of 'Izz-id-din al-Qassam, " p. 71. 
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Put another way, "the virtues precede[d] bravery or militancy as a prerequisite to 
fighfing. "141 In like manner, Johnson characterises al-Qassam's movement as 
'redemptive' and goes on to note that such a characterisation in fact became quite 
fashionable during the late-1930s in Palestine among Muslims themselves (here referring 
to the frequent use of the tennfida', meaning 'redemption' or 'ransoming'). 142 As he 
goes on to note, al 
, -Qass5m's 
message extended beyond a call to wage holy war. "He 
preached a reformed and more fundamentalist Islam, and believed that only those who 
were themselves pious could be the salvation of the country. "'43 
An emphasis on Islam, in addition to drawing the lower social strata into the national 
movement, also provided a shared understanding between them and the more educated 
strata, in particular, those Muslims among the professional class and what was a fast 
growing pool of newly educated Muslim youth who aspired to a salafli version of Arab 
nationalism (as discussed above). Members of both groups tended to affiliate with the 
various YMMA branches. As Porath notes, "the necessity for struggle against the British 
Mandate and Zionism overcame the barriers between the higher and educated strata and 
lower classes. But it should be bome in mind that this happened when the struggle was 
expressed and understood as an Islamic necessity [emphasis his]. ý9144 Haj AmTn al- 
Husayff, for his part, would evoke this older religious criterion in challenging the more 
moderate members of the traditional leadership, many of whom could count themselves 
among the elite on the basis of little more than their wealth. Given the perceptions held 
by the peasantry with respect to this element of the traditional leadership-that they were 
141 Ibid. 
142 Johnson, Islam and the Politics ofMean ing, p. 3 1. 
143 Ibid, p. 4 1. 
144 Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 137; also Johnson, Islam and the Politics ofMeaning, p. 46. 
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unwilling to put the nationalist cause before their own economic interests-it would 
prove an effective means of challenging their authority. 
The General Strike 
On 25 November 1935, the leaders of five of the six major Arab parties (the exception 
being the Istiqlýfl Party) submitted ajoint memorandum to the High Commissioner. In it, 
they reiterated their national demands: the immediate stoppage of Jewish immigration; 
the cessation of land sales to Jews; and the establishment of a democratic government in 
Palestine in accordance with the terrns of the covenant of the League of Nations 
(inclusive of the development of self-governing institutions). In the meantime, tensions 
between Arabs and Jews continued to rise. On 15 April 1936, two Jews were killed 
during a highway hold-up near Tulkarm, most likely by members of the militant group 
IkhwCzn aI-Qassdm. 145 Shortly thereafter, two Arab peasants were murdered near the 
Jewish settlement of Petah-Tikvah. The funeral of one of the murdered Jews, held two 
days later in Tel Aviv, quickly evolved into an angry demonstration, igniting a series of 
assaults on Arabs living in the vicinity. Arab mobs responded two days later by attacking 
Jews in Jaffa and killing three of them. The Government responded by ordering a curfew, 
and a state of emergency was declared. A few days later, a nationalist conference was 
convened in Nablus, and a national committee formed, which resolved to carry out a 
general strike involving all Arabs engaged in labour, transport and shop keeping until 
nationalist demands were met. The leaders of the six major Arab parties (again excluding 
the Istiql5l Party) agreed with the decision to strike, and national committees were 
established almost immediately in all the Arab towns and villages. 
With the complete radicalisation of the nationalist movement, Hajj Amfin a]-Husayn! and 
his faction quickly came to the fore. As already noted, though part of the traditional 
leadership, Hajj AmTn had proven considerably more astute than his rivals in adapting his 
145 The Ikhwiýn al-Qass6m (Brethren of al-Qass5m) sought to rally the peasantry to the nationalist cause by 
upholding Shcikh'lzz al-Din al-QassAm as a martyr. 
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rhetoric to the evolving situation. Even as representatives of the major Arab parties were 
convening in Nablus, Hajj AmTh sent one of his closest followers to Jerusalem to 
organise a gathering of Muslim youth there. Hajj Arran's ability to assume control of the 
nationalist movement required among other things that he dissociate himself from the 
traditional leadership. As noted above, one of the main challenges to the traditional 
leadership during the 1930s came from the Istiqlal Party, which had sought to take 
advantage of the peasantry's disaffection with the notables in order to transform the 
nationalist movement into a populist one. Hajj Armn had by the mid-I 930s managed to 
assert a fair amount of control over the Istiqlal Party, and many of its members had in fact 
come to join his own Palestine Arab Party, thus providing him with a base of support 
apart from the traditional framework of leadership. 146 It might be added that the inclusion 
of such individuals also had the effect of forcing Hajj Am7in to adopt a more militant 
stance. 
HajJ Am-in was soon able to assert his authority over the other parties as well. To a large 
extent, events had begun to take on a momentum of their own, and the traditional 
leadership had until now been more or less simply reacting to events. They now began to 
take steps to gain control of the movement. On 25 April, the Supreme Arab Council, 
consisting of ten members representative of all the major Arab parties (with the initial 
exception of the Istiqlal Party), was established to act as a coordinating body. In short 
time, this would become the Higher Arab Committee (the HAQ, 147 vAth HaJ AmYn al- 
HusaynT as its President. Christians were represented on the Committee by the Greek 
Catholic Alfred Rok (affiliated with Hajj Amin's Palestine Arab Party) and Ya'qfa-b Farrdj 
(of the Nashashibi camp). 148 The Higher Arab Committee confirmed the decision to 
strike, and declared that it would continue until nationalist demands were met. With the 
146 Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry, p. 186. 
147 hi Arabic, al-Lajnah al-'Arobiyyah al-'Aliýyah. 
148 Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 165. 
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one notable exception of Haifa (see below), what carne to be known as the General Strike 
would prove successful throughout Palestine and would continue until October despite 
the hardship it caused Palestine's Arabs. 
The period leading up to the General Strike saw a proliferation of militant organisations. 
There was of course the aforementioned Ikhwczn at-QassC7m, led by one of Sheikh 'Izz al- 
Din al-Qassdm's followers, Sheikh Farhan al-Sa'd7i. Another one of al-Qass,; bn's 
followers, KhalTl Muhammad 'Tsd, formed a militant group called the Dervishes. Another 
similar organisation was the aforementioned AI-Jihad al-Muqaddas, which emerged in 
the Jerusalem area some time in 193 1, under the leadership of 'Abd al-Qddir al-Husayn-i, 
the son of MUsd Kdzim. Beginning in May 1934, they called for open rebellion, and 
taking refuge in the hills surrounding Jerusalem, began attacking passing vehicles and 
nearby military installations. Another militant organisation was the Green Palm of the 
Hand'49 established in 1932 with the purpose of committing terrorist attacks. Though 
mostly based in Hebron, it had branches in other Palestinian towns and villages. 
Beginning in 1935, a group calling itself the Revolting Youth'50 became active in the 
Tulkarm-Qalqilya area. Other militant groups starting up around the same time included 
the Black Hand and Young Palestine. 
Christian involvement in the various militant groups was not entirely absent. Thus, for 
example, there were some Christians active in A I-Jihad al-Muqaddas. Three of its 
seventeen members were Christian in fact, among them, the aforementioned Emil al- 
Ghawri. 151 That said, the overwhelming majority of those militantly active were Muslim. 
The great majority of the rank-and-file of such organisations, in fact, came from the 
peasantry. As such, they were generally more inspired by Islamic sentiment than secular 
nationalism. Correspondingly, most of the militant groups were inspired by and modelled 
149 In Arabic, al-Kaff al-KhadW. 
150 hi Arabic, al-Shabi5b al-Thair. 
151 Porath, Rio is to Rebellion, p. 13 1. 
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themselves after al-Qassdm's organisation. ' 12 In most cases, the peasantry's involvement 
in the nationalist movement was channelled through local mosques, or the local branches 
of the YMMA. "' The importance of these institutions soon became readily apparent with 
respect to the organisation of militant activity. Even such an avowedly non-religious 
organisation as the Palestine Communist Party felt it necessary at its Seventh Congress to 
call for increased propaganda efforts at the mosques during Friday prayers and at popular 
religious festivals such as the Nabi Musa festival, noting that it was "during such mass 
celebrations that the fighting capacity of the fellahin [was] appreciably aroused. " 154 
On 7 May, representatives of the various national committees met in Jerusalem under the 
auspices of the Higher Arab Committee. In spite of the High Commissioner's appeals to 
desist, the Conference called for a continuation of the strike; also for an Arab refusal to 
pay taxes, to begin on 15 May, if by that date the British Government had not met their 
demands. Additionally, they called for the stoppage of municipal government. 155 By 
12 May, the Arab Chamber of Commerce had joined the General Strike, and on 15 May, 
the public was called on to implement the decision concerning non-compliance with tax- 
payment. Arab government officials, a large number of whom were Christian, found 
themselves in a particularly difficult position, and while some working in the Public 
Works Department went on strike, they were the exception. The vast majority refused to 
join in, rather agreeing in the end to relinquish a tenth of their salaries to a strike fund. 
Additionally, on 30 June, 137 Arab senior officials and judges submitted a signed 
memorial to the High Commissioner in support of the strike in principle, arguing that 
152 Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry, " p. 190. 
153 See, for instance, Johnson, Islam and the Politics ofMeaning, p. 18. 
"' Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry, " p. 187. 
155 Anne Mosely Lesch, "The Palestine Arab Nationalist Movement under the Mandate, " The Politics of 
Palestinian Nationalism, eds., William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber, and Anne Mosely Lesch (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1973), pp. 34-35. 
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distrust of the Government was justified, and threatening resignation in the event that 
JeNNrish immigration was not at least temporarily suspended. 156 Among those drafting the 
memorial was the Christian Arab, George Antonius. Interestingly enough, HaJj Amin 
found himself in a similar situation-as head of the Higher Arab Committee, he came 
under pressure to place the Supreme Muslim Council on strike. At the same time, he was 
technically a government employee. In the end, he opted for a partial strike, closing down 
the Council's main offices, while keeping open the sharl-a courts, the waqf 
administration, the mosques, and the poor relief services. 157 
Christian involvement in the Strike was initially fairly strong. Thus, among those 
organisations directing the strike at the ground level were Christian sports clubs. "' The 
one notable exception in this respect was Haifa. While it was not only Haifa's Christians 
that showed a disinclination to participate in the Strike, their general apathy as a 
community would very quickly become a source of tension between them and the city's 
Muslims. 1'9 Significantly, Muslim-Christian solidarity in Haifa had never been 
particularly strong-even at the height of Muslim-Christian solidarity, the Christian 
community there had chosen to maintain for itself separate political representation apart 
from the Muslim community. Thus, instead of an MCA, Haifa had from the beginning 
two separate Muslim and Christian Associations. 160 Christian enthusiasm for the strike 
waned after a time, something that no doubt reflected the fact that Christians suffered 
from the disruption of economic activity caused by the strike a good deal more than their 
1-56 Thid; also Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 170. 
1.57 Usch, "The Palestine Arab Nationalist Movement, " pp. 34-35. 
1-58 lbid, p. 3 4. 
159 ZA, S/25,3 252, Arab Bureau News, 12 July 1936, concerning conflict between Muslims and Christians 
in Haifa. See also Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 177. 
160 Porath. The Emergence, pp. 276-277. 
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Muslim compatriots. 161 Before long, many were resisting compliance. Thus, it was not 
uncommon that Christians were threatened by Muslim gangs demanding exorbitant sums 
of money as a demonstration of their loyalty to the nationalist movement. 162 Towards the 
163 end, Christians were generally reluctant to carry on with the strike , something that 
caused some tension with the Muslim majority. 164 
The Great Revolt 
The British took an unyielding position, 16' refusing to consider Arab demands, nor to 
suspend immigration (in May, the Government even announced the next six-month 
166 labour immigration quota) until the strike came to an end . It was not 
long before the 
General Strike evolved into outright revolt, particularly as the focus of activity shifted to 
the countryside. By mid-May, peasant bands had begun proliferating in the highlands. 
Militants inspired by the example of al-Qassdm-and hence often described as 
161 Esco Foundation for Palestine, Palestine, A Study ofJewish, Arab, and British Policies, Volume I (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), p. 552. 
'Q See, for instance, Filasffn, 15 July 1936, though the author claims that this was, in fact, a lie perpetrated 
by the Jews, and that the money was given voluntarily, as Christians were completely devoted to the 
nationalist cause. 
'63 Thus, for instance, the Christian-run FilastTn was the first newspaper to call for its end. Porath, Riots to 
Rebellion, p. 212, article appearing 16 September 1936. 
16' See, for instance, Filasrin, 16 July 1936, concerning attacks on Christian homes in Acre. Also ZA, S/25, 
3875, Najib to the Zionist Executive, 22 September 1936. 
'6' See, for instance, CO 733/310/1, 'Daily News Bulletin, ' issued by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 
25 April 1936. 
166 Lesch, "The Palestine Arab Nationalist Movernent, " p. 36. 
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'Qassamites'-featured. prominently in many of them. 167 By mid-May, violence peaked, 
and while much of it was directed against Jews, it was the Palestine Government that was 
the main target. Though their was no clear overall military commander, a number of 
figures did emerge-for example, Fawif al-Qdwuqji, the hero of the Syrian Druze 
rebellion of 1925, who entered Palestine with an armed detachment of pan-Arab 
volunteers, 168 and FakhrVAbd al-HadY. Overall, though, the various militant groups 
never became truly unified, divisions between them reflecting the more traditional ones 
that had plagued the Arab nationalist movement in Palestine since its beginning. 
Politically, leadership of the Revolt fell to the Higher Arab Committee, and thus, by 
extension, Hajj Amin al-Husayni. While in principle, Hajj Am-in was more than happy to 
assume a leadership role with respect to the Revolt, it did put him in a rather 
compromising position inasmuch as, technically, he was an employee of the Government. 
Initially, he adopted a relatively moderate position, at least as far as public 
pronouncements. Thus, for instance, he refrained from using his position as Mufti and 
President of the SMC to ascribe a religious character to the revolt, likewise, from using 
religious slogans. 169 As the Revolt continued, however, Hajj Amin began to take on a 
more extremist stance, '70 and even to become directly involved in it. The Haram al-Sharif 
was used to store arms and as a place of refuge for militant leaders, 171 and Hajj Amin 
began to play a more active role through the Higher Arab Committee and the various 
"7 Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry, " p. 19 1; also Johnson, Islam and the Poli tics of 
Meaning, p. 48. 
Lesch, "The Palestine Arab Nationalist Movernent, " p. 3 5. 
169 See Porath, Riots to Rebellion, pp. 193,195. 
170 See, for instance, CO 733/311/5, secret correspondence from Wauchope to Parkinson, October 1936. 
171 Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 194. 
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national committees in collecting the funds needed to maintain the rebels. 172 What 
influence he actually had with respect to the various militant groups is questionable. Al- 
Q dwuqjI, for instance, tended to favour the Nash5s hlis over the HusaynTs as far as any 
dealings he had with the traditional leadership, The Husayny faction did hold sway over 
the rebel bands in the Jaffa-Ramlah and Ramallah-Jerusalem-Hebron regions, particularly 
those affiliated with the militant group al-Jihdd al-Muqaddas led by 'Abd al-Qddir at- 
Husayff. Beyond this, it is unclear if he had any connections with the other militant 
groups, though as Porath points out, it might be that such contacts were maintained 
secretly. 173 
The Higher Arab Committee was coming under pressure from two sides-beginning in 
September, the British authorities boosted their military force to 20,000 and declared 
martial law. At the same time, the agricultural season had commenced and the peasantry 
wanted to resume work. Not surprisingly, the upcoming harvest was of equal concern to 
the wealthy citrus-growers, who were clarnouring for an end to the strike. '74 In addition 
to this was a recognition that the Jewish community was benefiting economically from 
the strike as it was making it more independent of the Arab economy. 17' The Higher Arab 
Committee, the majority of whom still represented notable interests, opted for 
negotiations, and on 10 October called off the six-month-old General Strike. 176 
Even at this point, Hajj Am-in al-Husayn! was not entirely committed to an extremist 
position. Nonetheless, in attempting to assert his leadership against his more moderate 
172 lbid, p. 286. 
lbid, pp. 193-194. 
174 Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry, " p. 19 1. 
175 Lesch, "The Palestine Arab Nationalist Movement, " p. 36. 
176 Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry, " p. 191. 
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rivals, 
177 he had painted himself into a comer. As noted by the High Commissioner, Hajj 
,, 178 Amin had "allowed himself to be pushed into extreme courses. Hajj AmYn tried to 
maintain some kind of middle ground, perhaps most evident in the partial strike of the 
Supreme Muslim Council (noted above), and indeed, related institutions continued to 
function to such an extent that the Palestine Government did not even acknowledge that 
they were on strike, something which eventually prompted the qadi-s of the shari-a courts 
to submit an almost mutinous memorandum to the Government insisting on the 
immediate fulfilment of all Arab demands. The greater part of Palestine's Arab 
population no longer trusted the traditional leadership, a leadership of which Hajj Am-in 
was as much a part as Rdghib al-Nash5sh-lbY. To a large extent, he had managed to 
redefine the basis of his leadership role so as to adapt to changing social and political 
realities. Still, it was something of an uneasy transition given his government-based 
positions as President of the Supreme Muslim Council and Grand Mufti, the very 
positions, ironically, through which he sought to assert his control of the nationalist 
movement as it became more radicalised and, correspondingly, more Islamicised. 
The British Government initially sought to deal with the Revolt by sending a royal 
commission to investigate its cause. On 5 November 1936, what came to be known as the 
Peel Commission-named after its head, Earl Peel, the former Secretary of State for 
India-departed for Palestine. The Higher Arab Committee initially took the decision to 
boycott the commission unless Jewish immigration was at least temporarily suspended, 
though they eventually relented under pressure from the Arab rulers. The Commission 
remained in Palestine for a little over a month, during which time it took statements from 
representatives of the various political elements. Its final report was issued on 7 July 
1937. It recommended that the Mandate be abandoned and that the country be divided 
into three parts: an Arab state comprising those parts of Palestine that were 
predominantly Arab; a Jewish state compromising those parts predominantly Jewish; and 
177 See also Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 195. 
178 See, for instance, CO 733/387/2, correspondence from Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore, 3 November 1936. 
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a smaller state, inclusive of Jerusalem and other areas of religious importance to 
Christians, to remain under British control. 179 Initially, Raghib al-NashdshTib-i and his 
faction indicated a willingness to consider partition, on the basis of which they withdrew 
from the Higher Arab Committee. This move backfired, however, when it became 
apparent that the partition plan allocated considerably more land to the Jews than had 
been anticipated. The result was that Raghib al-Nashiish-ibVs political standing was 
severely damaged, and the National Defence Party eventually forced to dissolve. 
For the most part, Christians were opposed to the partition plan, though to a large extent, 
this reflected the fact that the Galilee, an area heavily populated by Christians, had been 
allocated to the Jewish state. " This was in fact, of general concern to all Arabs, 
181 even 
among those inclined to at least consider partition. Some among the Christian leadership 
were willing to consider partition, at least in principle-thus, Ya'qiib Farraj was among 
those joining Rdghib a]-Nashash-ibT in withdrawing from the Higher Arab Committee. 
182 
Nonetheless, as soon as the extent of the territory being allocated to the Jewish state 
became apparent, most Christians came out against it. In the end, the partition plan 
actually had the effect of closing ranks between Christians and Muslims. Among other 
things, Christians were concerned about the impact partition would have in dividing what 
was already a small community. Some concerns were of a more practical nature-for 
179 Abdul Wahhab Said Kayyali, Palestine, A Modem History (London: Third World Centre for Research 
and Publishing, 1978), p. 207. 
180 See, for instance, ZA, S/25,3292, Report from Haifa, 19 July 1917, concerning the Greek Catholics in 
Galilee; ZA, S/25,10098, note on talk with Tawfiq al-Ghusayn, 21 March 1938, concerning the Greek 
Catholics in Galilee; also Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 270. 
"' Particularly given that at that time, the Jewish population made up only . 00 1 per cent of the rural 
population of the (corresponding) Acre subdistrict and 4 per cent of the Safad subdistrict. Lesch, "The 
Palestine Arab Nationalist Movement, " p. 37. 
182 Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 270. 
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instance that regarding the jurisdiction of religious courts, which under the plan being 
recommended, would remain in British-controlled territory. 183 
Resumption of the Revolt 
The second phase of the Revolt erupted in September 1937, following the assassination 
of the British District Commissioner for Galil ee (most likely by Qassamites). Almost 
immediately, the Palestine Government forcibly dissolved the Fligher Arab Committee, 
together with all of the national committees. Six members of the HAC were set for 
deportation, among them, Hajj Arn-in al-Husayni. The latter managed in the end to escape 
to Lebanon from where he was able, at least initially, to maintain control of the 
nationalist movement. By the summer of 1938, most of the Palestinian highlands were in 
rebel hands, and by September, even in the urban centres, government control had 
virtually ceased. As the Revolt progressed, its religious character became increasingly 
prominent. As noted by the High Commissioner, Harold MacMichael, the leaders of the 
revolt were "more and more stressing the religious aspect of their struggle. "' 84 It Was 
generally in the name of Islam, often as expressed by religious functionaries, that the 
masses were called upon to support the revolt and join its ranks. Much was made of 
alleged insults to the Qur'dn and mosques by British troops. Likewise, it was asserted 
with great frequency that the Muslim Holy Places would be lost if Zionism were allowed 
to prevail. "I 
As discussed earlier, for many Muslims, nationalist and Islamist sentiment often 
overlapped. This was certainly true among the peasantry, and indeed, it was the peasants 
(inclusive of those who had migrated to the cities and larger towns) who made up the 
Ibid. 
184 Ylana MilleT, Govemment and Society, p. 124. 
]85 FO 37 IJ2oO I g' CID Secret Reports, 23 June 1936 and 22 My 1936. 
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majority of band leaders and fighters. It was the peasantry that lent the revolt its character 
as well, something particularly evident in the costume forced on Arabs coming under the 
authority of the various militant commanders. Thus, for instance, many townsmen were 
ordered to remove their urban headgear, the fez, and don the peasant head cloth, the 
kfifiya. While to some degree, this was for practical reasons-it made it harder for the 
authorities to pick out rebels' 86 -it also marked the fact that the countryside had 
effectively gained hegemony over the city. "'7 It also reflected the assertion of what was a 
more traditionally-based value system-one more associated with traditional Islamic 
institutions, albeit, radically reconfigured along the lines discussed above-over the more 
Westem-based liberal ideas often favoured by the merchant elite residing in the cities and 
larger towns. 
As discussed above, the peasantry had never really come round to a secular brand of 
nationalism. As observed by the I-Egh Commissioner, 'Jalmong the village population 
Moslem religious sentiment is a stronger, more unifying and more universal sentiment 
than Arab nationaliSM.,, 188 In any case, for most, their sense of Arab identity was defined 
primarily by its association with the period of 'Islamic glory, ' when the Arabs were 
exalted as the carriers of the Islamic faith. 189 Added to this, for many Muslims, an Arab 
nationalism that emphasised Islam made considerably more sense as a response against 
186 Sarah CTraham-Brown, Palestinians and Their Society, 1880-1946., A Photographic Essay (London: 
Quartet Books, 1980), p. 169. 
"" The kafiya had till then been wom only by bcdouin and peasants, while those in the city had traditionally 
wom the tarbush. Ibid. 
188 CO 93 5121/27, the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State, 13 September 1938. 
189 Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arab ism, and Islam ism in the Ottoman Empire, 
1908-1918 (Berkeley., University ofCalifornia Press, 1997), pp. 6-7,37. Even to the extent that it was 
linguistically based, it was centred around the Arabic of the Quran, a language specifically bestowed by 
Allah on the Arab people. lbid, p. 37. 
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European imperialist encroachment, stressing as it did Islamic unity against Europe. " 
Concomitant with this tendency, as discussed above, were changes in how many Muslim 
peasants conceived of their religious identity. For most, it had become something more 
pronounced and particularistic. As such, it was an identity more susceptible to being 
appropriated by leaders of a certain religious qualification. 
Not surprisingly, it was the Qassamites who featured most prominently in organising and 
commanding militant bands. Most of the Qassamites had strong reputations as devout and 
righteous fighters "who followed in their nationalist fighting the precepts of the Qur'dn 
and the gospel which Sheikh al-Qassam had taught them. "'9' Many in fact saw their 
mission as being as much about reform as about liberation; in this sense, the revolt 
actually constituted only one component of a larger programme. Significantly, calls for 
reforms were often directly linked to the interests of the peasantry (as well as the migrant 
workers in the towns and cities). Thus, many rebel practices-such as the moratorium on 
debts and the heavy contributions levied against the wealthy-were directly aimed at 
addressing their more immediate needs. Just as urban men were forced to adopt the 
kfifiya, urban women were compelled to wear the veil. '92 Much of the leadership, 
particularly among the Qassamites, was made up of the aforementioned newly educated 
Muslim youth. It was these who took up the positions of commanders, advisers, arms 
transporters, and instructors. 193 Many of the highest posts were occupied by second-rank 
notables-individuals like FakhCCAbd al-HddT-who often were unable to define for 
themselves a meaningful role in the nationalist struggle within the traditional leadership. 
190 lbid, pp. 6-7. 
191 Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 183. Concerning the overall Islamic character of the Qassamites, see, for 
example, ZA, S/25,4550, Ha-Cohen and Sasson to Shertok, reporting on talk with al-Haj Tahir Qaraman, 
21 August 1938. 
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Indeed, in many respects, the Great Revolt was as much directed against the traditional 
leadership as against the British and Zionists. As discussed by Doumani, the Revolt had a 
strong social dimension, one that revolved largely "around the issues of debt, loss of land, 
vulnerability to the machinations of urban elites, and internal power struggles. ý1194 In 
areas where rebel commanders held control, wealthy notables were often compelled to 
6 contribute' large sums of money to the revolt. Particularly large sums were demanded 
from the citrus-growers and merchants of Jaffa who tended to support the Nash5shib! 
faction. '9' On I September, a declaration was issued by the joint rebel command calling 
for a moratorium on all debts and warning debt collectors and land agents against visiting 
the villages. It also called for the cancellation of all rents on urban apartments, which by 
then had risen to appallingly high levels. This, of course, directly impacted on the 
situation of many (formerly peasant) migrant workers. 196 Needless to say, it was members 
of the notable class to whom the peasants were indebted. 
Initially at least, it might be argued that the Revolt had a unifying effect between 
Muslims and Christians. Thus, an Englishwoman, upon her arrival in the predominantly 
Christian village of Bir Zeit in the summer of 1938 (during which time it was in rebel 
hands), had the impression that the rebellion had reduced negative feelings between 
Muslims and Christians. By the following spring, however, she noted that relations 
between the two had deteriorated significantly. 197 In general, it would seem that, at least 
over time, the Revolt had the effect of heightening tensions between Muslims and 
194 Issues which Doumani traces back to the Ottoman period. Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, 
pp. 244-245. 
195 Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry, " p. 193. 
'96 Ibid. 
197 Mller, Government and Society, p. 124, originally in H. M. Wilson's School Year in Palestine, 1938- 
1939. 
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Christians considerably. 198 Among other things, many Muslims were sure that Christians 
were receiving favourable treatment from the Govemment. '99 This was of course an old 
charge, but given the current circumstances, it raised strong suspicions regarding 
Christian commitment to the nationalist cause and greatly exacerbated anti-Christian 
sentiment. Tensions peaked in December 1936 when an anti-Christian leaflet was 
circulated in the countryside calling for Muslims to join in a boycott of Christians. The 
leaflet, signed by 'the carriers of the banner of al-Qassarn, 'jusfified this with the 
contention that Christians were not committed to the cause. 200 Muslim members of the 
Arab leadership, Hajj Amin included, tried to limit the damage caused by such 
incidences, though how successful they were in this respect is debatable. 201 
According to one British police-officer, it was generally held among Muslims that 
Christians were traitors to their own people. He went on to describe the relationship 
between the two as being one of 'savage and bitter feeling, ' and noted that it was often 
the case that a British constable was posted to the house of a Christian Arab to act as a 
bodyguard. Christian notables were targeted in particular it would seem and "were 
suspected of all manner of anti-Moslem activities, such as helping the British, or even 
selling land to Jews. "22 The Nabi Musa festival, once considered an expression of 
Muslim-Christian unity, now became an occasion during which agitators "urged the 
multitude to fall upon the Jew and Christian infidels and slay them. "20' 
198 Ibid. 
199ZA, S/25,3875, Najib to the Zionist Executive, Jaffa, 26 June 1936. 
200 ZA, S/25,9350, copy of leaflet. See also CO 733/347/10, Second Revision of section on 'The 
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Christians increasingly felt a need to demonstrate that they were as committed to the 
nationalist cause as Muslims. An article appearing in 
' 
FilastTn in July 1936, for instance, 
recounted an interview conducted by an American journalist in which Christian youth 
indicated emphatically that he stood side by side with his Muslim brothers in his 
willingness to sacrifice everything for the national cause. 204 Equally, efforts were made to 
demonstrate that. Muslim-Christian unity was still quite strong. Those accusing Christians 
of not being loyal nationalists were the exception, not the rule. Most Muslims understood 
that Christians were devoted to the nationalist cause. 205 Correspondingly, any evidence of 
cooperation between Muslims and Christians was quickly seized upon. Filasifn made 
much of the fact, for instance, that Christians in a village near Haifa had helped Muslims 
in the building of a mosque? O'; likewise, of the appearance of BulUs Shahdda, the editor 
of Mirat al-Sharq, as a guest speaker at the Gaza branch of the YMMA, who was invited 
there to speak on the subject of sectarianism. 207 
Of course, particularly when considering the peasantry, it was not only Christians who 
suffered at the hands of rebel bands; with respect to any given incident, it is hard to say 
whether Christians suffered on the basis of their faith, or simply because they were 
208 
peasants, and just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. On the other 
hand, the charge that Christians as a whole were not as committed as Muslims to the 
national cause had some justification, at least as measured by the level of their 
204 FilaStTn, 15 July 1936. 
205 See, for example, al-Karmil, 17 June 1936; FilastTn, 16 July 1936. 
206 FilastTn, 9 November 1932. 
'07 Ibid, 25 October 1932. Also attending was his wife Mary, whom spoke on the subject of feminism. 
'0" Miller, Government and Society, p. 124; also Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 270. 
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involvement in the Revolt. Certainly very few Christians numbered among its leadership. 
Thus, Porath notes that out of a total of 282 individuals who might be qualified as 
I officers, ' only four were Christian. LikeArise, very few Christians were to be found 
among the rank and file, and it was not uncommon that Christian villages refused to 
supply food and arms to rebel bands, even when pressured to do S0.209 Often this saw acts 
of retaliation directed against them, inclusive of the uprooting of vineyards and the raping 
of Christian girl S. 210 
Generally speaking, Christians found it difficult to support the Revolt given its strong 
Islamic undertone. As expressed by one British official affiliated with the 1937 Royal 
Commission, Christians had "come to realise that the zeal shown by the fellaheen ... was 
religious and fundamentally in the nature of a Holy War against the Christian Mandate 
and against Christian people as Well as against Jews. 112l 1 The Revolt was presented at 
times as a war between Islarn and Christianity rather than one of liberation. Thus, * 
Christians were greatly disturbed in one instance when a rebel band marching through the 
Christian village of Bir Zeit sang 'We are going to kill the Christians' instead of the more 
usual 'We are going to kill the British. ý 212 Christians were alienated by rebel injunctions 
forcing Christian women to wear veils and Christian men kfiffiya, and the insistence that 
Christians observe Friday instead of Sunday as their weekly Sabbath,. 213 While the 
partition plan had temporarily closed the ranks between Christians and Muslims (see 
above), the resumption of the revolt quickly saw a revival of tensions between Muslims 
209 lbid, p. 269. 
210 ZA, S/25,3875, Najib to the Zionist Executive, 22 September 1936. 
211 CO 733/347/10, Second Revision of section on 'The Christians, ' from the report of the Royal 
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213 ZA, S/25,10098, Tolifical News on the Arabs, ' 13 December 193 8. 
318 
and Christians. Muslims became outraged, for example, when Christian priests refused to 
join in political demonstrations. 214 
As the Revolt wore on, Christian Arabs increasingly inclined towards moderation. 215 Yet 
moderation was increasingly becoming an untenable and even dangerous position to hold. 
Thus, for example, in the summer of 1936, 'Isd al-'Isk was physically accosted on 
account of his moderate stance regarding the Strike as well as his pro-'Abdallah 
position. 216 By 1938, it was not only Christians who were being targeted in this respect. 
That year, Rdghib al-Nashash-ibi and his supporters were subjected to a series of terrorist 
attacks and murder attempts, mostly orchestrated by Hajj Arffn al-Husayni. A fair 
number of these were successful. Having by this time openly sided with the government 
against the Revolt, Raghib al-Nashash-lbi and his followers were considered by many 
Arabs to be traitors to the nationalist cause. By the summer of 1938, things had become 
so extreme that Raghib and a number of his more prominent associates were forced to go 
217 into self-imposed exile in neighbouring Arab countries. They would not return to 
Palestine until the spring of 1939. 
Christians by this time had become almost completely marginalized, and many of them 
knew it. Thus, for example, when in 1935, the Christian nationalist a]-Sakak-iny was 
offered the position of director of the Arabic department in the Palestine Broadcasting 
Service, he rejected it, explaining that a Muslim would be more appropriate for the 
PoSt. 21 'At the municipal level of govemment, Christian political influence had been in 
214 Porath, Riots andRebellion, p. 270. 
215 Esco, Palestine, A Study, p. 552. 
216 ZA, S/25,3 875, Najib's report from Jaffa, 14 August 1936. 
217 Lesch, "The Palestine Arab Nationalist Movement, " p. 39. 
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decline ever since the municipal elections of 1927. The Municipal Corporations 
Ordinance, promulgated in January 1934, only made matters worse. Whereas until then, 
representation had been secured for the different religious communities, municipal 
elections were now to take place on the basis of wards. In the subsequent 1934 election, 
36 Christians were elected against 94 Muslims. This represented a collective loss of 
seven representatives over the previous election. The loss was felt most strongly at the 
local level. In both Beersheba and Beisan they lost their lone representative; in Acre their 
representation decreased from three to one; in Nazareth, from five to four; and in 
Jerusalem, from three to two. Additionally, it was decided that in the towns only one 
deputy mayor should be nominated . 
21' The latter change was particularly problematic for 
Christians, inasmuch as, where there had been more than one, the second deputy mayor 
had usually been a Christian. In Jerusalem, the mayor had traditionally always been 
Muslim and his deputy Greek Orthodox. 220 The problem was that Christians and Jews 
were now competing for the same spot. Thus, during the 1934 election, Christians lost 
their deputy mayor in Haifa. " 
Christians were greatly alarmed by this trend, and many demanded that special measures 
be taken to ensure Christian representation, though not most claimed, for fear of being 
dominated by Muslims, but as a safeguard against the Jews. 222 In general, Christians were 
inclined to blame the Jews for their situation. Thus, for example, the Greek Catholic 
bishop of Galilee, Yusuf Hdjjar, blamed the weakening of the Christian position on 
219 Daphne Tsimhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians under the British Mandate in Palestine" in Middle 
Eastem Studies, 20 iv, 1984, p. 184. 
220 Graham-Brown, Palestinians and Their Society, p. 149. 
221 Tsimhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians" p. 194. 
222 Filasti-n, 23 October 1933. 
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Jewish immigration. 223 Christians tended to fie concerns about Christian representation to 
the problem of representation in general, a tendency that dated back to at least the late 
1920s. Thus, for instance, when threatening to boycott the Seventh Palestinian National 
Congress out of fear that they would not be properly represented as a community, 
Christians had asserted that it was not only with their own representation that they were 
224 concerned. In similar fashion, when criticising the proposed legislative council in 
1930, at a time when most Muslims supported it, FilasAn was careful to join its concern 
about the lack of Christian representation-there were to be only two Christians-with 
broader ones regarding representation in general. Thus, it was not only noted that "every 
Christian community has ... 
its own opinion, " but also that "[e]very district in Palestine 
has its own opinion. 225 
Regionally, it had become less fashionable to emphasise the Islamic nature of Arab 
nationalism in the manner that Rashid Rlda once had, and as was still asserted by such 
figures as Shak-lb Arsldn. For them, Islam took precedence over Arabism in an obvious 
way. The moral laws of Islam were to be binding on the nation; moreover, the Arabs 
were considered to have a kind of moral mission to regenerate Islam following its long 
period of corruption under the Turks. Emphasis was now on the Arabic language, which, 
as expressed by one Iraqi intellectual, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz, was the "soul of the 
,, 226 Arab nation. At the same time, it was Islam that defined the content of that language, 
though, it was argued, whosoever spoke Arabic might appropriate Islam and its past as 
his own. According to a]-Bazzaz, Christian Arabs were as much a part of the nation as 
223 Tsinihoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians, " p. 184, footnote 120; see also see also CO 733/347/10, 
Second Revision of section on 'The Christians, ' from the report of the Royal Commission, 1937, p. 9. 
224 See the third chapter. 
225 CO 73 3/18218, 'Palestine Arabic Press SummaryNo. 58, for the Week Ending 3V October, 1930. 
226 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the LiberalAge, 1798-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993 (first published in 1962)), pp. 308-309. 
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Muslims and might equally take pride in what had been done historically by 'Muslim' 
Arabs. It was still Islam that defined who the Arabs were, though now it was defined as a 
culture rather than as divine law. As Hourani puts it, "instead of Arab nationalism being 
regarded as an indispensable step towards the revival of Islam, Islam was regarded as the 
creator of the Arab nation, the content of its culture or the object of its collective 
pride. 3ý227 
A number of Christian intellectuals attempted to appropriate the idea of an Arab identity 
defined by Islamic culture. Qustanffn Zurayq, an Orthodox Christian from Damascus and 
a professor at the American University of Beirut, described the Arabs as a community 
that drew its inspiration and its principles from Islam. Again, it was an Islam that was 
more cultural than religious. Thus, while Muhammad was seen as the unifier of the Arab 
people and the creator of Arab culture, it did not follow that the Arabs should be guided 
by Islamic law or Islamic institution s. 228 Another Chrisfian intellectual promoting a 
similar understanding of Arab identity was Edmond Rabbath, a Uniate from Aleppo who 
defined Islam as underpinning a religious solidarity that was a forerunner of national 
solidarity. In this conception, the Islamic community was in effect an 'embryonic Arab 
community. 229 Whether such conceptions of Islam had any bearing on how most Muslim 
Arabs conceived of their identity and the place of Islam in it is highly questionable. What 
does seem clear is that Christians recognised a need to come to terms with Islam, and 
such attempts might be understood as constituting a last-ditch attempt by Christians to 
maintain some say in shaping Arab national identity-to allow for the primacy of Islam 
in a manner that did not see non-Muslims entirely relegated to second-class status. There 
is little to indicate, however, that they were successful in this. In Palestine, Christians 
remained active in the nationalist movement, but increasingly only as surrogates of 
227 Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp. 308-309. 
221 lbid, pp. 309-310. 
229 Ibid, p. 3 10. 
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Muslim nationalist leaders, leaders moreover, who-particularly in connection with the 
movement's radicalisation-tended to emphasise their Islamic identity. 
The Round Table Conference 
With the publication of the Woodhead Partition Commission report in November 1938 230 
declaring partition technically infeasible, and the British government's accompanying 
announcement to hold a Round Table Conference in London, the Revolt lost momentum 
and eventually collapsed. 23' An overriding factor in this was that by late-I 93 8, many 
among the peasantry had grown disaffected with the militant groups, thus helping the 
British to suppress the Revolt. 232 The Round Table Conference convened on 7 February 
1939 in St. James' Palace in London. 233 As the Jewish and Arab delegations had refused 
to meet one another, British. officials had to arrange separate meetings. The Palestinian 
delegation 234 was headed by Jamal al-Husayni. Also present was Rdghib al-Nash5shlibi, 
along with Ya'qiib Farraj. These two represented the only moderate element in the Arab 
delegation. The British Government proposed a drastic cutting back of Jewish 
immigration and land purchases; making future Jewish immigration dependent on Arab 
consent; and the eventual creation of an independent united Palestinian state. Jews were 
to be given veto-power over the latter as a counter-balance to Arab control over 
immigration. In the end, the Jewish delegation walked out of the Conference. The Arab 
230 A'Technical Commission of Inquiry' was established on 8 November under the chairmanship of Sir John 
Woodhead to consider the feasability of the partition proposal. 
231 Lesch, "The Palestine Arab Nationalist Movement, " pp. 38-39. 
232 Concerning the disaffection of the peasantry, see Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry, " 
pp. 193-194. 
233 On account of which it is also known as the St. James Conference. 
234 The overall Arab delegation included representatives of six other Arab countries. 
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delegation, for its part, attempted to impose ftirther conditions on the Government, which 
the latter found unacceptable. In the end, the British Government was forced to terminate 
the talks. In lieu of a settlement, the Government issued a white paper along the lines of 
what had been proposed during the Conference. What came to be known as the 
MacDonald White Paper (named after the Colonial Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald) was 
issued on 17 May. It disclaimed any intention of creating a Jewish state, and restricted 
Jewish immigration to 75,000 over the next five years. Likewise, it placed restrictions on 
land purchases, and called for an independent Palestinian state within ten years. Omitted 
was the Jewish right of veto. 
The decision by the Higher Arab Committee to take part in a conference in London gave 
the Christians some temporary leverage with respect to the national movement, as it was 
considered imperative by the Arab leadership that the HAC should appear representative 
of a united Palestinian-Arab people. 235 When the Christian leadership was asked to 
downplay the less savoury aspects of the Revolt with respect to Christians, they 
threatened to send a separate delegation to the London Conference. 23' The threat worked, 
and at the end of December, the rebel leaders in Jerusalem published a declaration 
condemning the various anti-Christian acts that had been committed in connection with 
the Revolt. (At the same time, they attributed such acts to renegade individuals whom 
they characterised as 'rascal S., )237 Hajj AmTh al-Husaym also tried to exert pressure on 
his followers to behave more tolerantly towards Christians. In the end, the Palestinian 
Arab delegation sent to the Conference did give the impression of a united front. Whether 
Christian Arabs actually exerted any influence within the delegation is another matter. 
Interesting to consider in this respect is the Christian Arab, George Antonius, who acted 
not only as Secretary for the Palestinian Arab delegation, but as Secretary-General of the 
235 Porath, Riots to Rebellion, p. 270. 
236 ZA, S/25,10098, 'Political News on the Arabs, ' 13 December 1938. 
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united delegation of the six Arab countries attending. That he played such a prominent 
role at the Conference, however, was probably more a reflection of his prominence 
within Western circles than an indication of any influence he had within Arab ones. 
Commenting on Antonius following the Round Table Conference, F. H. Kisch, one of the 
Zionist representatives noted that"[w]hatever may have been his services to England, it is 
certainly a fact that neither in Palestine nor in Syria is [Antonius] regarded as a leader of 
any Arab circle whatever. 1) 238 
The Second World War through 1948 
By the time of the Second World War, the nationalist movement was completely 
exhausted. It was also effectively leaderless, as a result of which, during the Second 
World War, the Arabs could neither act politically nor counter the Jewish revolt that 
started towards its close. The Nashash-ibY faction initially supported active cooperation 
with the British war effort. It became silent, however, following the assassination of 
Fakhri al-Nashdshib-i in November 1941.239 In any case, political activity was forbidden 
during the war, and this prohibition was strictly enforced. For his part, Hajj Amlin took a 
decided position against the British. Following a pro-Axis coup in Iraq, he went to 
Baghdad, only to be forced to flee after it was suppressed, first to Iran, and than on to 
Rome and Berlin, where he spent the remainder of the war engaging in pro-Axis 
activities. For its part, the Government sought during this period to implement the land 
transfer stipulations of the MacDonald White Paper. Overall, Arab reaction to this was 
muted, while the Jewish community was more absorbed with immigration issues. By the 
end of the Second World War, initiative with respect to the Palestinian nationalist 
movement had fallen to the surrounding Arab states, mostly through the newly created 
League of Arab States, formed on 22 March 1945. In the fall of 1945, the Higher Arab 
238 F. H. Kisch, Palestine Diary (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1938), p. 36 1. 
2'9 Lesch, "The Palestine Arab Nationalist Movement" p. 40. 
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Committee was recreated at the initiative of the outside states, and again came to be 
dominated by Hajj Am-in al-HusaynT, following his return from exile in France. 240 
The Arab nationalist movement in the meantime had become eclipsed by what was a 
growing Zionist militancy, which since the end of the Second World War had begun 
attacking British institutions with the aim of driving the British out of Palestine 
altogether. Most notable in this respect was ajoint-operation carried out by the Irgun and 
Stem Gang on 22 July 1946, which saw the office-wing of the King David Hotel in 
Jerusalem blown up at the cost of over ninety British, Arab and Jewish lives. 
Complicating matters was the fact that the British were coming under pressure from the 
United States to permit large-scale Jewish immigration. Ajoint Anglo-American 
Committee of Inquiry was established in order to consider the Jewish refugee problem. 
Its report, published in May 1946, called for the establishment of a bi-national state with 
neither a Jewish nor an Arab majority. Partition in fact was becoming the favoured 
solution within the international community, the newly formed United Nations voting in 
favour of it on 29 November 1947. As hostilities between Arabs and Jews continued to 
escalate, the British prepared to abandon Palestine altogether. 
Interesting to consider here is the statement made by those representing the Christian 
community before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, which essentially 
resembled a prepared speech with no other objective than to demonstrate Christian 
solidarity with Muslims. The Christian Arabs were collectively represented 24' by the 
Reverend George Hak-im, the Greek Catholic Archbishop of Galilee, who, interestingly 
enough, introduced himself by asserting that in spite of being Christian, he was an Arab. 
I am an Arab and my connections with the Byzantine Church do not 
deprive me of being an Arab with Arab blood running in my veins-just 
240 Ibid, pp. 40-41. 
241 ISA, 274/17-D, The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 23 March 1946. 
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as an Englishman is English whether he is Roman Catholic or 
Anglican. 242 
Beyond that, he 'limited his statement' to three points, points that in many ways 
encapsulated the basis and extent of Christian involvement by that time in the nationalist 
movement. First, that "the Christian Arab in Palestine [had] everything in common with 
their Moslem brethren [and] that [r]eligious beliefs [did] not in any way make of them 
two peoples. " Second, that "Zionism [was] a menace to the Christian as well as to the 
Moslem population in Palestine. " Third, that "the Zionists' claim to Palestine [was] based 
on Biblical promises in the Old Testament [and that] all promises given to the people of 
Israel in the Old Testament have been annulled by the advent of Christ. 11243 
The Reverend Nikola al-KhUff, Secretary of the Arab Greek Orthodox Clergy, 
immediately added that: 
we Christian Arabs in Palestine are very happy living in this country with 
our Moslem brethren. We are being treated well, and we have been living 
for hundreds of years amicably together, with no differences between us, 
and our Holy Places have been guarded, and we have no molestation from 
any sect so far. I believe that the country should be left to its inhabitants, 
whoever they are, as they are living well together. As far as the Moslems 
and Christians are concerned, we have been living very well together, and 
there have been no differences between us for many hundreds of years. 
We are all as one nation. 
242 Ibid. 
243 Ibid. 
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As far as can be determined from the minutes of the meeting-aside from one final 
comment by the Reverend George Haklm (belowý-the Christian Arabs had absolutely 
nothing to add. 
Were relations between Muslims and Christians as good as they maintained? It is 
interesting to note that the aforementioned final comment added by the Reverend Hakim 
at the very end was in reference to a declaration made by the Archbishop Mubdrak in 
Beirut that had appeared in the Palestine Post a few days earlier, which suggested that 
relations between Muslims and Christians were, in fact, less than ideal. Concerning this, 
the Reverend Hakim made clear that whatever the truth regarding the Bishop Mubdrak's 
position, "he [spoke] in his own name and not in the name of the Chfistians. "2441t would 
seem by the end of th-e Mandate that Christian involvement in the nationalist movement 
was basically limited to toeing the political line set by their Muslim compatriots. One 
might consider here a comment made by Richard Crossman, one of the members of the 
Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, concerning an acquaintance of his, the Christian 
Albert Hourani, then working for Chatham House, whom he characterised as being "more 
intransigent in [his] policy than the old leaders, [partly he supposed] because [he was] 
westernized and so compensate[d] for any western bias by an excess of nationaliSM.,, 245 
He went on to comment that Hourani and his friends 
realized that the present social structure won't last long and that the new 
political movements will be ultra-nationalistic. Hourani is quite right to. 
feel that if he is to represent the literate Arabs of Palestine then he must 
speak the same language as the Mufti, otherwise he will be rejected as a 
British agent, particularly since he worked so closely with Chatham 
House. 246 
244 Ibid. 
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While the statement no doubt also reflected the fact that Hourani had been born and 
raised in Manchester, England, his faith no doubt also constituted a factor. In any case, 
Muslims generally perceived Christian Arabs as Westernised and as overly sympathetic 
to their European coreligionists. As such, the sentiment perfectly encapsulated the 
dilemma confronting Palestine's Christian Arabs. 
One might consider here as well statements made by the Muslim dignitaries standing 
before the Anglo-American Committee, which, in addition to being significantly longer 
than those made by their Christian counterparts, strongly emphasised the Islamic 
character of Palestine. Thus, for instance, Sheikh Dia ad-D-in al-Khatib, though perhaps 
doing this the least and even briefly paying lip service to Muslim-Christian unity, made 
reference to the Crusades and noted that "it is the duty of every Moslem by religious law 
to help in safeguarding Moslem territory. ý7247 Subsequent Muslim speakers before the 
Committee took this theme further. Thus, for instance, Sheikh SabrT Abdi-na noted that 
There is no part of Palestine which does not abound in Moslem Holy 
Sanctuaries, mosques and shrines, and where Moslem monuments cannot 
be found. Its very soil has been sanctified by the bodies of a great number 
of the Companions of the Prophet, of those others who came after them, of 
the Ulamas (Learned), the Saints and the pious in Islam... Their tombs are 
248 to be found along the coast, in the hills and in the plains of Palestine. 
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He then went on to note that "[h]undreds of millions of Moslems in the Arab world, in 
India, Indonesia, China, the Philippine Islands, Afghanistan, Iran, Yugoslavia, Turkey 
and even in Russia and in other parts of the world passionately yeam for Palestine. ý249 
By contrast, those European Christians attending the inquiry on behalf of their churches 
seemed to feel that Christian interests would best be safeguarded if the places in which 
they lived were put under international administration rather than being left as part of a 
Muslim-dominated state. While no doubt such a position reflected the concerns of their 
respective larger church communities regarding the Christian holy sites, it would seem 
that it was also generated by a concern for the well-being of their respective Arab lay 
communities. Thus, when speaking out in favour of partition, W. H. Stewart, the Bishop 
of the Church of England in Jerusalem, insisted that it was as much a matter of protecting 
the rights of Christian minorities as anything else. Specifically, he felt that Christian 
rights would suffer equally whether in a state run by Jews or Muslims. While he hoped 
that in either case, 'proper guarantees' would be put in any future constitution, he did not 
have much faith that they would safeguard the rights of minority ChristianS. 250 The only 
solution, he asserted, was that a separate enclave be created inclusive of Jerusalem, 
Bethlehem, Nazareth and the Galilee. 
On 15 May 1948, the last High Commýissioner, General Sir Alan Cunningham, and his 
remaining staff departed from Palestine, thus ending the British Mandate forever. The 
same day, the State of Israel was proclaimed. In the fighting that ensued between Arabs 
and Jews, the former were only able to hold onto the seacoast around Gaza and the 
central hill region. Oddly enough, these two regions found themselves divided between 
the two factions that had split the Palestinian Arab nationalist movement from the start. 
The Higher Arab Committee under Hajj AmYn al-Husayn-i formed a'Government of all 
Palestine' in Gaza in late September 1948, while the hill area came under the control of 
249 Ibid. 
250 Ibid. 
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Am-ir Abddllah of Jordan, who shortly thereafter appointed Raghib al-NashdshTib-i as 
military governor in what would come to be known as the West Bank. 251 
The war saw a large exodus of Christians from Palestine-between 55,000-60,000 
Christian Arabs fled from the coast and the Galilean highland. Also hard hit were those 
Christians living in the western part of Jerusalem, as well as those in Haifa, Jaffa, Ramla 
and Lydda. About half of these settled in Jordan (inclusive of the West Bank), primarily 
in areas that already had large Christian populations, such as east Jerusalem, Bethlehem 
and Ramallah. Others settled in Amman and Madaba on the east side of the Jordan River. 
Many of those fleeing from Haifa settled in Lebanon. M Quite a few Christians stayed 
behind in the newly formed Israeli state, though usually only because they had had no 
choice, having been surrounded by Israeli forces during the war. Thus there remained a 
strong Christian presence in Nazareth and in parts of the Galilee. 253 In all, it can hardly be 
said that Christians suffered any less than Muslims as a result of the war. Nonetheless, 
the disillusionment felt in its aftermath saw Christians accused of having aided the 
Western 'imperialist' powers in establishing the state of Israel. 254 In other cases, 
resentment was felt over the fact that Christian refugees tended to be absorbed into the 
255 larger existing populations much faster than Muslim ones. It was later maintained that 
those Christians who ended up in Israel adjusted too easily to their new circumstances. 
Even until now, among Israeli-Arabs, Christians are generally seen as being more 
moderate, and in fact, they have been known in some cases to volunteer to serve in the 
251 Lesch, "The Palestine Arab Nationalist Movement, " pp. 41-42. 
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Israeli army. 256 At the same time, many Christians, particularly from the Orthodox and 
Protestant Anglican communities, have continued to act on behalf of the nationalist 
cause, even in some cases, taking part in militant activities . 
257 It would seem then that 
question of where Christians fall within the framework of Arab national identity remains 
a difficult one to resolve. 
2'6 David K. Shipler, Arab andJew, Wounded Spirits in a Promised Land (New York: Penguin Books, 
1986), pp. 161-162. 
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Conclusion 
In examining Muslim-Christian relations in Palestine during the Mandate period, I have 
focused on two factors. Firstly, I have examined what was an existing tension between 
two different conceptions of Arab national identity-the first defined primarily in secular 
terms and based on a shared history, culture and language; the latter, defined primarily in 
Islamic terms as an extension of the umma, or community of believers. Speaking in 
general terms, the former largely reflected the perspective of Christian Arabs and the 
latter, Muslim ones. During the early part of the Mandate, both Christians and Muslims 
found it quite easy to avoid confronting what were fundamental differences in their 
respective conceptions of Arab national identity. In many respects, this reflected the fact 
that the nationalist movement in Palestine had, from its start, defined itself first and 
foremost by its opposition to Zionism. 
The second factor was the internal struggle within the Arab leadership for political 
control of the nationalist movement, between its more extremist faction (centred around 
Hajj Am-in al-Husayni), and its more moderate one (the Opposition). The former, 
particularly as represented by Hajj AmTh al-Husayff -the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and 
President of the Supreme Muslim Council, religiously derived titles both-tended to 
emphasize the Islamic character of Palestine and of the nationalist movement. In addition 
to radicalising the movement by appealing to religious sentiment, such emphasis also 
served to enhance Hajj Arn-In's status. Through him, the nationalist cause was redefined 
as a matter of defending the country's Muslim holy sites, in particular, the Haram al- 
Shafif in Jerusalem. Not unrelated was the growing struggle between the traditional 
leadership--of which both Hajj Amin and the moderate faction were a part-and what 
was a growing militant element within the larger population, made up primarily of 
second-rank notables, a growing professional class, and newly educated Muslim youth. It 
was against this backdrop that Palestine's Christian Arabs sought to define for themselves 
a role, not only with respect to the nationalist movement, but likewise, in shaping Arab 
national identity. 
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It is perhaps useful here to briefly recap the argument set down in the thesis. Thus, it was 
noted that during the early part of the Mandate, the nationalist movement was indeed 
marked by a high degree of solidarity between Palestine's Muslim and Christian Arabs, 
most notably as represented by the various Muslim-Christian Associations (MCAs)-and 
by extension, the Arab Executive-which at the start constituted the movement's 
leadership. Significantly, the organisational structure of the nationalist movement was 
also reflective of the traditional political hierarchy. Christians were particularly well 
represented in the MCAs, in numbers greater then their percentage of the overall 
population warranted, and indeed, during the early going, they were arguably at the 
forefront of the nationalist struggle, something which reflected the fact that initially, 
Christians were more vehement than Muslims in their opposition to Zionism, both as the 
community most directly threatened by it economically, and because of what were strong 
anti-Semitic tendencies. 
In addition to the struggle within the traditional leadership was that between the 
traditional leadership as a whole and what was a growing militant element within the 
population at large. By the late-1920s, many of Palestine's Arabs had become frustrated 
with the traditional leadership's inability to achieve nationalist goals. A large number of 
these were newly educated Muslim youth, who, together with members of the 
professional class and certain elements within the notable class (that is, second-rank 
notables), would become increasingly politically active during the early-1930s. Almost 
all advocated a sala/z'Arab nationalism that stressed the relationship between Arab 
identity and Islam. Much of the dissatisfaction felt by newly educated Muslim youth 
during this period manifested itself in a growing belief that Christians were faring much 
better under the Mandate than Muslims, particularly with respect to government 
employment. Feelings of resentment were further exacerbated when, in 1928, the 
International Missionary Council held a conference in Jerusalem; while very few local 
Christians attended, they were not spared the resulting Muslim outrage. 
As the nationalist movement became more radical, it also became more Islamic. A 
number of factors underlay this development, one of which related specifically to 
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changes then taking place with respect to the peasantry. Over the course of the Mandate, 
large numbers of peasants migrated to the cities and larger towns in search of 
employment. Once there, they often became affiliated with local religious institutions, not 
only mosques, but also socio-religious organisations such as the YMMA. Associated with 
both were ofien religious reformers who preached a strong brand of Islamic orthodoxy. 
Many were also strongly nationalistic, and saw the reform of Islarn as a necessary 
precondition to the achievement of nationalist goals. A typical example of such a 
reformer, and one examined more closely in the thesis, was Sheikh 'Izz al-D-in al- 
Qassdm. 
The strong appeal such individuals had among the peasantry was predicated by certain 
changes that had taken place the previous century in how peasants conceived of their 
religious identity. Over the course of the nineteenth century, religious practice among the 
peasantry had become more formalised and more closely tied to Islamic institutions. 
Related to this, the peasantry had become more self-conscious of their Islamic identity in 
a manner radically different from the way in which they had conceived of it previously. 
During the greater part of the Ottoman period, being Muslim had meant first and 
foremost being part of the mainstream society; what was considered acceptable 'Islamic' 
behaviour reflected more social norms-often inclusive of folk practices and rural 
customs-than sanctioned practice. Muslims were now, however, becoming more aware 
of themselves as constituting a community among others; as such, it became more 
necessary to consider what being a Muslim actually meant. It is an important contention 
of this thesis that, while several factors may have underlay this development, a 
particularly important one was that encompassing the changes wrought by the Tanzimat 
reforms and increased European economic penetration. 
The Tanzimat reforms undermined the traditional basis of notable-peasant relations. 
Through the beginning of the nineteenth century, the authority of the notable class 
(inclusive of the rural elite) had in large part been defined through their collective role as 
mediators between formal Islamic institutions and the peasantry. The latter rarely took 
recourse to such institutions, relying rather on the notables to resolve disputes and 
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provide. rudimentary religious services and instruction. Correspondingly, the ability of 
notables to exercise authority was dependent in no small part on the willingness of the 
peasantry to accept that authority as legitimate. This ensured that the peasantry had at 
least some leverage in their dealings with members of the notable class. With the 
Tanzimat reforms, however, the basis of notable authority became wedded to newly 
created administrative institutions. As a result, notables no longer needed to worry about 
whether the peasantry accepted their authority as being legitimate or not. Additionally, 
the notable class began to use its administrative-based authority as a means of exploiting 
the peasantry. Increasingly, peasants found themselves tied to Islamic judiciary 
institutions, either through formal contracts or by virtue of having to take recourse to the 
Islamic courts in order to combat the exploitative practices of the notables. Combined 
with other changes then taking place, this had the effect of formalising the Islamic 
religious practice of the peasantry. 
The formalisation of Islamic pr4ctice saw a corresponding formalisation. of Islamic 
identity; whereas previously religious identity had been understood primarily as an 
inherent aspect of a traditional mode of living-one defined more by custom than 
legalism-it now took on a new dimension; it was an identity less defined by practice and 
more by ideal, an Islam defined less by tradition and more in connection with its 
institutions. Importantly, it provided the basis of a definable shared Islamic identity. As 
such, it was an identity more easily appropriated by leaders of a certain religious 
qualification-individuals like Sheikh 'Izz al-D-in al-Qassdm for example, whose strong 
appeal among the peasantry was based in no small part on his reputation as a pious and 
learned Muslim. It was also an identity that corresponded well with the salali'-Arab 
nationalism favoured by those members of the professional class, newly-educated 
Muslim youth and second-rank notables inclined toward radicalism. 
Particularly during the latter part of the Mandate, the nationalist movement underwent a 
process of Islamisation, something which first became overtly manifest with the Wailing 
Wall riots of August 1929, the immediate cause of which was, without doubt, religious. 
All of the Arabs who took part in the riots were Muslims, most being motivated by a 
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belief that the Zionists had designs on the Muslim holy sites. Hajj Amin al-Husayn-i was 
quick to capitalise on the religious passions aroused by the incident, first and foremost by 
seeking to recast the nationalist cause in terms as Islamic as possible. The culmination of 
this effort was the World Islamic Conference, held in December 193 1, of which he was 
the principal sponsor. Through the Conference, Hajj Am-in sought to redefine the 
Palestinian national cause as an Islamic cause-that is, as a matter of defending the 
Muslim holy places in Jerusalem. The World Islamic Conference marked a turning point 
for Christian Arabs. It was now Muslims who were entirely setting the political agenda, 
and Christians were increasingly finding themselves little more than surrogates to 
Muslim nationalist leaders. The emphasis given Islam during the Great Revolt of 1936- 
1939 saw Christian Arabs almost completely marginalized; very few took an active part 
in the Revolt, and it was not uncommon that they were accused of being disloyal to the 
nationalist cause. By the end of the Mandate, Christians were still active in the nationalist 
movement, though in many respects, largely only by sufferance. 
The relationship between Arab identity and Islam 
The extent of Christian involvement in the nationalist movement during this period might 
be taken as constituting a measure of to what degree Christians were able to participate in 
sh aping-likewise, share in-Arab national identity. As discussed in the thesis, the turn- 
of-the-century saw the conception of what were essentially two very different models of 
Arab national identity-the one largely a secular model based on a shared language, 
culture and historical legacy; the other (that is, the salafi model), based primarily on the 
special relationship between the Arabs and Islam. Given the eventual marginalization of 
Christians with respect to the nationalist movement and the outcome of the political 
rivalry between the Husayn-1 faction and the more moderate Opposition, it seems 
reasonable to maintain that it was the latter model that prevailed in the end. In any event, 
this is certainly my contention. A fair question to ask then might be if such an outcome 
was indeed inevitable. While it is difficult to be counter-factual on this point, 
consideration of two factors in particular might be suggestive as to a possible answer. 
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Significantly, both models emphasised the special role of the Arabic language in defining 
the basis of Arab national identity. Problematic from the point-of-view of secular 
nationalists, however, is the fact that Arabic is the language of the Qur'dn-hence, as 
noted in the introduction, what was often a strong resistance to allowing dialects to 
influence its development or use. ' The one exception has been in connection with the 
development of more regionally specific identities (Egypt and Lebanon, for example), 
and it is worth noting that such exercises have often reflected, at least in part, a conscious 
attempt to define a national identity as something apart from Islam. 2 This might be 
contrasted with the situation pertaining to European nationalist movements. Whereas 
there, the formulation of standard vernacular languages had originally been part of an 
exercise set against the holy language of Scripture (that is, Latin), 3 in the case of Arab 
nationalism, its standardisation actually embraced it (that is, the holy language of Islam). 
In the European case, the simple fact of having translated Scripture into the vernacular 
was significant in and of itself Although constituting a phenomenon predating 
nationalism, it served to divorce religious identity from the universal church in Rome, 
and thus diminish the role of religion as a whole in shaping national identity. Almost the 
exact reverse is true in the Arab case. Here, the language defining national identity was 
also the language of Scripture. Arguably then, its emphasis could only serve to enhance 
the role of religion-in this case, Islam-as a defining aspect of that identity. 
Another factor we might consider here is the greater emphasise given 'Islamic culture' as 
an identity marker, beginning in the 1930s-that is, as something evident of an 'Islamic' 
identity standing apart from Islam, the religion, and as such, more inclusive of non- 
Muslims. As discussed in the thesis, it was certainly a model many Christian Arab 
intellectuals supported at the time. Some historians have suggested that Christian Arab 
1 Yasir Suleiman, The Arabic Language and National Identity, A Study in Ideology (Edinburgh, Edinburgh 
University Press, 2003), p. 10. 
2 lbid, p- 9. 
3 That is, in connection with the Reformation. 
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nationalists had always accepted the idea of Arab identity as somehow being inherently 
Islamic. 41 would dispute this contention, holding rather that, while Christians had always 
recognised the need to concede Islam as constituting a significant part of a shared Arab 
heritage, ' they had from the beginning resisted the idea that it should somehow define the 
core of what constituted Arab national identity. One might characterise their attitude 
towards Islam and its relationship to Arab national identity as one of 'conceding the 
minimum possible. ' Nonetheless, over time, they were increasingly compelled to accept 
an ever more enlarged role for Islam as one of its defining components. 
One might ask then whether it is possible to speak of 'Islamic culture' (considered here 
as the basis of Arab national identity) as something apart from Islam. Regardless of how 
intellectuals may have sought to define the relationship between Islam and Arab identity, 
there, remains the question of how most Muslims actually saw it. Arguably, there was a 
certain inevitability concerning the centrality of Islam to Arab national identity. In trying 
to determine whether indeed this was the case, we might begin by considering the * 
situation of Palestinian Christian Arabs more recently-more specifically, how they have 
come to define their position in relationship to the Palestinian nationalist movement. 
Telling perhaps in this respect is an article published not too long ago by a Palestinian 
Christian Arab from Jaffa, one Andr6 thas Mazawi of Jaffa, entitled "Palestinian Local 
Theology and the Issue of Islamo-Christian Dialogue. " The article appeared in 1993, at 
the time of the First Intifada. 
Notably, whereas previously, Christian Arabs had once sought to define a shared identity 
6 
on the basis of Arab nationalism, the author here seeks to do so on the basis of Islam , on 
C. Eamest Dawn, From 01tomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins ofArab Nationalism (Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 1973), pp. 387-388. 
' See, for instance, Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence qfArab Nationalism, with a BacAground Study ofArab- 
Turkish Relations in the Near East (New York: Caravan Books, 1958 [reprinted 1973]), p. 34. 
6 Here cleýrly referring to 'Islam' the religion, as opposed to 'Islam' the civilisation. 
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the one hand, by trying to "produce some theological account of the meaning, and 
relevance, of [the] Islamic presence (wajad) and its specific V'ritness (Lhahada) for the 
iý7 Palestinian Christian , and on the other, 
by justifying the faith of the Christian 
Palestinian Arab, through the formulation of a 'local church' theology, such that it should 
be politically relevant to the nationalist struggle. ' As he expresses it, Palestinian church 
leaders should 
expand the ecumenic definition of 'local church' to overlap with the 
ethnico-national group to which Christians are affiliated, namely, all 
Palestinians, whether Christians or Muslims. Thus the notion 'local 
church' henceforth connotatively meant a 'Palestinian church' firmly 
rooted in a national spirit (walaniyya). 9 
While the author acknowledges that some might criticise such an exercise as leading to 
"the 'islamization' of Palestinian Christian theology and its 'emptying' from its unique 
world-perspective, "'O he justifies it by noting that the Palestinian Christian 
cannot detach himself from his ethnico-national identity, his heritage and 
his social life. In addition, he cannot disregard the fact that the socio- 
cultural environment in which he lives is embedded with Islamic values 
and traditions to a very large extent. " 
7 Andr6 IýIias Mazawi, "Palestinian Local Theology and the Issue of Islarno-Christian Dialogue: an 
Appraisal" in IslamochristianalDirasatIslaniiyaMasZH7ya, 19,1993, p. 108, also pp. 103,107. 
8 lbid, pp. 104-105. 
lbid, p. 104. 
10 Ibid, p. 107. 
11 lbid, p. 96. 
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More to the point perhaps, the author indicates that, among its many functions, such a 
theology would serve "as a mechanism concerned with the dissipation of doubts 
concerning Christian national loyalty. iA2 It is interesting to note that, concurrently, there 
were some Christians who felt they might best safeguard their interests by constituting 
themselves as a community apart from Muslim Arabs. Thus, the year before the 
publication of this article, some of the Christian members of the Israeli Arab Democratic 
Party called for the establishment of a 'Christian Democratic Party' in response to the 
former's perceived Islarnisation. 13 It would seem that questions concerning the nature of 
the relationship between Arab identity and Islam and the place of Christians with respect 
to both have yet to find a satisfactory resolution. 
Which brings us back to the question of whether it was inevitable that Arab national 
identity should become somehow 'Islam'-based. Smith, particularly in his book The 
Ethnic Origins ofNations (1986), argues strongly that modem national identities have 
deep roots in pre-modem forms of communal sel f-identifi cation; thus, we might expect a 
certain degree of continuity to exist between pre-modem and modem modes of identity. " 
Other historians dealing with the phenomenon of nationalism have recognised this, 
though have dealt with the question of continuity in different ways. Hobsbawm, for 
example, has suggested that proto-national modes of identity function as a kind of toolkit- 
from which modem political actors (and nationalists) are able to draw upon as proves 
expedient relative to existing circumstances. " By contrast, Smith, sees myth-symbol 
complexes and ethno-histories not simply as resources to be used, but as cultural 
12 lbid, p. 112. 
13 lbid, p. I 11. 
14 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins ofNations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). 
15 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Progrwnme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 83 -85. 
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structures delimiting the scope for this kind of ideological activity. 16 If we take 
Hobsbawm's model as our starting point, it might well be argued that the manner in 
which Arab identity came to formulated was hardly written in stone; that under a 
different set of circumstances, a very different kind of relationship might have developed 
between Islam and Arab identity. Conversely, Smith's argument suggests that there was a 
certain inevitability regarding how things turned out. 
One can find evidence to support both views. As noted above, salaJI, Arabism. was almost 
from the start, an anti-establishment movement, and it is arguably the case that there 
existed some support, at least during the early part of the Mandate, for European-style 
liberalism. As Palestine's Arabs (likewise, those in Syria and Iraq) became disillusioned 
with the Western powers in connection with their continuing status as mandates, 
however, they began to reject the ideologies and value-systems associated with them. As 
such, many turned to salaji'Arabism, much as their counterparts a generation earlier had 
done in expressing their opposition to Ottomanism and the CUP. As historians like Isaiah 
Berlin and Smith have noted, nationalism has often been adopted as an expression of 
opposition against the existing order, particularly when the latter might easily be 
characterised as foreign and imposed, and the former, as reflecting the indigenous culture 
and thus, as something entirely apart from the oppressive power. 17 In the case of 
mandatory Palestine then, the rising middle class was (so it is argued) attracted to a 
cultural nationalism, one based on a traditional Islamic model; this was set in opposition 
to a nationalism based on liberalism, which, though inherently more inclusive of non- 
Muslims, unfortunately bore too strong an association with British rule. The adoption of 
an Islam-based model of nationalism might thus be seen as constituting an expression of 
opposition. 
16 Smith, The Ethnic Origins, p. 14. 
17 Oliver Zimmer, Nationalism in Europe, 1890-1940 (Studies in European History) (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2003), p. 9. 
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Taking this perspective, one might well wonder if things would have turned out 
differently in the event that Britain had pursued policies other than the ones it did-for 
instance, if Britain had not lent its support to the Zionist movement, or had attempted to 
implement the terms of the Mandate calling for the eventual establishment of an 
independent Palestine within a reasonable timeframe. In the end, it is hard to be 
counterfactual, though Cottam's consideration of the case of Iran-wherein he contends 
that a liberal model of secular national identity inclusive of a broad range of ethnicities 
and religious groups might well have succeeded were it not for the CIA-inspired coup 
that saw Musaddiq thrown from power and a royal dictatorship imposed in his place18-is 
surely suggestive in this respect. 
We might conclude by considering some areas of possible future research. In considering 
the relationship between Islam and Arab national identity, it would, I believe, be 
worthwhile to re-examine Christian attitudes as they evolved over time. In much of the 
relevant literature, the Christian mind-set around this question has tended to be discussed 
as something relatively static and with little consideration of the manner in which it might 
have changed over time; likewise, the extent to which such changes might have reflected 
developments within the nationalist discourse of Muslim Arabs. Zeine and Hourani are 
something of an exception in this respect, but a good deal more could be done, and a 
systematic examination along these lines might prove insightful. 
Another area for possible future research relates to what constitutes a key component of 
my thesis-namely, the impact the Tanzimat reforms had on notable-peasant relations, 
"' His basic contention being that nationalist leaders such as Musaddiq enjoyed a certain degree of 
nationalist legitimacy and thus were able to act as a mobilizing agent among those newly politicised in 
favour of secular nationalism. His overthrow created an opening which clerical leaders were well suited to 
fill, particularly given the Shah's lack of nationalist legitimacy and the fact that most of those newly 
politicised came from the urban lower and lower-middle classes, and thus tended to be religious. Richard 
Cottam, "Nationalism in Twentieth-Century Iran and Dr Muhammad Musaddiq, " in Iranian Nationalism 
and Oil, eds., James A. Bill and William Roger Louis (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988), pp. 2347. 
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and, correspondingly, on the formalisation of 'Islamic' identity among the peasantry. 
Underlying my argument is the not entirely unfounded assumption that relations between 
the notable class and the peasantry were more equitable prior to the period of reform. It 
appears to me that there is something of a dearth of scholarly works dealing with the 
situation in Palestine and Syria just prior to the nineteenth century. It might be added that 
too often scholars dealing with the nineteenth century have seemingly taken for granted 
that the exploitative nature of notable-peasant relations so characteristic of that period in 
fact pre-dated it; and this, in spite of the fact that what circumstantial evidence there is 
seems to suggest that earlier, notables exhibited a very limited amount of actual control; 
equally, that both their authority and that of the country sheikhs was in many respects 
dependent on its tacit acceptance by those over whom it was exercised. 
Finally, assuming the correctness of my contention, I believe a more thorough 
consideration of the process by which the 'Islamic' identity of the peasantry became 
formalised is warranted. This might involve, for instance, a closer examination of the 
pattern of court appearances among the peasantry, something which overall saw a marked 
rise during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Any other information concerning 
changes in the religious practices of the peasantry during this period (for instance, related 
to mosque attendance; the construction of new mosques; practices tied to religious 
shrines, etc. ) might also prove insightful in this respect. Arguably, the special 
consideration of those groups which come to constitute 'minorities' in the formulation of 
nationalist identifies can prove especially illuminating, not only as far as the study of any 
particular identity is concerned, but as regards the phenomenon of nationalism itself in 
this light, it is my hope that some of the ideas set forth in this thesis might contribute in 
some small way to a better understanding of both Arab nationalism and nationalism as a 
whole. 
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Appendix 
Table A. I. All Palestine 1922: breakdown of 
population by religion and town/village' 
Locality Muslims Jews ChrisfianS2 Total 
Subdistrict of Jerusalem 
Jerusalem (inner) 9,345 5,639 7,262 22,247 
Jerusalem (outer) 4,068 28,332 7,437 40,331 
'Ain Karim 1,282 -- 453 1,735 
Al Tur 806 -- 231 1,037 
Selwan 1,699 153 49 1,901 
'Enab 459 -- 16 475 
Qubaibeh 210 26 236 
Subdistrict of Ramallah 
Ramallah 125 7 2,972 3,104 
'Abud 352 402 754 
'Ain 'Arik 165 -- 200 365 
Al-Bireh 1,407 72 1,479 
Bair Zait 119 777 896 
Jeffia --- 447 447 
Al Taibeh 7 954 961 
Subdistrict of Bethlehem 
Bethlehem 818 2 5,838 6,658 
Bait Jala 41 -- 3,060 3,101 
Bait Sahur 285 1,234 1,519 
Urtas 389 44 433 
Notes: I Taken from Table V. Population by Districts and Subdistricts: Subdistrict of Gaza, p. 8; Table VII. 
Population by Districts and Subdistricts, pp. 14-22; Table IX. Population by Districts and Subdistricts, pp. 
24-3 1; Table XI. Population by Districts and Subdistricts, pp. 33-4 1; Tables XIII-XIV. Christian Population 
Showing Members of Different Churches, pp. 44-45 from the 1922 Census in Reports and General 
Abstracts ofthe Census of 1922, Taken on the 23rd ofOctober, 1922, compiled by J. B. Barron, 
Superintendent of the Census (London, 1922). /2 Omitting villages with less than ten Christians. 
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Table A. I. All Palestine 1922: breakdown of 
population by religion and town/village (continued)' 
Locality Muslims Jews Christians 2 Total 
Subdistrict of Jaffa 
Jaffa proper 20,621 5,087 6,808 32,524 
Tel Aviv 78 15,065 42 15,185 
Bait-Dajan 1,689 -- 25 1,714 
Sarona. 70 7 202 279 
Wilhemla 36 1 185 222 
Subdistrict of Ramleh 
Ramleh 5,837 35 1,440 7,312 
Lydda 7,166 11 926 8,103 
Bait Jamal 3 -- 56 59 
Dair Latrun -- -- 37 37 
Lydda Junctions 134 9 46 189 
Subdistrict of Nablus 
Nablus 15,238 16 544 15,947 
Rafidia III -- 307 438 
Sabastia 562 10 572 
Nesf Ijbil 74 88 162 
Bait 1mrin 512 15 527 
Burcla 1,589 99 1,688 
Subdistrict of Jenin 
Jenin 2,307 7 108 2,637 
Muqibleh 181 -- 20 201 
Dair Ghazaleh 120 14 134 
Zababdeh 64 418 482 
Talfit 24 19 43 
Kufair 55 11 66 
Notes: I Taken from Table V. Population by Districts and Subdistricts: Subdistrict of Gaza, p. 8; Table VII. 
Population by Districts and Subdistricts, pp. 14-22; Table IX Population by Districts and Subdistricts, pp. 
24-3 1; Table X1. Population by Districts and Subdistricts, pp. 33 -4 1; Tables XIII-XIV. Christian Population 
Showing Members of Different Churches, pp. 44-45 from the 1922 Census in Reports and General 
Abstracts of the Census of 1922, Taken on the 23d ofOctober, 1922, compiled by J. B. Barron, 
Superintendent of the Census (London, 1922). /2 Omitting villages with less than ten Christians. 
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Table A. I. All Palestine 1922: breakdown of 
population by religion and town/village (continued)' 
Locality Muslims Jews Christians' Total 
S ubdistri ct ofB ai s an 
Baisan 1,687 41 213 1,941 
Sirin 621 -- 60 681 
Subdistrict of Haifa 
Haifa 9,377 6,230 8,863 24,634 
Shafa'Amr 623 -- 1,263 2,288 
'Aballin 289 528 817 
Bait Lahm 113 ill 224 
Umm al-'Amad 65 63 128 
Daliat al-Carmel 51 21 993 
'Aslia 17 -- 426 733 
Caesarea 288 26 32 346 
Sabbarin 833 -- 12 845 
Subdistrict of Acre 
Acre 4,883 78 1,344 6,420 
Al Bassa 366 1 867 1,384 
A] Makr 206 -- 75 281 
Al Judaida 108 96 204 
Kufr Yasif 172 665 870 
Abu Seman 43 247 518 
Yarka 26 15 978 
Kufr Sumai' 4 24 171 
Tarsheha, 1,521 358 1,880 
Ma'alia, 13 429 442 
Fassuta. 15 -- 444 459 
Al Buqai'a 70 63 215 652 
Submata, 589 -- 43 632 
Al Ba'na, 311 207 518 
Al Raineh 28 624 847 
'Arrabeh 937 47 984 
Dair Hanna 320 109 429 
Notes: I Taken from Table V. Population by Districts and Subdistricts: Subdistrict of Gaza, p. 8-, Table VII. 
Population by Districts and Subdistricts, pp. 14-22; Table IX Population by Districts and Subdistricts, pp. 
24-3 1; Table XI. Population by Districts and Subdistricts, pp. 33-4 1; Tables XIII-XIV. Christian Population 
Showing Members of Different Churches, pp. 44-45 from the 1922 Census in Reports and General 
Abstracts ofthe Census of 1922, Taken on the 23rd of0clober, 1922, compiled by J. B. Barron, 
Superintendent of the Census (London, 1922). /2 Omitting villages with less than ten Christians. 
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Table A. I. All Palestine 1922: breakdown of 
population by religion and town/village (continued)' 
Locality Muslims Jews ChristianS2 Total 
Subdistrict of Acre (continued) 
Sakhnin 1,367 208 1,575 
Al Berweh 735 72 807 
Al Damun 687 40 727 
Sha'ab 1,166 40 1,206 
Subdistrict of Nazareth 
Nazareth 2,486 53 4,885 7,424 
Jabata 308 -- 10 318 
Ma'alul 186 -- 250 436 
'Affuleh 471 28 62 563 
Mujaidel 817 -- 192 1,009 
Yafa 215 -- 400 615 
Jenjar 118 13 44 175 
Al Raineh 364 -- 423 787 
Kufr Kenna 672 503 1,175 
Tur'an 542 226 768 
Jabal Tabur 3 26 29 
Subdistrict of Tiberias 
Tiberias 2,096 4,427 422 6,950 
'Ailabun -- -- 319 319 
Mughar wa Mansura 265 -- 436 1,377 
Shajara 391 100 52 543 
Sarnakh wa Al-Hama 922 28 25 976 
Tabagha 157 -- 18 175 
Subdistrict of Safad 
Safad 5,431 2,986 343 8,761 
Hurfaish -- -- 26 412 
Kufr Berim -- 649 649 
Jesh 341 380 721 
Notes: I Taken from Table V. Population by Districts and Subdistricts: Subdistrict of Gaza, p. 8; Table VII. 
Population by Districts and Subdistricts, pp. 14-22; Table IX Population by Districts and Subdistricts, pp. 
24-3 1; Table XI. Population by Districts and Subdistricts, pp. 33-4 1; Tables XIII-XIV. Christian Population 
Showing Members of Different Churches, pp. 44-45 from the 1922 Census in Reports and General 
Abstracts ofthe Census of 1922, Taken on the 23rd of0clober, 1922, compiled by J. B. Barron, 
Superintendent of the Census (London, 1922). /2 Omitting villages with less than ten Christians. 
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Table A. I. All Palestine 1922: breakdown of 
population by religion and town/village (continued)' 
Locality Muslims Jews Christian S2 Total 
Subdistrict of Gaza 
Gaza 16,722 54 701 17,480 
Khan Yunes 3,866 1 23 3,890 
Majdal 5,064 -- 33 5,097 
Isdud 2,555 11 2,566 
Notes: I Taken from Table V. Population by Districts and Subdistricts: Subdistrict of Gaza, p. 8; Table VII. 
Population by Districts and Subdistricts, pp. 14-22; Table IX. Population by Districts and Subdistricts, pp. 
24-3 1; Table X1. Population by Districts and Subdistricts, pp. 33-41; Tables XIII-XIV. Christian Population 
Showing Members of Different Churches, pp. 44-45 from the 1922 Census in Reports and General 
Abstracts ofthe Census of 1922, Taken on the 23" of0clober, 1922, compiled by J. B. Barron, 
Superintendent of the Census (London, 1922). /2 Omitting villages with less than ten Christians. 
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Table A. 2. All Palestine 1922: breakdown of 
Christian population. by church and subdistrict' 
Church community - Total Southern Jer-Jaffa 2 Samaria Northern 
Orthodox 33,369 888 22,696 1,149 8,636 
Latin Catholic 14,245 67 9,740 617 3,821 
Greek Catholic 11,191 10 1,330 15 9,836 
Anglican 4,553 84 2,781 454 1,234 
Gregorian Armenian 2,939 11 2,800 8 120 
Maronite 2,382 2 258 2 2,120 
Protestants 826 3 554 -- 269 
Syrian Orthodox 813 2 784 4 23 
Templars 724 -- 697 -- 27 
Lutheran 437 1 110 -- 326 
Presbyterian 361 32 134 4 191 
Syrian Catholic 323 10 189 14 110 
Coptic 297 10 172 19 96 
Armenian Catholic 271 -- 176 10 85 
Abyssinian Church 85 81 -- 4 
Others 208 183 10 15 
Notes: I Listed in descending order by population and taken from Table X11. Christian Population of 
Palestine Showing Members of Different Churches, p. 43 from the 1922 Census in Reports and General 
Abstracts of the Census of 1922, Taken on the 23rd ofOctober, 1922, compiled by J. B. Barron, 
Superintendent of the Census (London, 1922). /2 Omitting villages with less than ten Christians. /2 
Jerusalem-Jaffa Subdistrict. 
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Table A. 3. All Palestine 1922: breakdown of Christian 
population by church and town/village' 
Latin Greek Other Other 
Locality 2 Orthodox Catholics Catholics Armenians Maronites Uniates Anglicans Protestants Others 
Subdistrict of Jerusalem 
Jerusalem 5,915 3,560 278 2,367 45 148 1,279 536 
'Ain Karim -- 237 202 -- 1 7 6 -- 
Al Tur 174 -- 30 -- -- 27 
Selwan -- 16 -- 33 -- 
'Enab 15 1 
Qubailbeh -- 26 -- -- -- 
Subdistrict of Ramallah 
Ramallah 2,162 332 144 -- 211 
'Abud 335 41 -- 26 
'Ain'Arik 144 56 -- 
Al Bireh 61 3 -- 
Bair Zeit 399 253 -- 125 
Jefila 300 118 27 2 
Al Taibeh 643 249 60 -- -- -- 2 -- 
Subdistrict of Bethlehem 
Bethlehem 2,285 2,696 155 150 11 35 74 14 
Bait Jala 2,628 358 4 -- 67 
Bait Sahur 886 348 -- -- 
Urtas 29 11 4 
Subdistrict of Jaffa 
Ja ffa 4,446 865 371 255 194 118 223 326 
Bait Dajani 25 -- 
Sarona -- 202 
Withelma -- -- -- -- -- -- 185 
Subdistrict of Ramleh 
Ramleh 1,226 150 8 12 4 36 -- 
Lydda 921 4 1 -- -- -- 
Rafai -- 13 -- -- 
Bait Jamal 29 24 2 -- 
Dair Latrun -- 34 1 -- 2 -- 
Lydda June 13 14 1 -- 18 
Notes: I Taken from Table XIII-XVI. Christian Population Showing Members of Different Churches-Southern 
District; District of Jerusalem-Jaffa; District of Samaria; Northern District, pp. 44-51 from the 1922 Census in Reports 
and General Abstracts of the Census of 1922, Taken on the 23 rd ofOctober, 1922, compiled by J. B. Barron, 
Superintendent of the Census (London, 1922). /2 Omitting villages with less than ten Christians. 
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Table A. 3. All Palestine 1922: breakdown of Christian 
population by church and town/village (continued)' 
Locality2 Orthodox 
Latin 
Catholics 
Greek 
Catholics Armenians Maronites 
Other 
Uniates Anglicans 
Other 
Protestants Others 
Subdistrict of Nablus 
Nablus 229 96 7 9 196 1 7 
Rafidia 206 44 1 -- 56 1 4 
Nesf Ijbil 50 -- -- 38 -- -- 
Bait Irnrm 15 -- -- 
Burqa 56 41 -- -- 2 -- -- 
Subdistrict of Jenin 
Jenin 39 14 3 1 39 3 9 
Muqibleh 20 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Dr Ghazaleh 14 -- -- 
Zababdeh 83 261 74 
Talfit 19 -- -- 
Kufair 11 
Lajjun 10 
Burqin 12 -- -- -- -- -- 
Subdistrict of Tulkarm 
Tulkarm 139 22 4 1 13 28 
Qalqileh 8 4 -- -- -- -- 1 15 
Subdistrict of Baisan 
Baisan 132 56 7 1 17 -- 
Sirin -- 60 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Subdistrict of Haifa 
Haifa 1,580 999 3,955 73 1,080 120 496 500 60 
Shafa'Amr 42 70 1,054 -- 3 -- 94 -- -- 
'Aballin 410 -- ill -- 7 -- 
Bait Lalun -- 16 -- 95 
Um al-Amad 1 62 
Dalt al-Crml 7 -- 14 -- 
'Asfia 6 6 107 7 -- -- 
Caesarea 6 3 4 14 2 3 
Sabbarin -- 12 -- -- -- -- 
Notes: I Taken from Table XIII-XVI. Christian Population Showing Members of Different Churches-Southern 
District; District of Jerusalem-Jaffa; District of Samaria; Northern District, pp. 44-51 from the 1922 Census in Reports 
and General Abstracts of the Census of 1922, Taken on the 23rd of0clober, 1922, compiled by J. B. Barron, 
Superintendent of the Census (London, 1922). /2 Omitting villages with less than ten Christians. 
352 
Table A. 3. All Palestine 1922: breakdown of Christian 
population by church and town/village (continued)' 
Latin Greek Other Other 
Locality 2 Orthodox Catholics Catholics Armenians Maronites Uniates Anglicans Protestants Others 
Subdistrict of Acre 
Acre 846 71 276 16 46 2 74 13 
Al Bassa 120 1 721 -- -- 8 17 -- 
Al Makr 30 -- 45 -- -- 
Al Judaida 51 -- 45 -- -- 
Kufr Yasif 577 1 6 2 79 
Abou Senan 196 44 4 3 -- 
Yarka 11 3 -- 
Kufr Sumai' 24 -- -- -- 
Tarsheba 53 -- 298 7 
Ma'alia 3 2 424 -- -- 
Fassuta I -- 425 18 
Al Buqai'a 167 48 -- 
Submata -- 43 
Al'Ba'na 207 -- -- 
Al Rameh 474 47 102 
'Arrabeh 4 -- 42 1 
Dair Hanna 109 -- 
Sakhnirn 87 121 -- 
Al Berweh 67 -- -- 5 
Al Damun -- 40 -- -- 
Sha'ab 15 -- 25 
Subdistrict of Nazareth 
Nazareth 2,054 1,165 995 7 200 58 297 83 35 
Ma'alul 250 -- - -- -- -- -- -- -- 
'Aff-uleh 61 -- I -- 
Mujaidel 150 33 2 7 
Yafa 168 112 108 12 
Jenj ar 31 13 -- -- 
Al-Raineh 203 87 101 32 
Kufr Kenna 264 82 137 20 
Tur'an 52 -- 174 -- 
Jabal Tabur 15 11 -- 
Subdistrict of Tiberias 
Tiberias 82 253 14 131 27 40 
'Ailabun 40 271 -- 8 -- -- -- -- 
Mughar -- 436 -- 
Shajara 52 -- -- -- -- 
Samakh 612 22 5 
Tabgha -- 17 -- -- -- 
Notes: I Taken from Table XIII-XV1. Christian Population Showing Members of Different Churches-Southern 
District; District of Jerusalem-Jaffa; District of Samaria; Northern District, pp. 44-51 from the 1922 Census in Reports 
and General Abstracts of the Census of 1922, Taken on the 23d ofOctober, 1922, compiled by J. B. Barron, 
Superintendent of the Census (London, 1922). /2 Omitting villages with less than ten Christians. 
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Table A. 3. All Palestine 1922: breakdown of Christian 
population by church and town/village (continued)' 
Latin Greek Other Other 
Locality 2 Orthodox Catholics Catholics Armenians Maronites Uniates Anglicans Protestants Others 
Subdistrict of Safad 
Safad 48 246 35 14 
Hurfaish - 26 -- -- -- 
Kufr Berim -- 469 
Jish -- -- 112 -- 268 -- -- -- 
Subdistrict of Gaza 
Gaza 593 33 -- 7 -- 10 50 26 
Khan Yunes 23 -- -- -- -- -- 
Majdal 31 2 
Isdud -- II -- -- -- 
Subdistrict of Hebron 
Hebron 22 12 1 88 28 
Subdistrict of Beersheba 
Beersheba 192 8 7 1 21 6 
Subdistrict of Jericho 
Jericho 45 12 13 -- 61 -- 
Dead Sea 24 2 -- -- I -- 
Notes: I Taken from Table XIII-XVI. Christian Population Showing Members of Different Churches-Southern 
District; District of Jerusalem-Jaffa; District of Samaria; Northern District, pp. 44-51 from the 1922 Census in Reports 
and GeneralAbstracts of the Census of1922, Taken on the 23d ofOctober, 1922, compiled by J. B. Barron, 
Superintendent of the Census (London, 1922). /2 Omitting villages with less than ten Christians. 
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Table A. 4. The process of the development of schools 
Since the establishment of the Civil Administration' 
Year Schools' Teachers Boys Girls 
1919-1920 124 
1920-1921 171 408 8,419 2,243 
1921-1922 244 525 13,656 2,786 
1922-1923 311 639 16,606 3,033 
1923-1924 314 672 16,046 3,285 
1924-1925 314 670 15,509 3,655 
Notes: I Taken from Colonial No. 12, Report by His Britannic Majesty's 
Government on the Administration UnderMandale of Palestine and Transfordan for 
the Year 1924, London, HMSO, 1925, p. 32. /2 The numbers of schools include 
training colleges and secondary sections of elementary schools. 
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Table A. 5. Palestine Government employees by 
religion for the period 1920-19211 
Govemate or 
Department 
Senior Staff 
British Palestinian 
Chr. Jews. Chrs. Jews. MUS. 
Junior Staff 
British Palestinian 
Chr. Jews. Chrs. Jews. MUS. 
Beersheba Gov 2 -- -- -- 3 2 2 
Galilee Gov 5 3 1 3 15 4 1 
Gaza Gov 2 2 -- -- 4 2 3 
Jaffa Gov 4 2 1 1 1 12 6 2 
Jerusalem Gov 6 1 3 1 2 2 21 7 -- 
Phoenicia Gov 4 -- 2 2 2 1 13 2 -- 
Samaria Gov 4 1 -- I 1 8 -- 4 
CntrI Administration 2 1 -- -- 3 1 -- -- I 
Secretariat 7 1 -- -- 12 4 10 9 4 
Financial Secretary 2 -- I -- 2 -- 3 -- -- 
Law and Justice 9 2 5 9 39 1 - 20 33 119 
Agricult & Fisheries 6 -- -- 5 5 4 1 17 20 9 
Antiquities 2 -- 2 1 3 -- -- -- -- 
Comnuce & Industry I -- -- -- 1 4 1 1 
Customs 1 7 -- 58 19 22 
Education 3 3 1 6 2 8 
Immgrtion & Travel 3 3 -- 1 10 17 3 
Land Commission 2 -- I -- 2 3 3 
Land Registries 1 2 -- 10 18 31 
Ports and Lights 3 1 4 3 1 
Posts and Telegraphs 12 -- 156 144 56 
Public Custodian -- -- -- -- -- 
Public Health 16 -- 37 6 6 12 1 115 28 37 
Public Security 20 1 5 1 2 5 -- 31 18 7 
Public Works II -- 4 1 4 3 12 39 1 
Revenue 2 7 -- 2 -- -- 58 6 97 
Palestine Railway 21 2 2 -- -- -- 331 126 104 
Stores I -- -- 5 1 6 18 5 
Surveys 2 -- -- I -- -- 
Treasury I1 13 3 37 26 -- 
Total 165 14 82 36 63 76 13 967 553 521 
Notes: I From Appendix H, in Command Paper Number 1499, An Interim Report on the Civil 
Administration ofPalestine, during the period ]'July, 1920-30 th June, 1921, Presented to 
Parliament by Command of His Majesty, August, 192 1, p. 25. 
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